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1. The Global March for Science, and STS
We live in an age that calls into question things that were previously tak-
en for granted. The freedom of science is increasingly put under pressure
internationally – and in Europe. And although science in the 21st century
is as important as never before in view of pressing global challenges such
as climate change, preservation of biodiversity, or combating infectious
disease, there is a sense that fact-based knowledge is questioned more and
more. This is unacceptable in the name of science as well as in the name
of civil societies. We bear the responsibility. The March for Science is an
opportunity to make this visible.
Prof. Martin Stratmann, President of the Max Planck Society
March for Science, Munich, April 2017.1
On 22 April 2017, scientists took to the streets in Silicon Valley, a symbol for
leading-edge science and technology. They joined protestors in more than
five hundred cities across the world on this day to participate in the March
for Science. Demonstrating scientists were photographed carrying banners
with slogans that read ‘Science is not Fiction’, ‘Trust Scientific Facts Not
Alternative Facts’, ‘Expert is not a dirty word’, ‘Science is Real’. These catch-
words were repeated in media coverage on the event. The March for Science
made it to newspaper headlines with titles like ‘Scientists to take to the streets
in global march for truth’.2 The venerated scientific journals Science and
Nature, and many reputable scientific institutions and associations such as
1 https ://www.mpg.de/11221750/max-planck-praesident-spricht-beim-muenchner-
march-for-science (author’s translation).
2 This title is taken from an article by Mark Lynas as published in the British news-
paper The Guardian on 17 April 2017.
the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the Ger-
man Science Council, or the Swiss Academy of Arts and Sciences, publicly
endorsed the March for Science.
The idea to hold a protest March for Science is reported to have evolved
from discussions on social network platforms over an initial plan to demon-
strate in Washington D.C. (Ley et al., 2018). Within a very short time, the
idea spread via Reddit, Facebook, and Twitter, and so-called satellite marches
were organized in other cities around the world, linked through an internet
website on the March for Science.
Why did the scientists take to the streets? The organizers of the March
for Science expressed their concern that science and evidence-based policy
were threatened by a loss of public confidence and scientific authority. The
majority of the protestors defended the position that science is a public good,
they believed that science informs responsible government policies and they
supported government investments in science (Ross et al., 2018: 228). Pro-
ponents of the march advocated for an increase in activities in science out-
reach and communication, science education, and scientific literacy as means
to defend science and evidence-based policy (Ross et al., 2018). The march
was to mark the beginnings of a global movement to defend the important
role of science in matters of health, security, economy and government.3
The March for Science was openly declared a political movement. The
political activism was also criticized by other parts the scientific community.
Concerns were raised about potential losses to the status of scientists as
impartial experts, and about possible accusations that scientists are self-inter-
ested opportunists advocating for a cause to get more funding and prestige
(Ross et al., 2018: 228).
In interviews, historians of science pronounced the march an unprece-
dented event in the history of science.4 Indeed, no past event appeared to
match the impressive number of scientists from across the spectrum of dis-
ciplines that took to the streets simultaneously in so many cities. Accord-
ingly, the march was interpreted by the organizers, the media, and the
3 https://www.marchforscience.com/.
4 Chris Mooney. 2017. ‘Historians say the March for Science is “pretty unprecedent-
ed”’ Washington Post, 22 April 2017.
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endorsing scientific institutions as exposing a crisis in the relationship
between science and society. The crisis had to do with the decline of public
trust in science and the rise of ‘post-truth’ politics. In the preceding years,
scientists had been active in citizen science projects, science cafés, partic-
ipatory technology assessments, or public communication initiatives in an
effort to reconfigure the relationship. Still, scientists took to the streets in
April 2017 to demonstrate against the momentous changes that were trans-
forming knowledge, power and truth in society.
Two further Marches for Science have taken place since then, but with
far fewer participants. The sense of anti-science attitudes among the public
and policymakers, and public scepticism about scientific evidence and exper-
tise, however, has anything but diminished. On the contrary, these attitudes
have increasingly come to be linked to recent political developments in
Western liberal democracies, polarized politics and the rise of populism.
There is widespread consensus that the relationship between science and
society is in peril.
Against this background, the March for Science in 2017 raises a number
of interesting questions. Why did these scientists take to the streets rather
than use conventional channels of science advocacy? And why did the event
take place in 2017? What lies behind this apparent loss of public confidence
in science? Why is scientific knowledge seen to be losing authority?
Figure 1: Map showing the locations of the March for Science in 2017.
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The relationship between science and society has been studied by the
academic field of Science & Technology Studies (STS) since the late 1960s
and early 1970s. STS draws from a variety of disciplines, theories and
approaches to study the advancement of science and technology and their
interaction with the many spheres of social life. In the words of the most
recent Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, STS ‘investigates the
institutions, practices, meanings, and outcomes of science and technology
and their multiple entanglements with the worlds people inhabit, their lives,
and their values’ (Felt et al., 2018: 1). Over the past fifty years, STS has
gained a rightful place in academia and has assembled analytical and theoret-
ical tools for studying science, technology and society. The March for Science
falls squarely within its analytical scope.
Given the scale of participation in the March for Science in 2017, and
the nature of the issues raised, STS is arguably well suited to turn to for guid-
ance, analysis and interpretation of our questions on the March for Science.
However, the prominent STS journals issued no articles to analyse the event.
Neither has the March emerged as a key topic at the conferences of STS’s two
main professional associations.5 At the same time, however, the issues raised
at this event continue to occupy social and political life in Western liberal
democracies. So why has STS not seized upon the March for Science as a
moment to showcase its analytical competences and potential contribution to
contemporary affairs? Why did the March for Science not make it onto the
research agenda of STS?
The answer lies in a dilemma that has come to haunt the field of STS.
As an academic field, STS has developed and employed analytical tools and
frameworks that have contributed to the demystification of scientific and
technological expertise by disclosing their historical, political, social and oth-
er contingencies. With the advent of ‘post-truth’ politics and the rising public
critique of experts, STS has been blamed ‘for the onset of the post-truth era’
(Sismondo, 2017: 587). The dilemma for STS scholars has to do with their
simultaneous roles as scientific experts and as critics of scientific expertise.
5 The Society for the Social Study of Science (4S) and the European Association for
the Study of Science and Technology (EASST) are considered here as the two main pro-
fessional associations for STS.
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As experts on matters concerning science, technology and society, they
belong to the community of academics who defend the exclusivity and validi-
ty of scientific knowledge. As experts on matters concerning science, tech-
nology and society, however, they also know that the standards and norms
that attribute scientific exclusivity and validity are inherently contingent and
change over time. The March for Science confronts STS with this dilemma.
The crisis in the relationship between science and society, which prompted
scientists to take to the streets and protest against the decline of public trust
in science and ‘post-truth’ politics, has also plunged STS into a crisis of legiti-
macy (Sismondo, 2017; Collins et al., 2018; Fuller, 2016; Jasanoff & Simmet,
2017).
The premise of this book is that the crisis of legitimacy affords an
opportunity for STS to refurbish its analytical toolkit and conceptual frame-
works. The book suggests that one of the reasons why STS has not produced
analyses and interpretations of the March for Science is that this field is not
conceptually equipped to carry out this task. It claims that postcolonial per-
spectives on science, technology and society offer new paths for interpreting
the meaning of the March for Science. This can be achieved by expanding
the current debate in STS on the crisis in the relationship between science
and society beyond the conclusion of a universal decline of public trust in
science and the rise of ‘post-truth’ politics.
The call for postcolonial perspectives in STS might easily be averted by
pointing to the recent international expansion of STS and the concomitant
multiplication of situated knowledges across the globe, as professed in the
latest Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (2017). However, the
alleged international expansion in geographic terms appears not to translate
into the ‘epistemic landscape’ of STS; the Handbook itself declares that
approximately ninety per cent of the Handbook’s authors are affiliated to
institutions in the United States and Europe, with over two thirds in the
United States and the United Kingdom (Felt et al., 2017). Therefore, refer-
ences to the geographic expansion of STS tells us little about its effect on the
analytical tools and conceptual frameworks in the field of STS.
The argument for postcolonial perspectives in STS is not new but dates
back to the early 1990s. However, postcolonial science studies, or post-
colonial technoscience, has remained an addendum to mainstream STS, one
of numerous approaches that might be pursued in the study of science,
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technology and society, particularly in postcolonial geographical settings.
Rather than a mere addendum, this book argues that the postcolonial per-
spective can contribute to tackling the momentous changes that are currently
transforming knowledge, power and truth in society by revising and expand-
ing the conceptual and analytical toolkit of STS. To put the postcolonial
approach to work, the book proposes a Programme in Science Studies Else-
where. The programme is developed on the basis of an examination of two
seminal books that influenced the formation and course of STS in the mid-
1980s: an in-depth empirical study of the seminal book by Thomas P.
Hughes, Networks of Power. Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930
(1983), and an analysis of the influential book by Steven Shapin and Simon
Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump. Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental
Life (1985).
The study begins with a brief report on STS’s new wave of expansion to
settings beyond Western Europe and North America (Chapter Two). The
chapter also introduces the paradox of the Collective Blind Spot of STS, rais-
es the question of its implications for the recent expansion of the field of STS
and describes the particular postcolonial approach to be employed in this
study. The next chapter applies this approach to Hughes’ study on the his-
tory of electrification in Chicago, Berlin and London, by adding the fourth
example of Johannesburg (Chapter Three). Chapter Four presents a post-
colonial examination of Shapin and Schaffer’s study of experimental practice
in early modern science. The findings of the postcolonial analyses are then
put to work in the Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere which is for-
mulated in Chapter Five. Chapter Six discusses the implications of the post-
colonial analysis for STS, and the last chapter returns to the March for Sci-
ence to draw conclusions from the study for the field of STS (Chapter
Seven).
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2. Science and Technology Studies Goes Global
The topic of this book may be introduced by way of a mental picture. Imag-
ine the historian of technology, Thomas P. Hughes, standing on the fiftieth
floor of the Carlton Centre skyscraper in Johannesburg (also called the ‘Top
of Africa’) enjoying the panoramic view of the city of gold. In its heyday, the
Carlton Centre was the tallest building in the Southern hemisphere and a
symbol of wealth and status. Hughes has just published his celebrated 1983
book, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930. He
had studied the history of electrification in Chicago, Berlin and London, and
presented a model of technological change that would leave an imprint on
subsequent academic studies of technology. What would Thomas P. Hughes
see? What questions would he ask about the history of the electrification of
Johannesburg, inspired by this bird’s eye view?
Looking south beyond the city centre, the landscape reveals the residue
of more than a century of mining along the gold reef outcrop. The remains
of mine dumps effectively display the origins of the city as a gold mining
camp. Gold was discovered in the wider metropolitan area of Johannesburg
(also known as the Witwatersrand) in 1886. Within barely a decade, the
Witwatersrand was producing one-fifth of the world’s gold output. By 1925,
the output from these mines had risen to more than half of the world’s gold
production. Within this time frame, even before the First World War, one of
the world’s largest electric power schemes was built to provide electric power
for the gold mines – before regional power systems were established in Ber-
lin or London.
From his lookout point, Hughes might note that the electricity trans-
mission lines only covered selected residential areas of Johannesburg. In the
mid-1980s, only roughly one third of households in South Africa would have
had access to electricity. The gigantic electricity scheme that had been built
in Johannesburg at the beginning of the twentieth century had led to patterns
of electricity distribution that overlooked the majority of the population.
With his model of technological change in mind, how would Hughes imag-
ine the history of electrification in Johannesburg? How would it relate to his
work on the history of electrification in Chicago, Berlin and London?
Hughes’ seminal book is attributed to the academic field of Science and
Technology Studies (STS). This field emerged in the late 1960s and early
1970s, and over the past fifty years has achieved a legitimate interdisciplinary
position among the contested territories of academic disciplines: journals
and international and national academic associations have been established,
handbooks have been published, university degree courses are offered, and
core literature and themes have been recognized. Hughes’ study of technol-
ogy contributed to shaping this emerging field in the mid-1980s. His model
introduced new concepts to the study of technology that continue to influ-
ence the field of STS today.
The STS researcher who sets out to study the history of electrification in
South Africa is likely to turn to Hughes’ systems model of technological
change for methodical guidance. He or she is also likely to consult other the-
ories of technological change that developed in STS subsequent to Hughes
such as, for example, Actor Network Theory (ANT). However, there is no
getting around Hughes’ history of electrification in Western society as refer-
ence to study the history of electrification in South Africa. Indeed, to omit
Hughes’s study might compromise this scholar’s qualification as a member of
the STS community.
The field of STS has secured a reputable academic position for studying
scientific and technological change. It has become an academic resource that
is consulted to address contemporary problems that concern science, tech-
nology and society. Today, science and technology are still regarded as the
most promising endeavours for finding solutions to the numerous problems
of humankind. At the same time, the rapid pace at which science and tech-
nology penetrate our daily lives gives rise to continual scepticism and criti-
cisms. Over the past few years, there have been increasing calls to pay atten-
tion to the new forces appearing on the global map of scientific and
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technological excellence, which is said to be undergoing a transformation.6
Western European countries have developed new national and international
science and technology policies to respond to these changing international
conditions.7 Likewise, the March for Science in 2017, as an historically
unprecedented event in the history of science, supports the premise that new
forces are currently reshaping the relationship between science, technology
and society.
More than ever, the field of STS is being challenged to help us to under-
stand and respond to these rapidly changing circumstances. Therefore, it is
important to ask how well this field is equipped to deal with these changing
global circumstances. STS scholars might respond by pointing out the
field’s international expansion. New STS communities and initiatives have
been observed to be emerging in various geographic regions such as, for
example, East Asia. STS scholars might also submit that new academic
journals have been founded, new scientific associations have been formed,
and new university courses are being taught in places beyond Europe and
North America.
STS’s growth in numerical terms across geographical territories, how-
ever, tells us little about how well STS is equipped intellectually to cope with
the global challenges described above. Despite its relative success as an aca-
demic field, STS continues to be plagued by a number of problems. As an
example, there are fierce internal battles for epistemic sovereignty and dis-
ciplinary authority over the study of science and technology, despite STS’s
self-declared interdisciplinary disposition. STS’s role in the decline of public
trust in science and ‘post-truth’ politics has also given rise to discussions in
6 This changing political economy of science and technology is typically described by
quantitative indicators for a range of issues including e. g. the emergence of new players
(such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and South Korea); new patterns of
international research investment (particularly in emerging economies); new information
and communication technologies; access to knowledge; new forms of competition (i. e.
from brain drain to brain circulation); new international regulations; and an increasing
number of internationally co-authored scientific publications and mobility of researchers
(e. g. NAS, 2011; EC, 2012; OECD, 2011; Royal Society, 2010; UNESCO, 2010).
7 See, for example, OECD 2005, 2010a, 2010b, 2011 and 2012; European Commis-
sion, 2008 and 2012; and U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 2011.
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the STS community. Furthermore, the silence of STS with regard to the his-
torically unprecedented March for Science, as a manifestation of a crisis
between science and society, suggests that the crisis has also left its mark on
STS as a field of scientific expertise.
Against this background, this book aims to contribute to the develop-
ment of STS by looking more closely at what happens when this field, as an
intellectual programme, goes global. It starts from the assumption that this
project requires attention to be given to one of STS’s predicaments. This pre-
dicament has been noted by various STS scholars but has yet to receive much
attention in the academic debate. Let us call this predicament ‘the paradox’ of
STS, as it has to do with a fundamental contradiction that is implicitly main-
tained in the field. The paradox is likely to haunt any STS scholar standing
on the fiftieth floor of the ‘Top of Africa’ skyscraper in Johannesburg, con-
templating science and technology from this vantage point. He or she will
search the intellectual repertoire of STS for concepts, models, approaches,
theories and methods to make sense of science and technology in this scen-
ery. For the case of electrification, the STS scholar is likely to end up using
the resources of the intellectual traditions of Actor Network Theory (ANT),
Large Technological Systems (LTS), or the Social Construction of Technol-
ogy (SCOT). The paradox enters as soon as this conceptual repertoire is
mobilized.
2.1 The Paradox: STS’s Collective Blind Spot
The academic field of STS has successfully achieved a legitimate standing
among other fields of knowledge. To secure this academic identity, STS
scholars have navigated the obligatory rites of passage that are marked out by
the gatekeepers of knowledge. Fields of knowledge attain academic standing
by presenting a history of intellectual achievements. This intellectual history
is an important proof of the validity of knowledge produced because it has to
stand the test of intellectual independence, untouched by politically, eco-
nomically or socially vested interests. Indeed, it is precisely this detached sta-
tus that makes an academic field trustworthy.
In the case of STS, however, the academic stipulation for intellectual
independence creates a critical dilemma. The field of STS itself has criticized
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the image of the virtuous progression of knowledge as a cumulative intellec-
tual enterprise. It has successfully demonstrated the intricate ways in which
knowledge is intertwined with, and co-constituted by, its specific contexts. In
1997, the parting president of the European Association for the Study of Sci-
ence and Technology (EASST), Aant Elzinga described this paradox :
STS-people are puzzling. They tend to become rather narrow-minded in construct-
ing their own past, positioning themselves programmatically in mostly cognitive
terms, while ignoring their own broader historical and socio-political contextuality. I
guess this is part of the (very much “modern”) game of having to legitimate oneself
in purely professional terms in academe in the fight for respectability and funding
(Elzinga, 1997).
By this act, STS scholars typically ‘tell their own origins story so as to empha-
size the internal development of their history, and to neglect any version of
externalism […] or any social constructionist account’, while they simulta-
neously ‘take for granted the social context of science’. Elzinga then notes the
tendency to regard Thomas Kuhn as the ‘founding father’ of STS and as ‘sin-
gle-handedly opening the doors to the possibility of a fully social account of
science’. He questions this account and insists ‘that attention is paid both to
theories and their historical location’ (Elzinga, 1997).8
8 Elzinga refers to the previous work of Loren Graham and Hilary Rose to make his
point: ‘[…] Loren Graham remarked how scholars in our field have repealed internalism
but when they write their own history in the long term perspective they sometimes point
to J.D. Bernal and even Joseph Needham, and so they play up the event of the History of
Science Congress in London 1931 as very significant. Then they go on to trace an intellec-
tual genealogy from the ideas in Boris Hessen’s benchmark paper to Bernal 1939, Need-
ham, Levy Hyman, and others to the externalism-internalism debate in the 1960s (with
Merton coming in as a target alongside historians like Butterfield) – leaving out all the
activism in and around the key figures from the thirties. Thereafter Kuhn’s The Structure
is usually introduced as a new benchmark. In this reconstruction of the past something
vital is rendered invisible. It is the existence and importance of the Science and its Social
Relations movement of the 1930s and the many science activists in various countries who
took part as committed and reflective intellectuals and scientists in a broader anti-facist
and anti-racist movement of that time. Their concern, shared with Merton’s, was “keeping
science straight”. Hilary Rose for her part has noted in the same way how the “social
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A few years later, Guggenheim and Nowotny (2003) introduced the
notion of the Collective Blind Spot of STS to capture this paradoxical
condition.
Science Studies’ standard genealogy, its academic self-portrait, stands in stark con-
trast to its own intellectual programme in which it has compellingly criticized the
representation of knowledge fields as a cumulative sequence of intellectual achieve-
ments and individual biographies. Indeed, such Whig historiography of science is
diametrically opposed to STS’s canonical argument of co-construction between
research and subject (Guggenheim & Nowotny, 2003: 239).
Guggenheim and Nowonty point out that the Collective Blind Spot of STS
might lead to ‘fateful misconceptions, uncritically favouring the actions of
heroic individuals and promoting a notion of progress as inherent in the
field’ (Guggenheim & Nowotny, 2003: 235–6).
This contradiction places the STS scholar in a paradoxical intellectual
and professional position. Although this paradox has been noted repeatedly,
it has not received much attention. However, it has not been swept under the
carpet; on the contrary, the problem is acknowledged by mainstream STS
scholars. Lynch’s introduction to his edited four volumes on Science and
Technology Studies: Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences ends with an elegy
on STS’s dilemma of progress.
Despite the questioning of the very idea of scientific progress in post-Kuhnian STS,
narratives of progress have been a conspicuous part of the field’s development over
the past several decades. There is no question that STS has become more visible and
institutionally established both within, and to some extent beyond, academia. This
progress – with the tendentious narratives that accompany and celebrate it – faces a
central dilemma. The dilemma is that the standard polemics for promoting a field,
gathering adherents and envisioning future success are endemic to the positive phi-
losophy that STS cut its teeth against (Lynch, 2012: 49).
Incidentally, Lynch forgot about this dilemma and its consequences when he
compiled the texts for the four-volume opus to demarcate the epistemic
turn” in our later history from the late 60s onward too has been reconstructed as an inter-
nalist cognitive genealogy that tends to fix upon Kuhn’ (Elzinga, 1997).
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territories of the field of STS. He also disremembered it in the volume’s intro-
duction which offers an (intellectual) genealogy of STS concepts and
approaches. Thus, the acknowledgement of STS’s paradox only pays intellec-
tual lip service to the problem.
This book assumes that the paradox of STS’s Collective Blind Spot has
implications for the international travels of STS. It claims that postcolonial
perspectives can shed new light on these relations. Before introducing the
postcolonial approach that will be applied in this book, a short profile of STS
is offered below.
2.2 What is STS?
STS is typically introduced as an interdisciplinary academic field with origins
in Western Europe and North America in the late 1960s or early 1970s. The
common assumption underlying the emergence of this field is that science
and technology have to be studied as social activities. In the words of Sergio
Sismondo, ‘the field investigates how scientific knowledge and technological
artefacts are constructed’ (Sismondo, 2010: 11). This section will briefly
sketch the field of STS by recounting the categories and standard narratives
that are typically used to introduce and legitimize the field of STS within
disciplinary academic structures and beyond.
Mainstream descriptions of STS have tended to accentuate an unfolding
intellectual history: a roadmap of evident academic strides marked by schol-
arly achievements and a number of intellectual ‘turns’.9 As already stated by
Elzinga above, the historical roots of STS are typically traced to Thomas S.
Kuhn’s (1962) book on the Structure of Scientific Revolutions.10 Rip describes
Kuhn as ‘something of a godfather to the field’ (Rip, 1999). His book is usu-
ally credited with having instigated this new field of research by integrating
‘historical, sociological and philosophical analysis’ (Rip, 1999), but an earlier
9 See Webster, 1991; Swidler & Arditi, 1994; Edge, 1995; Biagioli, 1999; Collins &
Evans, 2002; Bucchi, 2004; Yearley, 2005; Bauchspies et al., 2006; Sismondo, 2008; Tur-
ner, 2008; or Lynch, 2012.
10 See Restivo, 1987; Rip, 1999; Sismondo, 2008, 2010; Turner, 2008; Martin et al.,
2012; and Lynch, 2012.
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intellectual heritage is often acknowledged: ‘[…] the intellectual imprint of
S&T Studies, and its sense of breaking new ground, becomes recognizable at
that time’ (Rip, 1999).
Other accounts trace STS’s intellectual heritage back beyond the 1960s,11
promote an earlier group of founding fathers,12 or simply refer to earlier
scholars to describe the ‘pre-history’ of STS.13 Although the names and dates
may be a matter of dispute, the standard format for the founding myth of
STS consists of references to a limited number of intellectual forefathers who
have paved the way for the academic progression of STS.14 On the shoulders
11 For example, Felt et al. in their chapter ‘Eine kurze Geschichte der Wissenschafts-
forschung’ refer to Saint-Simon, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels (historischer Materia-
lismus), Max Weber’s Gesellschaftstheorie, Max Scheler & Karl Mannheim (Wissens-
soziologie), Alfred Lotka (Szientometrie), Boris Hessen, Ossowska/Ossowski, Popper/
Polanyi, Bernal, Needham, and Merton (Felt et al., 1995).
12 David Edge’s classic historical account of STS in the introductory chapter to the
second Handbook of Science & Technology Studies in 1995 traces STS’s origins back to the
‘mood of the mid-1960s’ (Edge, 1995: 6). Edge’s history of STS starts out by recalling the
intellectual influence of Derek de Solla Price and his seminal book Little Science, Big
Science 1963, and then proceeds to refer to a line of scholars ranging from John D.
Bernal, Michael Polanyi, and Thomas Kuhn to Robert K. Merton. Stephen Cutcliffe refers
to C.P. Snow as ‘Perhaps the most influential intellectual precursor of the STS movement’
(Cutcliffe, 2000: 7). He considers Snow’s metaphor of ‘two cultures’ to serve as an impor-
tant reference point for the field of STS.
13 The Handbook on Science and Technology Studies (2008) exemplifies this historical
approach to presenting STS. Its first chapter (by Sergio Sismondo) charts the intellectual
emergence of the field from Kuhn’s book. Its second chapter (by Steven Turner) is devo-
ted to ‘The Social Study of Science before Kuhn’. This chapter traces the heritage that led
to the emergence of the field, since, ‘The controversy over Thomas Kuhn’s astonishingly
successful Structure of Scientific Revolutions […] created the conditions for producing
the field that became “science studies”’ (Turner, 2008: 33).
14 This approach to STS history has materialized in introductions to volumes that
compile key texts for the field of STS. Mario Biagioli’s edited Science Studies Reader
(1999) is a case in point. His volume is offered for use ‘as the core text in introductory
courses in science studies at the graduate and undergraduate level’ (Biagioli, 1999: XIV).
His history of STS presents this field’s intellectual achievement. Although he omits from
this edited collection ‘the work of such classic authors as Fleck, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Mer-
ton, Canguilhem, Foucault, Barnes, Bloor, and Bachelard’, he strongly encourages readers
26 2. Science and Technology Studies Goes Global
of these intellectual founding fathers, the subsequent development of the
field is recounted along a few key historical markers, including its inter-
disciplinary approach; the development of research approaches of increasing
sophistication (such as the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), the
Social Construction of Technology (SCOT), the Empirical Programme of
Relativism (EPOR), or Actor Network Theory (ANT) etc.); the identification
of classic essays; its case study focus; its institutional history; and its division
into relativist and policy-oriented camps, etc.
At the most basic level, STS’s history is characterized by its integration
of a variety of disciplinary approaches and recurrent debates on their respec-
tive territories.15 Sismondo’s Introduction to STS describes STS as ‘a dynamic
interdisciplinary field […] the result of the intersection of work by sociolo-
gists, historians, philosophers, anthropologists, and others studying the pro-
cesses and outcomes of science, including medical science, and technology’
(Sismondo, 2010: vii). Cutcliffe (2000) identifies changes in various ‘tradi-
tional disciplinary academic fields’ that prompted ‘historians, sociologists,
and philosophers of both science and technology increasingly [to move]
away from internalist-oriented subdisciplines to progressively more external-
ist or ‘contextual’ interpretations’. (Cutcliffe, 2000: 7).
Another standard trajectory for recounting the history of STS has been
the intellectual development of traditions or subfields of increasing sophisti-
cation (Lynch, 2012; Edge, 1995). In this perspective, the development of
STS maps an increasing scope of inquiry and expertise, ‘[…] starting with
‘to familiarize themselves with this literature as it is very relevant to understanding the
intellectual genealogies of the essays presented here’ (Biagioli, 1999: XVI).
15 For example, the Advanced Introduction to Science Studies by Hess (1997) notes
that, ‘Notwithstanding the growth of interdisciplinarity, the disciplinary divisions remain
strong, and they underlie the organization of this book. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are therefore
organized as introductions to the philosophy of science, the sociology of science, and the
sociology of scientific knowledge. These fields still constitute the major sources of specia-
list terminology and theorizing. The title of chapter 5, “Critical and Cultural Studies of
Science and Technology” is suggestive of my view of where the field is moving. This chap-
ter introduces concepts from a number of overlapping fields: anthropology, critical social
theory, cultural studies, feminist studies, critical technology studies, and the cultural
history of science’ (Hess, 1997: 3).
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scientific knowledge, and expanding to artefacts, methods, materials, obser-
vations, phenomena, classifications, institutions, interests, histories and cul-
tures.’ (Sismondo, 2008: 13). The notion of construction as a central feature
of STS plays a decisive role in this point of view. Indeed, some scholars see
the history of STS as a progressive history of ‘extensions of constructivist
approaches’ (Sismondo, 2008: 17).
The metaphor of constructivism, in its generic form, thus ties together much of STS:
Kuhn’s historiography of Science; the strong program’s rejection of non-naturalist
explanations; ethnographic interest in the stabilization of materials and knowledges;
EPOR’s insistence on the muteness of the objects of study; historical epistemology’s
exploration of even the most apparently basic concepts, methods, and ideals;
SCOT’s observation of the interpretive flexibility of even the most straightforward of
technologies; ANT’s mandate to distribute the agency of technoscience widely: and
the co-productionist attention to simultaneous work on technical and social orders.
[…] Yet the metaphor has enough substance to help distinguish STS from more
general history of science and technology, for the rationalist project of philosophy of
science, from the phenomenological tradition of philosophy of technology, and from
the constraints of institutional sociology of science (Sismondo, 2008: 17).
One more strategy to map STS as an academic field has been seen in the
form of collections of classic essays in STS (examples are Biagioli, 1999 and
Lynch, 2012). Often, these essays follow the case study format, which also is
sometimes referred to as a common empirical feature of STS: ‘Case studies
are the bread and butter of STS. Almost all insights in the field grow out of
them, and researchers and students still turn to articles based on cases to
learn central ideas and to puzzle thought problems. The empirical examples
used in this book point to a number of canonical and useful studies’ (Sis-
mondo, 2010: viii). When, at times, the institutional history of STS is men-
tioned, it usually remains confined to a selected chronology of the dates of
origin of the first STS programmes at universities in the US16 or Europe.
Standard histories of STS typically do not refer to the formative political,
16 ‘Other founding STS programs with interdisciplinary curricular orientations inclu-
ded those at Cornell University (1969), Pennsylvania State University (1968/69), Stanford
University (1970/71), and Lehigh University (1972) […]’ (Cutcliffe, 1989: 422).
28 2. Science and Technology Studies Goes Global
social or economic conditions of the early STS programmes, organizations
and publications.17
An additional typical feature of STS that is mentioned in introductory
texts is its division into two distinct camps or ‘two subcultures – one activist,
the other academic’ (Waks, 1993: 339).18 Fuller (1993) and Fuller and Col-
lier (2004) further characterize STS by designating these camps as the high
and low church tendencies.
‘High Church’ STS tends to be interested in the special epistemic status that science
enjoys vis-à-vis other forms of knowledge. In coming to understand how science
organizes itself internally and projects itself externally, STS began mimicking those
very processes to acquire academic respectability and expert authority. In contrast,
‘Low Church’ STS focuses more on the problems that science has caused and solved
in modern society. From the Low Church standpoint, STS was preoccupied with
proliferating jargon, establishing self-contained citation networks, and solidifying a
canon […]. Both the High Church and Low Church sects of STS like to trace their
origins to the 1960s. Whereas the High Church points to Thomas Kuhn’s The Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions (1970) as the watershed STS text, the Low Church
portrays STS as a response to the disturbing symbiosis that developed between sci-
entific research and the military establishment during the Vietnam War’ (Fuller
2000b) (Fuller and Collier, 2004 [1993], xii).
These two subcultures also point to an alternative perspective on the emer-
gence, identity and purpose of STS, which sees the field as having a dual
heritage that is intellectual and activist. Although some scholars do not count
the policy-oriented stream as a valid part of STS, others acknowledge these
two perspectives but afford the intellectual perspective epistemic sovereignty
over the assimilated activist stances.19 A third group of scholars view STS’s
17 For example, Cutcliffe’s mention of a ‘five-million dollar grant from IBM’ to esta-
blish the Harvard University Program on Technology and Society in 1964, almost stands
out as a breach of taboo (Cutcliffe, 1989: 422 and Cutcliffe, 2000: 10).
18 Quoting Ilerbaig’s contrast (Ilerbaig, J. 1992: the Two STS Sub-Cultures and the
Sociological Revolution. Science, Technology and Society, Vol. 90, pp. 1–5).
19 ‘Parallel to this in the academy, “Science, Technology and Society” became, starting
in the 1970s, the label for a diverse group united by progressive goals and an interest in
science and technology as problematic social institutions. For researchers on Science,
Technology and Society the project of understanding the social nature of science has gen-
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activist origins as constitutive of the field. For example, Aant Elzinga refers
to a co-evolution of intellectual and social dimensions that shaped STS’s her-
itage when he contemplates the forces at play in the establishment of the
European Association for the Study of Science and Technology (EASST)
(Elzinga, 1997). He mentions various social movements in the 1960s and
1970s that involved ‘criticism of science, its uses and its products on the one
hand, but questioning also the very value of instrumental rationality’, such as
‘the anti-imperialist movement of those days, the radical student protest
movements, the environmental movement, and particularly the women’s
movement’. He traces the roots of STS within a broader perspective of move-
ments for the social responsibility of science beyond 1970 to the 1930s and
projects such as setting up the Committee on Science and its Social Relations
(CSSR) under the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) (Elzin-
ga, 1997). In 2003, Michael Guggenheim and Helga Nowotny again empha-
sized the importance of this dual heritage20 and referred to the establishment
of the social sciences in 19th-century Europe as an example of how STS’s
history reflects an already well-known ‘coevolutionary development between
social movements and their subsequent academic integration or appropria-
tion’ (Guggenheim & Nowotny, 2003: 8).21
erally been seen as continuous with the project of promoting a socially responsible science
(ref to Ravetz, Spiegel Rösing Price, Cutcliffe). […] This is the other “STS,” which has
played a major role in Science and Technology Studies, the former being both an antece-
dent of and now a part of the latter’ (Sismondo, 2010: 10).
20 STS in this view grew at least partly out of the broad stream of other political and
social movements of the late sixties and early seventies, as did feminism and the environ-
mental movement (Guggenheim & Nowotny, 2003: 8).
21 Stephen Cutcliffe’s introduction to STS also accentuates the activist roots of STS in
his description of the origins of two early STS programmes at North American univer-
sities: ‘One of the first [programs] was the Science, Technology, and Society program at
Cornell University, which appeared in 1969 at least in part as a response to campus unrest
and the need to develop “interdisciplinary courses at the undergraduate level on topics
relevant to the world’s problems.”’ (Cutcliffe, 2000: 10) and, ‘Another important early
program – the Science, Technology, and Society Program at Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity – emerged out of a “Two Cultures Dialog” begun in 1968/69. It solidified about 1971,
under the influence of the Cornell program. For many years it served as the host institu-
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Overall, however, current introductions to the field adhere to the intel-
lectual historiography that sketches the progressive introduction of scientific
concepts, approaches and theories (e. g., Webster, 1991; Edge, 1995; Biagioli,
1999; Collins & Evans, 2002; Bucchi, 2004; Yearley, 2005; Turner, 2008;
Lynch, 2012). Mainstream accounts of STS tend to overlook in their history
the influence of pioneering scholars who have made significant contributions
to the institutionalization of STS within academia. Standard histories of STS
have favoured the field’s intellectual heritage over its activist or ‘low church’
camp heritage.22 This ‘taming of science studies by its academic context’
(Martin, 1993: 255) feeds into the preservation of the Collective Blind Spot
of STS. The insistence on an intellectual history also affords the field of STS a
sheltered place among European and North American knowledge institu-
tions and disciplines. But what happens when STS goes global?
2.3 Transporting the Collective Blind Spot of STS
This book is concerned with the implications of the Collective Blind Spot of
STS for its development in geographical regions beyond Europe and North
America, henceforth subsumed under the expression ‘the North Atlantic’
(Trouillot, 2002a).23 As mentioned above, the genealogy of STS charts its
intellectual emergence in the North Atlantic, from where it subsequently
spread to other geographical regions.24 Again, Michael Lynch’s introduction
tion for the National Association for Science, Technology and Society’ (Cutcliffe, 2000:
11).
22 Brian Martin noted this omission in an article on ‘The Critique of Science Becomes
Academic’ in 1993: ‘Lack of acknowledgement of radical or activist origins is symptoma-
tic of the process by which academics use the critique of science for professional purposes,
distancing it from working scientists and activists dealing with the impact of science. The
process of academization has seen a move from a critique of science in society to a criti-
que of scientific knowledge and finally to a critique of the knower’ (Martin, 1993: 251).
23 ‘Science and Technology Studies (STS) is a dynamic interdisciplinary field, rapidly
becoming established in North America and Europe’ (Sismondo, 2010: vii).
24 This type of genealogy is described by Stephen Cutcliffe: ‘To assist in carrying out
that mission, numerous STS programs have come into being during the past three deca-
des. While the specific number is not clearly known, and some have fallen along the way-
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to the authoritative four volumes on Science and Technology Studies: Critical
Concepts in the Social Sciences classically reproduces this picture: ‘The geo-
graphical base of the field also broadened as STS programmes and associa-
tions formed in East Asia, India, South America and elsewhere’ (Lynch,
2012: 5).
However, there are alternative perspectives on the genealogy of STS and
its geographic expansion. For example, scholars from postcolonial science
and technology studies have pointed out that scholarly work on science and
technology has long been carried out in other geographical regions, but it has
not found its way into the STS canonical literature (Harding, 1998; McNeil,
200525). Others actually consider the early attempts to join forces to study
science and technology beyond the geographical boundaries of Europe and
North America as one of driving forces for the foundation of the field (Spie-
gel-Rösing & Price, 1977; Elzinga, 1997; Cutcliffe, 2000).
Lynch’s claim that STS has ‘attained a growing international profile in
recent decades’ (Lynch, 2012: 1), however, is not corroborated by the record,
as evidenced by the most recent Handbook of Science and Technology Studies
(2017). The great majority of the STS scholars who defined the epistemic
terrain of the field of STS in the Handbook are associated to institutions in
the United States and Europe. No authors from ‘Australia or Africa’ and only
seven from Asia and South America have contributed to the chapters of the
Handbook (Felt et al., 2017: 15, 16). This skewed geography of the epistemic
side, the number of full-fledged programs in the United States numbers nearly one hun-
dred, with perhaps a similar number in Europe. Equally important are the hundreds of
individual courses and groups of courses, which, while they cannot be considered pro-
grams in the fullest sense, certainly complement the more formally established programs.
Similar program and course development has also take place in Japan, China, Canada,
Australia and several Latin American nations’ (Cutcliffe, 2000: 10).
25 ‘Nevertheless, it is important to register that too often science and technology stu-
dies have lacked or marginalised global perspectives. In origin and focus the field has been
predominantly Eurocentric, influenced by the actors and concerns of Europe and its dia-
sporic communities in North America and Australia. Nevertheless, there have been criti-
cal strains within STS which have highlighted the ‘provincial’ nature of such orientations’
(McNeil, 2005: 106).
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landscape of STS26 raises a number of questions about STS’s specific capacity
to study contemporary global dynamics in science and technology.
The journal of East Asian Science, Technology and Society (EASTS),
established in 2007, offers excellent examples for examining some of these
questions. EASTS ‘aims to bring together East Asian and Western scholars
from the fields of science, technology, and society (STS)’.27 The Journal
‘serves as a gathering place to facilitate the growing efforts of STS networks
from Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, North America, and Europe to foster
an internationally open and inclusive community’.28 In 2008, historian of sci-
ence Warwick Anderson described the establishment of EASTS as a signal
for ‘[…] the emergence of novel sites for STS and the development of a
broader community of scholars’ that ‘provides a guide to the travels of STS
beyond Western Europe and North America’ (Anderson, 2007: 249). At
stake in this enterprise, according to Anderson, was nothing less than ‘to re-
chart the map of STS for the twenty-first century’ (Anderson, 2007: 249).
This image of an emerging field of STS in East Asia provides a good
opportunity to inquire into the effects of STS’s Collective Blind Spot on the
‘travels of STS’ beyond the North Atlantic. Anderson’s vision for a map of
STS symbolizes Elzinga’s paradox: the ‘travels of STS’ beyond the North
Atlantic replicate the archetypal image of scientific fields as composed of dis-
embodied concepts and ideas that can be transported across contexts and
time. The legitimacy of this image has been criticized – and indeed literally
overthrown – by STS itself in recent decades. Nevertheless, Anderson’s
vision of STS expanding on a global scale can be seen to represent main-
stream views. For example, in 2010, the annual meeting of the Society for
26 For example, Ben Martin et al. have analysed the core literature of STS over the past
fifty years to identify the twenty most influential contributions to the field by counting the
average number of citations per year in the Web of Science. The national origin of twelve
of these contributions are the United States, seven are from the UK, three from France
(one author) and two from the Netherlands (Martin et al., 2012: 8). This analysis was
conducted by means of a bibliometric study starting out with five handbooks that have
been published in the field as reference works (Martin et al., 2012: 6).
27 EASTS is sponsored by the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan.
28 The conference was jointly organized by 4S and the Japanese Society for Science and
Technology Studies.
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Social Studies of Science (4S) was held in Asia for the first time, and the
conference was entitled ‘STS in Global Contexts’. The description of the con-
ference reads as follows: ‘4S members will have a chance to experience, inter-
act with and understand the cultural diversity of Asia. Furthermore, holding
4S in Asia opens the door to questions relating to universalities and cultural
differences in STS concepts. This meeting is an example for reconsidering
STS in global contexts as well as strengthening STS network worldwide’.29
Some of the consequences of Elzinga’s paradox of STS are apparent in a
set of questions raised by the scholar Fa-ti Fan in the second issue of the new
EASTS journal: ‘Is East Asia a useful category for science and technology
studies? Is East Asian STS simply the application of existing theories from
the United States or Europe to East Asia? Is its aim simply to produce case
studies modelled on Western scholarship? How can East Asian STS be fruit-
fully distinctive from what is being practiced in the West today?’ (Fan, 2007:
243). In the same issue, the scholar Hideto Nakajima compares the history of
STS in Japan with that in East Asia and concludes that ‘Japanese STS is now
a mixture of European and American STSs’, whereas STS scholars in other
regions in East Asia ‘are under stronger influence, or almost sole dominance,
by American STS’ (Nakajima, 2007: 240).
Fa-ti Fan’s thoughts are significant in the light of the issues raised earlier
about STS’s contribution to the study of global dynamics of science and tech-
nology, and to the March for Science in 2017 in particular. Indeed, they
appear to present a critical stumbling block to practising STS outside of the
North Atlantic. Writing about the joint conference of 4S and EASTS in 2008,
Amit Prasad summarized these problems by formulating his version of STS’s
Collective Blind Spot.
It was, however, striking how often presenters and interjectors […] argued for the
need of STS to travel to such regions without acknowledging that this may perhaps
require a change in STS analytics. It seemed as though STSers, while consistently
analysing the problematic of how science travels as ‘immutable mobiles’, have start-
ed to believe that STS could (or should) do the same (Prasad, 2008: 36).
29 http://www.4sonline.org/meeting/10 /accessed in August 2019.
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2.4 A Postcolonial Lens: Science and Technology as North
Atlantic Universals
We are left to surmise that Fa-ti Fan’s questions cannot be reasonably
answered without first coming to terms with STS’s Collective Blind Spot.
How can these questions be addressed? How can the paradox of the Collec-
tive Blind Spot of STS be tackled? Guggenheim and Nowotny (2003: 8) pro-
pose ‘an assessment of STS in terms of its own standards and criteria and
suggest writing a socio-cultural history of STS that takes into account ques-
tions such as ‘What is the connection between the development and institu-
tionalization of STS and broader economic and political developments? How
did the specific cultural and geographic patterns of STS and its diversity in
orientation and research style develop as they did?’ (Guggenheim & Nowot-
ny, 2003: 7).30 The particular genealogy of STS as a North Atlantic field of
knowledge, however, implies that a socio-cultural history as proposed by
these authors (as important and urgent as it might be for other purposes) is
compelled to remain trapped in the vicious circle of the Collective Blind
Spot: examining STS in terms of its own standards and criteria will not elim-
inate the blind spot because STS is unable to overcome the co-construction
of research and subject.
Anderson’s portrayal of STS’s travels provides a point of entry for this
book to address STS’s Collective Blind Spot. What kind of map does Ander-
son plot when he sees STS travel beyond Western Europe and North Amer-
ica to East Asia? His map plots STS in its standard intellectual genealogy, as
an unfolding of an intellectual history with distinct national footprints that
presents the work of North Atlantic scholars.31 From its origins in Western
30 Additional questions raised by Guggenheim and Nowotny are: ‘Why are there rela-
tively many women in STS as compared to, say, economics, history, or even sociology and
anthropology? What were the factors leading to the establishment of STS units in the
universities of some countries but not in others? What were the relations between STS
and science policy and what has changed, if anything, with the growing importance of EU
research policies? Why did the political strand inside STS undergo a relative decline?’
(Guggenheim & Nowotny, 2003: 7).
31 See Webster, 1991; Edge, 1995; Biagioli, 1999; Collins & Evans, 2002; Bucchi, 2004;
Yearley, 2005; Turner, 2008; Lynch, 2012.
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Europe and North America, the ideas and concepts of STS are seen to be
relocated, translated and assembled in local contexts, such as ‘Asia’.
This book focuses on STS’s reciprocal co-construction of research and
subject to investigate the implications of STS’s Collective Blind Spot on the
field’s global disposition. However, Anderson’s map of STS’s travels beyond
the North Atlantic does not simply chart the passage of an intellectual corpus
of research, such as STS concepts, approaches or theories. It also quietly
monitors the transference of STS’s particular conceptions of its objects of
study, science and technology. STS scholars project the universal validity of
their own intellectual programmes on the global scale even though they bear
particular historical imprints.
Michel-Rolph Trouillot has introduced the phrase North Atlantic uni-
versals to refer to words that project the experiences of the North Atlantic
onto the global stage of history while simultaneously silencing their local
heritages. North Atlantic universals designate a family of words such as
development, progress, democracy and ‘the West’ (Trouillot, 2002a: 220).
Trouillot regards these words as ‘not merely descriptive or referential’
because they do not describe the world but rather offer visions of the world.
However, they are inherently ambiguous and can be seen as ‘analytical
fictions’.
North Atlantic universals are particulars that have gained a degree of universality,
chunks of human history that have become historical standards. They do not
describe the world; they offer visions of the world. They appear to refer to things as
they exist, but because they are rooted in a particular history, they evoke multiple
layers of sensibilities, persuasions, cultural assumptions, and ideological choices tied
to that localized history. They come to us loaded with aesthetic and stylistic sensibil-
ities; religious and philosophical persuasions; cultural assumptions ranging from
what it means to be a human being to the proper relationship between humans and
the natural world; ideological choices ranging from the nature of the political to its
possibilities of transformation. There is no unanimity within the North Atlantic
itself on any of these issues, but there is a shared history of how these issues have
been and should be debated, and these words carry that history. And yet, since they
are projected as universals, they deny their localization, the sensibilities and the his-
tory from which they spring (Trouillot, 2003: 35).
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Incidentally, North Atlantic universals display three additional properties:
they are prescriptive, seductive, and difficult to conceptualize. They are pre-
scriptive ‘inasmuch as they always suggest a correct state of affairs – what is
good, what is just, what is sublime or desirable’ (Trouillot, 2003: 35). They
are seductive, ‘at times even irresistible’, because they have the capacity ‘to
project clarity while remaining ambiguous’ (Trouillot, 2002a: 221). This
capacity, in turn, makes them problematic to conceptualize (Trouillot,
2002a).
North Atlantic universalsmay be studied by mapping two related geogra-
phies, or ‘two complementary spaces’: the geography of imagination and the
geography of management. Whereas the geography of management creates
places, the geography of imagination ‘has to do with the relationship between
place and space’. It necessarily requires a reading of alterity as ‘a referent
outside of itself—a pre- or non-modern in relation to which the modern
takes its full meaning’ (Trouillot, 2002a: 222). Trouillot offers the concept of
‘Elsewhere’ to study this alterity. Elsewhere designates ‘a space of and for the
Other that can be, and often is, imaginary’ (Trouillot, 2002a: 225). He con-
trasts ‘the Here and the Elsewhere, which [premise] one another and [are]
conceived as inseparable’ (Trouillot, 2002a: 222).
Notably, Elsewhere designates a space rather than place, which encom-
passes both the (often imaginary) Other outside and the Other within. This
kind of shift in perspective is effectively described in Marie Louise Pratt’s
analysis of travel writings about encounters with ‘Bushmen’ in Southern
Africa in the 18th century. She claims that this kind of encounter not only
involves a confrontation of Europeans with ‘unfamiliar Others’ but also
involves a confrontation with ‘unfamiliar selves’ (Pratt, 1992: 140) because
they are not explicitly anchored ‘[…] either in an observing self or in a par-
ticular encounter in which contact with the other takes place’ (Pratt, 1992:
140). The travel writings are a mode of ‘Othering’, a normalizing discourse
‘whose work is to codify difference […]’ (Pratt, 1992: 139). Similarly, Stuart
Hall has stated that although the Other appears to be ‘banished to the edge of
the conceptual world, constructed as absolute opposite, negation’, it con-
currently appears at the very centre (Hall, 1992: 221).
The example of Anderson’s map of STS travels beyond Europe and
North America suggests that STS’s designated objects of study, science and
technology, might be regarded as North Atlantic universals in Trouillot’s
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sense. The term North Atlantic universal offers plenty of room for theoretical
specification and empirical exploration, but Trouillot proposes two related
geographies or lenses to study these kinds of words: the geography of man-
agement and the geography of imagination (Trouillot, 2002a).
This book assumes that STS’s objects of study, science and technology,
can be studied as North Atlantic universals through the two related lenses of
the geography of management and the geography of imagination, and that
this analysis will deliver new insights into STS’s co-construction of research
and subject. This study hypothesizes that by using Trouillot’s lenses to exam-
ine case studies of key intellectual contributions to the field of STS, we can
gain the empirical scope to develop new concepts to address STS’s Collective
Blind Spot. In their guise as North Atlantic universals, technology and sci-
ence silence their particular histories and origins, and set standards of admis-
sion at the entry gates to the world stage of technology and science. This
book is interested in three implications of these properties of STS’s objects of
study: their effects on STS’s co-constructed body of research, concepts, meth-
ods and theories; the consequences for their global travels beyond the North
Atlantic; and their connection to STS’s Collective Blind Spot.
In other words, this book does not address STS’ Collective Blind Spot by
composing its socio-cultural history; rather, it sets out to explore STS’s co-
construction of research and subject further through Trouillot’s postcolonial
notion of the North Atlantic universal. The co-construction of STS’s partic-
ular conceptions of science and technology and the field’s intellectual prod-
ucts will be examined by means of two seminal books: Networks of Power:
Electrification in Western Society 1880–1930 (1983) by Thomas Hughes, and
Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life by
Shapin and Schaffer (2001 [1985]). The geographies of management and
imagination will be employed to analyse both books, so they need to be
specified in more detail. Trouillot’s description of these notions is converted
into a number of key questions to guide the inquiry (see Table 1).
It is important to qualify the nature and purpose of the postcolonial
approach employed in this study, lest it be assigned to some radical anti-STS
programme. Much STS work undertakes empirical research to test and fur-
ther develop the canonical conceptual landscape of STS. This book under-
takes a journey to critically consider this conceptual landscape. Its purpose is
not to disprove the brilliant work of Hughes or of Shapin and Schaffer. On
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the contrary, had they not produced such sophisticated intellectual work, a
systematic study would not have been possible. Neither is this book intended
to criticize STS. It seeks to contribute to current issues and the future devel-
opment of this field, which (like any other academic field) has developed in
a specific manner, although many other paths were possible.
STS would likely have looked different today without Hughes’ Networks
of Power or Shapin and Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump. They coined
concepts and approaches that went on to mark some of the central standards
and unique achievements that constitute the field. Some authors have left
stronger imprints than others on the academic standards that have been used
to manage participation in this field of study. This book maintains that it is
the business of STS to critically consider, from time to time, the analytical
tools that define these standards against new historical conditions and pros-
pects. This is particularly important when STS ‘goes global’, as pointed out
by Amit Prasad, ‘[…] we need to explore whether (and along with it also
why) STS needs a retooling of its analytics when it shifts its focus to the
trans-national or global arena’ (Prasad, 2008: 36).
This book also does not aim to undermine the legitimacy of STS’s
empirical body of research, which has applied these concepts and theories.
Geography of management What procedures and institutions of control were elaborated and imple-
mented both at home and abroad?
What is their relationship to the development of world capitalism, which
reorganizes space for explicitly political or economic purposes?
Geography of imagination What ideas and (individual and collective) identities inhabit the geogra-
phy of imagination?
Which two complementary spaces (not places) of the Here and the
Elsewhere (and its Other) have been used continually to recreate the
West?
Geographies of management
and imagination
How are the geographies of management and imagination intertwined,
and what is their relationship? In which ways are they inseparable, and
do they premise each other?
How do the geographies of management and imagination underpin
historicism and the legitimacy of the West as the universal unmarked?
How do the North Atlantic universals of technology and science set the
terms of the debate and restrict the range of possible responses?
Table 1: Key questions for the empirical study of North Atlantic universals with the lenses
of the geographies of management and imagination (based on Trouillot, 1991; 2002b).
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Rather, it seeks to help reshape the conceptual landscape in order to con-
stantly consider the best fit between STS’s body of research, concepts,
approaches and theories on the one hand and the problems STS researchers
are trying to solve on the other hand. In this sense, the conceptual categories
that compose STS’s body of research will be treated as transient categories
that shape historical thinking. The ultimate purpose is to position the field
more strongly as an intellectual field of inquiry within the global social scien-
ces and humanities. This book is not yet another exercise in deconstruction.
Its critical approach is inspired by Yehuda Elkana’s unrelenting question:
‘Are we conceptually equipped to deal with the world?’ Elkana was adamant
that there is no strict separation between theory and practice, because con-
ceptual frameworks are translated by carriers of knowledge of all kinds into
daily reality. Conversely, reality is read through conceptual frameworks.
What remains to us? To admit that we do not have, and never had, all embracing
theories of anything and to look realistically for the best and broadest local theories
that are practically useful, even if among them, for the time being or forever, contra-
dictions prevail. For that we need new concepts and a basic reeducation of our
thinking to a dialectical ability to live with contradictions in our theories; to live
with contradictions in practice we are used to and this constitutes no difficulty, but
to tolerate them in our theoretical frameworks is a radically new ballgame (Elkana,
2000: 18).
Following in Elkana’s footsteps, which draw no strict dividing line between
theory and practice, this book does not begin with a theoretical discussion of
selected STS concepts set against Trouillot’s notion of the North Atlantic uni-
versal. Instead, two influential STS studies on science and technology will be
reconsidered by applying the lens of the North Atlantic universal. The objec-
tive is to revisit the concepts put forward in these STS studies some thirty
years after their introduction and to suggest alternative analytical tools with
which to study science and technology that cut across the conceptual land-
scape that codifies them as North Atlantic universals. Trouillot’s spirit of
investigation sets the tone for this project.
But if the seduction of North Atlantic universals also has to do with their power to
silence their own history, then we need to unearth those silences, the conceptual and
theoretical missing links that make them so attractive (Trouillot, 2003: 36).
40 2. Science and Technology Studies Goes Global
Let us briefly return to the introductory image of Thomas Hughes standing
on the ‘Top of Africa’ skyscraper with a panoramic view of the city of gold,
pondering the history of electrification in Johannesburg. This book assumes
that Thomas Hughes would be wearing his particular scholarly spectacles
with glasses that were fitted for his study of electrification in Western society
– Chicago, Berlin and London. Through these lenses, technology would
come into sight in its guise as a North Atlantic universal, and the history of
electrification in Johannesburg would appear as a short, faulty chapter in the
history of technology transfer to the peripheries of the West. Of interest to
this book, however, is the Blind Spot that has settled on Hughes’ spectacles,
and its subsequent collective survival in the field of STS.
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3. Technological Change and the “Savage Slot”
3.1 Thomas Hughes’ Electrification in Western Society
This chapter offers a postcolonial reading of a book published in 1983 by
Thomas Parker Hughes, an American historian of technology. Hughes’ semi-
nal book Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society 1880–1930
introduced a new approach to the study of technology and is generally
acclaimed as one of the first interdisciplinary studies of technological change
in the scholarly tradition of STS. The book formed part of the emerging new
field of the sociology of technology, which in the mid-1980s started branch-
ing out into various subfields, such as the Social Construction of Technology
(SCOT), Actor Network Theory (ANT) and Large Technological Systems
(LTS). Hughes’ analysis of electrification presented a number of terms and
concepts that fostered these emerging academic debates and influenced the
subsequent academic discourse on technology. For this reason, Hughes’ study
has secured an unchallenged status in standard STS genealogies and features
as one of the foundational texts of the field of STS. As a pioneering inter-
disciplinary book, Hughes’ study also contributed to securing STS-distinct
academic terrain amid the contested territories of disciplinary fields. How-
ever, Hughes’ Networks of Power has repercussions for the study of elec-
trification and technological change beyond the field of STS. It has become a
standard reference across a variety of academic disciplines, such as econom-
ics, sociology, history and philosophy. Leslie Hannah’s review of the book in
1984 accurately predicted that ‘the discussion of electric power systems will
never be the same again’ (Hannah, 1984: 382).
Hughes presented a model that aspired to capture the key agents, ele-
ments and dynamics of technological change. He is credited with having
introduced a number of concepts that still circulate in empirical analysis in
STS, such as large technological systems, the system builder, the reverse
salient, critical problems, technological style and technological momentum.
The object of investigation in Hughes’ history of electrification is the electric
power system. He claimed that the ‘change in configuration of electric power
systems 1880–1930’ constituted the ‘formative years of the history of electric
supply systems’ (Hughes, 1983: 1). Accordingly, his book pursued the ques-
tion: ‘How did the small lighting systems of the 1880s evolve into the region-
al power systems of the 1920s?’ (Hughes, 1983: 2). One of the pioneering
assumptions of Hughes’ investigation into technological change was that the
history of electric power systems extends ‘beyond national borders’ (Hughes,
1983: x). This assumption informed the empirical analysis upon which his
model was based. He undertook a comparative analysis of electrification in
three countries: Germany (Berlin), England (London) and America (Chica-
go). The objective of his book, therefore, was ‘to explain the change in con-
figuration of electric power systems across these three sites during the half-
century between 1880 and 1930’ (Hughes, 1983: 2).
Chicago, Berlin, London – Johannesburg
Hughes’ history of electrification draws upon historical sources on Thomas
Alva Edison’s work and on the electrification in Chicago, Berlin and Lon-
don.32 Hughes’ historical account emphasizes their differences with the
intention of developing an overarching model of technological change that is
valid beyond these specific empirical sites.33 Indeed, his model proceeded to
32 Hughes’ explains his reasons for selecting Germany as follows: ‘I found that the net-
works of evolving technologies often linked Germany with the United States because both
were industrializing rapidly’. Hughes selected England because it ‘often provided a con-
trast to events and trends observed in the other two countries’ (Hughes, 1983: x). His
reasons for restricting the study to three countries were ‘Limitations of time, resources,
and language prevented exploration of the sources pertaining to France, Italy, Sweden, the
Benelux countries, Russia, Japan, and other industrializing regions of the world’ (Hughes,
1983: x).
33 ‘Although the electric power systems described herein were introduced in different
places and reached their plateaus of development at different times, they are related to
one another by the overall model of system evolution that structures this study at the
most general level’ (Hughes, 1983: 14).
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set academic standards, concepts and perspectives that have become ortho-
dox reference points in STS and beyond – both within and outside ‘Western
society’. In fact, it is hardly possible to propose an academic study of elec-
trification without referencing Hughes’ ‘landmark contribution’ (Morton,
2002: 60; see also Kale, 2014; Shamir, 2013; Hausman et al., 2008; Chiko-
wero, 2007; Coppersmith, 2004; Gugerli 1996; Nye, 1992).
This chapter presents a history of electrification in Johannesburg before
1930. Similar to Hughes’ study of electrification in Chicago, London and Ber-
lin, the historical analysis will look for emerging themes. However, rather
than applying Hughes’ model of technological change to identify these
themes, the history will be developed through the analytical lenses of Trouil-
lot’s geography of management and imagination. As indicated in the intro-
duction, technology belongs to the class of words that Trouillot calls North
Atlantic universals, because it creates historical standards by projecting ‘the
North Atlantic experience on a universal scale’. From this perspective, rather
than operating as a descriptive category for historical analysis, Hughes’
notion of electrification advances a technological vision of history. His his-
tory of electrification comes to stand for a particular but shared perspective
on how to stage ‘technology’ in world history.
The geographies of management and imagination offer analytical tools
to investigate the ways in which Hughes’ history of electrification in Western
society has set the terms of the debate. The electrification of Johannesburg, as
a case study located outside Hughes’ bounds of ‘Western society’, allows us to
probe Hughes’ specific calibration of the category ‘electrification’ and the
implications that this calibration has for his model of technological change.
For this purpose, the following chapter will map the themes that emerged in
the history of electrification in Johannesburg against Hughes’ framework for
studying technological change. The purpose of this comparative discussion is
to design an alternative set of concepts for studying technological change.
Through the perspective of this alternative conceptual landscape, we can
then investigate the co-construction of STS and its object of study, and we
can consider some of the implications of STS’s Collective Blind Spot on the
field of STS.
However, we must ask whether Johannesburg qualifies as a case study
for a local history of electrification alongside Chicago, Berlin and London,
which are home to ‘Western society’. Johannesburg is not situated within the
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bounds of this expression. Hughes does not use the term ‘Western society’ to
insist that his model of technological change is only valid within these geo-
graphical boundaries. On the contrary, he refers to the three different styles
of Berlin, Chicago and London to merge their variety into an overall model
of technological change. Hughes extrapolates the conclusions drawn from
the study of these three metropoles to the study of technological change
more generally. The category ‘Western society’ is employed to designate the
sites of origin of electrification, which are the sources and drivers of techno-
logical change and progress. In other words, Hughes applies ‘Western soci-
ety’ to position the West at the beginning of electrification and to contrast it
against its absence in other geographical regions. This strategy establishes the
global scope of his model. The effect of plotting these trajectories of elec-
trification is similar to that of Anderson watching the travels of STS beyond
the North Atlantic. It simultaneously accords the North Atlantic experience
‘analytical value and universal status’ vis-à-vis its residual, which only
appears on the world stage through the projected categories of this master
narrative (Mamdani, 1996; Randeria, 2002: 291).
As previously mentioned, Hughes’ model is regarded as a standard ref-
erence for the study of electrification. Hughes’ history relies on a picture of
technology transfer as the sequential distribution, dissemination, diffusion
and adoption of electrification across countries after its invention and devel-
opment in Thomas Alva Edison’s laboratory in New Jersey. Using just the
chronological measures of this picture, which in Hughes’ narrative begins in
1880, South Africa would qualify as a suitable candidate. Electric lights were
installed in South Africa as early as 1881. Kimberley, the city of diamonds, is
often cited as having installed electric streetlights before of London. Edison
electric lights were first installed in the Cape of Good Hope in 1882.
Some thirty years later, by the eve of the First World War, one of the
largest electric power schemes in the world would be operating in Johannes-
burg. In Renfrew Christie’s words, ‘one of the world’s most sophisticated
energy systems was created […] in a relatively undeveloped part of the Brit-
ish Empire’ (Christie, 1984: 6). This gigantic power scheme was British and
German owned and operated, but the history presented here will show that
this electric power scheme was not simply the consequence of the global
expansion of technology from the West to the Rest. This expansion actually
played an essential role in the process of encoding the universal notion of
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electrification. In other words, the history of electrification in Johannesburg
also shaped the history of electrification in Hughes’ ‘Western society’. This
rather bold claim means that this book has to demonstrate that the history of
electrification in Berlin, Chicago and London might have been different had
it not been for the history of electrification in Johannesburg.
If we consider Johannesburg along with Berlin, Chicago and London in
the early 1880s, a number of differences appear in the character of these case
studies. For example, Johannesburg was only founded in 1886, whereas Ber-
lin and London had already existed for centuries, and Chicago for decades.
Johannesburg was founded as a mining camp in 1886, when gold was dis-
covered on the Witwatersrand. The city is named ‘the place of gold’ in Zulu
(‘Egoli’) and Sotho (‘Gauteng’). Despite its late foundation relative to
Hughes’ case studies, the speed with which Johannesburg grew (driven by the
gold rush) was unprecedented. Within a decade of its founding, the pop-
ulation of Johannesburg exceeded 100,000. From the beginning, this pop-
ulation was cosmopolitan in today’s terms, including a wide variety of people
from Southern Africa, Europe and America.
Hughes was interested in the development of regional systems. The last
phase of his technological systems history ends with the maturity of the
regional power systems of Chicago, Berlin and London in 1930. Therefore,
strictly speaking, Hughes’ unit of study is the metropolitan area in which
regional power systems developed, and not their restricted city centre.
Accordingly, Hughes uses the word ‘Berlin’ to indicate both the ‘old Berlin’,
which encompassed ‘only about twenty-nine square miles’ and the ‘so-called
Greater Berlin, radiating ten miles from the city center’, where its industries
were located (Hughes, 1983: 176–7). Chicago also only acquired regional
system status when it connected its power stations to adjacent municipalities
(Hughes, 1983: 204).34
34 ‘The creation of an all-embracing system of electric light and power for Chicago was
Insull’s principal objective for almost two decades. In the end he reached out beyond the
city and interconnected the Chicago system with suburban companies and then linked
these with neighboring municipalities. The scope of the system became regional’ (Hughes,
1983: 204).
3.1 Thomas Hughes’ Electrification in Western Society 47
For the metropolitan areas in Hughes’ account, maturity was achieved
by developing these regional systems in interaction with the political con-
stituencies of municipalities and other stakeholders. Furthermore, they
expanded incrementally through successive interconnection. In Johannes-
burg, on the contrary, a gigantic regional scheme of electrification was con-
structed within only a few years, just before the First World War. This
scheme was developed outside the scope and powers of local municipalities
or other local stakeholder groups – in fact, Johannesburg only established a
town council in 1897. Electricity for municipal purposes accounted for barely
1% of this power scheme’s total electricity production in 1914.
To follow in Hughes’ footsteps, the unit of analysis for this study is the
wider metropolitan area of Johannesburg. Therefore, the designation ‘Johan-
nesburg’ henceforth refers to the broader area in which the regional power
system was established. This area surrounding the city of Johannesburg is
often referred to as the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area, or the Wit-
watersrand. The Witwatersrand includes the areas referred to as East Rand
and West Rand, which together span a low mountain range that radiates
about 40 miles. For methodological reasons, therefore, Johannesburg and the
Witwatersrand will be used interchangeably in this study. In contrast, the
municipality of Johannesburg will be used to explicitly designate the city
centre.
Within a decade, ‘the gold-reef city’ of Johannesburg ‘had sprouted up
on the veld of the southern Transvaal like an exotic mushroom’ (1895)
(Wheatcroft, 1985: 1). It was located in a territory referred to at the time as
the South African Republic or the Transvaal Republic. This country, however,
should not be confused with the contemporary Republic of South Africa. The
South African Republic designated a geographical territory in Southern Afri-
ca that achieved independence from Great Britain in 1884. It retained this
independent status until after the second Anglo-Boer War in 1901, when it
again became a British colony. A decade later, in 1910, this colony was incor-
porated into the newly formed Union of South Africa, a dominion of the
British Empire. The new country merged the two British Colonies (the Cape
Colony and the Natal Colony), the two Boer Republics (the Orange Free
State and the South African or Transvaal Republic) ‘and one or two African
protectorates or kingdoms’ (Wheatcroft, 1985: 1). At the time of the begin-
nings of electrification in Johannesburg, therefore, ‘South Africa was not
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indeed a “country” in any ordinary sense, scarcely even a geographical entity’
(Wheatcroft, 1985: 1).
Hughes’ Model of Technological Change
Thomas Hughes’ Networks of Power tells the story of ‘the growth of the elec-
trical power system, seen as a long process of technological innovation and
development’ (Barnes, 1994: 309). Hughes’ study of electrification introduces
a systems approach to technological change.35 This approach is framed by
the model of a dynamic technological network and its environment. The net-
work is shaped by internal and external forces as well as by contingencies.
Hughes’ key argument is that ‘technological systems are both socially con-
structed and society shaping’ (Hughes, 1983: 51). His model proposes the
technical system as a unit of study, the system builder as agent of change and
the reverse salient as a key mechanism of growth.36 Technological systems
pursue a common system goal. System builders work at achieving this goal.
One of the primary characteristics of a system builder is the ability to construct or to
force unity from diversity, centralization in the face of pluralism, and coherence
from chaos. This construction often involves the destruction of alternative systems.
System builders in their constructive activity are like ‘heterogeneous engineers’
(Hughes, 1987: 52).
Consequently, Hughes’ conception of technological change maps the evolu-
tion of a sociotechnical system from its formative period until it has reached
‘maturity’ and ‘stability’. Hughes’ study presupposes that ‘the change in con-
figuration of electric power systems during the fifty years from 1880 to 1930
constitute the formative years of the history of electric supply systems’
35 ‘The rationale for undertaking this study of electric power systems was the assump-
tion that the history of all large-scale technology – not only power systems – can be
studied effectively as a history of systems’ (Hughes, 1983: 7).
36 ‘System builders presiding over growth looked for, and corrected, reverse salient in
various parts of the embracing system, both technical and organizational’ (Hughes, 1998:
231).
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(Hughes, 1983: 1).37 A further assumption is that the history of electric pow-
er systems spreads beyond national borders. For this reason, his study is
comparative and focuses on three ‘representative power systems from differ-
ent regions for different phases of the history’ (Hughes, 1983: 14). Hughes’
traces the dissemination of the electric light and central power stations as
well as responses to technical developments in the cities of Chicago, Berlin
and London. Ending in 1930, his book covers a period of 50 years, during
which the regional power systems had ‘matured’ (Hughes, 1982: 461). The
agents engaged in, and the factors influencing, this process comprise engi-
neers, consultants, consulting companies, legislation, local governments, etc.
Although these agents and factors represent a myriad of individual, political
and industrial interests in America, Germany and England, Hughes’ key
statement is that (despite this complexity) these histories of electrification all
have something in common. To achieve this causal commonality, he coins
the phrase ‘sociotechnical system’, which is defined as an encompassing
notion for the area of complexity in question. In this way, respective local
differences in relative influence on the history of electrification can be sub-
sumed and a new order can be achieved.
Hughes’ model presents an evolutionary framework that extends over
time and space. On the one hand, he identifies five phases in the evolution of
the sociotechnical system of electrification. The five phases are distinguished
by ‘themes’, or ‘subthemes’, that emerge in the history of electrification.
These serve as narrative elements for recounting the story of electrifying
Western society. Hughes’ five phases in the development of electrical power
systems are shaped by ‘essential characteristics’ that introduce a number of
‘key themes’ that, according to Hughes, might be viewed as structuring the
development of large technological systems more generally. These phases
37 ‘The half-century from 1880 to 1930 constituted the formative years of the history of
electric supply systems, and from a study of these years one can perceive the ordering,
integrating, coordinating, and systematizing nature of modern human societies. Electric
power systems demanded of their designers, operators, and managers a feel for the purpo-
seful manipulation of things, intellect for the rational analysis of their nature and dyna-
mics, and an ability to deal with the messy economic, political and social vitality of the
production systems that embody the complex objectives of modern men and women’
(Hughes, 1983: 1).
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include: 1) invention and development, 2) technology transfer, 3) system
growth, 4) technological momentum and 5) maturity. Rather than para-
phrasing Hughes’ descriptions of these phases, they are quoted in the table
below (Table 2).
On the other hand, although not theorized explicitly, Hughes dis-
tinguishes three spatial dimensions (local, universal and regional) in the evo-
lution of light and power systems: 1) Edison’s local (direct-current) system,
characterized by homogeneity of supply and load, with similar generators
and components; 2) the universal system, characterized by heterogeneity of
load, with different generators and components; and 3) regional systems (or
utilities) of the 1920s, characterized by increased heterogeneity, different
kinds of turbines, high voltage systems and energy sources. These three spa-
tial dimensions, in turn, come into play through the spread of material tech-
nology.
Hughes’ book contains fifteen chapters. He first describes the invention
and development of Edison’s electric light system from 1878 to 1882. Then,
Hughes dedicates four chapters to introducing the key concepts of his history
of electrification: technology transfer, reverse salient and critical problems,
conflict and resolution, and technological momentum. Thereafter, he devotes
three chapters to recounting the history of electrification in Berlin, Chicago
and London from the late 1880s to 1914. These case studies apply the pre-
viously introduced concepts and cover the three phases of technology trans-
fer, system growth and technological momentum. Next, a chapter is devoted
to the First World War. The last chapters are concerned with the maturity of
regional planned systems and discuss the notions of technological culture
and style.
A quote from Hughes’ introduction to Networks of Power shall set the
tone for the following history of electrification in Johannesburg.
As a historian traditionally trained, I am reluctant to suggest a definitive model for the
evolution of electric power systems. Nevertheless, I have proposed a loosely structured
model because the history I explored was mostly untouched, and I want to provide
some landmarks by which other historians can chart their explorations. I expect my
findings to be revised, my map to be redrawn, and my themes to be redefined as the
archives are explored far more thoroughly in the future (Hughes, 1983: x).
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Hughes’ description of the phases
I In the first phase, the invention and development of a system are considered. The professionals playing
a predominant role during this phase are inventor-entrepreneurs, who differ from ordinary inventors
in that the former preside over a process which extends from the inventive idea through development
to the time when the invented system is ready to be used. Engineers, managers, and financiers also are
involved in this first stage, but they do not preside over the system’s growth until later phases (Hughes,
1983: 14).
II The second phase of the model directs attention to the process of technology transfer from one region
and society to another. The transfer of the Edison electric system from New York City to Berlin and
London is a case in point. The sites are specific, but general observations about the transfer process can
be made. During this phase the agents of change are numerous ; they include inventors, entrepreneurs,
organizers of enterprises, and financiers (Hughes, 1983: 14).
III The essential characteristic of the third phase of the model is system growth. As noted earlier, the
historian is responsible for analyzing growth and analyzing the growth of systems is a particularly
interesting and difficult challenge. The method of growth analysis used in this study involves reverse
salient and critical problems. Because the study unit is a system, the historian finds reverse salient
arising in the dynamics of the system during the uneven growth of its components and hence of the
overall network. In labelling such areas of imbalance ‘reverse salient’, the author has borrowed from
military historians, who delineate those sections of an advancing line, or front, that have fallen back as
‘reverse salients’. […] In the case of a technological system, inventors, engineers, and other pro-
fessionals dedicate their creative and constructive powers to correcting reverse salient so that the
system can function optimally and fulfill system goals (Hughes, 1983: 14).
IV As a system grows, it acquires momentum. The fourth phase of the system model is characterized by
substantial momentum. A system with substantial momentum has mass, velocity, and direction. In the
case of technological systems, as defined in this study, the mass consists of machines, devices, structu-
res, and other physical artifacts in which considerable capital has been invested. The momentum also
arises from the involvement of persons whose professional skills are particularly applicable to the
system. Business concerns, government agencies, professional societies, educational institutions, and
other organizations that shape and are shaped by the technical core of the system also add to the
momentum. Taken together, the organizations involved in the system can be spoken of as the system’s
culture. […] A system usually has a direction, or goals (Hughes, 1983: 15).
V The last phase of system history delineated by this study is characterized by a qualitative change in the
nature of the reverse salient and by the rise of financiers and consulting engineers to pre-eminence as
problem solvers. Managers played the leading role during the phase characterized by an increase in
momentum. In the newer phase, which involved planned and evolving regional systems, major reverse
salients became essentially problems of funding extremely large regional systems and clearing political
and legislative ground. Financiers and associated consulting engineers responded effectively to pro-
blems of this kind and scale. The phase was also characterized by an increased capability on the part of
engineers and managers, especially consulting engineers and managers, to plan new systems and the
growth of old ones (Hughes, 1983: 17).
Table 2: The five phases in the development of electrical power systems in Hughes’
Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930.
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Hughes’ landmarks are gratefully adopted as a conceptual point of departure
for exploring the history of electrification in Johannesburg. Nevertheless, we
can read Hughes’ introductory words as an invitation to continually redraw
his map and redefine his themes for understanding technological change.
3.2 Electrification in Johannesburg
Hughes’ history of electrification in Western society assumes that the fifty
years from 1880 to 1930 constitute the formative years in the history of elec-
trification. Histories of electrification in South Africa usually start with the
first electric lights in Kimberley (1881) and Cape Town (1882) and then
quickly move on to the establishment of the first regional power scheme in
Johannesburg between 1905 and 1914 (e. g. Troost & Norman, 1969; Chris-
tie, 1984; Marquard, 2006; Gentle, 2008). The intermediary years have not
yet received much attention in the literature.
The history of electrification in Johannesburg until 1930 can be divided
into five phases. Between 1882 and 1894, the first electric lights were instal-
led and the first private power generators were set up at the mines of Johan-
nesburg. The first two central power stations were built during the sub-
sequent phase (1894 to 1905) to supply power to gold mines. These power
stations were registered as limited companies in London and were owned by
a British company and a German bank, respectively. During the next phase
(1905 to 1914), a gigantic regional power supply scheme was established
within only a few years. This scheme determined the parameters for the
future course of the electrification of Johannesburg and South Africa at large.
It was established by a foreign-owned private company, the Victoria Falls
and Transvaal Power Company (VFTPC), and its subsidiary, the Rand
Mines Power Supply Company. The VFTPC was owned by the British South
Africa Company (BSAC) and a consortium of German banks. The BSAC
was a Royal Chartered Company with a vast set of political, administrative,
mercantile and martial rights, established by the imperialist Cecil Rhodes. In
the final phase (1914 to 1930), electrification was considered from a national
perspective, and national legislation and regulatory institutions were created,
essentially in response to the foreign-owned regional supply system in the
Witwatersrand.
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However, this is only four phases – indeed, the first phase has been left
out in this chronology. The first phase of electrification in Johannesburg took
place before the advent of the material technology in this location. Hughes
locates this phase of invention and development of the electric light and cen-
tral power station in Thomas Edison’s laboratory in New Jersey between
1878 and 1882, far away from Johannesburg and prior to its founding. Nev-
ertheless, this area featured in Edison’s project from the very beginning. This
first phase of electrification in Johannesburg remains invisible in conven-
tional historiography, but it appears when we investigate technology as a
North Atlantic universal.
It is important to emphasize that this study is not a critique of Hughes’
particular historiography, which accentuates certain aspects and eclipses oth-
ers, and applies a selective analysis of historical sources, just like any other
historical account. Hughes’ book was a brilliant contribution to developing
the study of technology in its day. It is only because of Hughes’ meticulous
analysis that this study can refer back to his history of electrification as its
starting point. What follows is neither a claim for historical defects in
Hughes’ history nor an aspiration to better historiography. The next section
also provides a selective historical account that emphasizes certain aspects
and eclipses others. It simply follows a different approach and set of ques-
tions, and refers to other historical sources.
1878 to 1882: Edison the Hedgehog
Hughes locates the beginnings of the history of electrification in Western
society in Thomas Alva Edison’s Menlo Park laboratory in New Jersey, where
Edison invented and developed the incandescent light and the central power
station. From this experimental geographical site, the technology was sub-
sequently transferred to other places in ‘Western society’, such as New York,
Chicago, Berlin and London. Accordingly, Hughes’ model of technological
change distinguishes between a first phase of invention and development and
a second phase of technology transfer.
The first records of Edison lights in South Africa date back to May 1882,
when Edison incandescent lights were fitted in the Hall of the Good Hope
Lodge at Cape Town. The date of their arrival appears to fit well with the
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advent of Hughes’ second phase of technology transfer. In Hughes’model of
technology transfer, the challenge to the historian of electrification is to map
the geographical transfer of electric light and power station technology from
Edison’s laboratory in New Jersey to Johannesburg, South Africa. This map-
ping accords with Trouillot’s notion of the geography of management. Here
we are interested in understanding the procedures and institutions that Edi-
son implemented to develop his electric light and central power station tech-
nology. In this view, adding the case of Johannesburg might be seen as
expanding Hughes’ case studies to regions outside ‘the West’. Hughes’ chro-
nology would remain intact, the first phase of invention and development
would remain confined to the geographic radius of Edison’s activities in New
Jersey and New York. In this model, South Africa only enters the history of
electrification with the material advent of Edison incandescent lights in 1882.
However, if we consider electrification as a North Atlantic universal, the
historian of electrification is challenged to also map Trouillot’s related geog-
raphy of imagination. As the following pages will show, South Africa already
appears on this map before the material arrival of Edison’s electric light and
central power station technology. Edison’s vision of the electric light and cen-
tral power station project from the very beginning included the area known
today as Johannesburg. The idea of technology transfer at a global scale was
not a sequel to but rather a driving force of the project’s invention and devel-
opment. Hughes’ separation of the processes of ‘invention and development’
and ‘technology transfer’ in time and in place, dissolves in this picture. For
this reason, this chapter will consider the relationship of the geographies of
management and imagination of Edison’s electric light and central power
station technology, before its material arrival in South Africa.
Invention and Development: Hughes’ Western Origins of
Electrification
In chronological terms, Hughes’ history of electrification begins in the fall of
1878, when funds for Edison’s electric lighting project had been secured, lab-
oratory equipment was purchased, and Edison ‘employed additional men
whose talents were particularly well suited for the project’ (Hughes, 1983:
23). Concurrently, Edison established the Edison Electric Light Company as a
‘patent-holding enterprise’ in November 1878 (Hughes, 1983: 23). Hughes
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considers the need to ‘acquire funds for additional laboratory equipment’ as
‘a major reason’ for its establishment (Hughes, 1983: 23). A ‘broad array of
expensive machine tools, chemical apparatus, library resources, scientific
instruments and electrical equipment’were acquired (Hughes, 1983: 23).
Hughes states that Edison sought assistance for dealing with the ‘eco-
nomic, legal and legislative factors’ involved in his electric light and central
power station project. In particular, Edison’s attorney, Grosvenor Lowrey
‘guided Edison in matters involving Wall Street, New York City politicians,
and patent applications’ and helped him ‘to fulfill his objectives as an inven-
tor-entrepreneur’ (Hughes, 1983: 29). Indeed, Edison describes Lowrey as
‘one of those who persuaded Edison to turn to electric lighting’ (Hughes,
1983: 30). However, Hughes insists that despite this assistance, Edison
‘played a prominent role in the financial and political scenarios concerning
his inventions’ (Hughes, 1983: 29). With Lowrey’s assistance, Edison found-
ed several companies between 1878 and 1882 and filed a large number of
patents. Hughes also mentions the assistance of the company Drexel, Mor-
gan & Co. of New York in the establishment of these Edison companies. In
Hughes’ history of electrification, Drexel, Morgan & Co. assume the role of
‘[disposing] of Edison’s inventions in England and Europe’ (Hughes, 1983:
48) and their activities are therefore seen as part of Hughes’ phase of technol-
ogy transfer.
Grosvenor P. Lowrey promoted the Edison enterprises not only in the United States
but in England and on the Continent as well. His activities provide an outstanding
example of modes of technology transfer. Lowrey’s associates, members of the great
banking and investment house of Drexel, Morgan and Company, had the financial
resources, the foreign contacts, and the organizational wherewithal to move technol-
ogy across national boundaries. From the start of the Edison electric lighting project,
Lowey anticipated the business that could be developed abroad. In October 1878 he
told Edison that the way to fulfill his dream of building a working laboratory “such
as the world needed and had never seen” was to sell patents, including foreign ones.
It was not unusual in the 1870s for Americans to look abroad for financing and for a
major market for their technology. Before the invention of his electric lighting sys-
tem, for instance, Edison had promoters representing his telegraph and telephone
parents in England and on the Continent. (Hughes, 1983: 47–8).
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By Hughes’ definition, the phase of technology transfer (and Drexel, Morgan
& Co.’s involvement), set in after Edison’s electric light and central power
station technology had been developed. However, the renowned financial
institution Drexel, Morgan & Co. was already involved in the project much
earlier. Edison’s negotiations for legal agreements with Drexel, Morgan & Co.
preceded his electric light and central power station project – indeed, Drexel,
Morgan & Co. made his project possible in the first place. Edison entered
into a contractual agreement with Drexel, Morgan & Co. to exchange control
over Edison’s patents (that were to result from his electric light experiments)
for financial support.38 The Edison Electric Light Company was established
in New York in November 1878 with their assistance.
The early involvement of Drexel, Morgan & Co. in Edison’s electric light
and central power station project is significant. The founding documents for
the Edison Electric Light Company (November 1878), the corresponding
agreements between Edison and Drexel, Morgan & Co. (31 December 1878)
and between Edison and the Edison Electric Light Company (15 November
1878) record the objectives of this involvement. These involved securing pat-
ent rights, establishing companies and organizing exhibitions at a global
scale. Edison’s vision of an electric light and central power station project
from the very beginning aimed at a global empire, including territories that
would later become part of South Africa. By June 1882, a separate company
had already been established to represent Edison’s business interests in this
territory, the Edison Indian and Colonial Electric Company, Ltd. This com-
pany predates Edison’s demonstration of central power station technology at
Pearl Street Power Station in New York in September 1882. In other words,
Edison had secured rights and privileges in territories across the globe before
the technical and economic feasibility of his technology had been ascer-
tained.
38 ‘Financiers J.P. Morgan and Cornelius Vanderbilt arranged a three hundred thousand
dollar investment in the firm, on the condition that Edison assign all patent rights on new
electrical inventions to the company for a period of five years’ (Sanford, 1989: 18).
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The World of Edison Patents and Companies: Countries, Colonies and
Dominions
The purpose of the Edison Electric Light Company was to ‘fund Edison’s
invention, research and development projects and to bring a return on his
investment through the sale or licensing of patents on the system throughout
the world’ (Hughes, 1883: 39, my emphasis). This company granted Edison
financial support in exchange for patent rights. The agreement between Edi-
son and the Edison Electric Light Company, dated 15 November 1878, clear-
ly sets out the scope of the rights that Edison transferred to this company:
‘[…] the Company has been organized with the view of becoming the owner
of and of making, using and vending and licensing others to make, use and
vend within the United States and other countries or colonies hereinafter
mentioned, all the inventions, discoveries, improvements and devices of said
Edison, made or to be made, in or pertaining to Electric Lighting or relating
in any way to the use of electricity for the purposes of power, or of illumina-
tion or heating […]’.39 The subsequent agreement between Edison and the
financial and investment company Drexel, Morgan & Co. on 31 December
1878, makes indirect reference to the area that today falls within the borders
of the Republic of South Africa. This agreement proposed ‘to aid Edison in
obtaining electric lighting, power, and heating patents in Great Britain, Ire-
land, and portions of the dominions and to manage and exhibit the inven-
tions described in the patents’ (Hughes, 1983: 49, 50, my emphasis).
The Edison documents contrast the notion of ‘countries’ against the cat-
egories of ‘colonies’ or the ‘dominions’. In 1878, the term ‘dominions’ was
used to designate territories belonging to the British empire. The British
empire in 1878 included territories that today form part of the Republic of
South Africa, such as the Cape Colony, the Colony of Natal, the Orange Free
State and the Transvaal. In fact, the British had only just annexed the Trans-
vaal Republic in 1877 – the territory in which Johannesburg was established
almost a decade later – and absorbed it as a British Crown Colony into the
British empire.
The term ‘South Africa’ appears in the records of the Edison’s Indian &
Colonial Electric Company, Ltd. in June 1882, established by Edison, Lowrey,
39 Edison papers, [HM780053; TAEM 28:1162], my emphasis.
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and Drexel, Morgan & Co. This company was ‘formed for the purpose of
acquiring and using in the Empire of India, Ceylon, Australasia and South
Africa the rights and privileges of Mr. Thomas Alva Edison, relating to the
application of Electricity or Magnetism as a lighting, heating, or motive agent
(except the application thereof for the purpose only of locomotion on rail-
ways or tramways or common roads, and except also the right of the Cape
Government to use an installation which has been already sent out to them),
and for the other objects specified in the Memorandum of Association
[…]’.40 With the founding of this Company, Edison claimed to have, for a
period of five years, ‘[…] acquired a most important advantage in the right
to patent and use in Australasia, South Africa, India, and Ceylon’.41
However, in June 1882, a country by the name of ‘South Africa’ did not
exist. The expression ‘South Africa’ referred to an indistinct territory under
siege from European imperial powers. Edison’s claim for rights to letters pat-
ent in ‘South Africa’ designated an entire geographic region.42 The legal and
40 Edison Papers, 1882: (D-82–40x); TAEM 63:32, pp.1), my emphasis.
41 Edison Papers, 1882: (D-82–40x); TAEM 63:32, pp.2). Edison appointed Edward
Hibberd Johnson as agent in London and attorney to manage his letters patent in the
‘Colonies’: ‘Letters Patent specified in Schedule A hereto and have also made the applica-
tions for other letters Patent of Letters of Registration in the said Colonies for inventions
of the like-character which are specified in Schedule B hereto. Now I Thomas Alva Edison
have made constituted and appointed and do hereby make constitute and appoint
Edward Hibberd Johnson now residing at 59 Holborn Viaduct London my true and law-
ful Attorney for me and my name place and stead to negotiate with any person or persons
for the sale and disposition of and to sell and dispose of for any sum of money or other
consideration and on any terms and subject to such stipulations and conditions as he may
think fit all my right title and interest in and to all and every of the […] April 5 1882’.
Edison Papers, 1882: [D8239ZAO; TAEM 62: 827].
42 By 1883, a prospectus of some 170 pages produced by the Edison Company for Iso-
lated Lighting in New York City, on ‘The Edison System of Incandescent Electric Lighting
as Applied in Mills, Stemships, Hotels, Theatres, Residences &c.’, provided a ‘List of Edi-
son Isolated Plants in various parts of the world’ which included Canada, Germany, Rus-
sia, France, Belgium, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Holland, Spain, Cuba, Chile. For the
case of the incandescent lights for the House of Assembly at Parliament in Cape Town,
the prospectus lists the Cape of Good Hope, a designation used for the British Colony
until the Union of South Africa in 1910.
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political status of this territory was complex and contested. But despite their
vagueness, the terms ‘South Africa’, ‘colonies’ and ‘dominions’ indicate that
Edison’s electric light and power station technology aimed at establishing
rights and privileges across the whole world as he imagined it. Importantly,
Edison (together with Lowrey and Drexel, Morgan & Co.), imagined this
world scale of rights and privileges before he developed the technology. Their
geography of imagination drove and shaped the design of his project.
Hughes draws a clear line between the phases of invention and develop-
ment. In the former, ‘an imaginary device is functioning in an imaginary
environment’ (Hughes, 1983: 19), whereas in the latter, ‘the invention is no
longer an imaginary device functioning in the inventor’s mind’ (Hughes,
1983: 20). South Africa is a geographical territory distant from Edison’s labo-
ratory in Menlo Park, the site that Hughes identified as the geographical cen-
trepiece for Edison and his group of inventors and technicians. However,
historical documents show that South Africa figured in the geographies of
management and imagination of Edison in ways that shaped the institutions
and procedures that Edison initiated during Hughes’ phase of invention and
development. ‘South Africa’ formed part of the imaginary environment for
Edison’s technology before it had been developed. By Hughes’ own measure,
this means that the territories included in the term ‘South Africa’ influenced
the phase of invention, the first phase of his technological model.
The example of South Africa confirms that Edison’s plans for electric
lighting and central power stations were global in scale from the very begin-
ning. This early global scope indicates that Edison’s technology was not only
devised for America and Europe; it was developed for the whole world as it
existed in the imperial imagination of the time. Edison pursued this global
project by managing three kinds of business: patents, companies and exhibi-
tions. As the following sections will show, these businesses, at the time, were
not simply connected to the architecture of the imperial world, but con-
tributed to its expansion.
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A Global Empire of Technology
Edison had already collaborated with agents in Europe in the late 1870s to
promote his telephone and phonograph patents.43 For his electric light proj-
ect, however, he sought a different league of partners. In this decision, he was
advised by his ‘counsel and business and financial adviser’, attorney Grosve-
nor P. Lowrey (Hughes, 1983: 25).44
Edison did not select Drexel, Morgan & Co. because Lowrey’s offices
were in the same building,45 or because of the company’s solvency, but
because this company was excellently positioned to secure his legal rights
and privileges outside of America. Drexel, Morgan & Co., with offices in
London and Paris, were ideally equipped to provide the kind of support that
Edison needed: ‘not only the financial backing of well-established bankers
but also their negotiating skills and experience with regard to international
agreements and the management of patents in foreign countries’ (Guagnini,
2014: 157). J.P. Morgan was a crucial figure in the ‘far-reaching diffusion of
43 ‘An agreement was signed in 1877 with the Hungarian-born entrepreneur Theodore
Puskas, for the sale of Edison’s patents in Europe (Russia, Spain, Australia, Italy, France
and Belgium); one year later Edison secured the support of Joshua Franklin Bailey, who
had been Elisha Gray’s agent. The two established a collaboration in a joined-up effort to
promote Edison’s interest in Europe, signing most of their correspondence with Edison
and the Edison companies as Puskas & Bailey’ (Guagnini, 2014: 157).
44 According to Misa, ‘[…] it was Grovenor P. Lowrey that steered Edison’s lighting
venture through the more complicated arena of New York City finance and politics. A
leading corporate lawyer, Lowrey numbered Wells Fargo, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,
and Western Union among his clients. He first met Edison in the mid-1860s in connec-
tion with telegraph-patent litigation for Western Union and became his attorney in 1877.
After experiencing the dazzling reception given to a new system of arc lighting in Paris in
1878, Lowrey pressed Edison to focus on electric lighting. While many figures were cla-
mouring for Edison to take up electric lighting, Lowrey arranged financing for his inven-
tive effort from the Vanderbilt family, several Western Union officers, and Drexel, Mor-
gan and Company. The Edison Electric Light Company, initially capitalized at $ 300,000,
was Lowrey’s creation’ (Misa, 2004: 140).
45 This banking house of Drexel, Morgan and Co. had been established in 1871 in New
York by John Pierpont Morgan and Anthony Drexel. The firm was renamed J.P. Morgan
& Co. in 1895, after Drexel’s death.
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incandescent electric lighting that occurred through a collection of compa-
nies and worldwide investments’ (Hausman et al., 2008: 76). He ‘had an
international perspective, had overseas experience, and “vision and imagi-
nation”’ (Hausman et al., 2008: 76). Drexel, Morgan & Co.’s strong ties to
Great Britain46 were especially important for establishing patent rights and
companies in the imperial world: Great Britain was the unchallenged indus-
trial and imperial power. Edison’s choice of investment bankers was a strate-
gic move to promote Edison’s technology on the global stage. Edison’s part-
nership with Drexel, Morgan & Co. was driven by his global aspirations and
cleverly fitted his project into the global political economy of the time.
In Hughes’ history, Edison established a large number of companies in
America with a wide variety of functions and purposes between 1878 and
1883, to promote his electric light and central power station projects, and he
subsequently established companies to represent his overseas business inter-
ests. Accordingly, his first chapter (invention and development) describes
the Edison companies founded in the United States, and selected Edison
companies established abroad are considered in the subsequent chapter on
technology transfer. This storyline serves to substantiate Hughes’ historical
account, in which Edison set up these companies to develop his technological
system, which was subsequently transferred to other countries. This sequen-
tial division, however, is not consistent with the historical record.47 Hughes’
history of electrification only refers to selected Edison companies and leaves
46 Morgan had close ties to London through his father, who had become a partner in
George Peabody’s London investment banking house, and later established J.S. Morgan &
Co (Hausman et al., 2008: 76).
47 For example, in his first chapter, Hughes refers to the incorporation in December
1880 of the Edison Electric Illuminating Company of New York. The purpose of this ‘uti-
lity, or operating, company’ – a ‘licensee of the parent Edison Electric Light company’ –
was to build the ‘central generating power station on Pearly Street in New York City’
(Hughes, 1983: 39). Concurrently, though not mentioned in Hughes’ book, the Edison
Electric Light Company of Europe was incorporated in New York in December 1880. As
regards Edison’s patent rights in Europe, Hughes only mentions the later establishment of
the English Electric Light Company Ltd. in London in March 1882, in the chapter on
Technology Transfer (Hughes, 1983: 54).
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out others. Edison companies were concurrently set up at home and abroad
to secure patent rights at a global scale.
According to Hughes, the technological system requires companies:
Edison wanted to control the manufacture of the various components that
were developed for the system. Furthermore, the steady progression of ‘the
level of experimentation from components to laboratory-scale models of the
system and then to a small, pilot-scale system’ required building ‘a central-
station system that would both function commercially and serve as a demon-
stration for potential franchise purchasers’ (Hughes, 1983: 38). This, in turn,
required the founding of an operating company.
Hughes’ book offers an illustration of the companies involved in ‘Edi-
son’s manufacturing system’ (Hughes, 1983: 41) (see Figure 2). The figure
shows two strands of companies supervised by the Edison Electric Light
Company Incorporated (31 December 1878).48 Examples of companies
include The Edison Electric Illuminating Company of New York (17 Decem-
ber 1880), established to build the Pearl Street Central Station, and the Edi-
son Lamp Works, established in 1880 to operate ‘the world’s first incandes-
cent electric lamp factory at Menlo Park’. Hughes’ text does mention in
passing an agreement that was entered into with Drexel, Morgan & Co. to
manage Edison’s patents in Great Britain and the dominions, only a few
weeks after Edison started concentrating on the electric lighting project in
the fall of 1878. However, his illustration only lists Edison companies estab-
lished in America, and neglects the concurrent founding of Edison compa-
nies overseas.
Edison established several overseas companies relating to electric light
and power between December 1880 and June 1882.49 Drexel, Morgan & Co.
48 The Figure is attributed to Jones, History of the Consolidated Edison System, p.13,
Courtesy of the Consolidated Edison Co. of New York.
49 Edison Electric Light Company of Europe, Ltd. (1880, December 23); Edison Elec-
tric Light Company of Cuba and Porto Rico and Edison Electric Light Company of Hava-
na (1881, June 10); Spanish Colonial Light Company Ltd. (successor of Edison Electric
Light Company of Cuba and Porto Rico) (1882, January); Société Electrique Edison,
France (1882, February 2); Compagnie Continentale Edison, France (1882, February 2);
Société Industrielle et Commerciale Edison, France (1882, February 2); (English) Electric
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managed the overseas business of Edison companies as well as the sub-
sequent constitution in 1883 of companies in Germany, Italy, Switzerland,
and Argentina. Legal arrangements to trade patent rights for equity interests
also existed for Sweden, Norway, Portugal, New Zealand, New South Wales,
Queensland, and Victoria in Australia (Hausman et al., 2011: 77). As a whole,
the Edison companies resembled a multinational enterprise group, the legacy
of which ‘afforded a very strong foundation for the next phases in the interna-
tional diffusion of electrical public utilities’ (Hausman et al., 2011: 80).
The Edison Electric Light Company
The Edison Electric
Illuminating Company of
New York
The Edison Electric
Illuminating Company of
New York
Other Edison Electric
Illuminating Companies in
American cities
The Edison Machine Works
(predecessor of General
Electric Company)
The Edison Electric Tubs
Company
Edison Company for
Isolated Lighting
The Edison Lamp Works
(predecessor of General
Electric Company)
TheThomas Edison
Construction Department
Bergmann & Company
(predecessor of General
Electric Company)
The Edison Manufacturing
Company
Figure 2: Abridged illustration of the companies listed by Hughes to describe Edison’s
manufacturing system (Hughes, 1983: 41).
Light Company Ltd., Great Britain (1882, March 15); Edison’s Indian and Colonial Elec-
tric Company, Great Britain (1882, June 13).
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The large number of Edison companies at home and abroad expresses
the original vision of a global empire of rights and privileges to the electric
light and central power station technology. This global strategy was deter-
mined and fixed in legal agreements before Edison set up his family of com-
panies. Letters between Edison and Lowrey dated before the establishment of
the Edison Electric Light Company offer glimpses of this vision. In a letter
dated October 1878, Lowrey proposes to Edison the services of Drexel, Mor-
gan & Co. This proposal is made in response to an ‘enclosure from the Mex-
ican Consul’ that had been sent to him by Edison, regarding patents in Mex-
ico. Lowrey’s arguments for partnering with Drexel, Morgan & Co. in the
development of the electric light are revealing of the expected benefits of this
association: ‘[Drexel, Morgan & Co.] desire very much to control the light in
all parts of Europe believing that by making one job of it, with headquarters
here, the general result will be more satisfactory in every way’.50 Edison’s
association with Drexel, Morgan & Co. would blend Edison’s project with the
power of international investment banks.
‘You keep, through [Drexel, Morgan & Co.], a controlling hand upon the develop-
ment of the invention on the other side so as to enforce your views and wishes, and
there may arise many occasions upon which you will be very thankful that every-
thing is managed and controlled at the corner of Wall and Broad Streets […]’.51
Accordingly, a few months later, the purpose and scope of the Edison Elec-
tric Light Company of Europe was specified as follows:
The Exploitation Company has for its object the sale of the patents, the granting of
licenses, in a word, the giving of value under whatever form it may be, to the said
50 Edison Papers, Lowrey to Edison, 10. 12. 1878, D7821ZBR; TAEM 18: 226, pp. 1.
51 The international dimension of patents also formed a strategic consideration for
entering into business with Drexel, Morgan & Co.: ‘Second. When you come to the busi-
ness of disposing of the patents, it may be good financial policy not to sell outright, but to
reserve interests in different places, to balance one thing against another, and to draw the
largest result by allowing time. To do this rightly requires an amount of skill and power
which neither you nor I possess, but which may be possessed by a great many bankers
and financial people living here and in Europe’. Edison Papers, Lowrey to Edison, 10. 12.
1878, D7821ZBR; TAEM 18: 226, pp. 2, 3.
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patents, and this according to the conditions hereinafter stipulated. […] The entire
sale of one or several of the patents in any country of Europe, or the giving of a
license for any one of these countries, cannot be made, except by express consent,
given in writing, by the Light Company. […] this contract only has reference to the
following countries: 1st, France and the French Colonies (Paris with its Banlieue,
Versailles included, excepted); 2nd, Belgium; 3rd Denmark; 4th, The German
Empire; 5th, Austria and Hungary; 6th, Russia; 7th, Italy; 8th, Spain’.52
Edison patents had already been taken for the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and Norway.53 Lowrey’s letters reveal
that the issue of the control of the rights and financial profits in overseas
countries actually predated the development of any company associated with
Edison’s incandescent electric light and central power station. The chrono-
logical record suggests that Edison kick-started his electric light and central
power station project by claiming and trading with legal rights to global enti-
tlement and privileges. In the imperial world of the time, these claims and
trades followed a geography of imagination that mapped countries, colonies
and dominions. Edison’s incandescent electric lamp and central power sta-
tion technology and their associated institutions and procedures of control
were tailored concurrently to suit this world geography.
International Exhibitions: Imperial Showcases for Technology
Drexel, Morgan & Co. acquired the rights to promote and exhibit Edison’s
electric light system and associated inventions in an agreement with Edison
dated December 1878. As Hughes notes, this company used international
exhibitions effectively (Hughes, 1983: 50).54 He presents the International
Exhibition of Electricity in Paris of 1881 as ‘an informal but important exam-
52 Edison papers, [HM780053; TAEM 28:1162].
53 Edison papers, [HM780053; TAEM 28:1162].
54 For example, the Edison Electric Light Company (which was financed jointly by the
financier and railroad tycoon Cornelius Vanderbilt and Drexel, Morgan & Co.) financed
the display of the Edison system at the Paris International Electrical Exhibition from
August to November 1881 (Hausman et al., 2008: 77).
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ple of technology transfer’ (Hughes, 1983: 51).55 He points out the ‘enthusi-
astic reception of Edison’s incandescent lamp’ at the exhibitions and its
importance for the publicity and subsequent sale of Edison’s technological
systems and patent rights.
Hughes mentions the impression that Edison’s technology made on ‘sci-
entists, engineers, inventors, financiers and entrepreneurs’ (Hughes, 1983:
50) such as Emil Rathenau, Werner Siemens, Frank Sprague, Oskar von
Miller and A.P. Trotter. The following year, Edison’s technology was exhib-
ited at the Crystal Palace Electrical Exhibition in London, which opened on
14 January 1882. Edison also built two prototype central power stations to
exhibit his technology in New York and London in 1882. In Hughes’ narra-
tive, the Pearl Street Station in New York (September 1882) served as Edi-
son’s model central station technology, which was to be diffused ‘to other
American cities and to the cities of Europe’ (Hughes, 1983: 47). The power
station at Holborn Viaduct in London (April 1882), on the other hand,
marked an important step to transfer Edison’s technology to Europe.56
All of these technology exhibitions were held at sites of great symbolic
imperial power. The Palais de l’Industrie in the Champs-Elysées, Paris, and
the Crystal Palace in London were established by the two major imperial
powers of the 19th century to hold international exhibitions. The Crystal Pal-
ace was built for the First World’s Fairs in 1851, in Hyde Park, London, and
it was later reconstructed at Sydenham Hill. The Palais de l’Industrie was
established for the 1855 Exposition Universelle in Paris. The Holborn Via-
duct, a richly decorated bridge built on iron girders and granite pillars,
opened by Queen Victoria in 1869, was seen as one of London’s Victorian
civil engineering showpieces. Edison’s model central power station in Pearl
Street station was built in New York’s lower Manhattan financial district,
55 ‘The combined effect of motivated young engineers and stimulated investors strea-
ming away from Paris with a favorable impression of Edison and his works is an informal
but important example of technology transfer’ (Hughes, 1983: 51).
56 The technology of both systems was similar; ‘Holborn Viaduct thus had generators
of the same kind as those at New York’s Pearly Street station, and its components – Edi-
son lamps, some underground cable, and other electrical equipment – were similar to
those found in the New York station’ (Hughes, 1983: 55).
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Wall Street, which was close to the offices of Drexel, Morgan & Co. (Sanford,
1989: 19).57
Hughes describes the Crystal Palace Electrical Exhibition in London and
Edison’s central station showpiece at Holborn Viaduct ‘in the heart of Lon-
don’ as forming parts of a ‘master scheme’ of Drexel, Morgan & Co. (Hughes,
1983: 54). From the perspective of the geography of imagination, the success
of this master scheme was not simply a combined result of the inherent per-
suasive power of Edison’s technology and Drexel, Morgan & Co.’s clever
overseas marketing strategy. The sites chosen to exhibit the Edison technol-
ogy were significant. To exhibit Edison’s technology at the Palais de l’Indus-
trie and in the Crystal Palace was an effective step to powerfully position his
electrical enterprise at the centre stage of the prevailing national and imperial
power configurations of the time.
This objective is evident in the correspondence between Edison and
Lowrey in October 1878. Lowrey proposed in a letter to Edison the services
of Drexel, Morgan & Co.
Before this light is introduced anywhere it must be exhibited in various places in
Europe, say, for instance, London, Paris, Vienna and perhaps Berlin. These exhibi-
tions should be under one control […]. To sum the whole matter up, you are now
in the best conceivable position which the circumstances permit. You are introduced
to a new class of men who entertain the highest confidence in your ability and
respect for your character. They possess all the means which may be required; (5)
they live here, speak your own language, share your ideas as to what is honest and
upright; are conveniently at hand to act as partners with you upon every question
touching the preliminary development and subsequent management of what we all
think is to be a great property. They supply precisely everything which you are
57 Hughes also distinguishes the phase of invention and development from the subse-
quent phase, technology transfer, in geographical terms. Edison invented and developed
the electric light system in New York, for New York, and subsequently transferred this
system to other geographical locations and socio-political contexts, where it had to be
adapted to local conditions. For this reason, his chapter on invention and developments
ends with the operation of the Pearl Street station in New York, and the next chapter on
technology transfer recounts the circumstances for the establishment of the Holborn Via-
duct electricity generating station in London, although the power station at Holborn Via-
duct started operation before the power station in Pearl Street.
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lacking, and possess all the European influence or the means of getting such influence,
which can ever be required.58
Lowrey proposed to Edison to exhibit ‘in various places in Europe’, such as
‘London, Paris, Vienna and perhaps Berlin’, before it was introduced ‘any-
where’59 because these cities were the capitals of the great industrial nations
Great Britain, France, Austria and Germany, and Europe was seen as the
centre of the world. Lowrey’s suggestion to Edison mirrors what Timothy
Mitchell refers to as ‘a particular view of geography, in which the world has a
single center, Europe […] in reference to which all other regions are to be
located’ (Mitchell, 2000: 7). Importantly, this staging of Europe at the centre
of the world ‘involves the staging of differences’ in other regions (Mitchell,
2000: 26).
Maps of Technological Expansion: Europe, the Universal Unmarked
The imagined position of Europe at the centre of the world was visually pre-
sented at the International Electrical Exhibition in Paris, at the Palais de l’In-
dustrie in 1881. The Electrical Exhibition attracted about 880,000 visitors to
see the work of 1,786 exhibitors. From the eastern end of the Palais, Siemens
ran an electrical tram to the symbolic Place de la Concorde (Beauachamp,
1997: 161). The venue comprised a grand nave of 182 metres, with galleries
on the upper floor (Beauchamp, 1997: 161), and it was divided into two sec-
tions, one devoted to France and the other to foreign nations (Bright &
Hughes, 1881).60 Three countries occupied the major exhibition area at the
58 Edison Papers, Lowrey to Edison, 10. 12. 1878, D7821ZBR; TAEM 18: 226, my
emphasis.
59 Edison Papers, Lowrey to Edison, 10. 12. 1878, D7821ZBR; TAEM 18: 226, pp. 2.
60 ‘The south side of the nave was given up almost entirely to the dynamo-electric
machines, the steam and gas engines […], the boilers, and the counter-shafting which
were needed for generating the powerful currents of electricity required all over the buil-
ding. The main part of this nave was divided into two equal parts, one of which was
devoted to the French nation, and the other to foreign countries. The galleries and rooms
on the upper story were used for miscellaneous exhibits, but were also largely utilized for
illustrating the applicability of the electric light to domestic purposes’ (Bright & Bright,
2012 [1898]: 591).
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centre of the national section: the United States (Etats-Unis), Great Britain
(Angleterre) and Germany (Allemagne).
International exhibitions in the latter part of the 19th century arranged
things ‘to stand for something larger’ (Mitchell, 1995: 295). They attempted
to reduce the world to a system of objects organized in ways that ‘enabled
them to evoke some larger meaning’ (Mitchell, 1995: 295). These material
objects also displayed industrial and imperial power. The world exhibitions
of the late 19th century represented reality as an exhibit set up for ‘an
observing European gaze surrounded by and yet excluded from the exhibi-
tion’s careful order’ (Mitchell, 1995: 297). The specific arrangement of
nations at the Paris Electrical Exhibition left visitors with no doubt as to the
national powers at the forefront of electrical inventions. Visitors con-
currently experienced displays of imperial and industrial power. This geog-
raphy of countries replicated the world map of countries and colonies, as
already encountered in the foundational records of the Edison companies.
The exhibition imprinted in its visitors images of the Here of Europe and of
its Elsewhere, the Colonies, or Dominions.
The Edison agreements and contracts between 1878 and 1882 pertain-
ing to his electric light and central power station project replicate the geog-
raphy of imagination of a world divided into ‘countries’ and ‘colonies’.61 Oth-
er categories employed in these documents to describe the geographical
scope of the Edison patent rights include ‘continental Europe’; the British
‘dominions’ and ‘tropical countries’; ‘Europe’; ‘the Continent’; and the ‘Colo-
nies’. These categories offer indications about the underlying images of the
world, its geopolitical boundaries and regions, and its business opportunities.
They map the geographical contours of an imperial world. Edison’s electric
light system and its associated companies came into being in a historical era
of imperial powers that were struggling for territorial control of colonies.
Parallel to establishing the Edison companies in Britain and France (respon-
sible for continental Europe), companies were formed for South American
61 The geographical scope of the rights that Edison transferred to the Edison Electric
Light Company in November of 1878 is specified as ‘the United States and other coun-
tries or colonies’. Agreement between Edison and the Edison Electric Light Company
dated 15 November 1878. Edison papers, [HM780053; TAEM 28:1162].
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countries and for the British, Spanish and French colonies. The resulting
geopolitical map of companies reflects the imagined world geography of Edi-
son, his lawyer and his investment banking house. This map followed in the
footsteps of imperial authority and envisioned nothing less than a global
empire of companies and patent rights.62 These maps were essential for the
formation of the Edison companies across the world to secure Edison’s rights
and privileges. As foundational background to the development of Edison’s
electric light and central power stations, these imaginary maps can be seen as
historical drivers for Edison’s electrical technology.
The territorial categories in Edison’s legal documents reveal a specific
feature. In addition to being divided into ‘countries’ and ‘colonies’, the impe-
rial world had a centre: Europe. Lowrey’s correspondence to Edison in
December 1878 to promote an agreement between Edison and Drexel, Mor-
gan & Co. reveals the status of Europe as ‘the universal unmarked’ (Trouillot,
2003). Lowrey considers this company to possess the necessary ‘European
influence, or the means of getting such influence’ required for Edison’s pro-
ject.63 This European influence allowed Edison, Lowrey, and Drexel, Morgan
& Co. to seek and proclaim rights and privileges for patents and companies
in far-away places such as ‘South Africa’.
‘International’ investment law and the electrification of imagined
territories
International patent law only started to take shape when Edison developed
his vision of a global empire for his technology. Europe played a leading role
in the newly emerging international investment law. In 1883, the Paris Con-
vention for the Protection of Industrial Property was held to compare and
62 Hughes acknowledges this global scope of the Edison project in quoting a letter by
Lowrey to Edison, dated 10 October 1878: ‘Lowrey promised in 1878 that the income
from electric-lighting patents would be enough to fulfill one of Edison’s dreams: it would
“Set [him] up forever—[and] enable [him] … to build and formally endow a working
laboratory such as the world needs and has never seen.”’ (Hughes, 1983: 30). However, he
does not further pursue the significance of these global aspirations.
63 Edison Papers, Lowrey to Edison, 10. 12. 1878, D7821ZBR; TAEM 18: 226, my
emphasis.
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discuss national and international law on industrial property. This event
concluded to protect the priority right across national borders. It marks the
beginning of a series of conventions that established contemporary intellec-
tual property rights.64
The legal institution of Edison, Lowrey, and Drexel, Morgan & Co.’s
electric light and central power station projects formed part of this emerging
international investment law. Edison, Lowrey, and Drexel, Morgan & Co.
shared a grandiose sense of entitlement to world technological expansion of
certain rights and privileges that led to the establishment of a diverse family
of companies across the world. Edison’s electric light and central power sta-
tion project was cleverly inserted into the broad imperial power config-
urations of the day, but at the regional and local level of the colonies, their
particular formations were in constant flux. International investment law
emerged as an attempt to tame the complex set of difficulties encountered by
imperial powers in their expansion of rights and privileges across the globe.
Two historical documents illustrate the kind of problems encountered
by Edison’s business in territories that were contested by imperial powers.
The brochure The Edison System of Incandescent Electric Lighting (published
in 1883), containing a ‘List of Edison plants in use in various parts of the
world’; and letters between Edison, Samuel Insull, Alfred Ord Tate (Edison’s
personal secretary) and the attorney’s office of Edison’s Electric Light Com-
pany, Eaton & Lewis, in New York in 1889.
In May 1882, sixty electric lamps were fitted in the Hall of the Good
Hope Lodge at Cape Town, which was used by the House of Assembly at the
time.65 The brochure The Edison System of Incandescent Electric Lighting
published in book format in New York in 1883 mentions the Edison lights
installed at the Cape (Edison, 1883). They are itemized in a ‘List of Edison
64 The Paris Convention, concluded in 1883, was revised at Brussels in 1900, at Wash-
ington in 1911, at The Hague in 1925, at London in 1934, at Lisbon in 1958 and at Stock-
holm in 1967, and was amended in 1979. http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/history.html
/accessed 31.5.15.
65 However, it appears that the Brush arc lamps were initially considered as more vi-
able technological option. The South African ‘Brush’ Electric Light and Power Company,
Ltd. was founded in London in 1882 (with a capital of 100,000 pounds) but was shut
down only three years later.
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plants in use in various parts of the world’. The table lists the city and coun-
try in which these Edison plants are used, among other categories. The place
of installation of electric lights in the House of Assembly is recorded as ‘Cape
Town’ (city) and the ‘Cape of Good Hope’ (country) (Edison, 1883). The
nomenclature used in these registers is revealing: the ‘Cape of Good Hope’
was not a country; it was a self-governing British colony. The Edison patent
rights for this colony were managed by the Edison Indian and Colonial Elec-
tric Company. South Africa during this phase designated a geographical
region and not a geopolitical territory. Edison technology appeared in the
region that was later to be referred to as the country of South Africa at a time
when various European empires claimed, and struggled to expand, their sov-
ereignty over land and territories.
These ambiguous and constantly changing circumstances caused by the
imperial wrangle over territory in ‘South Africa’ are also illustrated by an
order by a company in ‘Johannesburg, South African Republic’ for an Edison
electric power station in 1889. The request required clarification of Edison’s
patent rights in this place. Johannesburg, however, had only been founded as
mining camp three years earlier, in 1886, after the discovery of gold. The
South African Republic, in turn, had only been established in 1884, as one of
two independent Boer republics (the other being the Orange Free State),
when the London Convention was signed after the first Boer War of 1880–81.
The request set going an exchange of letters between Edison, Samuel
Insull, Alfred Ord Tate (Edison’s personal secretary) and the attorney’s office
of Edison’s Electric Light Company, Eaton & Lewis, in New York. In a letter
to Tate, Insull asks:
I have your favour of the 7th enclosing letter from L. Oscar Browning & Co., Johan-
nesburg, South African Republic. Do you know whether this territory is controlled
by the Australasian Company? Will you please look up Mr. Edison’s contracts in
relation to this matter and advise me further? (Samuel Insull to A.O. Tate66).
66 Edison papers, D8943AAV: TAEM 126:718.
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The Edison Indian and Colonial Electric Company (established in 1882) had
been absorbed in 1886 by the Australasian Electric Light Power and Storage
Company, Ltd.67 The attorneys respond:
We cannot ascertain for a certainty whether any patents whatever are granted in the
South African Republic […]. The presumption is that there are no patents granted
in that country.68
As to the question of whether or not the ‘South African Republic’ is covered
by any Edison agreement, Lewis’ letter to Eaton reads:
There are two sides to this question. It may be that the said agreement was meant to
cover only the English colonies, but this is not clearly expressed. The recitals in the
agreement specifically mention the English colonies, but the agreement itself speaks
of South Africa without any restriction. Probably all of South Africa, including what
is now known as the South African Republic (no matter what it was known as in
1883) is covered by the agreement, and belongs to the Australasian Company.69
Why was it difficult to ascertain whether or not Edison patents had been
granted for Johannesburg? The status of this territory in the early years of
electrification was contested. The South African Republic, also referred to as
the Transvaal Republic,70 had been granted independence from Britain after
67 The Edison’s Indian and Colonial Electric Company was succeeded by the Aus-
tralasian Electric Light Power and Storage Company, Ltd. in 1886. The Australian Electric
Light Power and Storage Co. obtained permission to promote the Edison system of elec-
tric lighting in Australasia, Ceylon, India, and South Africa. In October 1889 Edison for-
mally assigned his patent rights to the company. In 1891 these rights were assigned to the
Brush Electrical Engineering Company. Thomas Edison Papers, Rutgers. http://edison.rut
gers.edu/list.htm. /accessed on 18.11.15.
68 Eaton & Lewis, New York to Edison, 26th Dec. 1889 Edison Papers, 1889:
D8941ABL: TAEM 126: 666.
69 Eaton & Lewis, New York to Edison, 26th Dec. 1889 Edison Papers, 1889:
D8941ABL: TAEM 126: 666.
70 The independent republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were founded
by Boer populations who trekked to the interior from the British Cape Colony between
1835 and 1845. These Republics were first recognized by Great Britain but later annexed
in 1877.
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the first Anglo-Boer War of 1880–81. This agreement was specified in the
Pretoria Convention of 1881 and the London Convention of 1884. The South
African Republic was granted sovereignty but with the restriction of British
suzerainty. This decree demanded that its foreign agreements had to be
approved by the British Government. In other words, under the London
Convention, the Boer Republics had to obtain permission from the British
government for any treaty entered into with another country. The category
‘foreign’ also included the indigenous populations and territories in Southern
Africa that had not yet been taken over by European empires.
Hughes’ history claims that Edison separates the question of patent
ownership from ‘the question of his role he played as manager and entrepre-
neur of invention and development’ (Hughes, 1983: 28). The case of South
Africa shows that these questions were connected, because the very idea of
patent rights implies travel, movement and trade. Hughes’ conclusion that
Edison’s electric light and central power station technology was designed for
a particular site and later transferred to, and adapted in, other places is not
supported by the historical record.71 As we have seen, from the very begin-
ning, Edison established an empire of patent rights that reached across the
imperial world – not just ‘the Western world’. In fact, Edison’s technology
participated in the wrangle over territorial rights and privileges in colonial
settings.
The imagined territory of ‘South Africa’ was subsumed into foreign
investment and property rules in the emerging international investment law.
Such processes, according to Trouillot, ‘reorganised space for explicitly polit-
ical or economic purposes’ at a global scale (Trouillot, 2003: 37). For this
reason, they are not captured by analysing the geography of management,
which focuses on place; rather, they only become visible by applying the lens
of the geography of imagination, which considers both the place and space
occupied by the expression ‘South Africa’.
71 ‘Thus, without articulating the intent to do so, Edison and his associates designed a
site-specific technology. Undoubtedly, however, they believed that a system designed for
New York City would function well in the other great cities of the Western world’ (Hugh-
es, 1983: 47, my emphasis).
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Miles identifies a direct connection between colonialism and the expan-
sion of ‘international rules on the protection of foreign-owned property
[that] initially emerged from legal arrangements amongst European nations’
(Miles, 2013: 2). Edison, Lowrey, and Drexel, Morgan & Co.’s global patents
and companies for the electric light and central power station technology
contributed to these emerging international legal rules. However, the emerg-
ing international investment law was not simply impacted by the ‘colonial
encounter’; it was ‘shaped by it at a fundamental level’ (Miles, 2013: 2). The
resulting ‘universal’ and ‘impartial’ international investment mechanisms and
principles ‘essentially comprised protection for investors and obligations for
capital-importing states to facilitate trade and investment’ (Miles, 2013: 19)
and ‘protected only the interests of capital-exporting states, excluding the
host state from the protective sphere of investment rules’ (Miles, 2013: 2).
By ‘broadening their application to non-European nations, foreign invest-
ment and trade protection rules became part of an array of tools used to
further the political and commercial aspirations of European states’ (Miles,
2013: 2). This process involved ‘the calculated, often brutal, use of force,
and the manipulation of legal doctrines to acquire commercial benefits’
(Miles, 2013: 32).
1882 to 1894: Gold and light
[…] the history of electrification in South Africa was shaped by the ener-
gy needs of the nerve centre of industry – the gold-mining industry of the
Witwatersrand
Leonard Gentle, 2009.
This second phase of electrification in Johannesburg covers the years
between the first installed electric lights and plans for the first central power
stations. During this phase, the Johannesburg Lighting Company (later
renamed Johannesburg Gas Company) was founded and built a small gas
power plant for arc street lighting. Its first electric streetlights in Johannes-
burg were powered in June 1892. The diamond mines at Kimberly (and later
the gold mines of Johannesburg) started experimenting with electric light
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and electric motors for various purposes on the surface and underground.72
Electrical equipment was shipped from Britain, America and Germany.73
Johannesburg was established as a mining settlement after the discovery
of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886. A small gas power plant was built on
President Street for arc street lighting in June 1892, five years before Johan-
nesburg was granted a town council (in 1897). The power plant was oper-
ated by the Gas Works of the Johannesburg Lighting Company. The first
consulting engineer to this company was the British Engineer J. Hubert
Davies.74 Davis was also consulted to build the first electric railway in South
Africa at the Crown Reef Gold Mine, which began service in 1894.
There are few references to electric installations in Johannesburg before
1894. Nevertheless, this phase is significant because it created the prime con-
sumer for electricity in Johannesburg for the next 50 years: the gold mining
industry. Within a decade of its founding in 1886, Johannesburg ranked ‘as
one of the commercial centres of the world’ with a ‘white population’ of
102,000 (Oliver et al., 1985: 435). By that time, the value of gold exports
from the Transvaal had surpassed the export of diamonds. By 1894, the value
of gold production in the Transvaal was estimated at £7,800,000, which
amounted to more than one-fifth of the world’s gold production (Hatch &
Chalmers, 1895 [2013]: 5). These developments gave rise to a wave of
72 In 1894, a book published on The Gold Mines of the Rand notes the following uses
of electricity under the rubric ‘Electric Plant’: ‘On most mines the shaft plant includes a
dynamo for electric lighting of underground loading stations and cross-cuts, and of head-
gears, sorting-floors, tramways, etc., on the surface. In some cases also there are gen-
erators for electric transmission of power to underground pumps and winding-engines.
Dynamos in shaft installations are generally run by a simple high-speed engine’ (Hatch &
Chalmers, 1895: 147).
73 The German company Siemens and Halske Co. had already appointed agents in
Southern Africa as early as 1873 to supply telegraph equipment.
74 Davies founded the mechanical and electrical engineering firm Hubert Davies & Co.
in Johannesburg in 1889. Davies was involved in establishing the South African Associa-
tion of Engineers and Architects and is accredited with having presented the first tech-
nical paper before the association (‘Electrical transmission of power’) (Proceedings, 1892–
1894, Vol. 1, pp. 5–13). SA Biographical Database of Southern African Science. http://
www.s2a3.org.za/bio/Biograph_final.php?serial=665 /accessed 12. 5. 2015.
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immigration to the Transvaal and ‘[…] thousands of fortune seekers of every
description made their way to the “Golden Rand”’ (Oliver et al., 1985: 435).
The conditions on the Witwatersrand, however, were harsh. When the gold
fields were discovered, ‘mining and other supplies had to be brought by ox or
mule waggon from that point at very heavy cost’, as the nearest railway was
300 miles away in Kimberly (Hatch & Chalmers, 1895: 244). The particular
structure of the gold mining industry that developed under these conditions
preconfigured the enormous demand for power in Johannesburg in the early
20th century.
However, electricity only gradually came to play an important role in
the rapidly expanding gold mining industry over these years. The increasing
depths of the gold-bearing ore prompted the gold mining companies to
develop new organizational arrangements and extraction techniques. An
important step in this process was the amalgamation of a number of individ-
ual companies into the ‘system of group administration’.75 This term referred
to the unification of individual companies into a smaller number of mining
houses that displayed ‘a high degree of overlapping ownership’ (Oliver &
Sanderson, 1985: 434). This structure saved overhead expenses and afforded
the mining houses easier access to capital. The need to develop new mining
techniques to extract the gold-bearing ore, in turn, led the mines to consider
alternative cost-effective formulas to balance the ratio of manual labour and
machinery. Deeper level mining required larger capital investments. The
group system also allowed the investor ‘to spread his risk by investing in the
75 The group system designates the structure of mining companies where a family of
subsidiary companies amalgamated under one mining house. It determined the basic cor-
porate structure of the gold mining industry in the Transvaal : ‘By 1892 there were 95
members of the Chamber of Mines representing 59 companies on the Witwatersrand and
eight members representing four companies in other districts of the Transvaal. By the end
of the Boer War, more appropriately, South African War (1899–1902), there were as
many as nine such groups, controlling 114 gold mines between them’ (Tshitereke, 2006:
32). Fraser describes this system as follows: ‘[…] the parent or controlling company is a
mining-finance house which usually has ample financial, technical and administrative re-
sources, as well as very considerable mining knowledge and experience. It is a shareholder
in the individual mining companies and is represented on the boards of these companies
by its nominees who ensure that control is maintained’ (Fraser, 1975: 165).
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shares of a group, which had a great portfolio of mines, rather than speculate
in individual companies himself’ (Graham, 1996: 7). By 1894, this system
allowed the gold mining companies to further develop their operations into
deep-level mining.76
Two groups or mining houses played a pioneering role in these develop-
ments and achieved powerful positions in gold mining on the Rand: Wern-
her, Beit and Eckstein, and Consolidated Gold Fields. Both of these groups
later played important roles in developing the gigantic power scheme that
was built in Johannesburg before the First World War. The Wernher, Beit &
Company was established in 1890 as a private finance and investment com-
pany, with headquarters in London. It reconstituted a company head-
quartered in Paris that had been founded in 1871 by the diamond merchant,
Jules Porges. Jules Porges & Company sent its representatives Julius Wernher
and Alfred Beit to Kimberly in 1873. Its Johannesburg business was reor-
ganized into the firm H. Eckstein & Co. in 1889. Wernher, Beit & Company
entertained close associations with financiers in Europe, such as N.M. Roth-
schild and Sons, and had access to capital markets in Europe.
In 1893, Alfred Beit, Hermann Eckstein and Julius Wernher pioneered
the system of Group Administration by forming the Rand Mines Company
Ltd., registered in the Transvaal in 1893 (Fraser, 1975: 165). This mining
house was later referred to as the Corner House, and by the end of the cen-
tury, it extracted about half of the gold produced in the Transvaal. Up until
1902, all of the chairmen of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines (which was
formed in 1889 to represent the interests of the gold mining companies)
were employees of this mining house. The Rand Mines company became a
powerful force in Johannesburg and diversified its operations. For example,
Eckstein was involved in the establishment of the National Bank of South
Africa and the Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd., and in the real
76 ‘At the present moment the Transvaal is undoubtedly one of the most interesting
countries in the world. The enormous wealth which lies buried in the Witwatersrand
Gold Fields has attracted capital, enterprise, and talent, the three factors essential to the
proper development of a country. With marvellous rapidity a great mining industry has
sprung up, the ultimate limits of which it is difficult to assign; and the recognition of the
fact that it will be possible to work the ore-deposits down to great depths, is giving rise to
engineering problems of the greatest moment’ (Hatch & Chalmers, 1895: v).
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estate business in the Transvaal. From the beginning, the Rand Mines com-
pany recruited American engineers, and they later formalized this recruit-
ment process through the services of the Exploration Company in London
(Fraser, 1975).
The gold mining industry depended on manual labour, which was per-
formed by ‘natives’, who numbered approximately 40,000 in the goldfields of
the Witwatersrand in 1894 (Hatch & Chalmers, 1895: 257). The mining
practices carried out by ‘native labourers’ on the Witwatersrand in 1895 were
described as follows:
The classes of work for which [natives] are mainly engaged are: in the mines –
hand-drilling, shovelling, filling, tramming, also assisting machine drillmen, track
layers, timbermen, etc.; on the surface – landing, dumping and filling trucks, tram-
ming, ore-sorting, stoking and assisting enginemen, carrying coal, lumber, etc., pick
and shovel work, assisting millmen, filling and emptying tailing vats, and generally
all work carried on under strict supervision (Hatch & Chalmers, 1895: 253).
The ratio of ‘native labour’ to ton of ore extracted was an important indicator
of the economic performance of gold mining companies: ‘The native labour
employed in hand drilling and in handling rock in stopes varies from 11/4 to
11/2 Kaffirs per ton of ore’ (Hatch & Chalmers, 1895: 131).77
The category of ‘the native’ will be examined in more detail in the next
chapter, but it is important to note the encoding of this category in Johan-
nesburg in these early years of gold mining and electrification. The pop-
ulations subsumed under this category played a central role in the early
experimentation with the use of electricity in the gold mines, as illustrated by
the following quote.
Electricians object to handle over 200 volts underground, although in many instan-
ces currents of 500 and even 700 volts are now employed. Where the shafts are well
timbered and dry no especial difficulty obtains in laying and protecting mains,
77 ‘Although mules are employed underground in some mines, for instance at the City
and Suburban, the labour of tramming generally falls on Kaffirs, one or two being neces-
sary for each truck according to its size […]. A white man or a native at each loading
station is responsible for the tally of trucks according as they come from one reef or ano-
ther, or contain waste rock’ (Hatch & Chalmers, 1895: 132).
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except where a malicious or mischievous ‘boy’may attempt to cut or destroy them,
in which case, if the higher voltages are used, the same boy does not usually repeat
the experiment (Hatch & Chalmers, 1895: 171).
1894 to 1905: Power Stations for the Gold Mines
There are at present over 9,000 white employees at the mines, receiving
wages amounting to annually over 9,000,000 (dollars), and 70,000 Kafirs,
receiving in annual wages nearly 12,500,000 (dollars)
John Hays Hammond, ‘South Africa and its Future’, 1897.
Rough guesses place the number of natives at from two to ten millions,
but, as a matter of fact, no one knows even approximately their number.
This lack of information is due to the roving propensities of the natives.
Here to-day, there to-morrow, it would take a mightier hunter than even
the famed Selous to hunt them all down
Edgar Mels, formerly Editor of the Johannesburg Daily News on ‘The
South African Native’, 1900.
During this phase of electrification in Johannesburg, the first three central
power stations were constructed. All of these power stations were built to
supply electric power to gold mines. The two first central power stations
started running as privately owned companies in 1895 and 1898, financed by
German and British capital respectively. Both companies, the Rand Central
Electric Works Ltd. (RCEW) and the General Electric Power Company Ltd.
(GEPC), were registered in London. Table 3 presents key parameters of these
two companies. Both central power stations would be replaced by the larger
stations of a gigantic power scheme before the beginning of the First World
War. Nevertheless, they determined the sites for this expansion and also
established the major customers for electricity supply in Johannesburg: the
gold mines. In many ways, these foreign-owned and constructed first central
power stations also set the parameters for future electrification in Johannes-
burg.
Hughes’ conception of ‘technology transfer’ does not suffice to capture
the defining conditions for the establishment of Johannesburg’s first two
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power stations. The circumstances that drove the early electrification of
Johannesburg are revealed when the first two power stations are considered
through the lenses of the geographies of management and imagination.
The RCEW was equipped and constructed by the German company Sie-
mens and Halske in 1895 to supply the mines of the German-owned com-
pany Goerz GmbH by way of high-voltage power lines. Goerz GmbH had
been established by the Deutsche Bank in 1893. The second power station,
the GEPC, was established in 1898 as subsidiary of Cecil Rhodes’ Con-
solidated Gold Fields Group to supply electric power to six of its gold mining
companies. Starting in 1902, the largest mining group of the Witwatersrand,
the Eckstein/Rand group of mines, purchased power from the GEPC and
acquired shares in the company (Christie, 1983). The GEPC sourced its
equipment from a variety of British, American and German suppliers under
the management of the British engineer Hubert Davies, who had also been
involved as a consulting engineer for the RCEW. The Transvaal government
granted concessions for the construction and running of these power plants.
The first concession was obtained directly by Siemens and Halske in 1894,
and ceded to the RCEW in 1895. The second concession was obtained by
Simmer and Jack Mines in 1897 and later ceded to the GEPC, a subsidiary of
the Consolidated Gold Fields.
A third power station was established in 1905 at East Rand Proprietary
Mines. In addition, some mining houses set up their own electric power sta-
tions, such as Randfontein, East Rand Proprietary Mines and New Kleinfon-
tein. Several collieries also set up their own power stations (Gentle, 2008: 54).
The first power stations in Johannesburg were not established to provide
municipal power. They were built to supply power to gold mines of the Wit-
watersrand. Municipal electricity continued to be supplied by the Johannes-
burg Gas Company, but this company could not meet the increasing demand
for electricity for lighting the city of Johannesburg, and an agreement was
made to purchase power from the RCEW. By 1903, the city of Johannesburg
was obtaining about half of its power from the RCEW. Johannesburg has
remained the only South African city with piped gas infrastructure.
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Siemens and Halske had been doing business in Southern Africa since the
early 1860s.78 According to Weinberger, both Siemens and Halske and AEG
focused their African expansion efforts on South Africa. When the RCEW
was established in 1895, Siemens and Halske founded the Siemens and
Halske South African Agency, with its headquarters in Johannesburg, to
reorganize their business activities in South Africa ‘more systematically’. In
the same year, the Deutsche Bank, in co-operation with Siemens and Halske,
established the Technical and Commercial Corporation Ltd., a joint agency
to promote their commodity exports (Weinberger, 1975: 59).79 Three years
Rand Central Electric
Works (RCEW)
General Electric Power Company
(GEPC)
Commissioned in: 1895 1898
First power generated in: 1897 1898
Owned by: Deutsche Bank, Goerz GmbH Consolidated Gold Fields Group (subsidia-
ry)
Registered in: London London
Power supplied to: Mines of Goerz GmbH Simmer and Jack Proprietary Mines Ltd.,
Simmer and Jack East Ltd., Simmer and
Jack West Ltd., Knights Deep Ltd., Jupiter
Gold Mining Co. Ltd., Rand Victoria Mines
Ltd. (from 1898)
Eckstein/Rand Mines (from 1902)
Site : Brakpan Driehoek, near Germiston
Original concession: Siemens and Halske, 1894 Simmer and Jack Mines, 1897
Equipment from: Siemens and Halske British, American and German suppliers
Construction: Siemens and Halske Hubert Davies
Table 3: Specifications on the Rand Central Electric Works Ltd. (RCEW) and the General
Electric Power Company Ltd. (GEPC).
78 Siemens and Halske also built the first central power station in South Africa. This
power station was financed by the Cape Colonial Government and was built by the Table
Bay Harbour Board in Cape Town in 1891. Siemens first operated in South Africa in 1860
through its British affiliate Siemens, Halske & Co. (from 1865: Siemens Brothers). It set
up a telegraph line between Cape Town and Simon’s Town.
79 Concurrently, the Dresdner Bank, in co-operation with the A.E.G., established Uni-
ted Engineering Co. Ltd. for the same purpose (Weinberger, 1975: 59).
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later, in August of 1898, the South African agency of Siemens and Halske
was reorganized as a limited company, Siemens Limited Johannesburg.80
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the gold mining industry faced a
crisis in the mid-1890s as the surface outcrops reached groundwater level
(Christie, 1984). The usual gold mining methods no longer worked because
the ore needed to be crushed and chemically dissolved in order to recover the
gold. The gold-bearing stratum dipped south at an angle and the increasing
depths of the gold ore and the different composition of the rock layer
demanded mechanization of the gold mining process. This, in turn, required
different mining equipment and processes, and increased power and labour,
which, in turn, required greater capital investment. The mining companies
responded to these changing conditions by amalgamating to form groups of
companies. Although the overall demand for power increased in this period,
generators driven by reciprocating piston steam engines installed at the
mines continued to supply most of their power until 1905.
At the end of this phase, in 1905, Georg Klingenberg, an electrical engi-
neer and later the director of the Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft (A.E.G.)
in Berlin, indicated that the gold mining industry in the Transvaal included
66 gold mines, handling 9,567,993 tons of ore, with a gold output value of
17,557,350 pounds. The power that these mines’ machines needed was over
200,000 HP, most of which was provided by a steam generating plant, with
only 25,310 HP generated by electrically-driven machines (Klingenberg,
1916: 167–8). These 66 companies, however, included a broad variety of cor-
porate, management and ownership structures, and they were often regis-
tered under the legal authority of foreign sovereign powers. They operated as
finance, exploration and trust companies under the auspices of far-away legal
and political authorities.
80 ‘Robert Howe Gould, the son of an Englishman who had settled in Berlin to exploit
his inventions, […] was thus educated in Berlin and completed his training at the works
of Siemens and Halske. Through its Johannesburg agency, this firm had received large
contracts for electrical installations in the Transvaal, such as the large power-undertaking
at Brakpan, referred to above, the electrical plant at the dynamite factory at Modderfon-
tein, at Pilgrim’s Rest, and so on. Young Gould was sent out to South Africa to work on
these contracts’ (Hahn, 1973: 2428).
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During the decade from 1894 to 1905, the Transvaal Republic under-
went several political changes. The discovery of gold in 1886 had spurred a
tremendous influx of immigrants from Europe and America, which led
European powers to become increasingly interested in gaining territorial
control in Southern Africa. Germany had secured possessions in South West
Africa, Great Britain annexed a large part of Zulu territory in 1887 and Cecil
Rhodes acquired Bechuanaland after 1885. In the following years, Rhodes’
British South Africa Company (BSAC) would also bring the kingdoms of the
Matabele (1889) and the Barotse (1899) under British control.
In the years preceding the establishment of the Union of South Africa in
1910, a fierce battle for territorial sovereignty took place between European
imperial powers and among local populations. In 1894, Johannesburg
belonged to the Republic of South Africa (or the Transvaal), one of two
independent Boer Republics that had been proclaimed in the London Con-
vention of 1984 following the first Boer War in 1880–81. The Cape Colony,
in contrast, belonged to the British Empire. The tensions between the British
and Boer population were fostered by the famous Jameson Raid in 1895,
which attempted to provoke an uprising against the Boer government of Paul
Kruger, president of the Republic from 1883 to 1902. It was instigated by the
British South Africa Company and others to overthrow the Boer Republic of
the Transvaal. These tensions led to the Second Boer War (1899–1902), in
which the two Boer Republics fought against the British. After the war, the
two Boer republics were annexed and became British crown colonies. These
colonies were placed under self-government in 1906, until the establishment
of the Union of South Africa in 1910.81 During this time, several battles were
also fought against indigenous populations in Southern Africa. They were
81 The chief consulting engineer to Consolidated Gold Fields, the American John Hays
Hammond, sketched the following picture of ‘South Africa’ in 1897: ‘The term “South
Africa” designates that part of Africa extending southward from the Zambesi River […]
to Cape L’Agulhas, the southernmost promontory of the continent […]. It embraces
German West Africa; the Portuguese territories under the administration of the Mozam-
bique Company; Rhodesia, south of the Zambesi, under the administration of the British
South Africa (Chartered) Company; the republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free Sta-
te; the British Crown Colonies of the Cape, Natal, Zululand, and Basutoland, and the
British Protectorates of Bechuanaland and Amatongaland’ (Hammond, 1897: 234).
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dispossessed of their land and laws were passed to restrict their rights. The
demand for labour in the Transvaal‘s gold mining industry increased, and
the influx of foreign settlers to the South African Republic continued.
The first two power stations in Johannesburg were built during the final
years of the independent Boer Republic of the Transvaal. They symbolize
two features that would continue to shape the history of electrification in
Johannesburg: they were built for foreign gold mining companies (Goerz
GmbH, mines of the Consolidated Gold Fields group), with capital from
overseas investment enterprises that represented the interests of the imperial
powers of Germany and Great Britain, respectively (Deutsche Bank, Con-
solidated Gold Fields group). The first central power stations in Johannes-
burg were built in the age of the ‘scramble for Africa’, before the First World
War, in which rival imperial European nations claimed sovereignty over
African territories. During this period, European nations conquered about
90% of the continent’s territory (see Figure 3),82 whereas in 1870 (before this
period of imperial conquest), only about 10% of the African continent was
under European control.
The capacity of these first two power stations was extended after the
Boer war of 1899–1902, during which the mines had been closed (Draper,
1967: 123). According to Christie, ‘the demand for energy soared in the
Transvaal’ during the first decade of the 20th century (Christie, 1984: 12). De
Beers Consolidated Mines at Kimberley commissioned a Central Station in
August 1903. The technology for the power stations and electrical equipment
came from a variety of suppliers and companies in America, Germany and
Great Britain, but most gold mines continued to run their own power plants
with reciprocating steam engines until 1910. Electric power ‘was not exten-
sively used, but such installations as existed employed high-speed vertical
steam engines as prime movers’ (Draper, 1967: 123).
The electrical equipment installed in Johannesburg during these years
mirrors the imperial struggle of the rival European nations, Great Britain and
Germany, in Southern Africa. However, an imperial struggle for industrial
monopoly was also being waged between America and Europe. Towards the
end of this phase, in 1903, Emil Rathenau travelled to America on behalf of
82 Most of this territory was conquered by Great Britain.
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A.E.G. to conduct negotiations with General Electric to divide up the world
electricity market. The result of these negotiations would have a critical influ-
ence on the subsequent development of electric power in South Africa.
The RCEW and the GEPC power stations were decommissioned and
replaced by larger power stations after the first decade of the 20th century,
but the sites were retained and formed the cornerstones of the gigantic
regional power scheme that was built in Johannesburg in 1912. From the end
of 1897, the Rand Central Electric Works transmitted electricity from the
area surrounding the shafts of the Brakpan coal mine across forty five miles
to the Main Reef Gold Mining Company on the Paardekraal farm, 10 miles
west of Johannesburg. The first power stations demonstrated the benefits of
electrifying mines and set the scene for the 1905 decision by the main group
of gold mining companies to electrify the gold mines. They also confirmed
the potential for profit to German and British capital and manufacturers.
Their focus on supplying the mines bypassed the municipal needs of the
Johannesburg area. From the very beginning, electrification was linked to the
problem of labour in the mines. Because of their lasting influence on the his-
tory of electrification in Johannesburg, the first two power stations in Johan-
nesburg require more detailed investigation. A number of major themes
emerge in the histories of these two central power stations, and by extrap-
olation, we can regard these themes as formative of the history of elec-
trification in Johannesburg.
Deutsche Bank: Rand Central Electric Works Ltd. (RCEW)
The Rand Central Electric Works Ltd. (RCEW) was registered under British
company law. Perhaps for this reason, it is typically referred to in the liter-
ature as a British enterprise.83 However, the RCEW was initiated and
financed by a German bank, for a German gold mining company (owned by
83 For example, Renfrew Christie’s book on the history of electrification in South Afri-
ca mentions that the RCEW ‘was controlled from London’ (Christie, 1984: 30). Others
mention that the RCEW had a local South African board but was administered from Lon-
don and financed by British capital (http://www.eskom.co.za/sites/heritage/Pages/Rand-
Central-Works-Limited-11.aspx). It was not unusual for German-owned companies to be
registered in London.
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the same German bank), and it was built and equipped by a German electric
manufacturing company.84 This exclusively German initiative was not a
Figure 3: Map showing the ‘European partition of Africa’ in 1902.
84 Wills, for example, names The Rand Central Electric Works Ltd. as a company of
the A. Goertz & Co. Ltd. (Wills, 1907 [2006]: 45). Hahn refers to the Rand Central Elec-
tric Works – ‘the forerunner of the power-supply industry of the gold mines’ – as one of
‘many pioneer companies in Johannesburg’ that were founded by Adolf Goerz (Hahn,
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response to any local demand for electricity; neither did it connect in any
way to local industry or municipal interests. On the contrary, the first power
station in Johannesburg represented the pre-emptive strategic implementa-
tion of German industrial, financial and imperial interests overseas at the
end of the 19th century.
The registration of German-owned and operated companies in London
was not unusual at the time, but the silence surrounding the initiators and
patrons of the RCEW has implications for the historical narrative about the
development of electrification in South Africa. The RCEW is often intro-
duced as the first electric power station to supply the municipality of Johan-
nesburg. In fact, the RCEW only sporadically (and on request) supplied
power to the municipality when demand outstripped the supply of its central
gas power station. The silencing of its origins obscures the original intention
for electrification in Johannesburg: to establish the German electric industry
in the Transvaal (rather than for the municipality of Johannesburg) and to
supply electricity to the foreign-owned, private gold mines. In 1895, two
years before the RCEW started operation, the Witwatersrand had become
the world’s major gold producer.
The German mining engineer Adolf Goerz, who had previously worked
as a consultant in Berlin, was sent to South Africa in 1888 on behalf of the
Deutsche Bank. He was sent in response to a request by Eduard Lippert, a
German businessman residing in the Transvaal who had obtained the dyna-
mite concession in 1887 thanks to his ‘particularly close links with President
Kruger’ (Jones, 1995: 7). The Deutsche Bank sent Goerz to South Africa to
provide ‘expert advice on the potential of the Witwatersrand goldfield’
(Jones, 1995: 7). Although ‘nothing came of the banking concession’, Goerz’s
report to the Deutsche Bank resulted in the bank forming a syndicate85 to
1973: 2428). Helfferich, too, considers the RCEW as resulting from the initiative of the
Goerz company: ‘Die im Jahre 1896 von Siemens and Halske erstellte grosse electrische
Kraftanlage der Rand Central Electric Works, die gleichfalls der Initiative der Görz-
Gesellschaft ihre Entstehung verdankt, ist oben (S. 132) bereits erwähnt … (Helfferich,
1921: 132).
85 The syndicate also included the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft and Jacob HS Stern of
Frankfurt.
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‘develop the Gold and diamond reserves in South Africa’ by establishing A.
Goerz GmbH with a capital of 100,000 pounds (Jones, 1995: 7). Following
Adolf Goerz’s success in acquiring directorships in various mines,86 the syn-
dicate was changed into the private company Ad. Goerz and Co. in 1892.
This company’s capital allowed Goerz to ‘build up significant shareholdings
and think of floating new and deep-level mines’. According to Jones,
although Goerz himself had ‘substantial’ investments in the company, ‘con-
trol remained with Deutsche Bank and its German partners’ (Jones, 1995:
10). In 1897, the company registered in Pretoria, and its name was changed
to A. Goerz and Co. Ltd., with ‘an injection of new capital’ (Jones, 1995: 11).
Nonetheless, ‘its discretion – and this was to be important for the future –
was firmly established in London’ (Jones, 1995: 11). According to Jones, four
of the eight other directors were German citizens and ‘the overwhelming
majority of the staff came from Germany or Austria’ (Jones, 1995: 11).
Goerz maintained personal ties to powerful German individuals and
companies. Lord Battersea, the chairman of the new A. Goerz and Co. Ltd.,
was married to a member of the British Rothschild banking family (Con-
stance Rothschild, Lady Battersea, a daughter of Anthony de Rothschild)
(Jones, 1995: 11). Goerz’s sister was married to Georg von Siemens, the
founding director, and director of the Deutsche Bank for 30 years. Georg von
Siemens was a nephew of Werner von Siemens, who had founded Siemens
and Halske with Johann Georg Halske in Berlin in 1847.87
The Deutsche Bank’s investment in the first central power station in
Johannesburg to supply electricity to the gold mines was no random venture
opportunity; instead, it exemplifies the bank’s strategic business policy.
Around 1895, 20% of the foreign capital invested in South Africa was Ger-
man (Craig, 1978). German businessmen played a significant role in the eco-
nomic and financial life of Johannesburg at the time. The Deutsche Bank had
86 These mines included May Consolidated Mines, Crown Reef, the Meyer, and Prin-
cess Estate, Metropolitan Gold Mining and New Riefontein Estate and South West Africa
Company (Jones, 1995: 10).
87 Georg von Siemens had previously worked at Siemens and Halske, for which he
travelled to Teheran in 1868/9 to negotiate wayleaves with the government on the con-
struction and running of the Indo-European telegraph line from London to Calcutta.
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been established as a foreign trade bank in Berlin in 1870,88 one year before
the founding of the German Empire under Otto von Bismarck. Its purpose
was to ‘break the English supremacy in foreign trade’, which had been domi-
nated by British banking institutions (Klawitter, 2013: 78; my translation).
According to Klawitter, the dream of world trade oversees inspired the
founders of the bank, and the project of global expansion also complied with
Bismarck’s plan of informal imperialism through economic control (Klawit-
ter, 2013: 79; my translation). The Deutsche Bank resulted from this pio-
neering spirit, and ‘by the turn of the century the Deutsche Bank [resem-
bled] a spider in the web of the young German industry’, pulling the strings
of every future technology, including ‘power stations, trams, oil, light bulbs’
(Klawitter, 2013: 79; my translation).
Hughes only briefly mentions the importance of the Deutsche Bank’s
assistance to the two leading German manufacturers: Siemens and Halske,
and the A.E.G. He describes the Deutsche Bank as ‘one of the leading Kre-
ditbanken which were, in effect, a combination of commercial and invest-
ment banks, banks that have been characterized by many historians as the
centres of great historical influence – almost control – during the rapid
industrialization of Germany after 1871’ (Hughes, 1983: 180).
The RCEW project required the purchase of land and water rights, a
supply of coal, and a concession from the Transvaal government. In 1894,
Siemens and Halske sent N.J. Singels from Berlin ‘to study the possibility of
electrical power transmission along the Witwatersrand’ (Machinery,
Oct. 1897: 247). Singles purchased land at Brakpan and reached an agree-
ment with the Transvaal Coal Trust Company89 after having tested coal from
various mines. He also secured the necessary water rights and obtained a
concession from the Transvaal government to pass a transmission line along
the Rand. He was assisted in these activities by the British consulting engi-
neer Hubert Davies. After these rights had been secured, the RCEW was
88 The initiative to set up the bank came from the banker and businessman Adelbert
Delbrück together with several other German private banks.
89 The Transvaal Coal Trust Company was established in 1889 and was taken over by
Ernest Oppenheimer in 1916, renamed as Rand Selection Corporation which later became
a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation, established in 1917.
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established in March 1895 in London. The concession was ceded, and the
project was contracted to Siemens and Halske, with Mr. Singels as con-
struction supervisor. The chief engineer of the power station from Siemens
and Halske later became the managing director of the company.
The concession issued to Siemens and Halske in 1894 was organized
with the assistance of the German businessman Eduard Lippert. His name
already appeared in connection with the Deutsche Bank’s decision to send
Goerz to check out the gold mines in South Africa, and it will appear again
in connection with another concession that was to influence the history of
electrification in South Africa: the establishment of the Victoria Falls Power
Company in 1906. Incidentally, Eduard Lippert was a cousin of Alfred Beit,
whose South African mining house was financially involved in the company
that established and owned the second central power station of Johannes-
burg. Lippert was known as a ‘concession hunter’ who benefitted from his
personal friendship with Paul Kruger (President of the South African Repub-
lic from 1883 until 1902). Lippert obtained several concessions, such as the
right to manufacture and sell dynamite in the Transvaal (1887) and the right
to set up a cement factory in Pretoria (1888). The roles that Lippert and
John Hubert Davies played in obtaining the concessions and agreements for
the first power station in Johannesburg are unspecified, but these men were
mentioned on the occasion of the transaction of the Siemens and Halske
concession to the RCEW on 21 December 1895, as receivers of £5,000 and
£1,000 in cash, respectively.90 The type of concession necessary to build the
first power station in Johannesburg differs from Hughes’ use of the terms
concessions or franchises.
90 ‘The subscribed capital of the company is (pound) 300,000, and at the end of 1898,
(pound) 216,234 had been spent in construction expenses’. Despatches from United Sta-
tes Consuls in Pretoria, 1898–1906. The Rand Central Electric Works. http://www.moca
vo.co.uk/Despatches-From-United-States-Consuls-in-Pretoria-1898-1906-Microform/
110030/421, pp. 134.
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Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa: Central Electric Power
Company
In 1896, while the RCEW was still under construction, the Consolidated
Gold Fields of South Africa Limited decided to build its own power station
rather than purchase power from the RCEW. It established the GEPC as a
subsidiary company to supply electricity for six mines (the Simmer and Jack
Proprietary Mines Ltd., Simmer and Jack East Ltd., Simmer and Jack West
Ltd., Knights Deep Ltd., Jupiter Gold Mining Co. Ltd., and Rand Victoria
Mines Ltd.). The concession to build the station at the Simmer and Jack
Mine in Germiston, close to the Rand Victoria Mine, was obtained in July
1897 (Christie, 1984). This concession was ceded to the GEPC, which started
transmitting power in 1898.
The GEPC was financed by Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd. After 1902,
shares were bought by the Eckstein/Rand Mines group, when their mines
began to purchase power from the company. By 1905, the GEPC supplied
power to nine mines and the town of Germiston (Christie, 1984: 22). The
power station had been designed to meet the increasing need for power in
the gold mining process. Reciprocating steam engines had been used to sup-
ply power for surface gold mining, but the mines were being dug at increas-
ingly deeper levels, which required more power for pumping water from
deep-level shafts.
At first glance, the GEPC (just like the RCEW) appears to have been
owned by a mining enterprise, its holding company, the Consolidated Gold
Fields. However, on further inspection, the powerful architecture of asso-
ciated companies reflects a dense assortment of operations and objectives in
Southern Africa. Consolidated Gold Fields was founded in 188791 by British
citizens Cecil John Rhodes and Charles Dunell Rudd, who had previously
established the diamond mining monopoly in Kimberly, the De Beers Min-
ing Company. The Consolidated Gold Fields Group branched out into an
intricate dynasty of companies that Rhodes was financially involved in, such
as De Beers, the British South Africa Company and the African Concessions
Syndicate. According to Newbury, the ‘overall management of these financial
91 Gold Fields Ltd. (established in 1887) was renamed as Consolidated Gold Fields of
South Africa in 1892.
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strands centred, however, not on Rhodes in Cape Town or at Kimberley, but
on the London and Johannesburg offices of Wernher, Beit & Company’
(Newbury, 2009: 96). He argues that Rhodes’ association with the founders
of this company, Julius Wernher and Alfred Beit, was his most important
source of funds, advice and support: ‘Alfred Beit was the accounting and
financial genius behind Rhodes’s entrepreneurial success. More than any oth-
er institution, this gold mining and industrial house influenced the manage-
ment and policies of De Beers Consolidated in ways that kept Rhodes on a
more stable course in business after 1895 and enabled him to restore much
of his fortune for his visionary purposes’ (Newbury, 2009: 97).
The engineering company of J. Hubert Davies in Johannesburg was giv-
en a contract to supply the equipment for the GEPC. Equipment and exper-
tise were procured from various companies in America, Great Britain, Ger-
many and Switzerland, including the General Electric Co. of America,92
Brown Boveri of Switzerland, and Siemens and Halske.93 The Consolidated
Gold Fields recruited American electrical engineers to run and manage the
GEPC.
The history of the two first central power stations in Johannesburg
exposes a powerful group of German and British personalities and compa-
nies. Viewed through the geographies of management and imagination, a
number of themes may be discerned as formative subjects for this phase of
electrification: gold mining, empire, national competition, companies, con-
cessions and ‘the native’.
92 ‘General Electric had a paid company representative in the Transvaal from 1894
onward’ (Hausman et al., 2008: 89).
93 The driving engines for the generators were made by the Allis Co. of Milwaukee,
USA. The generators were made by Brown Boveri and Co. of Baden, Switzerland. The
flywheels were supplied by Yates and Thom of Blackburn, England. The exciter engines
were made by Bumstead and Chandler of Hednesford, England and the exciter generators
by the Electrical Construction Co. of Wolverhampton, England. http://heritage.eskom.co.
za/driehoek/driehoek.htm / accessed 1.7.15.
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1905 to 1914: A Gigantic Power Scheme for the Gold Mines
South African electricity supply in 1905 was insignificant in world terms,
but within a decade SA would have ‘the largest power-works in the
world’, supplying ‘labour-saving’machinery in the gold-mines of the Wit-
watersrand.
Electricity, Industry and Class in South Africa, Renfrew Christie, 1984.
A unique position is occupied by the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power
Company in South Africa; this has existed for nearly four years, and has
reached an output of half a milliard (500,000,000) kw.-hours yearly […].
It is worth while, therefore, to go into the history of this gigantic under-
taking more closely, since the unusual growth of the plants can only be
appreciated with a thorough knowledge of the conditions of power con-
sumption prevailing at the time the plant was installed.
Georg Klingenberg, Large Electric Power Stations, 1916 [1913].
Between 1905 and 1914, a gigantic scheme of connected central power sta-
tions was constructed in Johannesburg – a regional system of electricity sup-
ply, in Hughes’ terms. It created ‘one of the world’s most sophisticated energy
systems […] in a relatively undeveloped part of the British Empire’ (Christie,
1984: 6) before regional power systems were instituted in Berlin or London.
It was established in 1906 with capital provided by a consortium of German
banks and the British South Africa Company (BSAC), and it was operated
and owned by the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company Ltd.
(VFTPC). This regional scheme of central power stations was designed, built
and equipped by the German company Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft
(A.E.G.) of Berlin. In 1907, two existing power stations, the Rand Central
Electric Works (RCEW) and the General Electric Power Company (GEPC),
were taken over by a company that had been established on 17 October 1906
as the Victoria Falls Power Company Ltd. (VFPC), registered in Rhodesia. In
February 1908, the VFPC was renamed as Victoria Falls and Transvaal Pow-
er Company (VFTPC), and a few months later, it created a subsidiary com-
pany, registered in the Transvaal, called the Rand Mines Power Supply Com-
pany (RMPS). The two associated companies VFTPC and RMPS together
were responsible for the gigantic build-up of electric power stations between
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1905 and 1914. The VFTPC power scheme was designed by Georg Klingen-
berg, ‘the engineering head of A.E.G.’s power plant design and construction
division, an engineer of international reputation and author of definite works
on power-plant design and operation’ (Hughes, 1984: 197).
Within a year of its establishment, the VFTPC purchased two existing
central power stations on the Witwatersrand, the RCEW and the GEPC, and
registered in the Transvaal a subsidiary company, the Rand Mines Power
Supply Company (RMPS) in 1908, to acquire a monopoly of power gen-
eration on the Witwatersrand. In response to these developments, and at the
request of the collieries, in 1909 the Transvaal government appointed a
Commission of Inquiry into electric power supply to consider government
regulation of the industry. Based on the recommendations of the Commis-
sion, the Transvaal Power Act of 1910 was passed to provide for the estab-
lishment of the Power Undertakings Board to licence power station under-
takings. The VFTPC and the Rand Mines Power Supply Company came to
operate under two separate licences granted by the Government in accord-
ance with the Transvaal Power Act of 1910 (Hadley, 1913: 3). In effect, this
legislation served to sanction the foreign German and British monopoly in
power supply on the Witwatersrand.
The VFTPC power scheme
By 1914, the VFTPC and its subsidiary the Rand Mines Power Supply Com-
pany provided electricity to the gold mines from four central power stations
that were connected through transmission lines and overseen by a central con-
trol station at Simmerpan. This early regional scheme fixed the terms and con-
ditions, as well as the sites and main customers, for the future development of
electrification in Johannesburg. Apart from a few local adaptations, the layout
of these power stations was similar and amounted in 1913 to a total capacity of
power installed and in progress of 176,000 kW (see Table 4).
In addition, power was distributed by another method that ‘had not pre-
viously been considered on so large a scale’ (Hadley, 1913: 22): six electri-
cally-driven air compressors operated at Robinson Central air station at a
capacity of 3,500 kW each (Hadley, 1913: 5).
96 3. Technological Change and the “Savage Slot”
In 1913, Hadley94 characterized the VFTPC power scheme as ‘a single sys-
tem’95 connected by 40,000 volt overhead transmission lines ‘stretching prac-
tically the whole length of the reef’ (Hadley, 1913: 5). He described the area
‘over which a power supply had to be given’ to lie ‘within a strip about two
miles broad and stretching 50 miles from east to west’ (Hadley, 1913: 4).
Johannesburg was situated ‘about the middle of this strip’, but it had its own
electric plant (Hadley, 1913: 4), a gas power station.
Electricity was fed into this power scheme at four central power sta-
tions: Brakpan, Simmerpan, Rosherville and Robinson Central. At Robinson
Central power station, the electricity generated at the Vereeniging power sta-
tion, some 36 miles to the South of Johannesburg, connected with the sys-
tem. The transmission lines ran through ‘two distributing centres at Hercules
to the east and Bantjes to the west’ (Hadley, 1913: 6). Together, these six
points composed a network to supply the ‘step-down transformer stations’ of
Name of
Station
Total Capacity of Electric
Generating Plant installed
Steam-driven Air
Compressors installed
Extensions in
progress
Brakpan Two 3,000 kW sets - -
Simmer Pan Six 3,000 kW sets - -
Rosherville Five 10,000 kW sets Six 3,500 kW machines Three 7,000 kW steam-
driven air compressors
Vereeniging Four 10,000 kW sets - -
Extensions
in 1913
- - Two 10,000 kW sets
113,000 kW 21,000 kW 41,000 kW
Total capacity of plant installed and in progress: 176, 000 kW
Table 4: Total capacity of power installed and in progress in the four power stations of
Johannesburg in 1913 (Hadley, 1913).
94 The paper Power Supply on the Rand was presented to the Institution of Electrical
Engineers in 1913 by A.E. Hadley, who succeeded Price as general manager of the VFTPC
in 1926, and later served on the Board of Directors of the BSAC.
95 ‘The system has been laid out so as to be operated during the development of the
undertaking as a single system, but arranged that when the growth of the load made it
desirable (both from the point of view of economy and also of safety of supply) it could
be sectionalized without the necessity of running additional machinery’ (Hadley, 1913: 9).
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the mines (Hadley, 1913: 6, 29).96 Simmerpan also operated a central control
system to control and supervise the technical and safety regulations of the
transmissions network, and later it continued to assume this function as
national control centre. The repair, refurbishment and testing of equipment
and instruments was also centralized, at a workshop and testing department
at Rosherville.
In 1914, a few other power stations were providing electricity in Johan-
nesburg, although they were hardly comparable in capacity to the supply of
the VFTPC: the gas power station of Johannesburg Municipality (13.25
MW) and the East Rand Proprietary Mines (19.95 MW), Randfontein, and
New Kleinfontein, but all of these stations ‘eventually took additional sup-
plies from the VFTPC’ (Christie, 1984: 17).
The VFTPC built its monopoly in successive steps but at a rapid pace.
In June 1905, the Rand Central Electric Works extended its existing triple-
expansion engines with a 400 kW steam turbine. Plans for additional exten-
sion a year later (in December 1906) with a 2500 kW turbine were made but
not executed because of VFTPC’s purchase of the RCEW in February 1907
(Power Company Commission, 1910: 9–10). In 1908, the VFTPC built a
new power station next to the generating station of the RCEW at Brakpan
that consisted of two 3000 kW turbo generators (Power Companies Com-
mission, 1910: 10).97 In 1909, the power station at Simmerpan, built by the
VFTPC close to the site of GEPC, was equipped with six 3 MW sets and two
11 MW sets (Troost & Norman, 1969: 178). These extensions were made to
accommodate ‘a complete re-design of the distribution system’ (Power Com-
panies Commission, 1910: 10). The VFTPC built two further stations, one in
Rosherville in 1911 (five 9.6 MW sets) and one in Vereeniging (two 9.6 MW
96 ‘The electrical supply at 2,000 volts and 550 volts to the consumers’ premises is
effected from step-down transformer stations, which are built by the consumers, but are
equipped with switchgear and transformers by the power company. There are 60 of these
consumers’ sub-stations connected to one system, and their individual capacity varies
from 10,000 k.v.a., the normal size being 5,000 k.v.a. […] The transformers have been
supplied by Messrs. Siemens, the Allgemeine Electricitäts Gesellschaft, and the West-
inghouse Company’ (Hadley, 1913: 29).
97 These turbo generators were later extended by 12.5 MW sets in 1915 (Troost &
Norman, 1969: 178).
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sets in 1912 and two 12 MW sets in 1913), located 36 miles to the south of
Johannesburg on the banks of the Vaal River, close to a colliery.98 The total
installed generating capacity of the VFTPC in 1915 (162 MW) did not
increase during the First World War (Troost & Norman, 1969: 178).
The power requirements of the mines were supplied by means of electric
motors that were used for winders, pumps, stamp mills, compressors, tube
mills, hauling and conveying, crushers, workshops and ventilation (Rider,
1915: 613). Electrical mechanization of the labour in the gold mines directly
eliminated jobs (Christie, 1984: 17). Hand tramming, the ‘horizontal move-
ment of ore underground’ was replaced by electrical systems and under-
ground haulage roads: ‘The motive behind this electrical mechanisation was
the displacement of black workers because of their relative scarcity “with
electric locomotive traction underground tramming costs could be reduced
to less than half of what they are with native labour, and a great many
natives would be liberated for other work in the mine”’99 (Christie, 1984: 17).
Electricity was also used for smaller applications at the mines:
In 1905 the Eckstein group measured twelve processes for electrification which were
“mine-pumping; winding; air-compressing for drilling; crushing and sorting; stamp
milling; raising of tailings; grinding in tube mills; cyanide treatment; tailings and
other surface haulages; lighting; motor repair shops and grinders for the assay of-
fices”100 (Christie, 1984: 18).
Over the years, various engineers have commented on the ideal conditions of
the Witwatersrand for a large power supply scheme. In 1941, Jacobs men-
tions the ‘relatively compact’ and ‘considerable number of large consumers in
a terrain devoid of natural geographical obstacles’, as well as the availability
98 According to Troost and Norman, ‘Vereeniging was the first power station in South
Africa (and possibly in the world) to be located on a coal mine and it is thus the fore-
runner of the giant pithead stations subsequently constructed in South Africa’ (Troost &
Norman, 1969: 178).
99 Quoting Mackie, R.G. 1910. General Application of Electricity to Rand Mines Un-
derground. SAE /Nov. 1910, pp. 81.
100 Quoting Heather, H. and Robeson, A.M. 1908. On the Cost of Power at Mines of the
Witwatersrand with Reference to a Proposed Supply from a Central Source. Min. Proc.
Inst. Civ. Eng. (1906–7), Vol. IV, pp. 345–6.
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and reasonable pit-head prices of coal from the nearby collieries (Jacobs,
1941: 259). Klingenberg adds that there were ‘low building costs in the vicin-
ity of a large town (JHB)’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 201) and ‘exceedingly
simple’ ‘legal conditions for the transmission of energy on the Rand by
means of overhead lines and underground cables’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]:
240).
The legal conditions for the transmission of energy on the Rand by means of over-
head lines and underground cables were exceedingly simple. As the land in this dis-
trict consists almost exclusively of mining claims, the rights of property of mine
owners are restricted by legislation to the minerals underground, while the land
itself is at the mine’s disposal only as far as it is required for working the ore. The
authorities are therefore free to grant permission to a third party to use the land for
transmission lines. When the company took over the Rand Central Electric Works,
it also acquired the concessions granted to that company. It was therefore protected
against opposition on the part of the mines (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 230), pro-
vided that their buildings were not interfered with, a condition which could easily be
fulfilled (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 240).
The transmission lines from the power station at Vereeniging, however,
passed over private property, and therefore they were subject to other con-
ditions, and ‘difficulties arose similar to those we are accustomed to encoun-
ter in Europe’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 240). Although a concession had
been purchased from the Lewis & Marks collieries (who had received way-
leaves for a transmission line in 1905), construction had to wait for the
investigations by the Power Companies Commission (Hadley, 1913).
Accordingly, Klingenberg reports that preliminary work, such as ‘the pur-
chase of land, borings, locality of site, and questions of water supply’, were
settled in 1909 while ‘the commencement of building operations was, how-
ever, delayed by negotiations with the authorities in connection with the nec-
essary wayleaves’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 239).
In 1915, in a paper entitled ‘Power Supply to the Mines of the Rand’,
Bernard Price, general manager of the VFTPC, noted ‘an outstanding feature’
of the VFTPC: ‘that no less than 99 per cent of the business is represented by
supply to the Mining Industry’ (Price, 1915: vi), with only 1% supplied to
other industries and municipalities (see Table 5).
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Origins and purpose of the VFTPC
The establishment of the VFTPC is typically regarded as the starting point
for the history of electrification in South Africa. These beginnings are usually
seen as a response to the rising need for power in the gold mines in the early
20th century. However, when the establishment of the VFTPC is considered
in light of the prior history of electrification in Johannesburg, a different pic-
ture emerges. From this perspective, the development of the VFTPC is a
sequel to the battle between the powers involved in the development of the
first two central power stations in Johannesburg, the RCEW and the GEPC.
The forces that shaped these two power stations continued to compete in the
run-up to the VFTPC: (foreign-owned) gold mines; British investment com-
panies and financial enterprises; German investment banks and their asso-
ciated electrical industries and technology; British imperial mining and con-
cession companies, especially those connected to Cecil Rhodes and Alfred
Beit; and American, British and German engineers.
The establishment of the VFTPC, as indicated by its name and country
of registration, was initially associated with the idea of generating power
from the Victoria Falls on the Zambezi River in Rhodesia, but such a project
was not realized. Therefore, the name of this company (which continued to
exist until 1948) is misleading. Prior to the establishment of the VFTCP,
there were numerous initiatives to establish power stations in the wider
Class of Consumer No. of Consumers Aggregate of
Non-simultaneous
Maximum Demands
at Points of Delivery,
January, 1915
Units Consumed per Annum
kW Percentage of
Total
Millions of
Units
Percentage of
Total
Mining 65 95,000 98.0 514.5 99.0
Industrial 8 1,100 1.1 2.8 0.55
Bulk supplies to
Municipalities
5 900 0.9 2.3 0.45
Totals 78 97,000 100 519.6 100
Table 5: Particulars of electricity consumers (mines, industries, municipalities) supplied by
the VFTPC in Johannesburg in 1915 (Price 1915: vi).
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Johannesburg area, but the VFTPC put an end to those initiatives. Important
considerations for this phase of electrification are the origins of the idea of
harnessing the power of the Victoria Falls and transmitting it to the gold
fields of the Witwatersrand; the pioneers, negotiations and initiatives leading
to its foundation; and the legislation that was subsequently created to
endorse the VFTPC/A.E.G. monopoly.
Most accounts of the establishment of the VFTPC attribute the idea of
generating electric power at the Victoria Falls and transmitting it to the gold
mines of the Witwatersrand to the rising need for electrical power of the
machines needed to work the deepening levels of gold mining on the Witwa-
tersrand in the early 20th century. Similarly, the establishment of the African
Concessions Syndicate, the subsidiary of the BSAC, is erroneously dated to
the early 1900s. The African Concessions Syndicate had already been found-
ed in 1895 to acquire the concession (from the BSAC) to generate power at
the Victoria Falls. There is evidence that the idea of power generation at the
Victoria Falls dates back much earlier, even before the power works at Niag-
ara Falls, the model that inspired the idea, went into service in 1895.
George Forbes, the ‘chief electrical consultant’ (Hughes, 1983: 139) to
the Niagara Falls power works had already been consulted on the matter of
power generation and transmission at the Victoria Falls in 1894. In an article
published in November 1898 in the Journal of the Society of Arts, Forbes
reported that he had been asked ‘by letter from Johannesburg whether it
would be possible to transmit power from the Victoria Falls, on the Zambesi,
to all the gold mines in Rhodesia, varying from 350 to 500 miles distance’
(Forbes, 1898: 25). He subsequently travelled to South Africa ‘to negotiate
with Mr. Cecil Rhodes and Dr. Jameson for a concession’. Evidently, he con-
sidered the idea realistic and profitable. However, according to Forbes, the
draft concession to the Chartered Company was interrupted by ‘the Jameson
raid and the Matabele rising’ (Forbes, 1898: 25).
The African Concessions Syndicate Ltd. was established and registered
on 4 October 1895 (Skinner, 1911: 371). According to Wills, the African
Concessions Syndicate Ltd. ‘was formed […] to acquire a concession of the
Victoria Falls on the Zambesi River, South Africa, for the purpose of utilizing
the water power for the generation of electricity, and has obtained from the
British South Africa Company a lease of the Falls for 75 years under certain
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conditions’ (Wills, 1905: 282).101 Its balance sheet for 1903 discloses an
amount of 11,104 pounds for ‘obtaining and maintaining Concession as of
June 30 1902’ (Wills, 1905: 283). Its consulting engineers were listed as Sir
Douglas Fox and Sir Charles Metcalfe, the chairman was W.A. Wills (not W.
H. Wills), and the director was Henry Wilson Fox (involved in the Mata-
beleland and Mashonaland uprising in 1896, and manager of the Chartered
Company from 1896).
Authors differ on the origin of the idea for generating and transmitting
electric power from the Victoria Falls, but they all regard its origins as being
in the early 1900s and tend to mention parallel initiatives involving the A.E.
G., the Dresdner Bank, the BSAC and Harper (among others) that were con-
cerned with assessing the viability of the project. However, there is evidence
that the early roots of the idea formed part of Cecil Rhodes’ imperial British
expansion and appropriation of territories in Mashonaland and Matabele-
land. The BSAC referred to these territories as Rhodesia in 1895. The timing
is no coincidence, as the idea formed part of Rhodes’ various strategies to
establish white settlement in Rhodesia, which, in turn, was part of his vision
to create a British Empire from the Cape to Cairo (Figure 4). One key to
achieving this empire was a railroad between the Cape and Cairo (Figure 5).
The objective of this idea was to expand imperial British territories, and pro-
viding electricity to the gold fields was a means to this end.
In the current year, as has been stated, the Victoria Falls have been reached by the
Cape-to-Cairo Railway. That fact is fraught with vast possibilities for Rhodesian
enterprise. That railway is already stimulating the development of Rhodesia, and the
transformation now quickly coming to pass is one of the most impressive in the
history of colonization. In the near future, however, there looms the most momen-
tous achievement of all – namely, the harnessing of the Victoria Falls […]. The
Victoria Falls are about two and a half times as high as those of Niagara, and they
are approximately twice as wide (Wills, 2006 [1907]: 264).
101 Both Weinberger and Klingenberg incorrectly date the founding of the African Con-
cessions Company Ltd. (which acquired the rights to build a power station up to 250,000
PS at the Victoria Falls), subsequent to the second Anglo-Boer War although it was alrea-
dy established in 1895.
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Various historical accounts have been put forward of the conditions sur-
rounding the establishment of the VFTPC. Because of its importance in the
history of electrification in Johannesburg, and in South Africa, various inter-
pretations of this historical moment are outlined below.
The first power stations of the VFTPC, and the related first regional
scheme for power generation in South Africa, were designed by the A.E.G.
engineer Georg Klingenberg, who succeeded Rathenau as head of the divi-
sion for the construction of central power stations. In 1913, Klingenberg
Figure 4: Map of Cecil Rhodes’ vision of British dominion from the Cape to Cairo.
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Figure 5: Map of Cecil Rhodes’ plans for a railroad line
from the Cape to Cairo.
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wrote a textbook that was considered to be standard literature in engineering
courses for many years. It was translated into English in 1916. The two-vol-
ume book is entitled Large Electric Power Stations: Their Design and Con-
struction. With Examples of Existing Stations, and it dedicates almost 100
pages to the instructive example of the VFTPC. Klingenberg provides engi-
neering, financial and historical information on the power stations that were
built and planned by the A.E.G. for the VFTPC up until 1913. His account
presents the establishment of the grand centralized regional power system as
a response to the rising demand for electric power at the gold mines of the
Witwatersrand.102 This view is shared by Christie, who describes the soaring
demand for energy by the increasingly deepening and mechanizing of the
Transvaal’s gold mines in the first decade of the 20th century (Christie, 1984:
12).103 Klingenberg claims that ‘the proposal for a general power supply on
the Rand was taken up almost simultaneously by the different parties
involved’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 169), including the A.E.G.,104 the
102 Klingenberg’s description of the VFTPC begins with a review of the gold mining
situation on the Rand and its power needs which at the time were supplied by means of
steam plants. He maintains that these ‘working conditions prevailing on the Witwa-
tersrand made it imperative, in this instance, more than in any locality, to centralise the
generation of power’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 169).
103 Christie describes the situation as follows: ‘The supply of black labour was declining
relative to the increased needs, at least in part because of wage reductions made during
and after the Anglo-Boer war. The mine-owners’ major response to this relative labour
shortage was the use of more machinery. Unable to increase the gold-price, and faced by
inflation, the mine-owners were forced to cut costs by mechanisation. This led to the
creation and growth of the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company Limited’
(Christie, 1984: 12).
104 Klingenberg reports that the A.E.G., ‘in connection with the German Dresdner
Bank, commissioned two engineers, Loebinger and Dr. Apt, to carry out exhaustive inve-
stigations of the power demand and other conditions upon which the centralisation of a
power supply depended’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 166). The date of their trip, however,
is not mentioned. Based on these reports the A.E.G. developed a scheme with an output
of 30,000 KW of which half was to be provided by power stations at one of the large dams
of the Rand (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 173).
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Eckstein group105 and the British South Africa Company.106 However,
Klingenberg’s account of the negotiations leading to the grand power scheme
does not provide dates to support his chronology of developments.
One set of negotiations was with the BSAC (and its subsidiary, the Afri-
can Concessions Syndicate), which resulted in an agreement for a general
scheme and the establishment of the Victoria Falls Power Company. The
second set of negotiations took place with the Eckstein group of mines, ‘the
largest of the mining concerns’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 192).
The Eckstein group had issued a ‘provisional contract for the supply of
energy to the Eckstein group’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 192) to the British
engineer W.A. Harper. At the time, the municipality of Johannesburg had
commissioned a new gas engine generated power station, but because it ran
into difficulties, the city continued to obtain electricity from the Rand Cen-
tral Electric Works, and thereafter from the VFPC. According to Klingen-
berg, the contractors of the plant ‘commissioned W.A. Harper, in the spring
of 1908, to negotiate on their behalf’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 192). Harp-
er developed an ‘entirely new scheme’ of supply to a wider area, and he nego-
tiated with the municipality and various mining companies. He obtained a
‘provisional contract for the supply of energy to the Eckstein group’ (Klin-
genberg, 1916 [1913]: 192). In 1916, Klingenberg judged this contract to be
‘the most important contract of this kind that has ever been made with a
single consumer’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 193). The Eckstein Group
105 Klingenberg names Robeson, ‘at the time chief engineer of the Eckstein group as the
first to have worked out a scheme of about 70,000 HP to provide electricity and com-
pressed air to the mines of the Eckstein group and the Consolidated Gold field’ (Klingen-
berg, 1916 [1913]: 169). Again, the date of this scheme is not given.
106 Klingenberg declares that the British South Africa Company simultaneously, but
independently ‘also studied the question of power supply on the Rand, with the object of
utilising the enormous water power of the Victoria Falls on the Zambesi river, which
belong to them’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 173). According to him, H.W. Fox, manager
of the BSAC, founded the African Concessions Syndicate in order to acquire ‘the right
from the British South Africa Company to erect a power station with an output of
250,000 H.P. at Victoria Falls’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 173). Since this required tech-
nical and economic investigations, ‘a committee of experts’ was formed (Klingenberg,
1916 [1913]: 173).
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guaranteed a maximum consumption of 80,000,000 kWh per annum and
agreed to replace their existing steam plant with electricity purchased from
power works that were to be established under the contract. Thus, Harper
needed to establish a company to finance the new power stations, and
according to Klingenberg, he approached the A.E.G. ‘Successful negotiations’
followed between Klingenberg and the ‘principals of the Eckstein group’, and
‘a modified contract’ was signed with the VFPC, after Lord Winchester,
chairman of the VFPC, ‘had been successful in securing the large extra capi-
tal the company required for the new undertaking’ (Klingenberg, 1916
[1913]: 194).
However, financial power or technical excellence alone still appear
insufficient to explain why the Chartered Company would be prepared to
concede rights to the German A.E.G. – given the rivalry between the imperi-
al and industrial powers, Great Britain and Germany. Wernher, Beit and
Company, as a leading shareholder of the Chartered Company,107 was also
represented on the board of directors of the A.E.G. after its merger with the
Union Elektrizitätsgesellschaft in 1905. The London financing house Wernh-
er, Beit and Company was one of the creators of the VFTPC, and it was giv-
en a preferential position with the establishment of the Rand Mines Power
Supply Co. as a subsidiary of the VFTPC. The mines of the Eckstein group
would receive electricity at a lower rate than other consumers (in 1910, 3.723
Pfennig per kWh, other customers 6.33 Pfennig) (Weinberger, 1971: 72).
The magnitude of this deal cannot be overemphasized: in 1911, the Eckstein
group of mines produced over 9,000,000 of the 24,000,000 tons of ore crush-
ed on the Rand (Rickard, 1922: 235). Its employees comprised ‘about 8000
whites and 56,000 natives’ (Rickard, 1922: 235). The Rand Mines and the
Eckstein group played an important role in the move to deep-level mining
after the Anglo-Boer War and the amalgamations of the Central Rand
between 1906 and 1911, which transformed the productive base of the
107 According to Albrecht, Alfred Beit helped Rhodes establish and finance the British
South Africa Company. He became a member of its board of directors in 1889 and took
over shares to the value of 34,000 pounds. Rhodes owned 75,000 pounds, De Beers
200,000 pounds and Gold Fields almost 100,000 pounds and the Exploration Company
75,000 pounds in shares (Albrecht, 2011: 60).
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mining industry.108 In 1908, during this period of transformation, Rand
Mines Ltd. and the Eckstein group decided to ‘change over their mines to
electric driving’ (Hadley, 1913: 3).
According to Bernard Price, the founding Chief Engineer (and, from
1926, General Manager) of the VFTPC,109 the Eckstein Group stipulated (in
their contract with A.P. Harper) the terms for the VFTPC to supply the Eck-
stein mines. First, ‘a separate company should be established for supplying
108 The amalgamation of the gold mines of Johannesburg in the early twentieth century
is described by Richartdon and van Helten: ‘Both companies [Rand Mines/Eckstein] took
a particularly prominent part in the merger movement which swept across the Central
Rand between 1906 and 1911. The key year for the Wernher Beit companies was 1908/9.
[…] no less than six major mergers in this year involved this group, out of which grew
extensions […] and a wholly new mine, the Crown Mines. These changes involved the
disappearance of twenty-two separate mining concerns. In addition, in November 1909
Rand Mines Ltd. acquired the whole of the claim property of Rand Mines Deep Ltd.’
(Richardson & van Helten, 1982: 330). They consider these amalgamations to have
impacted on the entire region: ‘This shift to predominantly deep-level mining after 1902,
as exemplified in both the amalgamations of the Central Rand and the opening of the Far
East Rand, had significant consequences. The productive base of the industry was trans-
formed. Large-scale industrial organization and financial criteria became the predominant
forms of operation’ (Richardson & van Helten, 1982: 334).
109 Bernard Price came to South Africa in 1909 as founding Chief Engineer (and from
1926 General Manager) of the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company. He had pre-
viously been employed by the consulting engineering company Merz and McLellan in
London. Price maintains that he was a member of staff of Merz and McLellan in Newcat-
le-on-Tyne when A.W. Harper approached financial houses in London with his contract
with the Eckstein group, and these ‘at once called in for advice the leading firm of Consul-
ting Engineers in the field of electric power supply, Messrs. Merz and McLellan’ (Price,
1941: 270). Other authors have claimed that it was Klingenberg who persuaded Price to
assume this post in South Africa (Christie, 1984: 38): ‘The Germans […] had enough
sense to see that they must manage the thing through Englishmen, and they got our
friend, Arthur Wright, to act as a general adviser, and, later on, Klingenberg persuaded
Bernard Price (who was head of our Electrical Department), whom he had met in con-
nection with Durham work, to go out to Africa as their chief engineer. This was the
beginning of Price’s long and successful career there, and of the huge undertaking which
he has built up, the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company’ (Christie, 1984: 38,
quoting from C. Merz: Charles Hesterman Merz, (TS, 1936), pp. 2.
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the Group’s requirements’ (Price, 1941: 271). Second, the power company
had to supply compressed air ‘at a price which was roughly equivalent to that
which would have been paid had the Mines of the Group electrified the com-
pressors then existing on their properties and purchased electricity under the
Contract for driving them’ (Price, 1941: 271).110
This capital of £1,800,000, according to Klingenberg’s declarations,
included equal portions of debentures and shares. The debentures ‘were
again subscribed in Germany, the Deutsche Bank participating on this occa-
sion, with the result that a share of the plant was manufactured by the Sie-
mens Schuckertwerke’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 194). The ‘idea of devel-
oping the water power of the Victoria Falls had in the meantime been
abandoned’ because of pressure from the coal owners, who ‘had prohibited
the importation of electrical energy into the Transvaal (Klingenberg, 1916
[1913]: 194). This position led the Victoria Falls Power Company Ltd.
(VFPC) to change its name to the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Com-
pany (VFTPC) in 1908 and to register a subsidiary company in the Trans-
vaal named Rand Mines Power Supply Company (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]:
194).111
The A.E.G. was contacted to construct new power stations and to supply
seven steam turbines and equipment for transmission lines, a cable network
and a network of air pipes (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 195). According to
Klingenberg, the RMPS appointed him (Klingenberg), Arthur Wright and
W.A. Harper as consulting engineers.112 Finally, Klingenberg points out that
the impending increase in the demand for power by the Eckstein group was
110 ‘This presented the Power Company with the somewhat novel and by no means
easy problem of establishing a centralised scheme for the production and distribution of
compressed air on a much larger scale than had previously been attempted anywhere in
the world’ (Price, 1941: 271).
111 Klingenberg mentions a trip to South Africa with Lord Winchester in spring 1909 to
discuss the design and sites for the power stations, and claims that Lord Winchester pro-
posed to form the Rand Mines Power Supply Company (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 193).
112 Klingenberg assumed responsibility for engineering and Wright and Harper ‘under-
took the certification of surveys and invoices and the work of inspecting and testing the
whole of the plant before dispatch and after erection to ensure compliance with gua-
rantees’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 195).
110 3. Technological Change and the “Savage Slot”
expected to push their total to 5000 million k.w.-hours, due to their acquisi-
tion of two additional mining companies (Modderfontain Gold Mining
Company and the Bantjes Consolidated Mines) and new contracts for power
supply to ‘the Goldfields and Albu groups’ (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 195).
In other words, Klingenberg’s chain of reasoning for the establishment of the
VFPC and the RMPS ends with the situation in which they appear on the
scene just in time to meet the demand with a regional system of large central
power stations.
Weinberger, on the other hand, claims that the idea to generate electric
power at the Victoria Falls cannot be attributed to any single person or
group. Instead, she attributes the gigantic regional power system on the Wit-
watersrand, and the strong role of the A.E.G. in its development, to the
expansion of German imperialism, spurred by the close collaboration
between German banks, government and industry (Weinberger, 1971). Ger-
man banks were co-owners of mines in the Transvaal that, according to
Weinberger, possessed one-sixth of the entire mining capital of the Trans-
vaal. Deutsche and Dresdner Banks, together with Siemens and the A.E.G.,
respectively, had already established export organizations in the Transvaal by
1895.113 In addition, Weinberger points out that the VFTPC and the RMPS
removed the Siemens company as the main supplier of electrical manu-
facturing equipment in the Transvaal and established the monopoly of the A.
E.G. The A.E.G.’s drive for capital expansion abroad was reinforced by the
situation in Germany, where the construction of power stations was inhib-
ited by the historically fragmented development of the electricity supply and
legal restrictions (Weinberger, 1971: 62).
In Weinberger’s account, the African Concessions Syndicate convened a
board of experts to oversee the contracting process, and the American Ralph
Mershon114 and the German Georg Klingenberg independently proposed the
best technical solutions. They reached an agreement to proceed with joint
forces, and ‘at the end of these negotiations was the establishment of the Vic-
toria Falls Power Company in 1906’ (Weinberger, 1971: 62).
113 Technical and Commercial Corporation Ltd., and United Engineering Company Ltd.
114 Hughes also mentions Ralph Mershon, as an engineer of Westinghouse (Hughes,
1983: 161) and graduate of the new electrical engineering programs (Hughes, 1983: 163).
3.2 Electrification in Johannesburg 111
With the Marquis of Winchester as Chairman, the head offices in Lon-
don and the place of jurisdiction in Salisbury, Rhodesia, the VFPC appeared
in public as a British company. Ten of the 12 members of the board of direc-
tors were British, and two were German. The German directors were Emil
Rathenau and Hans Schuster. The African Concessions Company (on behalf
of the BSAC) owned one million pounds of common shares, but the prefer-
ence shares and debentures were possessed by German banks and the A.E.G.
(Weinberger, 1971). A finance syndicate had been established to finance the
VFPC, which in the beginning comprised 15 German and Swiss banks, head-
ed by the Dresdner Bank (Weinberger, 1971: 63). In this way, the A.E.G. and
the German banks owned the controlling interest and could dictate their
conditions (Weinberger, 1971: 63).
Weinberger raises two important questions about this decisive point in
the history of electrification in Johannesburg. Why would the the BSAC/
African Concessions Syndicate Company voluntarily concede rights and
privileges to the A.E.G.? Why was the technical project commissioned to a
German company despite the official preference for British companies, given
that Ralph Mershon appeared to have submitted a technically equivalent solu-
tion? She mentions two factors that influenced this outcome: capital cross-
ownership and the 1903 division of the world between the A.E.G. and Gen-
eral Electric.
One of the most powerful figures in the gold mining industry, Werner
Beit, was financially involved in both the BSAC and the consortium of
German banks that financed the VFCP. In February 1904, Union Elek-
trizitätsgesellschaft (UEG, founded 5 January 1892 as the overseas agency
of the Thomson-Houston Electric Company (founded 1882)) merged with
the A.E.G. in Berlin. All of the banks of the Union company were repre-
sented as directors of the A.E.G. At the time of the merger, Union Elek-
trizitätsgesellschaft was a subsidiary of the American General Electric Com-
pany. Rathenau had travelled to America in 1903 to negotiate with General
Electric.
Weinberger writes that the first step that the VFPC took was to acquire
the two existing power stations on the Rand, the RCEW and the GEPC. The
particulars of this agreement are of interest, because they may be regarded as
an excellent strategy by the VFPC to create a monopoly. Instead of paying
for the power stations, the VFPC reimbursed its potential competitors by
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involving them in the new enterprise; the RCEW was reimbursed with pref-
erence shares and debentures (175,000 and 175,000 respectively), and the
GEPC with 150,000 preference shares (Weinberger, 1971).
Renfrew Christie’s history of electrification in South Africa dedicates an
entire chapter to the establishment of the VFTPC, entitled ‘The Creation of a
Monopoly, 1905–1914’.115 Christie emphasizes the close connections
between electrification, industrial development, labour and class in South
Africa. He considers the monopoly to be the logical result of the large capital
investment required for the establishment of an electric power industry.116
Accordingly, he presents the history of the VFTPC as resulting from the
struggle by different interest groups to obtain this monopoly. The winners of
this struggle, the A.E.G. and the German banks, in his view, had bought
‘their way into the British colony of the Transvaal by paying the African
Concessions Ltd. an exorbitant price for the Falls Concession’ (Christie,
1984: 31). Through this transaction, the BSAC ‘was selling to the Germans a
British character for the power works’ (Christie, 1984: 31). The VFPC project
to harness power from the Victoria Falls served to hide ‘the real intentions’ of
the company, which were ‘to build a very large set of steam plants on the
Rand’ (Christie, 1984: 31).
The Power Companies Commission and the Transvaal Power Act
of 1910
In response to the VFPTC monopoly, the Transvaal government appointed a
Commission of Inquiry into the ‘desirability of the establishment of large
electric power companies in the Transvaal’, their effects on various industries
115 Christie’s historical account is largely based on publications in the British journal
Electrical Review and correspondence between key players in this process: Professor Ayr-
ton, R. Hammond, Hermann Eckstein, Julius Wernher, Reyersbach, Harper, L. Phillips,
Winchester, Rathenau.
116 ‘Steam power was well-established on the Rand before developments in electrical
technology made steam less efficient than electricity […]. The existence of steam made
the introduction of electric engines more difficult, because steam engines represented
large investments which had to be more than compensated for by increases in pro-
ductivity, if electrification were to be profitable’ (Christie, 1984: 13).
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(gold, coal, railways and agriculture) and on labour (Power Companies
Commission, 1910: 7). The Power Companies Commission also was expect-
ed to report on the state’s powers and its involvement with such compa-
nies.117 Christie (1984) has referred to the appointment of the Power Com-
panies Commission and its findings as ‘an exercise of accommodation’ by the
Transvaal government, ‘whereby the new, and highly necessary, electricity
monopoly was fitted into the existing relations of production, in such a way
as to ensure the minimum of unnecessary disruption of vested capitalist
interests’ (Christie, 1984: 39). The Power Companies Commission was
established by the governor general of the colonial government (Gentle,
2008: 55), ‘his Majesty’s High Commissioner for South Africa, and the Gov-
ernor and Commander-in-Chief of the Transvaal’, the Earl of Selborne (Wil-
liam Palmer) (Christie, 1984: 39).118
The Power Commission’s report contained details on the authorized
capital, assets, financial results and prospects of the VFTPC. It also recog-
nized that ‘It is obvious that the Victoria Falls Company intended, not only
to buy up existing undertakings on the Rand, but also to increase and
improve existing plant, to enlarge the sphere of operations, and to obtain as
many as possible of the Rand mining companies as its customers’ (Power
117 ‚What powers and facilities (if any) should be conferred on such companies by the
State; what restrictions and conditions (if any) should be imposed upon them, and what
powers of expropriation (if any) should be reserved to the State’ (Power Companies
Commission, 1910: 7).
118 The Committee first heard ‘the evidence of the proprietors of existing undertakings
engaged in the supply of electric power and the promoters of proposed schemes, and after
them all persons who might have objections against existing or proposed undertakings’
(Power Companies Commission, 1910: 8). Written statements were also submitted on
behalf of ‘individuals and public bodies’ (Power Companies Commission, 1910: 8). One
of the individuals who provided evidence ‘on behalf of’ the Victoria Falls and Transvaal
Power Company, in favour of the building of a monopoly system of large power stations
was ‘Professor’ Georg Klingenberg. His evidence was referred to in the report. Charles
Merz had also been approached for advice with regard to the work of the commission but
he could not spare the time to travel to South Africa.
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Companies Commission, 1910: 11).119 The report also noted that ‘the large
holding of German firms is responsible for the fact that the supply of materi-
al for the new stations at Brakpan and Simmer Pan, as well as the contracts
for erection, have fallen mainly to German contractors and manufacturers’.
The commission was, however, satisfied ‘that although the German sub-
scribers of capital stipulated for German manufacturers and contractors,
these latter would, in any case, have succeeded in open tender’ (Power Com-
panies Commission, 1910: 12). The Power Companies Commission pointed
out that the articles of association of the VFTCP were ‘of the widest charac-
ter’ (Power Companies Commission, 1910: 11) and those of its subsidiary,
the Rand Mines Power Supply Company, were ‘as various in character and as
wide in scope as those of the parent company’ (Power Companies Commis-
sion, 1910: 12).
Despite these reservations, the report emphasized the importance of
cheap electric power for industrial development and concluded in favour
of new technology,120 centralized power generation and distribution,121
119 ‘The existing power companies have taken steps which have had the effect of elimi-
nating competition within considerable areas, with the result that they are now in the
possession of what is practically monopolistic power’ (Power Companies Commission,
1910: 27).
120 ‘The greater simplicity and convenience of electric power is a technical advantage
which has been adduced by several of the engineers who gave evidence’ (Power Compa-
nies Commission, 1910: 16).
121 ‘The evidence before the Commission is unanimous that in comparison to the cost
of an average mine where the size of generating plant does not exceed a few thousand
kilowatts, the cost of producing power is greatly reduced when running plant ten to twen-
ty times as large’ (Power Companies Commission, 1910: 15), and ‘Your commission are
satisfied that the supply of cheap electric power to the mines will, on account of the eco-
nomic and other advantages adduced, help to lead to an expansion of the mining indu-
stry’ (Power Companies Commission, 1910: 16).
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a monopoly of electricity supply on the Witwatersrand122 and the need to
stipulate government regulations.123
Following the report of the Power Companies Commission, the Trans-
vaal Colonial Government passed the Transvaal Power Act of 28 May
1910.124 It supported the construction of large electric power stations under
the monopoly of the VFTPC and the A.E.G. under government supervision.
Although the operational expansion of the VFTPC was allowed, the com-
pany was to be expropriated after 35 years. Under this Act, the generators
and distributors of electricity in specific areas had to apply for a licence from
the Power Undertaking Board.125 Local authorities retained the exclusive
right of supply within their boundaries. The Transvaal Power Act was passed
only three days before the establishment of the Union of South Africa on 31
May 1910 (Christie, 1984).
122 ‘The principle should be adopted by the State that no legal monopoly be allowed
within the area of supply, but at the same time, unless it is in the public interest, a compe-
titor should not be allowed to enter the area of supply’ (Power Companies Commission,
1910: 32). The report of the Power Companies Commission makes reference to the Eng-
lish Lighting Act of 1882, 1888, and 1899, the statutes of which ‘specifically declare that
no legal monopoly shall be granted to the undertaker’ (Power Companies Commission,
1910: 29).
123 ‘Since the supply of electric power thus leads to the establishment of a virtual mono-
poly in a commodity which has become practically a necessity of modern civilization, it
should, while being left as far as possible to private enterprise, at the same time be placed
under Government control and subjected to regulations which shall secure the equitable
supply of power, the public safety, and public interests generally’ (Power Companies
Commission, 1910: 26).
124 ‘This Act should constitute the requisite controlling and regulating authority under
the direction of a Minister of the Crown, and should define its limits and the scope of its
discretion in such a manner as to enable it to make general regulations and special pro-
visions for the licensing, control, and supervision of power undertakings subject to such
principles as may be laid down in the general Act in order to secure the public rights and
interests’ (Power Companies Commission, 1910: 30).
125 ‘It seems desirable to the Commission that every power company operating in this
Colony should be registered in the Transvaal under limited liability laws of the Colony, and
should have its head office in this Colony’ (Power Companies Commission, 1910: 31).
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The Act also regulated prices for consumers by introducing an auto-
matic method of profit sharing as the basis for controlling the operations of
power supply undertakings, which would continue to influence the econom-
ics of the electricity supply in the decades to come. This method ‘does not
involve the continual investigation and litigation necessitated by the systems
adopted in America and certain other countries’ (Price, 1941: 272).
Technological empire and ‘the native’
The VFTPC monopoly was formed in Johannesburg during the years when
the Transvaal was still a British Colony. Companies of the two otherwise
contending imperial nations, Great Britain and Germany, allied to establish
this gigantic electric power scheme. The foreign monopoly was legally
endorsed through the Power Companies Act just a few days before four sep-
arate British colonies were joined to found the Union of South Africa as a
dominion of the British Empire.
At the time of Union, Johannesburg was already racially segregated.126
After Union, the different segregation policies of the four provinces127 gave
way to national segregation policies (Christopher, 1988), such as the Mines
and Works Act of 1911 (sometimes referred to as the Colour Bar Act) and
the Natives Land Act of 1913 (Act of Parliament of South Africa), the first
major piece of segregation legislation passed by the Union Parliament.128
126 ‘[…] in Johannesburg […] private compounds and shanty towns housed conside-
rable numbers of Black and other persons. In 1902, the largest shanty town, “the Insani-
tary Area”, housing a mixed population, was demolished and a new all-White township,
“Newtown”, took its place. Blacks and Coloureds were moved to new locations set aside
for them as singly race residential areas. […] effectively removing a portion of the Black
population from the sight of the White citizens’ (Christopher, 1988: 155).
127 ‘Urban racial segregation in South Africa is complex and bound up with urban ori-
gins and development. Prior to 1910 the four colonies which merged to form the Union
had evolved different approaches to racial segregation ranging from passive socio-econo-
mic segregation to legal enforcement’ (Christopher, 1988: 151).
128 The Act decreed that only certain areas of the country could be owned by natives. It
created a system of land tenure that deprived the majority of South Africa’s inhabitants of
the right to own land.
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In 1910, the British Empire ‘[comprised] a fourth part of the habitable
globe and almost a third of the numbers of mankind’ (Lyttelton, 1911: 2),
and ‘the British dominions in South Africa, south of the Congo State,
[extended] to some 1,200,000 square miles of country’ (Hely-Hutchinson,
1911: 93). Birchenough, a member of the Board of Directors of the VFTPC
considered ‘the gold-bearing reefs and deposits of the Witwatersrand and of
Southern Rhodesia’ as ‘among the wonders of the modern world’ (Birche-
nough, 1911: 134). Newspaper articles on the Victoria Falls power project
reveal the imperial disposition of this idea. An article in the Chicago Sunday
Tribune of 28 November 1908 noted that the Victoria Falls amounted to five
times Niagara’s power capacity and ‘[…] may be used for the building up of
an industrial empire which will affect the whole of this part of the continent’
(Carpenter, 1908: 2).129 The article further stated:
The financial arrangements for harnessing the Niagara of the Zambesi have been
completed. Within the last few months a London syndicate has been formed, with a
paid up capital of 15,000,000 dollars, and surveys are now making for the installa-
tion of one of the greatest electrical plants of the world. The various power compa-
nies of the Rand have been purchased, and the new syndicate practically controls
the power possibilities of South Africa (Carpenter, 1908: 2).
The New York Times in 1912 summarized the Victoria Falls power project
as the largest undertaking outside of America:
The great power scheme at Victoria Falls is not yet under way, and according to Mr.
Hadley [Managing Director] it is not likely to be pushed until the country adjacent
to the Falls gets other population than what it has at present. Just now the wild
tribes don’t need electricity, and lions, elephants, and giraffes cannot find any use
for it, so the company [VFTPC] is devoting its attention mainly to making power in
the Transvaal, and selling electricity and compressed air to the gold mines on the
Rand (New York Times, 1912).
129 The newspaper article on Harnessing the Victoria Falls. Industrial Revolution Likely
to Follow the Utilisation of the Tremendous Force, by Frank. G. Carpenter, published in
the Chicago Sunday Tribune of 28 November 1908, reads: ‘This power here, at the same
rate, would daily equal the force of 1,000,000 tons of coal, to that, figuratively speaking, a
million tons of black diamonds are dropping down into this gorge every twenty-four
hours’ (Carpenter, 1908: 2).
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The original idea to ‘harness’ power from the Victoria Falls had formed part
of Cecil Rhodes’ vision of a British Empire from the Cape to Cairo.130 This
vision had led to the BSAC’s annexation of Mashonaland and Matabeleland
and its attempt to populate the country with white settlers. The railway
reached the Victoria Falls in April of 1904, and the Victoria Falls Bridge
across the Zambezi River was completed and opened by the President of the
British scientific Association, George Darwin (son of Charles Darwin) only
one year later, in July 1905.
The realization of the idea to build railways to, and a tourist resort at,
the Victoria Falls at the beginning of the 20th century must be pictured.
McGregor presents the idea of the railways reaching the Victoria Falls as
provoking ‘fantasies of economic growth, and global comparisons’ (McGre-
gor, 2003: 725):
[…] the resort commemorated nineteenth century explorers […] was significant in
establishing a lineage stretching backwards, but it also reflected a new sense of dis-
tance from, and progress since, the age of the Victorian pioneers. The early twen-
tieth century resort celebrated modernity, the achievements of colonial science and
command over nature, epitomised by the railway, the bridge over the Zambezi […]
(McGregor, 2003: 725).
The local inhabitants of the area around the Victoria Falls, the Leya, had
been removed from the lands that they had occupied around the waterfall :
‘What is notable about the tourist images of scenery, leisure and luxury at the
Victoria Falls, particularly on the South bank, is the exclusion of all Africans
(other than the occasional glimpse of Lozi royalty or ‘dusky servants’), and
the failure to mention those who bore the costs and laboured to build the
resort’ (McGregor, 2003: 733).
Although the VFTPC ultimately did not exploit the Victoria Falls, the
original idea continued to inspire the company, as is indicated by the reten-
tion of its original name and reputed purpose. The electrical industry and
130 ‘And in years to come, when industrial cities spring up north and south of the pre-
sent township at the Falls, the fruits of the undertaking may be colossal. […] it is not
surprising that the scheme is one having a peculiar fascination for men of large prevision
like the late Mr. Cecil Rhodes, and that engineers and other practical men have become
enthusiastic since their interest was aroused’ (Wills, 2005: 265).
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technology established in Johannesburg was designed to meet the interests of
settler populations. Although British and German colonial policies in South-
ern Africa pursued different strategies and ends, they shared a sense of social
entitlement to impose colonial rule over the indigenous populations, which
they referred to as ‘the native’ or ‘the kaffir’.
The VFTPC’s Simmerpan and Rosherville power stations were built in
tandem with ‘residences and quarters’ for its employees (Hadley, 1913:
30).131 At the time, ‘public transport was limited to a horse-drawn bus to and
from Cleveland, and stables were provided for employees who owned hors-
es’.132 The transport of materials was handled by ‘a special department’ that
employed ‘two motor lorries and 50 mules and horses’ (Hadley, 1913: 31),
and ‘a fleet of 14 motor-cars [was] maintained in constant service for the use
of those officers and engineers of the Company whose duties [necessitated]
visiting the different parts of the system’ (Hadley, 1913: 30–1). VFTPC
employees were categorized into the following three groups.
1. A small, but highly skilled ‘officers corps’ consisting of engineers of
whom the majority were British immigrants from the industrial areas
of northern England and Scotland.
2. A middle class consisting mostly of local skilled white supervisors,
clerks and artisans.
3. A large group of unskilled labourers.133
These employment categories essentially reflected the threefold racial classi-
fication of population groups at Union, introduced in the 1911 census.
131 ‘The Company realizes the importance of welfare work and its influence on the con-
ditions of the life of the staff. They give a generous support to recreation and sport, and
facilitate in every way the promotion of social intercourse among all classes of the emp-
loyees. Some 60 residences and quarters have been built by the Company at the various
power stations, and at each station a boarding-house and recreation-rooms are provided.
Generally speaking, the conditions of life compare very favourably with those of an eng-
ineer on the mines’ (Hadley, 1913: 30).
132 http://www.eskom.co.za/sites/heritage/Pages/VFP-%281%29.aspx., accessed 15.9.2015.
133 Quoted from Eskom’s heritage site at http://www.eskom.co.za/sites/heritage/Pages/
VFP-(1).aspx (accessed October 2015).
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1. Europeans (Whites) – descendants of persons originating in Europe
who were recognizably white.
2. Natives (Blacks) – descendants of persons indigenous to Africa, with
the exception of the Khoisan peoples of the Western Cape, who were
included in group 3.
3. Coloureds – other persons not included in the first two categories.
The two main subgroupings, recognized in subsequent censuses,
were Cape Coloured (the predominantly mixed population descend-
ed from Europeans, Africans and Asian slaves), and Asians, immi-
grants predominantly from India (Christopher, 1988: 151–2).
Accordingly, ‘the towns and cities of South Africa were, in 1911, all of Euro-
pean foundation and constructed for the European colonists to live and work
in’ (Christopher, 1988: 152). Temporary quarters were established for the
non-white society, and segregated residential areas were defined. At this
time, Johannesburg had ‘marked racial residential zoning restrictions which
strongly influenced population distributions, as few Blacks or Indians were
able to acquire property in areas where Whites sought consistently to exclude
them’ (Christopher, 1988: 156). Christopher considers mining settlements
such as Johannesburg to have been much more segregated than other towns
because of the ‘presence of large numbers of Blacks housed in segregated
company compounds’ (Christopher, 1988: 165). The system of compound
housing had been adopted from the diamond mines in Kimberley.
In 1907, the German colonial secretary, Richard Dernburg, designated
technology as the most important ancillary science of the German colo-
nizer.134 He considered cultural progress to have affected a change in the
colonial method: ‘Whereas previously colonization took place by methods of
destruction, today colonization takes place by methods of conservation, and
these equally include the missionary, the doctor, railroads, machines, in
134 ‘Die Technik ist vielleicht die wichtigste Hilfswissenschaft des Kolonisators. Wir
haben den Bohrtechniker und den Windmotor. […] Wir haben den Elektrotechniker
[…]’ (Dernburg, 1907: 11).
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other words, the advanced theoretical and applied sciences in all fields’
(Dernburg, 1907: 9, my translation).135
In 1908, Bernhard Dernburg was accompanied on his tour of Southern
Africa by Walther Rathenau, the son of Emil Rathenau (purchaser of Edison
Patents for Germany and the founder of the A.E.G.), a member of the board
of directors of the A.E.G., the head of the division on central power stations
in 1899 prior to Klingenberg, a member of the governing board and later the
board of directors of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft and members of the
board of directors of more than 100 companies, including the A.E.G., the
industrial undertaking that received financing from the Berliner Handelsge-
sellschaft. Along with the Deutsche Bank, the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft
had been involved in the syndicate that financed the establishment of A.
Goerz GmbH in 1892, the company for which Siemens and Halske had built
the first power station in Johannesburg.
On the occasion of their trip through Southern Africa, Rathenau was
hosted by Louis Botha (who was to be the first prime minister of the Union
of South Africa) and Jan Smuts (prime minister of South Africa in 1939).
Rathenau and Dernburg were also received as private guests of Lionel Phil-
lips (Christie, 1984: 43). Dernburg, Rathenau and Phillips shared a sense of
entitlement of imperial nations over the indigenous populations of the
Transvaal and Southern Africa, as indicated by the following quotes.
Because the black man does not know investment capital, return on equity,
administrative expenses, depreciation, settlement of working hours, his production
cost is covered with his daily subsistence (Rathenau, Reflexionen, 2008: 149, my
translation).136
135 ‘[…] ist es eine Freude, zu konstatieren, daß mit dem kulturellen Forschritt in der
Welt auch die Kolonisationsmethoden eine große Wandlung haben durchmachen kön-
nen. Hat man früher mit Zerstörungsmitteln kolonisiert, so kann man heute mit Erhal-
tungsmitteln kolonisieren, und dazu gehören ebenso der Missionar, wie der Arzt, die
Eisenbahn, wie die Maschine, also die fortgeschrittene theoretische und angewandte Wis-
senschaft auf allen Gebieten‘ (Dernburg, 1907: 9).
136 ‘Denn der Schwarze kennt weder Anlagekapital noch Verzindsung, Verwaltungs-
kosten, Abschreibungen, Zeitverrechnung. Seine Erzeugungskosten sind gedeckt, wenn er
sich den Tag über ernährt hat’ (Rathenau, Reflexionen 2008: 149).
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But the native is the most important object of colonisation […]. Because slavery has
been abolished – thank God – and suitable labourers can only be obtained either
from other colonies or one’s own, and because manual power of the native is the
most important asset, we have here an eminently important problem (Dernburg,
1907: 6–7, my translation).137
There are two respects in which even the uncontaminated Kaffir is low in the scale,
according to our moral standards. He has no regard for the truth, and he is treach-
erous by nature. His smiling face is no index to his reflections (Phillips, 1905: 102).
According to the present standards of measurement, the natives are in all respects,
in strength, in stamina, in capacity, and in acquirements, inferior beings, and, if that
be acknowledged, the mission and the right of the white man lies in governing them
with justice and firmness, in giving them a well-defined legal status, in promoting
their intellectual and industrial training, in stimulating their power of self-control,
and in inculcating the principles of morality. For the present they are separated
from white men, not by colour, not by wealth, not even fundamentally by education,
but by a gulf of profound mental dissimilarity (Phillips, 1905: 137).
Although there are no records that present the views of the A.E.G.’s designer
of the gigantic power scheme in Johannesburg, Georg Klingenberg, on
‘natives’, he may be seen to follow suit with these previous quotes. His tech-
nological scheme did not consider ‘the native’ as a member of society but
only as a labourer:
Notwithstanding the many impurities it contains, the cost of mining the coal is very
small ; the low depth at which it is found, cheap native labour, chiefly, however, the
great thickness of seams, which make all constructional work unnecessary, keep the
mining costs very low (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 197).
137 ‘Nun ist aber der Eingeborene der wichtigste Gegenstand der Kolonisation […].
Denn da die Sklaverei – Gott sei Dank – abgeschafft ist, die geeigneten Arbeiter also nur
entweder auf dem Wege des Kontakts aus anderen Kolonien, oder aus der eignenen bezo-
gen werden können, und die manuelle Leistung des Eingeborenen das wichtigste Aktivum
bildet, so liegt hier ein eminent wichtiges Problem‘ (Dernburg, 1907: 6–7).
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1914 to 1930: Enter Escom
In the development of every new country the first necessity is the estab-
lishment of means of communication – roads, railways, telegraphs. At a
later stage, depending upon the labour, raw materials and markets avail-
able, manufactures spring up. In order to develop and flourish, manu-
factures nowadays need cheap power.
Merz and McLellan, ‘Electric Power Supply in the Union of South
Africa’, 1920.
The First World War
The First World War brought South Africa ‘higher productivity, new prod-
ucts, new markets, more machinery and greater use of energy, especially elec-
tricity’.138 (Christie, 1984: 52). The war in Europe spurred the growth of local
industry, and mining and agricultural production increased. After 1917, the
gold mining companies undertook to ‘increase mechanization of mining’ and
required more electric power (Christie, 1984: 56). Jackhammers were intro-
duced, and working hours were prolonged. The VFTPC was directly influ-
enced by these changing conditions: ‘[…] when gold boomed so would the
VFTPC’s fortunes. Equally, strikes would hit both’ (Christie, 1984: 57). South
Africa also developed new industries that required electricity during and
after the war. Consumption increased because of ‘a heavy industrial infra-
structure […] under state ownership or stimulus, in the fields of metallurgy,
transport and energy’ (Christie, 1984: 51).
These developments were accompanied by a series of strikes involving
the gold mines, the coal mines and the VFTPC. In May 1915, employees of
138 ‘The wars brought state research into problems of local industry, they brought state
co-ordination and planning of production, they brought fuller employment and higher
effective demand. World financial disruption spurred on the creation of local capital.
Competitive imports were excluded temporarily by shipping problems. The need for sol-
diers meant that machinery was used wherever possible in production, releasing men for
military service. In all, the crises formed by the wars led to higher productivity, new pro-
ducts, new markets, more machinery, and greater use of energy, especially electricity’
(Christie, 1984: 52).
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the VFTPC went on strike ‘demanding that the Company should cease to
employ Germans’, and in 1918, ‘Johannesburg municipal power-workers
struck for higher wages’ (Christie, 1984: 55). In April 1919, the Johannes-
burg municipal power station workers went on strike. At the same time, a
‘mass pass-law resistance campaign’ was launched by the Transvaal Native
Congress (Christie, 1984: 60). In early 1922, strikes were held by workers at
collieries, gold mines and electric power stations of the VFTPC. Failed nego-
tiations led to an armed uprising, known as the Rand Revolt. Power stations
‘were an important focus of much of the fighting’ in these events (Christie,
1984: 66). The revolt was put down forcefully by Prime Minister Jan Smuts.
According to Christie, the strikes ironically ‘moved the mine-owners further
to control the labour-process by using machinery’ (Christie, 1984: 67). This,
in turn, increased the gold mines’ demand for electric power from the
VFTPC. After the strike and the Rand revolt in 1922, the VFTPC continued
to grow steadily for 20 years (Christie, 1984).
After the war, the regulation of the electricity supply was considered at
the national level for the first time, spurred by the issue of railway elec-
trification. The Electricity Act of 1922 was passed, superseding the Transvaal
Power Act of 1910. This new Act provided for the establishment of a nation-
al Electricity Commission (Escom) and an Electricity Control Board. Escom
was authorized to sell electricity to consumers at neither profit nor loss.
When the demand for electricity by the gold mines increased after 1922,
Escom and the VFTPC built a new power station at Witbank. The equip-
ment for this power station and the electrification of the railways was sup-
plied by British manufacturers (Christie, 1984: 89).
The First World War ended the VFTPC’s connection with the German
manufacturing industry.139 The war greatly impacted Germany’s interna-
tional industry, and ‘prewar German interests in electric utilities [were]
replaced by foreign capital intermediated by companies domiciled in the
139 In 1915, the managing director of the VFTPC would state, ‘“There is a popular idea
that the VFTPC is a German company. This is entirely wrong. There is not a German
Director on the Board, and it is only on account of the Debentures still held by the
German banks that any connection with Germany still exists.”‘ (Christie, 1984: 56, quo-
ting Bernard Price, 1915).
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homelands of the victors, in countries that had been neutral, or in countries
that had been occupied by Germany […]’ (Hausman et al., 2008: 137). In
August 1914, Britain forbade trade with Germany (Christie, 1984: 56). The
German interests in the VFTPC ‘passed to British ownership and control
(with the control now linked with British South African mining interests)’
(Hausman et al., 2008: 139).140 Prior to the war, German investors ‘had used
or maintained British registration as they became owners of the equity of
certain free standing companies in electric utilities’ (Hausman et al., 2008:
139). The British government had promoted these processes as part of their
attempt to foster the basic industries in the empire (Christie, 1984). In 1918,
a British Departmental Committee on the Electrical Trades issued a report
that considered the effect of the war on ‘the British electricity industry’s big-
gest competitor’ (Christie, 1984: 52). The report regarded electricity as ‘cru-
cial to the industrialization of South Africa’ (Christie, 1984: 54). Jan Smuts, a
member of the Imperial War Cabinet, saw this report and ‘took steps leading
to the creation of Escom’ (Christie, 1984: 54).
The Merz Reports on Railways (1919) and Electrification (1920)
In 1917, during the war, the British consulting company Merz and McLellan
was appointed to report on the possibilities and advantages of electrification
of the South African Railways. F. Lydall completed the report for Merz and
McLellan in 1919. Merz discussed the report at several meetings in London
with General Botha, General Smuts and Sir William Hoy, after the Versailles
conference (Rowland, 1960: 87; Christie, 1984: 79). Merz subsequently trav-
elled to South Africa for further conferences and was again commissioned by
140 At the imperial level, industrial research committees were established in England.
The committee on electrical trades argued that the war would destroy the British elec-
tricity industry’s biggest competitor, Germany, which, because of the relative backwar-
dness of Britain and the financial power of Germany, had obtained British Empire con-
tracts before the war, ‘including the well-known case of the Victoria Falls Company’
(Christie, 1984: 52).
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General Smuts in August 1919 to undertake a study of the general supply of
electricity in South Africa (Rowland, 1960: 88; Christie, 1984: 81).141
The report was submitted in April 1920 and recommended that the
South African government adopt a policy to establish ‘a system of power
supply […] before the industrial development of the country [had] pro-
ceeded any further’ (Merz & McLellan, 1920: 19). Merz considered South
Africa to be in an advantageous position because it could enact legislation
before industrial development and thus without interference of a variety of
interests.
In Great Britain and the older countries generally, the fact that electrical legislation
has had to follow industrial development, instead of keeping pace with or, better
still, preceding it, has seriously hampered the development of manufacturing. South
Africa is fortunate in being able at the present times to lay down its power supply
system almost at the foundation, instead of having to superimpose it upon an old-
established industrial fabric (Merz & McLellan, 1920: 19).
To regulate and unify the electricity supply in South Africa, Merz recom-
mended an Act of Parliament to establish ‘a body similar to the Electricity
Commissioners which had been set up in Britain under the Electricity (Sup-
ply) Act 1919’ (Rowland, 1960: 88). Legislation was necessary to impose
‘technical uniformity, limit prices, control the raising of capital and deal with
water rights, wayleaves, and expropriation and the like’ (Christie, 1984:
81).142 The Merz report argued in favour of large power stations for
141 ‘The object of this Report is to consider the possibility and best means of organizing
the supply of power to the industries both existing and likely to develop in the Union of
South Africa’ (Merz & McLellan, 1920: 1).
142 ‘[This Act] should deal with rights of way, compulsory acquisition of land, consents
of local authorities, breaking up of streets, the use of water, statistical returns, powers to
undertakers to co-operate and make agreements with other producers and industries ; and
their responsibility as regards issue of capital, rates and conditions of sully, tariffs, etc. It
should authorise the fixing of standards of pressure and frequency’ (Merz & McLellan,
1920: 17).
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economic reasons.143 Merz advocated the development of an electric power
supply in South Africa as follows.
The importance of developing the supply of electric power in the Union arises from
the need for encouraging its existing manufactures and attracting new and perma-
nent industries as rapidly as possible. This latter has been emphasized by yourself,
and by many important public bodies, who have stated that in no other way can an
adequate white population be obtained. It is therefore a policy which justifies the
expenditure of money in advance of to-day’s actual needs (Merz & McLellan, 1920:
iii ; my emphasis).
In this way, Merz linked the necessity of large-scale, strategic electrification
to the development of the ‘white population’ of South Africa. In the report,
he refers to the Electricity (Supply) Act that had just been passed in Britain,
which he considered to be ‘not without its bearing on South Africa, in view
of the similarity of the general principles involved’ (Merz & McLellan, 1920:
18).144 The report regularly refers to South Africa as a ‘new country’ and con-
trasts it with ‘Europe’ (Merz & McLellan, 1920: 15) or ‘Great Britain and the
older countries generally’ (Merz & McLellan, 1920: 19). Merz repeatedly
emphasizes the advantages of the South African situation compared with
Great Britain.
This being the existing state of affairs, it may be said that the Union is fortunate
because in many ways it is in a much better position than Great Britain and other
old countries as regards the possibilities of initiating a new policy of electrical sup-
ply. In these older countries vested interests have been created to a much greater
extent, and must be considered to a greater degree than in South Africa. In Great
Britain the industry is still to a large extent governed by legislation passed over 30
143 ‘The Report shows that in order to obtain electric power cheaply its production
must be, as far as possible, concentrated in large plants, and the distribution network
must be extended as widely as possible’ (Merz & McLellan, 1920: iii).
144 ‘In this connection the recent legislation in Great Britain is not without its bearing
on South Africa, in view of the similarity of the general principles involved. Under the
British “Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919,” a Board of Electricity Commissioners is appoint-
ed, to whom have been transferred all the powers relating to electric supply hitherto exer-
cised by the Board of Trade and other Government departments’ (Merz & McLellan,
1920: 18).
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years ago, which was framed in a parochial spirit, and has much retarded progress.
The reorganization of electric supply was only undertaken by the British Parliament
last year, and in view of the considerable electrical development which has already
taken place, must be a slower and more difficult process than in South Africa. In the
latter country electrical and industrial development is fortunately at an early stage,
and advantage can be taken of the experience of Great Britain and other countries to
void their mistakes, and of the conditions in South Africa to exploit its advantages
(Merz & McLellan, 1920: 12).
The report recommends standardizing a ‘comprehensive system of power
supply’ across the Union of South Africa before industrializing the country,
including such matters as the type of current and frequency, and the stan-
dard voltages for transmission and distribution (Merz & McLellan, 1920:
13).145
The Electricity Act of 1922, Escom, the Electricity Control Board, and
Witbank Power Station
A committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Robert Kotze, Government
Mining Engineer, drafted and submitted an Electricity Bill to the Minister of
Mines and Industry on 4 March 1921. After various negotiations, the amend-
ed Bill was presented to Parliament in 1922. The Merz report recom-
mendations ‘were put into effect by the passing of the Electricity Act No. 42
of 1922’, which became effective on 1st September 1922 (Jacobs, 1941: 261).
The Act provided for the creation of the Electricity Supply Commission
(Escom) and an Electricity Control Board. The functions of Escom were:
‘The establishment, maintenance, and working of undertakings for the sup-
ply of electricity to the Government and any other bodies or persons what-
soever in the Union of South Africa, and the investigation of new or addi-
tional facilities for the supply of electricity and for the co-ordination or co-
operation of existing undertakings so as to stimulate the provision of a cheap
and abundant supply of electricity’ (Jacobs, 1941: 261). Escom ‘was obliged
to establish and work electricity undertakings to supply railways, government
145 Merz points out the problems encountered in Great Britain where ‘numbers of
systems are to be found employing frequencies varying from 25 cycles to 133 cycles’
(Merz & McLellan, 1920: 13).
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departments, local authorities, industrial undertakings and private persons’
(Christie, 1984: 84). It would be responsible for the evaluation of, and
reporting on, tenders for electricity undertakings to the Electricity Control
Board (ECB). The ECB146 was responsible for the control and licencing of
electricity undertakings and for the examination of tariffs (Jacobs, 1941).147
Decisions on these tenders were to be made by the Governor-General. Escom
was obliged to operate at neither profit nor loss. The Act afforded municipal-
ities the right to provide electricity in municipal areas, on condition of
approval by the provincial administrator (Christie, 1984).
Witbank Power Station
During this same period, the VFTPC anticipated an increasing demand for
electricity and started planning a large new power station at the Witbank
coalfield. By the time the Electricity Act came into force, the necessary
‘agreements for the supply of coal, water and other requisites had been con-
cluded, designs had been prepared and everything was in readiness to pro-
ceed’ (Price, 1941: 272). In 1923, after the 1922 strike had been put down,
the VFTPC applied to the Electricity Control Board for authorization to
build the power station. The Electricity Supply Commission was hurriedly
appointed, with Hendrik van der Bijl as chairman. According to Bernard
Price, general manager of the VFTPC, one of its first actions was ‘to hold up
the hearing of the Company’s application and to engage Messrs. Merz and
McLellan as its Consulting Engineers’ (Price, 1941: 273). With the assistance
of Merz, who travelled to Johannesburg for this purpose to advise Escom,
‘the heads of an agreement were negotiated which laid the foundation for the
co-operative arrangement under which the Commission and the power
Company have been operating’ (Price, 1941: 273).
146 The first members of the ECB were appointed soon after the Act had been passed
and included Sir Robert Kotze, H.J- van der Bijl, J.A. Vaughan and A.C. Marsh (Christie,
1984: 84).
147 ‘When a licence was applied for, the ECB would hold a public hearing of objectors
and arbitrate between rival applications. The ECB would fix standard prices and enforce
the sharing of surplus profits with consumers’ (Christie, 1984: 84).
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The agreements between the VFTPC and Escom for the Witbank power
station were ‘of far-reaching significance in the development of power supply
on the Rand’ (Price, 1941: 273). The negotiations mediated by Merz also
involved the gold mines, collieries, the Johannesburg municipality, and the
South African Railways (Christie, 1984: 87), and they resulted in ‘a carefully
drafted synergy between Escom and the VFTPC’ (Gentle, 2008: 58). The
Witbank power station would be financed and owned by Escom, but it was
to be built, operated and maintained by the VFTCP on behalf of Escom
(Christie, 1984: 87; Price, 1941: 273).148 Electricity from the Witbank power
station would be supplied by Escom to the South African Railways, to colli-
eries, and to industries and other consumers in Witbank. The municipality
of Johannesburg would also be able to purchase power from Escom when
required. The VFTPC was obliged to purchase from Escom and to transmit
all remaining power to the gold mines (Christie, 1984: 87). Under this
arrangement, Escom assumed the role of the provider of electricity for the
collieries and the railways, and the VFTPC was the supplier of power to the
gold mines (Gentle, 2008: 58). The licence to establish and supply electricity
from the Witbank station was granted to Escom. Contracts for the Witbank
Power Station were given to British manufacturers and construction
companies.149
148 ‘An equitable basis was worked out for dividing the cost of producing the energy at
the Station, including capital charges, between the parties according to their respective use
of the plant, so that the overall result was very nearly the same as it would have been had
the Power Company invested its own capital and incurred capital charges thereon at the
rates allowed to it when arriving at surplus profits for division with its consumers’ (Price,
1941: 273).
149 These included Babcock & Wilcox, Ltd. (boilers and boiler house accessories, pipe-
work and pumps, steel buildings and coal and ash handling plants), CA Parsons & Co.,
Ltd. (steam turbines, generators, condensing plant and water cooling plant), Metropoli-
tan-Vickers Electrical Co., Ltd. (transformers and power station switchgear and accesso-
ries), Alexander Jack & Co., Ltd. (overhead travelling crane), Drysdale & Co., Ltd. (ver-
tical spindles pumps and motors), J. Blakeborough & Sons, Ltd. (valves, penstocks and
fittings for pump house), Paterson Engineering Co. (filtration plant for domestic water),
Stewarts & Lloyds, Ltd. (water piping, valves, etc.), British Mannesmann Tube Co., Ltd.
(poles for overhead transmission lines from generating station to pump house), The Bau-
ghan Crane Co. (crane for pump house), A. Stuart, Germiston (construction of dam,
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These principles of ‘co-operative arrangement’ were applied to sub-
sequent new power stations on the Witwatersrand. Escom also established
power stations in Natal and Cape Town after 1924. Electricity supply in
Johannesburg would remain dominated by the VFTPC until 1948, ‘essen-
tially a foreign company making abnormally high profits […]’ (Gentle, 2008:
58) from its business in South Africa. Escom operated ‘as freely as does any
private company’ and was not ‘in any sense a branch of the civil service’
(Jacobs, 1941: 261). Its only stipulations were the appointment of the Com-
missioners by the Governor-General and his approval of any loans taken up
by Escom for its undertakings. Essentially, Escom operated independently of
government, but it had the status of ‘a public utility corporation initiated by
the Government’ (Jacobs, 1941: 261).
The municipality of Johannesburg continued to generate and distribute
its own electricity, because ‘[…] neither Escom nor the VFTCP reached an
agreement for cooperative working with the Johannesburg Municipality […]’
(Christie, 1984: 88). In 1923, shortly after the Electricity Act was passed,
Johannesburg municipality was given a licence to build a new power station
on Jeppe Street adjacent to the existing power station. The first electricity
from the 10 MW turbo generator at Jeppe Street Power Station was gen-
erated in September of 1927, and two further generators were completed
three years later. This independent network was only connected to the
VFPTC distribution system in 1934 (Christie, 1984: 89).
In 1928, another major consumer of electricity was established by the
South African state, the Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR). This state-
owned enterprise was chaired by Escom’s chairman, Hendrik van der Bijl,
who subsequently ‘co-ordinated the work of his two state-owned enterprises
in industrializing South Africa’ (Christie, 1984: 93). Escom, ISCOR and the
South African Railways represented three major industries that were ‘either
state-owned or had a major state-owned component’ (Christie, 1984: 95).
ISCOR built its own power station, designed by A.M. Jacobs, an Escom
pump house, residential buildings, excavations, drainage system, cooling ponds and servi-
ce reservoir and laying of pipeline), A. Bradbury & Co. (Pietermaritzburg, construction of
railway siding from Witbank Station to power station). (http://www.eskom.co.za/sites/heri
tage/Pages/Witbank.aspx), accessed 20. 6. 2015.
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engineer (Christie, 1984: 93). By 1930, the total generating capacity in South
Africa had risen from 162 MW (supplied by the VFTPC) to 418 MW (sup-
plied by the VFTPC and Escom) (Troost & Norman, 1969) (see Table 6).
1915 generating
capacity (MW)
1930 generating capacity (MW)
Brakpan 31 52
Simmerpan 40 40
Rosherville 48 60
Vereeniging 43 51
Witbank 101 powered by duff coal, Escom owner, VFTPC constructor and
operator; transmission line to Brakpan, where it linked up with the
VFTPC distribution system
Colenso 60 (Railways Natal 1921–26)
Built by SAR sold to Escom in 1927
Congella 24 (Durban 1928)
Salt River 30 (Cape Town 1928)
Total 162 MW (VFTPC) 418 MW (VFTPC and Escom)
Table 6: The total electricity generating capacity in South Africa in 1915 (supplied by the
VFTPC) and in 1930 (supplied by the VFTPC and Escom) (Troost & Norman, 1969).
In 1938, Escom decided to build the Vaal power station, and in 1940, the
Klip power station was completed. In 1948, Escom purchased the VFTPC for
£13,500,000 (Gentle, 2008: 59), with the assistance of a (£15,000,000) loan
granted primarily by the Anglo American Corporation. The Transvaal Power
Act of 1910 had given the state the opportunity to purchase the private util-
ities by 1950. It was not until the late 1960s that the power stations started to
interlock, and a national grid was achieved in 1973. During the 1970s, Escom
‘undertook a major programme of expansion, building very large pithead
power stations on the coal fields of the Eastern Transvaal and Northern
Natal’ (Gentle, 2008: 62). In the early 1990s, only 35% of South African
households had access to electricity, and the new government embarked on a
national electrification programme. Between 1994 and 1999, approximately
2.8 million households were connected to the national electricity grid. The
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level of electrification was increased to about 66% of households in 1999,
and to 86% in 2014.150
“National” legislation
It has been remarked that in the Union of South Africa the native areas
can generally be distinguished on a map by the fact that these areas are
generally excluded from the otherwise well-developed railway system. The
same is generally true of the electricity system in both rural and urban
areas. Lydall’s report on railway electrifications perpetuated the pattern
[…]. Black peasants were accordingly denied the benefits of railways and
power systems
Renfrew Christie, 1984.
During this phase, national legislation was introduced that would determine
the conditions for electricity supply for the next 50 years. The VFTPC played
a formative role in the establishment of the two government bodies appoint-
ed to regulate the industry. Had no foreign-owned electricity supply
monopoly existed in Johannesburg, it is likely that national legislation would
have taken another form. Just like Klingenberg, Merz advocated large power
stations with a monopoly of supply (Christie, 1984: 81). Christie considers
Merz and McLellan’s recommendations to have ‘[…] in fact formed the basis
for the non-Witwatersrand spatial expansion of Escom until 1945’ (Mar-
quard, 2006: 147), and ‘[…] laid the basis on which the provincial and
national grids were built up’ (Christie, 1984: 81). However, the influence
exerted on this legislation by the British consultant Charles Merz was not
confined to the technological expertise of his engineering company; he also
represented British financial and industrial interests more broadly.151 Other
150 Statistics South Africa: General Household Survey 2014.
151 ‘Merz was doyen of the British electrical engineers, and had long been mentor to
Bernard Price. Merz exported British technology to the world, acting as consultant to
many governments, municipalities and railways systems. His connections with the finan-
ciers of the City of London were perhaps more subtle than those of Rathenau’s A.E.G.
with the Deutsche and Dresdner banks, but they were no less close. Merz represented
British finance capital, in which banks and manufacturers combined to export to the
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interests represented in this process were the manufacturing industry, the
Natal coal industry, De Beers, and various state officials, such as General
Smuts, William Hoy, Hendrik van der Bijl and Robert Kotze (Christie,
1984).152
Merz had personal connections to the VFTPC through his former
employee, Bernard Price, the general manager of the VFTPC.153
Several reasons led to Merz’s decision to open an office in London […]. There was
however another reason why the London office was regarded as important. It was
that the partners knew that electricity for power was bound to be extended over-
seas as well as in this country, and if British electrical engineers were to justify their
existence they would have to work for overseas clients as well as those at home.
There were great areas in Australia, in South Africa and in Canada, where industri-
al development was slow, partly because a cheap and abundant source of power
was lacking. If electrical energy could be made available, the development of the
Empire, now known as the Commonwealth, would progress by leaps and bounds.
Any overseas development could most conveniently be discussed in London (Row-
land, 1960: 51–2).
In addition to being a consultant to the South African government, Merz was
actively involved in electrification at a global scale:
Merz was already interested in what was happening overseas. He had made an early
visit to the USA in 1901 and later in 1906 revisited Chicago, where, at the request of
formal and informal empire, be it in Australia or Argentina, Eskom is as much the crea-
tion of Merz wishing to sell British technology as it is the creation of South African indu-
strialists’ (Christie, 1984: 76).
152 General Smuts was Prime Minister of South Africa, William Hoy was General
Manager of the South African Railways, Hendrik van der Bijl would be Chairman of
Escom from 1923, and Robert Kotze was Government Mining Engineer.
153 ‘I look upon Dr. Merz as one of the biggest men of his time and, in a special sense,
the father of centralised power supply in the British Commonwealth. He was much more
than an able engineer. He was a man of outstanding vision and balanced judgement with
an insight into the essence of a problem which amounted almost to an instinct. […]
Throughout the world, in America, Australia, India, South Africa as well as in Great Bri-
tain he has left an indelible mark on power supply development […]’ (Price, 1941 in
Jacobs, 1941: 271).
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Samuel Insull, he prepared a comprehensive report on the electric system there.
Insull had suggested that it would be useful to deal with ways of laying out a net-
work of distribution lines so as to ensure continuity of supply […]. In Ottawa he
met too, Earl Grey’s son-in-law, W. Grenfeld, whom he had known in England; and
was asked to assist in some complicated negotiations on power supply to the gold
mines on the Rand in South Africa. These jobs had been interesting. They had given
Merz a new insight into many problems (Rowland, 1960: 52).
The first ‘national’ legislation of South Africa was shaped by a British con-
sultant who viewed South Africa as a ‘new’ country that required electricity
for industrial and social development.
South Africa possesses most of the requirements needed for the development of
manufactures. It has wonderful natural resources, a splendid climate, and both
internal and external markets for its goods; and although at present its white pop-
ulation is not proportionate to its area and possibilities, it is probably sufficient for
its immediate manufacturing needs if power be more widely used, while it obtains
valuable supplies of good native labour (Merz & McLellan, 1920: 1).
Following the promulgation of the new legislation, Merz and McLellan
expanded their activities in South Africa and Rhodesia, and established offi-
ces in Johannesburg and Salisbury.154
The British consultant Charles Merz substantially influenced the sub-
sequent history of electrification in South Africa. He prepared the ground for
the establishment of Escom, the major institutional product of the first
national legislation. Escom played a key role in supplying the gold mines
with cheap energy in the years before the Second World War (Gentle, 2008:
59). It also set up the conditions that would give the municipalities a minor
role and little influence in electrification during these years. The grand power
scheme of Johannesburg was established on the Witwatersrand, the wider
Johannesburg metropolitan area, without considering the requirements of
154 ‘As a pleasant contrast, however, the work in South Africa and also at Salisbury in
Southern Rhodesia tended to extend, the war having given a great impetus to industrial
development in South Africa. […] The work in Rhodesia was originally dealt with from
Johannesburg but as it grew the decision was made to establish a further local firm –
Merz and McLellan (Rhodesia) with the same partners as the South African firm’ (Row-
land, 1960: 107).
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urban or municipal Johannesburg. The appointment of Hendrik van der Bijl
as chairman of Escom also marked the beginnings of a closely knit associa-
tion of large industries under state involvement.
Escom’s status and sphere of power as a government-instituted commis-
sion are significant. Escom was instructed to plan the development of elec-
tricity schemes at the national level, but it was classified as a private producer
(Marquard, 2006: 132). The Electricity Control Board was mandated to
licence electricity undertakings, but it ended up approving tariff increases for
the VFTPC and Escom’s tariff structure (Marquard, 2006: 133): ‘In reality,
the Board had almost no capacity (having 3 to 5 board members and one
staff member) to undertake sophisticated economic regulation […] it seems
that the Board’s time was taken up playing a mediating and facilitative role in
resolving disputes concerning rights to supply, holding hearings on land
expropriation for electricity infrastructure, and addressing consumer griev-
ances’ (Marquard, 2006: 133).155 In effect, the new regulation entrenched the
(foreign) private sector generation monopoly and expanded it with various
‘undertakings’ of Escom to sell electricity to mines, railways and municipal-
ities. Escom possessed a high degree of autonomy,156 it was not accountable
to political institutions and processes, and its leadership had close ties with
the government. One of the likely consequences of the informal and self-gov-
erning status of Escom was its decision to suspend development of a national
grid until the early 1970s. Until 1950, electricity demand was dominated by
the energy-intensive mining industries (Marquard, 2006: 138).
The association between the VFTPC and Escom ultimately put elec-
trification in the service of the industrial development of the British domin-
ion of the Union of South Africa and its white population of the British
Commonwealth.
155 The ECB only enlarged after 1977 after a Board of Trade and Industries report into
electricity tariffs, but even then ‘the ECB was not successful in exerting […] influence
over Escom’ (Marquard, 2006: 133).
156 ‘Oversight of the organisation was carried out by a ‘Commission’ of around five
people appointed by the Governor-General (later the relevant Minister); this process of
appointment constituted the only direct involvement by the government in Escom until
the 1980s’ (Marquard, 2006: 150).
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3.3 “How Do Technological Systems Evolve?”
To answer the question ‘how do technological systems evolve?’, Hughes pre-
sented a systems history of electrification based on the case studies of Chica-
go, Berlin and London from 1880 to 1930. He used these case studies to
develop his framework for studying technological change. This framework is
based on a number of themes and subthemes that shape the history of elec-
trification: ‘Embodied in the different power systems of the world is a com-
plex variation on major themes that keeps the technology from becoming
homogeneous and dull and that provides the historian with the challenging
task of description and interpretation’ (Hughes, 1983: 17). He described the
subthemes as ‘in most instances related to questions often asked about tech-
nological systems and about the history of technology in general’ (Hughes,
1983: 461).
However, Hughes does not discuss the difference between themes and
subthemes, nor does he specify them for his study. The five phases of his
system model might be viewed as major themes: invention and development,
technology transfer, system growth, technological momentum, and maturity.
Hughes also introduces the expressions reverse salient, critical problems, the
culture of regional systems, the style of evolving systems, the system goal and
the system builder to present his systems framework. Are these themes or
subthemes that emerge from the study of electrification, or simply new con-
cepts introduced by Hughes to analyse technological change? This question
cannot be answered conclusively. Hughes’ inexplicit use of terminology has
methodological consequences for the analysis of additional case studies. It
complicates the task of comparing Hughes’ themes with themes that emerge
from histories of electrification in other metropolitan areas. This, in turn,
makes it difficult to improve Hughes’model or develop new concepts to ana-
lyse technological change.
Trouillot’s analytical framework of geographies of management and
imagination has yielded a number of recurring themes in the history of
electrification in Johannesburg: gold mining, empire, national competition,
companies, concessions and the ‘native’. These themes will be discussed sep-
arately below, across the various phases of the history of electrification in
Johannesburg. Then, these themes will be related to Hughes’model to devel-
op concepts that are able to capture the dynamics, procedures and
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underlying forces of electrification in Johannesburg. Based on these consid-
erations, alternative analytical and descriptive tools for the empirical analysis
of technological change are proposed.
Hughes claimed that the ‘change in configuration of electric power sys-
tems 1880–1930’ constituted the ‘formative years of the history of electric
supply systems’ (Hughes, 1983: 1). One of his brilliant insights was to
assume that the history of electric power systems ‘extends beyond national
borders’ (Hughes, 1983: x). Thus, his book addressed the question: ‘How did
small lighting systems of the 1880s evolve into the regional power systems of
the 1920s?’ (Hughes, 1983: 2). The objective of his book, therefore, was to
explain the change in configuration of electric power systems during the
half-century between 1880 and 1930 (Hughes, 1983: 2) by investigating
major themes in the history of electrification of Chicago, Berlin and London.
Hughes considered these themes to be relevant ‘to history focused on tech-
nology more generally’ (Hughes, 1983: 461) and applied his ‘model of system
formation and growth’ as a ‘mode of organization’ to ‘co-ordinate’ them. Fol-
lowing Hughes’ chain of argument, the following paragraphs identify the
themes that help ‘to explain the change in configuration of electric power
systems during the half-century between 1880 and 1930’ (Hughes, 1983: 2)
in Johannesburg.
Themes in the History of Electrification of Johannesburg
Six recurring themes emerge from the history of electrification in Johannes-
burg: gold mining, empire, national competition, companies, concessions,
and the ‘native’. These themes are diverse and do not suggest any obvious
connections. Neither do they appear to respond to Hughes’ question con-
cerning how the small lighting systems of the 1880s evolved into regional
power systems. To claim that electrification in Johannesburg between 1886
and 1930 was driven by gold mining, empire, national competition, compa-
nies, concessions, and the ‘native’ does not make sense. Nor do these themes,
prima facie, appear to be significant to the history of electrification in Chica-
go, Berlin or London. What, then, do these themes signify?
To investigate this question, the themes are assessed individually in
more detail across the various phases of the history of electrification in
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Johannesburg. Then, these driving forces in the history of electrification in
Johannesburg are weighed against Hughes’ themes and framework for study-
ing technological change. At several key moments, the history of elec-
trification in Johannesburg unambiguously and directly connects to the his-
tory of electrification in Chicago, Berlin and London. To make visible the
themes identified in the history of electrification in Johannesburg, Hughes’
framework needs to be supplemented by new concepts. These new concepts
should provide new historical markers to the question of how small lighting
systems of the 1890s evolved into regional power systems outside of the con-
fines of the category of ‘Western society’.
For the moment, the themes – gold mining, empire, national competi-
tion, companies, concessions, and the ‘native’ – appear to be rather remote
from Hughes’ topic of technological change. This has to do with the different
frames of analysis employed in his histories of Chicago, Berlin and London
on the one hand and the history of Johannesburg on the other hand. Hughes
presents a systems history of regional power systems at three sites by assum-
ing a ‘seamless web’ of technology and society. Hughes’ ‘rationale’ for study-
ing electric power systems is the assumption that the history of all large-scale
technology (not just power systems) can be studied effectively as a history of
technological systems. The rationale for studying the electrification of Johan-
nesburg was the assumption that all large-scale technology (not just power
systems) can be studied effectively as a history of the North Atlantic univer-
sal ‘technology’.
Hughes’ systems are connected in a network of interacting components,
with defining system properties such as centralized system control, a com-
mon system goal, and system environment. His history claims to go beyond
a mere history of connected internal and external forces, dynamics, growth
and factors; it depicts ‘a history of technology and society’, shaped by the
specific cultures of the societies under examination (Hughes, 1983: 2).
Instead of Hughes’ setting of the network, or the connected system of
components, the history of electrification in Johannesburg used the geo-
graphical scenery as backdrop. Following Trouillot, this study traces the his-
tory of electrification in Johannesburg through the intertwined lenses of the
geographies of management and imagination. Electrification in this frame-
work appears as a deployment of the North Atlantic universal ‘technology’.
Trouillot’s geographies or lenses serve to trace North Atlantic universals,
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which are hard to conceptualize but seductive to use because they have the
power to silence their own history. The challenge, therefore, is to ‘unearth
those silences, the conceptual and theoretical missing links that make them
so attractive’ and to reveal their ‘hidden faces’ (Trouillot, 2003: 36).
Hughes’ notion of technology, as employed in his history of elec-
trification and model for technological change, classifies as a North Atlantic
universal. However, North Atlantic universals offer neither descriptive nor
referential accounts of the world; instead, they offer visions of the world.
These visions are prescriptive because they project ‘an historically limited
experience on the world stage’ and thereby imply ‘a correct state of affairs –
what is good, what is just, what is sublime or desirable’ (Trouillot, 2003: 35).
Whereas Hughes’ framework pursues answers to the question of how tech-
nological systems (particularly electric power systems) evolve, the frame-
work proposed here in the analytical style of Trouillot seeks to ask how tech-
nology – or its deployment in the idea of electrification – sets the terms of
the debate and restricts the range of possible responses.
The geographies of management and imagination might appear to be
more abstract than Hughes’ network or system of components. Indeed, the
forthright, nuts-and-bolts image evoked by Hughes’ terms for the specific
case of electric power technology may have contributed to the lasting author-
ity of his model. In addition, Trouillot’s notion of the geography of imagi-
nation refers to an indefinite and therefore contested realm. Moving in this
realm requires considerable abstraction. The abstraction, however, is not
artificial or limitless; it mirrors very specific empirical circumstances. For
example, consider the late 19th century idea to conquer land, to generate
electric power at a place named the ‘Victoria Falls’ in Southern Africa (esti-
mated by engineers to carry five times the horse power of the Niagara Falls)
and to carry electrical current to gold mines over a distance of 600 miles.
This idea appears both grandiose and abstract, but it helped to shape the
history of electrification in South Africa (see Figures 5 and 6). Or, consider
the idea to build a German electric power station in the late 1890s for Ger-
man-owned gold mines in Johannesburg. The railway line from Cape Town
to Johannesburg had only just been opened, and ox-wagons still provided the
principal means of transport. This idea, too, may be considered to be abstract
retrospectively, but it helped to shape the history of electrification in South
Africa.
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The geographic scenery forces us to juggle different lenses to map various
scales, places and (at times imaginary) spaces from empirical material. This
procedure does not lead to a never-ending confusion of possible connections.
On the contrary, the case of electrification in Johannesburg has shown that
certain developments can only be explained by consulting the abstract realm
of the imaginary. For the case of Johannesburg, the specific nature of this
Figure 6: The Victoria Falls at the Zambezi River.
Figure 7: The Victoria Falls at the Zambezi River compared to Oxford Street
and St. Paul’s Cathedral.
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imaginary is most obviously exposed in the historical figures and institutions
that influenced Hughes’ history of electrification but also appear in the his-
tory of electrification in Johannesburg, such as Emil Rathenau, Georg Klin-
genberg and Charles Merz. Thus, the analytical step into the geography of
imagination does not lead to unlimited possibilities in historiography,
because this step maps levels of abstraction that are intrinsic to all empirical
material. In fact, it is precisely this focus that allows us to shed light on cir-
cumstances that are otherwise overlooked.
Gold mining
Of all industries to which it is applicable, gold-mining is the one which
has come mostly to my notice as wanting a continuous supply of power
day and night, and often without any economical means of getting it
except by electric transmission. In these cases it will often be profitable to
the gold miner to pay a high price for his power.
George Forbes, 1898.
British consultant to the Niagara Falls power project and consultant to
Cecil Rhodes on the Victoria Falls power project.
The first electric lights, the first power stations and the first regional power
system in Johannesburg were all set up to serve the gold mines of the Witwa-
tersrand. The evolution of small lighting systems in Johannesburg into a
regional power system followed the dictates of the expanding gold mining
industry. Johannesburg’s raison d’être was gold. It was founded to accom-
modate the settler and migrant communities pouring into the Witwatersrand
after the discovery of the gold fields in 1886. In 1914, the VFTPC and its
subsidiary, the Rand Power Supply Company, sold 99% of its generated elec-
tricity to the gold mines. Christie aptly described this close relationship
between gold and electricity during the First World War: ‘If Britain needed
gold, the South African gold-mines needed the VFTPC’ (Christie, 1984: 58).
In other words, the demand for gold spurred the demand for electric power.
The gold mines were the principal purchasers for the electrification projects
in Johannesburg between 1886 and 1930.
Gold in itself, however, was not a primary driver for electrification. The
initiatives to build the first central power stations in Johannesburg did not
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spring from local requests for electric power. They originated from German
and British imperial objectives in the Transvaal. The first regional power
scheme in Johannesburg also did not grow from local power requirements.
On the contrary, this power scheme resulted from a clever merger between
several ideas that served to further British and German colonial interests in
the Transvaal. Nevertheless, electrification in Johannesburg was presented in
terms of the power needs of the gold mines. In this way, ‘gold’ set the terms
of the debate for electrification in Johannesburg and restricted the range of
possible paths to be taken. What afforded this mineral such discursive
power?
The timing of the gold discoveries on the Witwatersrand was significant.
Gold was discovered in the Transvaal at a time when the international econ-
omy ‘was suffering from severe structural crises and rivalries among imperia-
list powers’ (Van Helten, 1982: 530). During the course of the 19th century,
Great Britain, the world’s most powerful nation, had adopted gold as the
monetary basis for its pound sterling, and other powerful nations, such as
France and Germany, had followed suit (Van Helten, 1982). Gold came to
dominate global monetary relations after 1870 and ‘bolstered the Bank of
England’s hegemonic position in the international financial system’ (Van
Helten, 1982: 529). At the end of the 19th century, gold was not simply an
end in itself ; it had ‘emerged as the basis of international payments among
the leading industrial nations of the world’ (Van Helten, 1982: 533). Gold
became the lifeblood of the political economy of imperial nations. For this
reason, the gold discoveries on the Witwatersrand propelled this previously
unknown part of the world ‘onto the centre stage’ of the international econo-
my (Van Helten, 1982: 530).
This centre stage attracted settlers, companies, investors, capital and
manufacturers from Europe to exploit the profits of gold mining, and it
imposed new social formations and hierarchies. Local and migrant African
workers were employed in the gold fields under conditions that deprived
them of rights.157 Only twelve years after gold was discovered on the
157 ‘Tens of thousands of diggers and fortune seekers made their way to the Transvaal
from the four corners of the earth and large numbers of French rentiers, British investors
and German banks poured millions of pounds into a myriad of honest and dishonest
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Witwatersrand, a remote region in Southern Africa that had to be reached by
ox-wagon before railways arrived in 1892, the Transvaal ‘was producing over
one quarter of the world’s annual output of gold’ (Van Helten, 1982: 529).
This project of enormous historical scale was orchestrated by South African
gold mining companies, which branched out into a ‘complex London net-
work of brokerage, insurance, refining and marketing facilities of gold’ (Van
Helten, 1982: 548). The early history of electrification in Johannesburg was
determined by the specific companies and institutions involved in this gold
mining industry, such as Consolidated Gold Fields, Werner, Beit and Com-
pany, Eckstein, A. Goerz Co., the Rand Mines Co., the Central Mining and
Investment Company, the South African Chamber of Mines, the British
South Africa Company, the Deutsche Bank and the African Concessions
Syndicate.
Hughes’ history of electrification in Western society does not make ref-
erence to gold. On closer inspection, however, some interesting connections
emerge. Thomas Edison developed businesses in the field of mining technol-
ogy and ore-crushing processes.158 Furthermore, gold is not mentioned in
Hughes’ chapter on ‘Californian coal’, despite the importance of coal for the
power needs of the booming Californian gold mining industry. The influence
of gold mining on the development of the regional power supply system in
California is not considered. Rather than proposing gold as a theme for ana-
lysing electrification, these examples reveal close connections in the histories
of electrification and gold mining. Another example is Hughes’ portrait of
Drexel, Morgan & Co. He presents this firm as the principal financier and
marketer of Edison’s electric light and power project, and he eclipses the pri-
vate banking business enterprises of J.P. Morgan and his subsequent compa-
nies (Drexel, Morgan & Co. was succeeded by J.P. Morgan & Company in
mining companies, thereby courting speculative financial losses or gains on a grand scale’
(Van Helten, 1982: 529).
158 These companies include, for example, the Edison Ore Milling Company Ltd.
(1879), the Edison Iron Concentrating Company (1889), New Jersey and Pennsylvania
Concentrating Works (1888), and Dunderland Iron Ore Company Ltd. (1902) (Rutgers
Edison Papers).
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1895), whose business involvement in electricity and gold is notable by any
measure.
Viewed from the global perspective of the geographies of management
and imagination, the private banking business enterprises of J.P. Morgan
(and related companies) exemplify the high degree of correspondence
between the business of electrification and the business of gold mining. J.P.
Morgan and his companies acted as a financing agency for Edison’s electric
light and central power station project and some 70 years later (in 1948)
issued a loan to the South African government to purchase and ‘nationalize’
the VFTPC. In between, he acted as the holder of rights to these Edison pat-
ents, stage-manager of the Edison technology in Europe (Paris Electrical
Exhibition 1881, Holborn Viaduct power station) and in the US (Pearl Street
Power Station), creditor for a private loan to the British imperial government
to finance the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902 in South Africa and financier
of Ernest Oppenheimer’s Anglo-American Corporation in 1917 (initially
founded as a gold mining company). Against this powerful record, the pio-
neering lighting of Drexel, Morgan & Co.’s Wall Street offices with power
from Edison’s prototype central power station on Pearl Street acquires new
symbolic power.
Although it might be tempting to regard gold only as a powerful theme
for the specific case of Johannesburg’s regional power system, we may also
consider it to be an example of the close association between electrification
and the mining of natural resources more generally. From this perspective,
the case of Johannesburg might show similarities with the early histories of
electrification in other resource-based economies with a colonial legacy. The
early international scope of American, German and British electrical manu-
facturing and consulting power companies (and the investment houses
behind them) in places such as Argentina, Mexico and India illustrate the
close fraternity between electrification projects and the imperial exploitation
of natural resources. Furthermore, the specificity of the Johannesburg case
found its way unfiltered into one of the grand textbooks of the day, written
in 1913 by the leading engineer Georg Klingenberg from the A.E.G., and
translated into English in 1916. This textbook was a significant opus in the
establishment of the paradigm of large electric power systems – a paradigm
that was still widely contested at the time.
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Thus, as a theme, gold mining may serve to shed light on the entangle-
ment of the history of electrification in Johannesburg with histories of elec-
trification in other geographical places.
Empire
A white population of less than 1,200,000—about twice the population of
Birmingham—has been entrusted with the duty of administering, under
the Sovereign, the government of a country four times as large as the
United Kingdom, with a trade of £80,000,000, a budget of £15,000,000, a
debt of more than £110,000,000, a system of Government railways
extending to more than 7000 miles; and the Union Government is to rule
and look after the interests of more than 4,000,000 black and coloured
people who (except in the Cape Colony) are not represented in the
Assembly.
Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, 1911.
Hughes identifies a 50-year time span as the foundational years in the history
of electrification, split into the years preceding and succeeding the First
World War. Over these 50 years, the political world map underwent
momentous changes. The years preceding the First World War correspond
to a historical period often referred to as the New Imperialism. Hughes’ his-
tory of electrification in Western society considers three cities in Britain,
Germany and America over this period, without mentioning these countries’
positions in this global political economy. His choice of countries, three
major imperial powers, is by no means coincidental. Studying the history of
electrification outside of these sites shows the intricate relationship between
electrification and imperial history.159 Moreover, this alliance did not set in
159 This text follows Miles’ (2013) distinction between empire, imperialism, and colo-
nialism: ‘Notions of empire, colonialism, and imperialism have been afforded a range of
meanings within different analytical frameworks and disciplines. […] I use the term
“colonialism” as a reference to explicit policies of formal territory acquisition and esta-
blishment of colonies. “Imperialism” has more informal implications, referring to policies
that were not limited to formal colonialism, but pursued commercial and political expan-
sionism, and involved the economic exploitation of target territories in circumstances
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after the electric light and power station technology were invented and devel-
oped; rather, from the very beginning, this relationship was part of the pro-
ject of developing electric light and power stations.
Empire does not only enter the stage after Edison’s invention and devel-
opment of the electric light and central power stations. Imperial objectives
were part of Edison’s early idea and project development: Edison deliberately
chose Drexel, Morgan & Co. as a strategic point of entry to profitably posi-
tion his (not yet invented) technology in the global political economy of the
day. Revealingly, the first agreement between Edison and Drexel, Morgan &
Co. regarding their rights to Edison’s electrical inventions makes mention of
the ‘British dominions’. The sense of entitlement to privileged legal and eco-
nomic rights in far-away territories is a key feature of the imperial period.
Rather than simple ‘technology transfer’ across national boundaries of ‘West-
ern society’, Edison’s project plainly sought to create a world empire. This
sense of entitlement rests upon assumptions of intellectual supremacy over
other populations.160
The small lighting systems of the 1880s in Chicago, London, Berlin and
Johannesburg evolved into regional power systems amid the national and
industrial forces of a global political economy intent on empire building. The
change in configuration of electric power systems during the half-century
between 1880 and 1930 in these cities directly and indirectly forms part of
these global dynamics. The three countries that Hughes used in his case
study were the three most powerful nations at the time, and they fought for
political and industrial territories across the globe during these years.
The Cape Colony, where the first Edison incandescent lights were instal-
led in 1882, was a British colony, and the House of Assembly at Cape Town,
beyond actual annexation. The term “empire” is used to refer to the continuation of these
imperialist practices, as well as to refer to the colonial empires created by Britain, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, from the seventeenth to early twentieth
centuries’ (Miles, 2013: 4).
160 ‘Besides that, Americans and Englishmen, as Mr Fabbri said the other day, are a
different kind of men to deal with from Continental people. I believe from my own expe-
rience that Americans are the honestest and most straightforward, as well as the best
hearted people in the world. I think the English are next’ (Edison Papers, Lowrey to Edi-
son, 10. 12.1878, D7821ZBR; TAEM 18: 226, pp. 3).
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where the lights were installed, was an institution of British colonial rule. The
first experimental use of electric lights in South Africa is recorded to have
taken place in August 1881 in the Kimberly diamond mines – concurrent
with the opening of the Paris International Electrical Exhibition, to which
Hughes affords great significance for the technology transfer of Edison tech-
nology. These mines were established with mining rights to land that Euro-
pean settlers took by conquest. The objective of the mines was to serve the
interests of imperial agents rather than those of the indigenous population.
Indeed, the mines formed part of an intricate set of tools to gain control and
power over the indigenous population.
Imperial interests were behind the first two power stations built in
Johannesburg to supply gold mines; one was financed by the Deutsche Bank
and the other by Rhodes’ Consolidated Gold Fields Company. Power stations
require certain rights and privileges for construction and operation. Obtain-
ing such rights and privileges in settings that are controlled by European
imperial powers is different from what is required to obtain them in places
like Chicago, Berlin and London. In Johannesburg, the institutions and per-
sonalities that acquired these rights for the first two power stations shared a
general sense of entitlement to appropriate and exercise rights and privileges
in overseas territories. Sometimes this entitlement was conferred through
public routes of passage, such as the purchase of land or coal. Even then, the
public nature of the acquisition depended upon the subjugation of the rights
and privileges of others for the transaction to proceed. At other times, the
procurement of rights served to obscure grand ideas and goals, such as the
imperial incentive of the Deutsche Bank to invest in RCEW of Goerz and Co.
to establish a privileged point of entry for the German industrial manu-
facturer Siemens and Halske. In other cases, the rights and privileges were
simply obtained through conquest – the land of the Transvaal republic had
been conquered by the Boers and had only achieved the status of a self-gov-
erning republic less than two decades before its government issued the con-
cessions to build and operate central power stations. Or, the rights and priv-
ileges were obtained by trade or wilful deceit by concession hunters, such as
the German businessman Eduard Lippert.
The power station that Siemens and Halske built in 1897, the Rand Cen-
tral Electric Works, was modelled after power stations that the company had
built in Berlin. In Johannesburg, however, in addition to the power station,
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residential buildings, guest houses and accommodation had to be built for
married and unmarried men, as well as manor houses with horse stables for
the directors. This infrastructure was seen as urgently needed to recruit
enough skilled professionals from Europe. The first power stations encour-
aged the importation of European settler communities to Johannesburg.
The founding of the VFTPC, which determined the subsequent course
of electrification in Johannesburg and South Africa, also may be viewed as a
result of the rival interests of the three imperial powers; Germany emerged
as the winner, Britain was the loser, and America was left out because of
Rathenau’s agreement with General Electric in 1903 to divide the world mar-
ket. After the First World War, this situation was inverted, and Britain and
America took over the market previously dominated by German electrical
technology.
Merz’s recommendations on the electrification of South Africa in 1920
considered the national situation relative to the ‘trend of opinion in Europe’
(Merz & McLellan, 1920: 15). He viewed South Africa as a new country, a
tabula rasa to be developed by white settlers. These ‘imperial eyes’ (Pratt,
1992) did not register the indigenous population other than as labourers but
envisioned a future for the ‘white’ population only. Accordingly, his consid-
erations for railway and electricity infrastructure only concerned this seg-
ment of the population and disregarded the needs of the rest of the pop-
ulation. Merz’s recommendations led to the Electricity Act of 1922 and the
establishment of Escom, which has survived in modified form to the present
day as an effective monopoly over electricity generation, transmission and
distribution in South Africa.
In sum, prior to the First World War, the small lighting systems of
Johannesburg evolved into regional power systems on a wave of imperial
conquest of Southern African territories. After the First World War, the
monopoly of the regional power system in Johannesburg was endorsed by
new regulatory authorities and legislation drafted by a British consulting
company at the request of General Smuts. The recommendations of this con-
sulting company were modelled on precedents in Great Britain, France, Ger-
many, Sweden and the United States, and they promoted the establishment
of monopolies and large regional power systems. Incidentally, this consulting
company was also awarded the contract to supply and build the next large
power station in Witbank.
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Empire, imperialism and colonialism are essential themes for describing
the changes in the electric power systems in Johannesburg from 1880 to
1930. They set the terms of the debate for electrification in Johannesburg and
restricted the range of possible paths. They set the broad course for the elec-
trification process in Johannesburg across all phases: Edison’s global empire
of patent rights including the territory of ‘Southern Africa’ (Edison Indian
and Colonial Electric Company); the first lights and electric generators at the
(foreign-owned) gold mines; the first two central power stations, owned by
German and British companies; the first regional power scheme of the
VFTPC, designed and built by the German A.E.G. and owned by German
and British investment enterprises such as the Deutsche Bank and the British
South Africa Company; and the British-designed national legislation and
regulatory bodies established after the First World War to electrify the ‘Uni-
fied’ Republic of South Africa, which endorsed the monopoly of the foreign-
owned enterprises of the VFTPC and ensured the growing market influence
of British manufacturing and consulting businesses.
National competition between Britain, Germany and America
Three powerful nations competed for control of electrification in Johannes-
burg during the historical period under consideration: Great Britain, Ger-
many and America. Electrification was a vehicle for enacting scenes of con-
test between these major competing powers on the global stage. Up until the
First World War, Germany was the strongest competitor among these
nations, but after the First World War, Great Britain took over the leading
role, and America also entered the market. The competition among these
three countries shaped the particular history of electrification in Johannes-
burg across all of its phases up until 1930.
The German company Siemens and Halske built and equipped the first
power station in Johannesburg. It had already supplied telegraph equipment
to the Cape Colony and stationed an agent in Cape Town before it estab-
lished the Siemens and Halske South African Agency Johannesburg in 1895,
and it was contracted to build the first power station in Johannesburg, the
RCEW. The Transvaal was especially important to Germany at this time, and
in 1896, it was described as ‘the pivot of German imperialistic pretensions’
(Penner, 1940: 58). German industrialists allied with the Boer government in
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the Transvaal. In a paper on Germany and the Transvaal before 1896, Pen-
ner notes that ‘it was the hope of the German imperialists to create a second
German Empire in South Africa, a second India under German control’
(Penner, 1940: 31). By the early 20th century, Germany owned about one-
sixth of the mining capital in the Transvaal (Weinberger, 1971). The close
association between German banks and German government and industry
reinforced the country’s imperial objectives.
One route that was successfully pursued in this mission was to establish
monopolies through the acquisition of concessions. For example, the Ger-
man ‘concession hunter’ Eduard Lippert managed to secure concessions for
the manufacture of dynamite, gunpowder and cement, the whisky monopoly
was held by a German firm, and the concession for the National Bank and
the South African railways were held by German–Dutch firms (Penner,
1940: 47). The first Transvaal government concession to establish a central
power station was afforded to a German company for a mining company
owned by the Deutsche Bank. In the mid-1890s, German electrical industries
established export organizations in co-operation with German Banks (Deut-
sche and Dresdner Banks, Siemens and the A.E.G.). The concession to gen-
erate and supply power from the Victoria Falls to the Transvaal gold fields
was purchased by the African Concessions Syndicate from the VFTPC, a
company controlled by a syndicate of German banks and electrical industry,
and the British South Africa Company.
A quote from the illustrious Emil Rathenau illustrates the extent to
which electrification had to do with broader issues of competition between
imperial nations. Rathenau wrote to the German Foreign Office to inform
them about the impending conclusion of the deal between the A.E.G. and the
British South African Company to establish the VFTPC.
This deal would represent an unexpected success, previously hardly achieved by
German industry, and the large banks have made an effort […] to make this busi-
ness possible for interests more patriotic than material, because it stands without
precedent in the electrical industry that an English Company would commission to
a German company orders of such magnitude and thereby acknowledge its superi-
ority over all other nations. The impartial print media has also duly honoured the
success of German industrial competence and has made an effort to support the
commenced work through factual statements. The undersigned respectfully had the
honour personally to present the project to your majesty the emperor and to point
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out that the business relationships between the two nations are improving (Wein-
berger, 1971: 61161 ; my translation).162
German economic success in the Transvaal was a challenge to British hegem-
ony (Penner, 1940): ‘Germany was the natural ally of the Boer’ (Penner,
1940: 53). London, the financial centre of the imperial world, figured as
major hub for the registration of German, American and British companies
generally and for electric utilities in particular. In the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, Great Britain ‘was the world’s greatest capital exporter’ (Wilkins,
1998: 5). Various kinds of joint-stock companies were established to serve as
‘international capital flow conduits’, and often these were foreign controlled
(Wilkins, 1998: 9). Accordingly, American and British electrical industries
were also present in South Africa from the very beginning. However, they
were only able to overhaul the monopoly position of German electrical com-
panies after the First World War. For example, the Anglo-American Brush
Electric Light and Power Company (registered in London) established a sub-
sidiary, the South African Brush Electric Light and Power Company, in 1882,
but this company was discontinued after only few years.
The unchallenged position of London as the centre for most companies
involved in the early electrification of the Witwatersrand is easily illustrated.
161 Weinberger (1971) is quoting DZA Merseburg, Rep. 120, CXIII 14, Nr. 46, Bd. 6,
Bl. 107 f.
162 ‘Es verwundert daher nicht, mit welchem – durch ein “patriotisches” Mäntelchen
kaum verhülltem – Triumph Emil Rathenau am 10. September 1906 an das Auswärtige
Amt über den bevorstehenden Abschluss mit der Chartered Co. schrieb: „Dieser Abschluss
würde einen ungeahnten, von der deutschen Industrie bisher wohl kaum erzielten Erfolg
bedeuten, und weit mehr aus patriotischer Gesinnung als aus materiellen Interessen haben
die uns befreundeten Grossbanken […] um das Zustandekommen des Geschäfts sich
bemüht, denn es steht in der elektischen Industrie ohne Beispiel da, dass eine englische
Gesellschaft Aufträge in solcher Höhe freihändig an eine deutsche Firma überträgt und
hiermit ihre Überlegenheit über alle anderen Nationen anerkennt. Auch die objective Presse
hat diesen Erfolg deutschen industriellen Könnens gebührend gewürdigt und sich bemüht,
durch sachliche Darstellungen das begonnene Werk zu fördern. Der ergebenst Unter-
zeichnete aber hatte die Ehre, Sr. Mjestät dem Kaiser persönlich über das grossartige Projekt
Vortrag zu halten und darauf hinzuweisen, wie die geschäftlichen Beziehungen der beiden
Nationen zueinander sich zu bessern anfangen’ (Weinberger, 1971: 64).
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For example, the Edison Indian and Colonial Electric Company had already
used London as the base for its operations in ‘the Colonies’.163 The first two
power stations, the RCEW and the GEPC, were both registered in London,
the first manager for the VFTPC was recruited from the company Merz and
McLellan in London and the headquarters of the Rhodesia-registered VFTPC
was in London. Although London managed to retain its position as the
financial centre of the world prior to the First World War, Germany and
America dominated the electrotechnical market. Emil Rathenau’s trip to
America in 1903 to negotiate the division of the world market between the
American and German electrotechnical industries was not presumptuous; it
realistically reflected the clashing frontiers of the two global competitive
players of the time. After the First World War, Great Britain took over Ger-
many’s prime position in the electricity manufacturing and consulting indus-
try in Johannesburg.
The VFTPC, which was ‘born of two empires’, may be viewed as a joint
British–German imperial project (Christie, 1984: 56). Renowned German,
British and American engineers were summoned by various parties to pro-
vide expert judgements about the viability of the original project to supply
and transmit electricity from the Victoria Falls to the gold mines of the
Transvaal, including George Forbes of Great Britain, Georg Klingenberg of
the German A.E.G. and Ralph Mershon of America. In the negotiations that
preceded the establishment of the VFTPC and its subsidiary the Rand Mines
Power Supply Company, local government, municipalities, business and civil
society played no significant role. The future of electric power supply in
163 Registered in London in 1882, it was to act as parent company for Lighting and Power
Companies in ‘the Colonies’ of Australsasia, South Africa, India, and Ceylon (Edison
Papers, 1882: [D8239ZAO; TAEM 62: 827]). To ‘enlist local capital and influence’, this
company would be to ‘grant licenses to Corporations and local Companies’ to ‘[light] up
towns, public buildings, manufactories, barracks, and residences, and [supply] power by
means of electricity’ (Edison Papers, 1882:(D-82–40x); TAEM 63: 32, pp. 2). Edison
appointed an agent in London as attorney to manage his letters patent of this company.
The company intended to purchase and send out ‘Edison’s lamps, dynamos, and other
materials which are now in London, ready for shipment to some of the principal centres of
population and industry within the Company’s field of operations’ (Edison Papers, 1882:
(D-82–40x); TAEM 63: 32, pp. 2).
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Johannesburg was determined by the interests of German and British finan-
cial and industrial companies and their owners. The engineers for the
VFTPC also were recruited in England.164 After the First World War, the
contracts for new power stations went to the British electrical and manu-
facturing industry.165 Escom, in turn, was established in 1922 on the basis of
recommendations put forward by the eminent British consulting company
Merz and McLellan. These recommendations were modelled after British
legislation and the problems it sought to address. The subsequent negotia-
tions that settled the relative powers and range of influence of the VFTPC
and Escom for the next 20 years were conducted under the personal media-
164 ‘In the attempt to ensure an “English” character for the VFTPC, not only Bernard
Price, but a large team of engineers had been recruited from the Tyneside power stations’
(Christie, 1984: 45).
165 Bernard Price writes about ‘Experience with German Firms and Plants’: ‘It may not be
out of place if I now refer to the Power Company’s experience in dealing with certain
German concerns, because I do not think a better example could be cited of the methods
which our enemies have diligently pursued in their attempt to attain supremacy in the
industrial world. The Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company was promoted by Bri-
tish interests, and every effort was made to raise the necessary capital in Britain. Unfortu-
nately, these efforts failed, and in the end certain German industrial banks took up deben-
tures on condition that the main contracts were placed in the hands of German
manufacturing concerns with which they were allied. As a result, the A.E.G. obtained
important contracts on favourable terms. It is unnecessary for me to enlarge upon the
advantageous position in which the A.E.G. were thus placed but I would emphasise the fact
that the whole arrangement was the direct result of the German system of industrial banks,
under which financial assistance rendered for an industrial undertaking such as a power
company becomes the means of assisting German manufacturing firms. Needless to say,
this initial arrangement was not continued, and, as the power scheme grew and proved its
worth, capital was raised in London at the rate of no less than £1,000,000 sterling per
annum and quite independently from German banks. The A.E.G. then became faced with
keen competition, but this did not deter them in their effort to secure contracts for the
additional plant required. On the contrary, they at once reverted to the policy of dumping
their goods at low prices. […] It must be remembered that, although feelings of sentiment
to-day run high, no purchaser in 1912 would have been prepared to sacrifice large sums of
shareholders’ money in order to avert the dumping of German goods. In the end the
Germans secured most of the contracts at prices largely below those offered by their British
competitors’ (Price, 1916: 63).
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tion of Merz, and they resulted in contracts to British electrical and manu-
facturing industries.
In this way, national competition between Great Britain, Germany and
America set the terms of the debate for the electrification of Johannesburg
and restricted the range of possible paths to be taken. Competition between
these countries was driven by notions of entitlement to establish large tech-
nological enterprises in overseas territories, which in turn required appropri-
ating rights to foreign land and natural resources. Racial superiority over
populations in far-away territories lay behind these claims.
Companies
At first view, the early history of electrification in Johannesburg appears to
have involved a small number of companies only, such as the first two cen-
tral power stations (the Rand Central Electric Works (RCEW) and the Gen-
eral Electric Power Company (GEPC)) and the company that established the
first regional power scheme, the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Com-
pany (VFTPC). However, it developed under the financial, administrative
and legal patronage of a large number of companies, including the Edison
Indian and Colonial Electric Company, the Deutsche Bank, Consolidated
Gold Fields of South Africa, Siemens and Halske, the A.E.G., the British
South Africa Company, the Corner House group of companies of Beit and
Eckstein, the Rand Mines Ltd., N.M. Rothschild & Sons, the Exploration
Company Ltd., the Central Mining and Investment Corporation Ltd., and
others. The various labels given to these enterprises include the private or
public limited liability company, the joint-stock company, the free-standing
company, the holding company and its subsidiaries, the investment group,
the chartered company, the merchant firm, and others. Needless to say, these
companies spanned a broad spectrum of objectives, strategies and dealings
that are typically not accessible through a given type of company. However,
from the viewpoint of Johannesburg, most of these companies had three
attributes in common: they were foreign owned, foreign managed and for-
eign financed. Another striking feature is their perpetual transformation.
Over time, their continually changing status, structure, operations and focus
produced a ‘forest of company names and […] jungle of business groups’
(Hausman et al., 2008: 41).
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Despite the complexity of companies involved, a few features emerge in
the early history of electrification in Johannesburg. Several companies were
established by German initiatives and formed part of Germany’s strategy of
economic imperialism in the Transvaal. German-owned or co-owned compa-
nies such as Goerz, and the RCEW and the VFTPC were financed by German
banks or by banking syndicates that were largely German. Often these compa-
nies were registered in England, and the German ownership was not disclosed
to the public. Another group of companies were British owned and financed,
such as the GEPC, Consolidated Gold Fields, the BSAC and the African Con-
cessions Syndicate. These companies were more openly connected to British
imperial economic and political interests in Southern Africa. However, a fine
line separates ‘British’ from ‘South African’ attributes, because the status of the
Transvaal kept changing over the years 1880 to 1930: this area was once con-
sidered to be an independent Republic (but still under British suzerainty),
then it was a British colony, and after the union of the four colonies (Cape
Colony, Natal Colony, Transvaal Colony and Orange River Colony) in 1910, it
became a non-sovereign dominion of the British Empire.
In countries with local electrical manufacturing industries and local cap-
ital, the companies involved in the business of power stations are easily
traced and profiled. In Johannesburg, the companies that appeared at centre
stage in electric power projects were entangled in a complex and often unin-
telligible labyrinth of pursuits and ideas because of their dependence on for-
eign capital, foreign expertise, foreign legal provisions, foreign management
and foreign national policies. These intricate dependencies cannot be simply
disentangled by tracing the technology, the economic, social setting or poli-
cies of electrification. This complexity is a challenge for historical analysis.
However, it granted the companies an ideal environment to undertake strate-
gic business manoeuvres.
During the first phase of Hughes’ history of electrification, an Ameri-
can-owned company registered and managed in London claimed rights and
privileges in a vaguely indistinct area referred to as South Africa. The Edison
Indian and Colonial Electric Company was part of the family of Edison com-
panies that were established between 1880 and 1883 to exchange patent
rights for equity interests domestically and abroad. At the time, companies
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were often registered under British law.166 Although the Edison Indian and
Colonial Electric Company, along with most other companies connected to
Edison’s electric light and central power station project, became independent
within a decade, these business enterprises drove the early international dif-
fusion of Edison’s technology, and therefore may be classified as a multina-
tional enterprise group (Hausman et al., 2008: 77).
During the second phase of electrification, large electrical companies
such as the German A.E.G. and Siemens, the American General Electric and
Westinghouse, and the Swiss Brown Bovery, were carrying out international
projects, and for this purpose, they established manufacturing and sales
enterprises (Hausman et al., 2008: 92). For example, in 1895, by the end of
this phase, Siemens and Halske founded a South African Agency with head-
quarters in Johannesburg and, together with the Deutsche Bank, established
a joint agency to promote their commodity exports in South Africa (the
Technical and Commercial Corporation Ltd.). The German electrical compa-
nies assumed diverse roles in these years, and operated as finance institu-
tions, manufacturers and energy suppliers.167
Segreto notes that the ‘expanding market for electricity also brought new
kinds of complications to the companies involved in this field, particularly the
166 Wilkins proposes five categories of joint-stock companies that were set up under Bri-
tish joint-stock company law and operated as ‘international capital flow conduits’ as part of
multinational enterprises or under the control of foreign individuals (Wilkins, 1998: 9).
Overseas investment occurred through domestic companies (developed business operations
abroad after registration); domestic and international companies (with domestic and inter-
national business at the time of registration); trading and shipping companies, investment
trusts and other financial intermediaries, and free-standing companies (organized to und-
ertake business in foreign countries or regions) (Wilkins, 1998: 8).
167 The authors quote the German economist Jacob Riesner: ‘“[T]here was scarcely a
form of management or financing which was not utilised in the nineties by the [German]
electrical industry. There were syndicates, subsidiary companies (Tochtergesellschaften),
and trust companies […] operating companies proper, and manufacturing companies, as
well as financing institutions, increases and reductions of capital, silent participations,
commandites, issues and sales in the open market, fusions, pooling of profits (Gewinnge-
meinschaften), buying of shares, separations and combinations, independent and syn-
dicated enterprises at home and abroad. In short, a medley of undertakings […]”’ (Haus-
man et al., 2008: 95).
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electrical equipment manufacturers’ (Segreto, 1994: 163). The management
of electric companies required a costly professional bureaucracy, and these
companies employed various strategies to maintain and expand their mar-
kets (Segreto, 1994). The holding company was preferred by all of the major
equipment manufacturers over limited liability or joint-stock companies.168
The holding company, the equipment manufacturer, and the electric operat-
ing company were associated by contract and were represented in each oth-
er’s respective boards of directors.169 Hausman and colleagues consider hold-
ing companies to be ‘a pyramided corporate structure that came to be an
umbrella designation for highly diverse underlying behaviour’ and as a ‘very
important set of initiators in spreading electricity around the world’ (Haus-
man et al., 2008: 52). The case of Johannesburg reveals the complicity of
these companies with German imperial ambitions.
During the third phase of electrification in Johannesburg, the first
central power stations, the Rand Central Electric Works (RCEW) and the
168 According to Segreto, the relationship between the electrical equipment producers
and their financial holding companies came to be known as Unternehmergeschäft : ‘The
financial trusts’ purpose were to establish and finance, alone or, more often, in collabora-
tion with other partners, companies for the production and distribution of electricity;
they planned the projects and supervised the construction of the plants, just as a modern
engineering consulting firm would, obtaining from that activity a commission of approxi-
mately 7% of the total costs of construction. The machinery and the necessary equipment
to run the power plants were provided by the electrical equipment manufacturer connec-
ted to the holding company or by the manufacturer’s affiliated companies. Once the elec-
tric companies were able to distribute dividends regularly, the holding companies com-
pleted their job by entering the shares on the market’ (Segreto, 1994: 164).
169 ‘There were numerous connections among the three actors – that is, the equipment
manufacturer, the holding company, and the electric operating company. Representatives of
the equipment manufacturing firms as well as those of the participating banks were among
the directors of the holding companies. Representatives of the holding companies sat on the
boards of directors of the electric power companies that the holding companies and the
banks financed. The relations between each electrical equipment enterprise and its holding
company were defined by contract and bound the choices of the latter to the commercial
needs of the former. However, the holding companies had quite a wide margin of auto-
nomy from the head office, especially in their distinctly financial operations, and some-
times, as in Indelec’s case, moments of tension and dispute occurred’ (Segreto, 1994: 164).
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General Electric Power Company (GEPC) were established by two groups of
powerful companies. A brief sketch of these companies illustrates the variety
of objectives, structures and operations that were subsumed under the cat-
egory of the ‘company’. At first glance, the RCEW and the GEPC appear to
be simply connected to the mining companies of their founders; Goerz and
Co. (founded by the German Adolf Goerz), and the Consolidated Gold
Fields Group (formed by the Britons Cecil Rhodes and Charles Dudd).
However, the RCEW and the GEPC branched out into a complex group of
diverse but interrelated business ventures. These business ventures display an
opaque diversity of organizational forms and objectives. Notably, the legal
provisions governing the international business of these companies at the
end of the 19th century were not subjected to international company law.
Rather, the laws of selected European nations determined the legal frame-
work for territories under colonial rule. One of the model legal provisions for
these laws was the British Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 which intro-
duced the principle of limited liability.
The RCEW illustrates an industrial business venture in which banks and
industry collaborated closely to further the interests of the German Empire
in the Transvaal. It presented itself in public as founded and owned by Adolf
Goerz and his company Goerz and Co. However, the RCEW was initiated
and financed by the Deutsche Bank and equipped and built by the German
company Siemens and Halske. The private company Goerz and Co. (estab-
lished in 1892), too, was controlled by a syndicate of German banks: the
Deutsche Bank had sent Goerz out to South Africa in 1888 to explore busi-
ness opportunities and had formed a syndicate to provide the capital of
100,000 pounds to found Goerz GmbH (the predecessor to the private com-
pany Goerz and Co.). Incidentally, Adolf Goerz’s sister was married to Georg
von Siemens, the founding director of the Deutsche Bank and nephew of
Werner von Siemens (co-founder of Siemens and Halske).
The GEPC, on the other hand, was built by Consolidated Gold Fields of
South Africa, which formed part of a family of companies under the influ-
ence of Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Beit. Rhodes had also been involved in the
establishment of the De Beers Consolidated Mines in Kimberly and the Brit-
ish South Africa Company, all of which had been supported by N.M. Roth-
schild & Sons, a British investment banking house. The Consolidated Gold
Fields of South Africa also was associated with the ‘Corner House’ Group of
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companies established by the German financiers Beit and Eckstein. These
connections merged financial and business interests with political power and
imperial visions, and paved the way for the large electric power scheme that
was built in Johannesburg before the Second World War.
The holding company Rand Mines Ltd., established in February 1893 by
Beit and Eckstein, illustrates the measure of control exerted by these business
associations. Rand Mines Ltd. was a group mining finance house that pro-
vided ‘a centralised set of managerial, secretarial and administrative services’
to facilitate the provision of (predominantly European) investment capital
(Turrel & Van Helten, 1986: 188).170 The group of investors involved in its
establishment included the Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa and the
London Exploration Company Ltd., which had been established in 1886 by
N.M. Rothschild & Sons and other merchant bankers. The original purpose
of the Exploration Company was ‘simply [to] assess mining propositions
and recommend investments to its members’. This brief was changed to that
of company promotion in 1889 when the company was restructured as a
joint-stock venture (Turrel & Van Helten, 1986: 184). The Exploration Com-
pany ‘combined engineering and financial expertise’ (Turrel & Van Helten,
1986: 182) and recruited the American mining engineers Hamilton Smith
and Edmund de Crano to run the company. The Rand Mines Ltd. was a
‘giant holding company’ and ‘undoubtedly the most profitable concern on
the Reef’ (Turrel & Van Helten, 1986: 188).
The establishment of Rand Mines Ltd. has been described as a ‘turning
point in the system of capital provision’171 (Graham, 1996: 6). Incidentally, it
170 The first general manager of Rand Mines was an American engineer, Henry Cleve-
land Perkins, who had previously served as consultant to the Exploration Company (Tur-
rel & Van Helten, 1986: 188). Two directors of the Exploration Company were also direc-
tors of the BSAC (Sir Horace Farquhar and Rochfort Maguire) (Turrel & Van Helten,
1986: 188).
171 This new style is described as the ‘group system’: ‘In the first instance, it signalled
the start of the “group system”, whereby each mine was controlled by one of a few huge
groups. Each mine was floated as a joint stock company with its own directors and its
own manager, the Group maintaining control through share ownership and, more impor-
tantly, by dominating the board of directors. The individual companies were never whol-
ly-owned subsidiaries, but rather the objective was to raise capital by flotation and the
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involved two powerful friends, Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Beit: ‘[…] through
thick and thin Rhodes retained valuable support from Alfred Beit and his
partners, H. Eckstein and Julius Wernher, their agents on the Rand, and
from their bankers, N.M. Rothschild & Sons. It is important to emphasize
that the Johannesburg subsidiary of the Wernher, Beit house, namely
H. Eckstein & Company, was in fact run by subordinate employees who were
supportive of Rhodes’s imperial schemes and deeply implicated in the James-
on Raid’ (Newbury, 2009: 98). Consolidated Gold Fields was one of two
sources of Rhodes’ financial power that allowed him to pursue his pro-
gramme of political expansion in Africa (Galbraith, 1975: 57) (the other
being De Beers).172
By the end of this phase, the sixty-six gold mines of the gold mining
industry in the Transvaal in 1905 covered a broad variety of corporate, man-
agement and ownership structures and were often registered under the legal
authority of foreign sovereign powers. They operated as finance, exploration
and trust companies under the auspices of distant legal and political author-
ities and continually changed their structure.173 In addition, joint-stock
subsequent sale of vendors’ interests, and in many cases to make substantial profit by the
sale of shares, once stock prices had risen’ (Graham, 1996: 7).
172 ‘The most important controller of the mines, Julius Wernher, the financial genius
behind the Corner House, was of course an international entrepreneur who directly con-
trolled local capital allocation and development tactics from his vantage point in the City.
Both he and most of the other mining magnates sought funds from all of Western Europe’s
primary and secondary markets. Through stock market operations, the entrepreneurs
siphoned large amounts of capital into their personal fortunes. […] Thus, the strategies of
these two mining houses [Corner House, Goldfields] served to amass significant amounts
of wealth through gold mining finance which were then invested, neither in the gold
mining industry nor in South Africa, but elsewhere in the world. […] Though the mines’
controllers may be variously labelled, it was their function as international developers and
speculators which was fundamental to the evolution of the industry’ (Kubicek, 1979:
196–7).
173 For example, during the early 1890s, as mines increasingly had to dig deeper to reco-
ver the ore and as extraction and processing techniques became more costly, there was a
tendency to subsume several territorial claims for gold mines into holding companies to
provide the necessary capital for larger scale investments. The change in company structure
and status of the enterprises established by the German Adolf Goerz, who also founded the
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companies came to function as intermediary financial advisors to investors,
such as the London Exploration Company Ltd.
At the beginning of the fourth phase of electrification, Wernher Beit &
Company established another financial investment company in May 1905,
‘the biggest trust of its kind the Rand or even London and Paris had seen’
(Fraser, 1975: 166, quoting Kubicek, 1979),174 the London-registered Central
Mining and Investment Corporation Limited,175 with a capital of six million
pounds. According to Kubicek, more than one-third of the Witwatersrand’s
gold output between 1902 and 1913 (which amounted to 11% of world out-
put) ‘was produced by companies controlled by the Central Mining and
RCEW in 1897, reveals the nature of the investment business involved during this phase.
What started out as a syndicate Goerz GmbH, was established as Ad. Goerz and Co. Limit-
ed under German Law in 1889 and restructured as A. Goerz and Company, Limited in
1897, ‘with a view principally to finance, exploit, develop, and work gold mines in South
Africa and elsewhere’ (Skinner, 1911: 141). By the end of the year 1903, ‘the company held
512 claims, most of them being well-situated deep-level blocks in the western district of the
Rand, and its land holdings consisted of 7,480 acres of unproclaimed deep-level ground in
the Western and Eastern districts, including the western half of the farm Witpoort, upon
which five bore-holes have cut the main reef’ (Wills & Barrow, 1905: 275). In June 1904,
the capital was increased to present amount [1,500,000 pounds], […] the Deutsche Bank
guaranteed the entire issues for 1 s. per share […] (Skinner, 1911: 141).
174 ‘Wernher Beit’s own resources were likely so large that it need not have called upon
outside sources or close associates for the additional capital the deep-level mines required.
Securities the firm had deposited with the Union Bank of London in 1895 are instructive.
On face value these securities were worth £1,170,000. Almost half this amount, or £547,000,
was in Consols and earning 2 3/4 percent. Bonds issued by the governments of Argentina,
Chile, Cape Colony, the Transvaal, Egypt, Russia, and India had a value of £233,000. Ame-
rican securities, mostly railway bonds, totaled £230,000 and promised an average yield of
4.8 percent. […] Other small commitments included Netherlands and South African Rail-
ways debentures (£50,000), Beira Railway bonds (£23,000) [in Mocambique] and Fraser
and Chalmers securities (£5300). […] it was increasingly becoming a London-based private
investment house with diversified interests overseas’ (Kubicek, 1979: 68–9).
175 ‘Central Mining was formed originally to take over the business of the African Ven-
tures Syndicate which Wernher had formed in 1903 to buy old shares […] and to attract
mainly French capital to finance the mines during the reconstruction of the Transvaal,
after the South African war’ (Fraser, 1975: 166).
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Investment Corporation, by its affiliate, Rand Mines Limited, or by the crea-
tor of these two investment trusts, the private financial house of Wernher,
Beit and Company’ (Kubicek, 1979: 53). The decision of this gold mining
imperium to convert their mines to use electric power determined the course
of history of electrification in Johannesburg and South Africa. It became the
major consumer of electric power in Johannesburg and the principal custom-
er of the VFTPC.
The VFTPC was registered in Rhodesia, but it presented itself as a Brit-
ish company, with head offices in London and one million pounds of ordi-
nary shares belonging to the African Concessions Syndicate Ltd. (which was,
in turn, owned by the BSAC). However, of the two million pounds of prefer-
ence shares, 900,000 pounds were owned by the A.E.G. and the consortium
of German banks. All debentures were owned by the A.E.G. and the con-
sortium of German banks. Both the chairman and the managing director
were British (Marquis of Winchester, A.E. Hadley), with ten British and two
German (Emil Rathenau, Hans Schuster) members on the board of directors.
The German A.E.G. engineer, Georg Klingenberg, was on the technical advi-
sory board. According to Weinberger, this form of association complied with
the corporate policy of the A.E.G. (Weinberger, 1975: 63). Of note are the 15
banks initially involved in the German finance consortium, which also
include several Swiss banks: Bank für Handel und Industrie; Berliner Han-
delsgesellschaft; Disconto-Gesellschaft; Dresdner Bank; Gesellschaft für elek-
trische Unternehmungen; Nationalbank für Deutschland; Schaffhausenscher
Bankverein; S. Bleichröder; Delbrück Leo & Co.; Hardy & Co., GmbH, sämt-
lich in Berlin; E. Heimann, Breslau; Gebrüder Sulzbach, Frankfurt a.M.;
Bank für electrische Unternehmungen, Zürich; Schweizerische Kreditanstalt,
Zürich und Basel; Aktiengesellschaft vorm. Speyer & Co., Basel (Weinberger,
1975). The A.E.G. had already established a bank syndicate under the leader-
ship of the Deutsche Bank, the Deutsch-Überseeische Elek-
trizitätsgesellschaft, with a capital of 10 million Deutsche Mark, to establish
electric installations and to purchase and finance enterprises in the field of
applied electricity (Sothen, 1915: 65).176
176 ‘Um besonders in Südamerika festen Fuss zu fassen, gründete die A.E.G. im Jahre
1898 mit ihrem Bankkonsortium unter Führung der Deutschen Bank die Deutsch-
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The other major shareholder of the VFTPC, the British South Africa
Company, had been incorporated under British law by Royal Charter, 29
October 1889, instigated by Cecil Rhodes, with an original share capital of
one million pounds. Its ‘principal field of operations’ was defined as ‘in that
region of South Africa lying to the north of Bechuanaland and to the west of
Portuguese East Africa’. The BSAC’s legal powers are elusive; the company
was ‘specially authorized and empowered’ to issue shares, borrow money,
make loans, establish banks and companies, to ‘make and maintain roads,
railways, telegraphy, harbours’, to ‘carry on mining and other industries and
to make concessions of mining forestall or other rights’, to ‘improve, develop,
clear, plant, irrigate and cultivate’ land, to ‘settle […] territories’, to ‘acquire
and hold personal property’, and to ‘carry on any lawful commerce, trade,
pursuit, business, operations, or dealing’ – in short, to ‘do all lawful things
incidental or conducive to the exercise or enjoyment of the rights, interests,
authorities and powers of the Company in this Our Charter expressed or
referred to, or any of them’. The Charter states:
That the Petitioners desire to carry into effect divers concessions and agreements
which have been made by certain of the chiefs and tribes inhabiting the said region,
and such other concessions agreements grants and treaties as the Petitioners may
hereafter obtain within the said region or elsewhere in Africa, with the view of pro-
moting trade commerce civilization and good government (including the regulation
of liquor traffic with the natives) in the territories which are or may be comprised or
referred to in such concessions agreements grants and treaties as aforesaid.177
The line and power of jurisdiction for legal disputes relating to the BSAC are
worth highlighting: ‘In case at any time any difference arises between any
chief or tribe inhabiting any of the territories aforesaid and the Company,
that difference shall, if Our Secretary of State so require, be submitted by the
Überseeische Elektrizitätsgesellschaft mit einem Kapital von 10 Millionen Mark. Zweck
der Gesellschaft ist Bau- und Betrieb elektrischer Anlagen, Erwerb und Finanzierung von
Unternehmungen auf dem Gebiete der angewandten Elektrizität, insbesondere Beleuch-
tung, Transportwesen usw.‘ (Sothen, 1915).
177 Charter of the British South Africa Company, (London Gazette), 20 December 1889.
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Company to him for his decision, and the Company shall act in accordance
with such decision.’
The BSAC’s function was to assume the risk of extending the infra-
structure of modern capitalism (including railways) into south-central Africa
for the benefit of the British, but without the British taxpayer having to pay
the costs.178 Unlike normal companies, the BSAC was permitted to establish
a political administration with a paramilitary police force in areas where it
might be granted rights by local rulers. It was also allowed to profit commer-
cially through its own operations or by renting out land, receiving royalties
on the mining of minerals, levying customs duties and collecting other fees.
One of the shareholders in the BSAC, in turn, was Wernher, Beit &
Company. This company led the Corner House group, which by 1913 con-
trolled 15 Rand mines ‘with an issued share capital of more than £14 million’
(Harvey, 1989: 115). At the same time, these mines were the main customers
of the VFPTC’s subsidiary, the Rand Mines Power Supply Company. All of
these companies operated under a self-awarded sense of entitlement, appro-
priation and intellectual ascendancy that may be encapsulated in their desig-
nation as ‘settler companies’.
The above image contrasts with Hughes’ conclusion that the institu-
tional form of a public and private utility ‘presided over’ and was influenced
most directly by electric power systems (Hughes, 1983: 15). In Johannes-
burg, a diverse set of companies that prima facie appear unconnected to the
business of electrification, in fact presided over its development. These com-
panies offer a window into several underlying forces in the history of elec-
trification in Johannesburg between 1886 and 1930. These forces connect
178 ‘The sub-Continent is particularly indebted to joint-stock enterprise. Even Rhodesia,
a country larger in area than France, Germany, Austria and Italy combined, is admi-
nistered under what is for all intents and purposes the Joint Stock Companies Acts. At a
time when more than one European Power was anxious to establish itself in Africa, the
British Imperial Parliament could not undertake the vast responsibilities involved in the
acquisition of such an extensive territory as that which has for years borne the name of
Rhodesia; and had it not been for the foresight and patriotic enterprise of Mr. Cecil Rho-
des and his associates in the formation of the Chartered Company, Matabeleland and
Mashonaland would probably have fallen to either one of these Powers, or would have
become part of the South African Republic’ (Wills & Barrett, 1905: 257).
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directly to the imperial politics and industrial policies of America, Germany,
and Britain.
The companies involved in the establishment of the first power stations
of Johannesburg and the subsequent grand scheme of the VFTPC were for-
eign companies. They pursued numerous purposes, including the investment
of capital, the administration and management of electrification projects, the
sale of manufacturing equipment, the generation, marketing and sale of elec-
tricity, the acquisition of land and rights, the establishment of living quarters
and settlements, territorial hegemony, racial and social control, national
imperial interests, personal careers, and the implementation of ideologies of
modernization and civilization. In legal terms, these companies operated in
the no man’s land of emerging international law. Most of them were regis-
tered in Great Britain and therefore fell under that country’s business laws.
However, the degree of power formally bestowed and actually executed by
these companies, their privileges, spheres of operation and influence are not
readily appreciated.
An illustrative example is the A.E.G., the company that equipped,
designed and built the gigantic regional power scheme in Johannesburg. Emil
Rathenau travelled to America in 1903 to negotiate the division of the world
electricity market with General Electric on behalf of the A.E.G. However,
Rathenau entered into these negotiations as the director of a global business
empire, not as the director of a German manufacturing company:
This time he did not make his appearance in the New World as one who seeks to
assimilate a small part of their accumulated richness of intellect to take it home to
establish a humble livelihood. He made his appearance as intellectual sovereign, as
industrial king, who intended to confront the leading men over there on equal foot-
ing to negotiate the distribution of the electrical world (Pinner, 1918: 269).179
179 ‘Diesmal erschien er aber in der Neuen Welt nicht als einer, der einen kleinen Teil
des drüben angehäuften Geistesreichtums in sich aufnehmen und zur Errichtung einer
bescheidenen Existenz im Heimatlande mit sich forttragen wollte, sondern als ein Geistes-
herrscher, ein Industriekönig, der den führenden Männern drüben als Gleichberechtigter
entgegenzutreten und mit ihnen über die Verteilung der elektrischen Welt zu verhandeln
beabsichtigte‘ (Pinner, 1918: 269).
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Most of the companies that were involved in the early history of elec-
trification in Johannesburg were legally accountable to overseas nations and
pursued their imperial interests. These conditions generated complex legal
situations in which ‘“legal variations” and parallel legal orders co-existed
within the same territory’ (Miles, 2013: 26).180 Companies both contributed
to and made extensive use of the ambiguous legal circumstances. They set
the terms of the debate for the electrification of Johannesburg by obscuring a
variety of underlying interests.
Concessions
The legal garment clothing a concession may vary.
Peter Fischer, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 1985.
It is not in fact possible to exclude a priori any subject matter from the
possible sphere of a concession. By its nature the State is capable of assert-
ing an exclusive competence in any sphere of activity not denied to it by a
rule of international law, as a slave trade concession would be today.
Peter Fischer, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 1985.
The supply of electric power is both a legislative and a technical question.
Charles Merz & William McLellan, 1920.
Electric lighting and power schemes require the purchase of certain rights
and privileges, such as for wayleaves, water, coal, land, transmission poles,
and for the general operation, generation and sale of electric power. Acquisi-
tion of such concessions is part of the traditional trade of electric power
undertakings. In Hughes’ history of electrification in Western society, such
rights and privileges are referred to as patents, franchises, licences and con-
cessions. Typically in his narrative, they were granted by local or national
government agencies and fell under their respective legislative and regulative
sovereignty. Overall, Hughes views concessions, licences and franchises as
180 Quoting Benton, Lauren. 2010. Search for Sovereignty. Law and Geography in Euro-
pean Empires, 1400–1900. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 2–8.
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forming part of the local legal and political process required to establish pow-
er systems. For the case of Johannesburg, the rights and privileges conferred
through concessions reach far beyond the local, and they also transcend legal
and political matters.
Hughes first mentions concessions in connection with Edison’s plans to
sell ‘concessions or licenses’ to prospective companies in the United King-
dom through English Edison (Hughes, 1983: 55). As early as 1882, Edison
claimed patent rights in South Africa with the establishment of the Edison
Indian and Colonial Electric Company. Except for a few lighting projects,
however, these rights were not used. In the Transvaal Republic, rights of local
authorities to establish electricity undertakings were only established in the
1890s, following the model of legislation in Great Britain, where the Board of
Trade regulations regulated municipal electricity supplies (Marquard, 2006:
144). However, diamond and gold mines continued to install electric lights
and (later) small electric power plants without obtaining government per-
mission. The Johannesburg Gas Works did not need to obtain a concession
for their plant. When it was commissioned, local government was still new.
The first government of Johannesburg was founded in 1886, and it took the
form of a ‘Digger’s Committee’, which consisted of nine members under the
chairmanship of the Mining Commissioner. Within a year, it was succeeded
by the Sanitary Board, which acted as the local authority and was also headed
by the Mining Commissioner.181 The Sanitary Board, in turn, was replaced
by a Town Council in December 1897, when the status of Johannesburg was
changed to that of a town.182 When the British occupied Johannesburg dur-
ing the Anglo-Boer War in 1900, the town became an ‘Imperial Government
Municipality’ and the Military Governor was assisted by an Acting Mayor
who had to administer municipal affairs until it was possible to establish a
181 The Sanitary Board originally included five elected members and two government
nominees. Two years later, it was reconstituted ‘to consist of twelve elected members
under the chairmanship of a Government Commissioner and its area of jurisdiction was
five square miles’ (Public Relations Office, 1967: 2).
182 ‘The Town Council comprised twelve elected members and a ‘Burgomaster’ appoint-
ed by the Government. The Council was given powers to make regulations in regard to
safety, public order, morality and health’ (Public Relations Office, 1967: 2).
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civil form of local government in 1901.183 Thus, concessions in Johannesburg
during this period were granted under the unstable circumstances that are
typical of territories under the fierce contest of imperial powers.
Significantly, the first government concession to establish a central pow-
er station was awarded to a foreign company, the German Siemens and
Halske, in July 1894. This concession was drafted in the form of an agree-
ment signed by the state secretary and a representative of Siemens and
Halske – the operating company (the Rand Central Electric Works (RCEW)
owned by the gold mining company Goerz & Company) was only estab-
lished two years later. The concession included ‘the right to lay and have
electric conductors for the transmission of power to the mines along the
Witwatersrand’ on certain conditions.184 The concession to establish the sec-
ond power station in Johannesburg was acquired in 1897 by the Simmer and
Jack Proprietary Mines Ltd., a subsidiary of the Consolidated Gold Fields
Group, and it was signed by Jan Smuts in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds.
It was ceded to the General Electric Power Company (GEPC) in 1899 and
conferred ‘the right of laying and maintenance of electrical installations for
motive power’ on behalf of six mines owned by the Consolidated Gold Fields
Group (Power Companies Commission, 1910: 52). At the time, the Trans-
vaal was a self-governed, independent republic under British suzerainty,
which meant that it actually was not entitled to enter into agreements with
foreign countries without the consent of the government of the Great Britain.
The Siemens and Halske concession was granted with the option of expro-
priation by the government after 15 years. Both concessions specified that
‘amalgamation with other grants for power transmission can only occur with
the approval of the Government’ (Power Companies Commission, 1910: 48,
54).
183 In 1901, Lord Alfred Milner became Administrator of the Transvaal and invited
twelve prominent citizens to serve as town councillors until such time as proper elections
could be held’ (Public Relations Office, 1967: 2).
184 ‘The Government grants to the firm Siemens and Halske in as far as such is not in
conflict with rights already granted, the right to erect poles and to fix electrical conductors
to the same on Government grounds, public roads, and proclaimed goldfields […]’
(Power Companies Commission, 1910: 47).
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Despite these specifications, both concessions were ceded to the newly
established VFTPC in 1907. As part of its strategy to achieve a monopoly to
supply electricity to the gold mines of the Witwatersrand, the VFTPC first
obtained the necessary concessions to purchase and extend existing under-
takings. This included the purchase of the Lewis and Marks concession in
1905 for a pole line from their coalfields at Vereeniging to supply power to
the Witwatersrand 25 miles to the north as well as ‘an agreement for the
right to establish a power station at Vereeniging’ (Hadley, 1913: 3). The
company from which the VFTPC purchased this concession belonged to
cousins Isaac Lewis and Sammy Marks, who had previously considered sup-
plying the Rand from their coalfields at Vereeniging, 25 miles south of
Johannesburg, and they had obtained wayleaves for a pole line for this pur-
pose (Hadley, 1913: 3). Sammy Marks was a friend of President Kruger.
The RCEW and the GEPC were built on land classified as farmland. The
first power stations in Johannesburg required rights to use this land and
water, and rights to build and maintain transmission lines to distribute elec-
tricity. The concessions for the RCEW185 and the GEPC186 were issued by the
185 Siemens and Halske obtained a concession on 19 July 1894 and ceded it to the
RCEW in 1895 ‘[…] the right to lay and have electric conductors for the transmission of
power to the mines along the Witwatersrand’ (Chamber of Mines, 1911: 45). The gover-
nment grant stated several conditions, including the restriction that ‘amalgamation with
other grants for power transmission can only occur with the approval of the Government’
(Chamber of Mines, 1911: 46). This concession was amended on 5 February 1906 to cede
the rights of Siemens and Halske to the Rand Central Electric Works Ltd.
186 The Simmer and Jack concession was obtained on 31 July 1897 and ceded to the
GEPC on 16 March 1899. Simmer and Jack Proprietary Mines Ltd. were granted ‘the
right of laying and maintenance of electrical installations for motive power on behalf of
the Simmer and Jack Proprietary Mines Limited, Simmer and Jack East Limited, Simmer
and Jack West Limited, Knights Deep Limited, Jupiter Gold Mining Company Limited,
Rand Victoria Mines Limited. This included ‘the right to erect poles on Government
lands, public roads, and proclaimed mining areas […] for the transmission of motive
power’ (Chamber of Mines, 1911: 52). Again, it was stipulated that ‘amalgamation with
other grants for motive power can only take place with the approval of the Government’
(Chamber of Mines, 1911: 54). The concession was amended on 14 November 1905 to
grant the GEPC ‘the right to erect poles and to affixt hereon electric mains or conductors
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South African (Transvaal) government, which had gained independence
from Great Britain in 1884. The rights of the Transvaal government to issue
these concessions regarding land had been granted by Great Britain in the
London Convention of 1884. The indigenous population of this territory was
not considered in the institution of this European land ownership scheme.
The land of the Transvaal had been contested for centuries. The early Afri-
can land tenure practices of the Africans were displaced by various pop-
ulations. By the end of the 19th century, all African populations had been
conquered. In other words, the concessions were issued by a Boer govern-
ment with political authority conferred by an imperial European power, and
not by the local population.
However, the concessions granted to the RCEW and the GEPC were not
comparable to the concessions or franchises granted by municipal or nation-
al governments for the construction and operation of the first central power
stations in Berlin, Chicago or London at the time. In Great Britain, legis-
lation to regulate the excavation of streets for electrical lines was passed by a
political process that ended within two weeks of Edison’s model central pow-
er station opening at Holborn Viaduct. The electric lighting bill was devel-
oped by the Board of Trade,187 which also dealt with transportation, commu-
nications and industries, and therefore could draw from precedents
concerning, for example, tramways or waterworks. This legislation was sup-
ported to protect the public against the tendency of public utilities to abuse
monopolistic powers. In Berlin, Emil Rathenau’s Deutsche Edison-Gesell-
schaft, having acquired patent rights from Edison, established the Städtische
Electricitäts-Werke in 1884 and entered into a concession agreement with
the municipality of Berlin to supply it with electric power.
The strategy pursued by the German company Siemens and Halske,
however, was not unique among multinational electric power business
for the transmission of electric power over Government and private ground, public roads
and ways, proclaimed goldfields’ (Chamber of Mines, 1911: 55).
187 Incidentally, the Board of Trade during the time of this legislation was presided over
by Joseph Chamberlain in Gladstone’s cabinet, from 1880 to 1885, who later assumed the
post as Colonial Secretary to British Colonies from 1895 and was accused of complicity in
the Jameson Raid.
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ventures. From the beginning, they included ‘the scouting and negotiation of
the franchise, the securing of the contract, engineering, company promotion,
underwriting, construction, operations and management, and primary and
secondary distribution of securities’ (Hausman et al., 2008: 47). In colonial
contexts, which are characterized by a multiplicity of unstable and ever
changing governance and administration structures and rules, such business
enterprises profited from the confusing, transitory and unprotected local
conditions. Because of the types of conditions that prevail when a region is
under the siege from imperial powers, the legal designation of a concession
in a place like Johannesburg assumes a broader spectrum of meanings than it
would in places like Berlin, Chicago and London.
For example, the concession acquired by the Consolidated Gold Fields
Group (through its subsidiary the Simmer and Jack Mines) to establish the
GEPC was part of a concession-hunting policy that Cecil Rhodes (and his
companies) used to further his imperial vision of expanding the British
Empire. In fact, when the concession for the right to supply electricity to five
mines was issued in 1897, Rhodes had only just established the African Con-
cessions Syndicate Ltd. (registered on 4 October 1895). This ‘syndicate’ was
awarded the ‘preferential right for seventy-five years to generate 250,000 kW
at the Falls, and the exclusive right to transmit power from the Falls to the
Rand’ (Christie, 1984: 28). In 1894, Rhodes had requested and received a
positive expert opinion on the feasibility of this project from George Forbes,
who had been a consulting engineer to the Niagara power works. The sale of
this concession on 14 December 1906 to the VFTPC marked the beginning
of one of the largest power schemes to be established in Johannesburg before
the First World War.
The African Concessions Syndicate Ltd. was a subsidiary of the British
South Africa Company. Extensive rights and privileges were conferred to the
Syndicate by its British parent company. The BSAC, in turn, held vast pow-
ers that are usually assigned to governmental authorities or state bodies, such
as the right to military interventions. This company effectively operated as a
‘commercial entity’ with sovereign powers (Miles, 2013: 41) and merged
functions that are usually carried out separately by the state and investors
(Miles, 2013: 33). In fact, the BSAC claimed these rights on the basis of its
status as a Chartered Company under the British Crown, which endorsed it
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to perform a colonial mission in Southern Africa, including the conquest of
land, mineral and property rights.
However, on what grounds was the BSAC entitled to concede the rights
to harness power from the Victoria Falls (and transport it to the mines of the
Witwatersrand) to a subsidiary company, the African Concessions Syndi-
cate? The BSAC claimed these rights to the Victoria Falls territory based on
‘the Rudd concession’, which was acquired in 1888, the year that the BSAC
was established.188 This concession was acquired to colonize Mashonaland
and Matabeleland in Southern Rhodesia. The way in which this concession
was acquired189 is crucial, because the rights conferred in this concession
were eventually purchased by the VFTPC, and in fact, the acquisition of
these rights was the reason for its existence. The concession consists of a
document, signed by the King of the Ndebele, Lobengula, under deceptive
conditions. It ceded rights to mine and administer but not to occupy land.
Nevertheless, the BSAC in 1890 occupied and started settling Mashonaland.
Effectively, the land was annexed by Britain through a chartered company
under the control of Cecil Rhodes. The complex and contested legal rights
and privileges that lie behind these early concessions, especially concerning
land and property, persist to this day. They precede the often-cited land loss-
es through the Native Lands Act of 1913, but much dispossession of land
occurred before then.
188 These claims were challenged by the Lippert Concession in 1891.
189 ‘Not surprisingly, when European-concessionhunters came with legal documents for
the chiefs to sign, the Africans could not conceivably have grasped the implications of
what they were signing, especially in the case of grants pertaining to land rights: Their
culture orientation did not encompass private ownership of land, let alone the alienation
thereof as a commodity. Never realising that the documents they signed and the money
they received alienated their land permanently according to European law and in fact
prepared them for colonial domination, the chiefs actually perceived themselves as having
the power and authority to grant complete rights of usufruct and still have the last say as
for the ownership of the land. […] Lacking in the comprehension of the powers they were
up against. The chiefs when they found that they had been caught up in legal niceties with
concessionaires, simply offered to return the monies they had been offered. They disco-
vered, often too late, that the monies they received legally and permanently alienated the
concessions areas. (Selolwane, 1980: 85–6).
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By the time the Transvaal Power Act (which obliged electricity suppliers
to apply to the Power Undertaking Board for a licence) came into force in
1910, the VFTPC had already acquired all of the significant concessions and
rights to generate and transmit power in Johannesburg. The Act essentially
endorsed the VFTPC’s monopoly, with the option to expropriate the com-
pany after 35 years. When the Electricity Act established Escom and the
Electricity Control Board in 1922, Escom effectively remained outside of gov-
ernment control.190
Concessions designate a bundle of rights with varying powers, com-
petences, authorities and jurisdictions. Overall, however, unlike Hughes’ case
studies in Chicago, Berlin and London, where concessions were issued
through the political procedures of stable local or national governments, the
concessions in Johannesburg were issued by transitory (and at times precari-
ous) agencies that, in turn, operated within the opaque, contradictory and
changing legal and political circumstances of imperially contested territories.
Up until 1910, these concessions were issued in the absence of legislation or
regulatory frameworks. By this time, however, the formation of a power sup-
ply scheme that would determine electricity provision in Johannesburg over
the next 40 years had already been completed.
The notion of the ‘concession’ has been used to designate a variety of
arrangements (Veeser, 2013; Fischer, 2014). Concessions in the colonial
context were transactions of power on a grand scale. They operated at the
intersection of ‘the historical narrative of empire and international invest-
ment law’ (Miles, 2013: 28). Concessions also were used as a tool to play out
‘political and commercial rivalries […] amongst the European capital-
exporting states’ (Miles, 2013: 30).191 For example, Selolwane considers the
190 The ECB was given regulatory powers to issue licences to anyone supplying elec-
tricity except ‘local authorities, the South African Railways and Harbours, a government
department’ or ‘self-producers’ (Marquard, 2006: 148).
191 Miles considers concession agreements often to have been exploitative : ‘The rights
obtained by concessionaires were often extensive, involving jurisdictional control of
substantial areas of land and significant natural resources for lengthy terms in return for
payment of royalties. The scope of individual agreements varied, and, although this type
of arrangement often concerned only an isolated enterprise, it still effectively involved
3.3 “How Do Technological Systems Evolve?” 175
colonization of Bechuanaland to have mainly taken place ‘through con-
cession rather than conquest’ (Selolwane, 1980: 76). The BSAC acquired a
legal doctrine of entitlement ‘to enter into treaties, found and administer
settlements, engage in military conquest, and build forts’ that enabled ‘non-
sovereign actors to operate in the international sphere’ (Miles, 2013: 34). In
territories ruled by colonial powers, special privileges and monopoly rights
were often added to concessions in order to attract capital from foreign
investors (Veeser, 2013: 1136). Selolwane views the colonial activities of
‘commercial’ companies, such as the BSAC, ‘as major agents of capitalist
expansion that constituted private rather than public imperialism’
(Selolwane, 1980: 76). Concessions in such circumstances often functioned
as tools ‘to bridge the gap between the legal systems’ of states (Veeser, 2013:
1142). Sometimes concessions granted in colonial territories also gave com-
panies ‘the right to compel labour’ (Veeser, 2013: 1143). Moreover, con-
cession agreements also involved the creation of settlements. This policy was
pursued in the case of the power stations in Johannesburg, which were also
built with adjacent settlements. Such overseas concessions were ‘international
legal doctrines [that] were developed and moulded to legitimise the use of
oppressive techniques by European powers throughout the colonial encoun-
ter’ (Miles, 2013: 31). According to Miles, international law ‘was an impor-
tant tool in facilitating the objectives of Western commercial and political
hegemony’ (Miles, 2013: 31). Categories such as ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’
were used to justify the exclusion of non-European communities from inter-
national law (Miles, 2013: 31).
Miles observes that concessions were protected and legitimized by
‘international rules on investment protection’ (Miles, 2013: 28). From the
rules that were set up by European nations emerged legal principles that
‘became part of the process of building and maintaining Western economic
and political dominance’. This process ‘evolved into imposed assertions of
universally applicable international law as the colonial encounter unfolded’
(Miles, 2013: 29). Selolwane proposes that ‘concession-acquisition came to
play an important role in the expansion of monopoly capitalism’, and she
the transfer of sovereign rights held by the state to the holder of the concession’ (Miles,
2013: 28).
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considers concessions to be a tool of imperial conquest (Selolwane, 1980:
79). She views the pursuit of concession hunting ‘as a minor agency of capi-
talist expansion’ because ‘[o]nce acquired, a concession was valueless until
and unless it could be taken over by a company with substantial capital back-
ing’ (Selolwane, 1980: 79). By granting the BSAC a British royal charter in
1889, ‘the British imperial government was merely establishing political con-
trol over the process of concession-colonization spearheaded by various
companies, and through the cheapest way possible’ (Selolwane, 1980: 113).
The BSAC was granted extraordinary powers by the United Kingdom ‘to
enter into treaties, to annex territory, and to obtain commercial concession
agreements’.192 Through these concessions, the BSAC ‘acquired wide-ranging
trading, investment, and jurisdictional rights’ (Miles, 2013: 30). The con-
cession sold by the BSAC to the African Concessions Syndicate to supply
power at the Victoria Falls represents a ‘transfer of economic and jurisdic-
tional control’ that ‘contributed to the process of infusing European notions
of property rights and the creation of replacement legal regimes’ (Miles,
2013: 31).
Whereas Hughes considers concessions to be one of many components
in the ‘seamless web’ of society and technology, the above deliberations draw
a different picture. For regions that fell under the competitive imperial con-
test of European nations, the wide-ranging scope of concessions required for
the establishment of electric power stations formed part of an emerging
international legal order. It endorsed the interests of imperial powers and
served as a legal sanction to accommodate inconsistencies, to justify violence,
and to transcend contradictory parallel jurisdictions (Miles, 2013: 33). Con-
cessions were essential for the development of the electric power scheme in
Johannesburg, yet in their certified function as legal instruments, they silence
the vast scope of issues that were managed under this label. However, these
issues are important indicators of the underlying forces that set the terms of
debate for electrification in Johannesburg and restricted the range of possible
paths to be taken.
192 Charter of the British South Africa Company, London Gazette, 20 December 1889.
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Natives
Of all the problems with which the present and future statesmen of South
Africa are faced, none can compare in gravity or complexity with the
native question. Stated in brief terms, it may be defined as a standard of
the relations between the white man and the black man.
Lionel Phillips, 1905.
On ‘The Native Problem’
What I would like in regard to a native area is that there should be no
white men in its midst. I hold that the natives should be apart from white
men, and not mixed up with them.
Now, I say the natives are children. They are just emerging from barbar-
ism. They have human minds, and I would like them to devote themselves
wholly to the local matters that surround them and appeal to them.
Cecil Rhodes: His Political Life and Speeches, 1881–1900.
Rough guesses place the number of natives at from two to ten millions,
but, as a matter of fact, no one knows even approximately their number.
This lack of information is due to the roving propensities of the natives.
Here to-day, there to-morrow, it would take a mightier hunter than even
the famed Selous193 to hunt them all down.
Edgar Mels, Scientific American, 1900.
The small lighting systems of the 1880s evolved into the regional power sys-
tems of Johannesburg and the Rand against the background of migrating
populations before the First World War. These included indigenous pop-
ulations, people from adjacent colonies (e. g. Portuguese), European and
American immigrants, and Boer and English settlers. From the very begin-
ning, these populations were organized into a hierarchical labour admin-
istration that was based on the idea of racial supremacy over African pop-
ulations. The labour policy of the gold mines followed three main categories
to classify the work and wages in the mines, ranging from highly skilled
193 The British explorer and hunter Frederick Courteney Selous (1851–1917) was active
in Southern Africa.
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mining engineers to unskilled workers: indigenous peoples of Southern Afri-
ca for ‘unskilled labour’; imported European and American skilled labour;
and local ‘White’ skilled labour. In 1897, at the time the GEPC was con-
structed, the chief engineer of the Consolidated Gold Fields Group said that
the workers at the Witwatersrand mines comprised more than 9,000 ‘white
employees’with total annual wages over $9,000,000, and 70,000 ‘Kafirs’, with
total annual wages of nearly $12,500,000 (Hammond, 1897: 240).
This socio-political and administrative order shaped the particular
course of the history of electrification in Johannesburg. Conversely, the
maintenance and consolidation of this oppressive administration was sup-
ported by the institutions of the electric power industry. The VFTPC also
assigned its employees to three categories: ‘professionals (well-paid and
dependable), white artisans and supervisors (not so well-paid, far less
dependable), and black workers (poorly paid, housed in compounds for con-
trol, and substitutable)’ (Christie, 1984: 57).
The category of ‘the native’ stands at the centre of this classification. He
typically appears in connection with the labour requirements of the gold
mining industry. The gold mines regularly lamented the shortage of unskil-
led labour, but at the same time, they consistently endeavoured to cut the
costs for this type of labour. These circumstances favoured the mines’ deci-
sions to mechanize labour through new technology and power sources. The
first lights and generators in Johannesburg were installed at the gold mines.
The first two power stations in Johannesburg came into operation at a time
when the surface outcrops started hitting lower levels that commanded new
deep-level mining procedures. These new mining practices compelled the
gold mines to reach a new balance between human labour and power for
machinery. Thus, the amount of electric power supplied to foreign-owned
gold mines in the late 1890s was directly related to labour costs, ‘the crucial
area of cost minimisation’ in the gold mining industry (Richardson & Van
Helten, 1982: 81).194 The entitlement of foreign companies to mining and
194 ‘In 1898, for example, 58 producing companies spent 53–44 per cent of their total
production costs on labour, and the balance on various stores and fuel, the largest single
items being explosives (10.95 per cent) and fuel (8.23 per cent). Consequently, commodi-
ty price levels and the costs of different types of labour-power were a central concern of
3.3 “How Do Technological Systems Evolve?” 179
exploration rights entailed an associated sense of entitlement to ‘native’
labour.195
Therefore, the production process adapted to save costs, ‘exploited the
growing reservoirs of cheap unskilled African labour’ (Richardson & Van
Helten, 1982: 81) and ‘the ratio between European and African (and later
Chinese) miners, both in terms of numbers and relative costs, became one of
the most sensitive indices of the profitability of mining operations on the
Rand’ (Richardson & Van Helten, 1982: 81). This ratio fuelled the rhetoric
about the expansion of the mines to argue that ‘expansion depended to a
very large extent upon the movement of this ratio in favour of African
labour’ (Richardson & Van Helten, 1982: 81).
Because of the ‘problem’ of the ‘native labour supply’ for the gold mines,
the Transvaal Chamber of Mines experimented with various plans to recruit
unskilled workers. Such plans were supported by several legal regulations
that aimed to control the movement and residence of ‘natives’ in Southern
Africa, and they endorsed a racial division of labour by imposing a ‘colour
bar’.196 Examples of these regulations include the Transvaal Native Pass Law
of 1895197 (drafted by the Chamber of Mines and adopted by the Transvaal
the industry’s managers. As the industry was not generally able to exercise a controlling
influence over commodity prices, labour costs thus became the crucial area of cost mini-
misation’ (Richardson & Van Helten, 1982: 81).
195 ‘The technical difficulties of deep-level mining, the scale of investment that it requi-
red, and the absence of an indigenous skilled workforce meant that in the initial stages of
capital accumulation the industry was forced to resort to the introduction of skilled immi-
grant workers to perform certain specific tasks of production and to oversee the produc-
tion process in general. However, the reliance upon the relatively scarce and therefore
expensive skills of immigrant miners from Europe, North America and Australasia to
perform these tasks was in direct conflict with the cost-minimising strategies dictated by
the imperatives of profitable production’ (Richardson & Van Helten, 1982: 81).
196 These policies continued legislation that had previously been passed to regulate the
‘native’ population in Southern Africa, such as the Masters and Servants Ordinance (passed
to deprive black tenants of legal protection by defining them as ‘servants’ instead of wage
labourers) or the Glen Grey Act (passed by the Cape Parliament by Cecil Rhodes in 1894).
197 The Pass Law No. 31, of 1896, amendment of Law No. 23 of 1895: ‘[…] so it is hereby
enacted as follows: Regulations in terms of Article 88 of the Gold Law. For the purpose of
facilitating and promoting the supply of native labour on the public diggings of this
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government to incorporate Africans into wage labour),198 the Liquor Law of
1896 and the Transvaal Labour Importation Ordinance of 1904 (designed to
enable the importation of Chinese labourers).
In 1897, an Industrial Commission of Inquiry was convened to examine
the problems of the gold mining industry. One of the main obstacles identi-
fied was the inability to find an ‘adequate supply of native labour at reason-
able pay’ (Chamber of Mines, 1897: iii).199 The Commission’s report includ-
ed a detailed overview of ‘native wages’ (see Figure 8).
One of the means of controlling and regulating the native labour force
was the Pass Law.200 The ‘native’ was obliged to register and apply for a pass
Republic, and for the better controlling and regulating of the natives employed, and the
relations of employer and native labourer’ (Industrial Commission of Inquiry, 1897: 576).
198 ‘Regarding the Pass Law, there has been, as far as I am aware, no witness yet before
the Commission who has stated that this law, as administered, had benefited his compa-
ny, and Mr. Goldmann has informed you that out of thirty-three companies employing
19,000 boys monthly, 14,000 have deserted since the new Pass Law came into operation,
without any single one of these deserters having been brought back to the mines and
justice. In my opinion, the Pass Law, though good as a temporary expedient, is only the
kindergarten of the native question […]’ (Mr Jenning’s Evidence, Industrial Commission
of Inquiry, 1897: 219).
199 ‘Now, regarding the native labour, which comprises in numbers by far the greater
proportion of labour we are using. What has been the keynote of our trouble? Lack of
supply in proportion to the demand, and inefficiency and ignorance of this class of labour
which is not trained to the intricate work demanded of it. Far more skill is required of the
kaffir on the Witwatersrand than is the case for the most part on the diamond fields, or in
any agricultural pursuit in South Africa. The boys come here raw, some very young, often
with weak physique, and are all comprised in the same classification. They are accustomed
to their own simply ways, and desire to return to them as soon as possible. They come, in
fact, only in order to make enough money to return to their kraals with sufficient means to
enable them to marry and live in indolence. There is much latent possibility in them for
learning, but they leave us often as soon as they become really useful, and by the various
companies vieing with each other to obtain their services, they have become masters of the
labour situation’ (Mr Jennings’s Evidence, Industrial Commission of Inquiry, 1897: 219).
200 ‘The whole object of the Pass Law is the control and regulation of native labour on
the goldfields, and if the desertion of natives can be prevented, the mining industry
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Figure 8: Schedule of Native Wages, Witwatersrand. Agreed to at a combined meeting of
Mining Companies, May 1897 (Industrial Commission of Inquiry, 1897).
would be fostered […]’ (Mr F.W. Kock’s Evidence, Industrial Commission of Inquiry,
1897: 296/297).
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and badge in order to be identified by pass officials.201 The following para-
graphs provide excerpts from the Pass Law No. 31, 1896 to illustrate the
detailed administration that was established to deal with ‘the native’.
6. The Mining Commissioner or pass officer appointed for the district shall enter
in a register to be kept for the purpose, of the form of schedule B hereto, the name
of the native, his tribe, chief, father, district or country, stature and marks, if any,
etc., and he shall also number each native consecutively. Such registered number
shall thereafter be the native’s official mark so long as he remains within the district.
7. In addition to the district pass to form A, the pass officer shall at the same time
issue to each native a metal ticket or badge, on which shall be clearly stamped or
impressed at the time of issue the native’s registered number, the initial letters of the
labour district, and year of issue. This ticket or badge shall be attached to a strong
leather strap or buckle, and must be worn by the native round his left arm about the
elbow, so as always to be clearly visible. Such district pass and badge shall be issued
free of charge.
8. Such district pass and metal badge shall enable and authorize the native to
whom it is issued, to seek employment within the labour district for which it is
issued for a period of three days from the date of issue.
9. If the native fails to find employment within the prescribed three days from the
date of issue of district pass, or after discharge by his last employer, he shall return
to the Mining Commissioner or pass officer who issued the pass and badge, and
may have an extension of a further three days endorsed thereon by the pass officer,
on payment of a fee of two shillings […].
11. A native working on a proclaimed goldfield, and wishing to remove from one
labour district to another, or such or any other proclaimed goldfields, shall first
201 ‘It thus speaks for itself that, perhaps with a few exceptions, deserting natives are
punished. It has to be acknowledged that when a native throws away his passes and bad-
ge, he cannot again easily be identified by any of the pass officials, and I challenge anyone
to describe a native, and register him in such a way that he would be able to identify him
without the aid of his passes and badge, out of 60,000 other natives […]. Identification
would, therefore, be easier by the officials of the different mines, and in order to meet this
I have suggested a charge office, with a large yard, where all natives arrested could be kept
for a certain time to ensure identification by their employers. According to my opinion,
the question is not so much the detection and apprehension of deserters, but the preven-
tion of desertion […] this may be accomplished in two ways […].(2) By making the
punishment for desertion so severe that no native will venture to leave his employer ille-
gally […]’ (Mr F.W. Kock’s Evidence, Industrial Commission of Inquiry, 1897: 297).
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apply for leave to do so from the Mining Commissioner or other appointed pass
officer in his district, and such leave shall be granted him, provided he then holds a
district pass, in clear order, with metal badge, and that his last employer, if any, shall
have filled in the full discharge required on the district pass, form A […].
14. Any native found in the labour district without the distinct pass of form A and
metal badge, or without a travelling pass, or any defaulter under Article 9, shall be
punishable by a fine of not exceeding (pounds) 3, or not more than three weeks’
imprisonment with hard labour for first offence, and for second offence a fine not
exceeding (pounds) 5, or not more than four weeks’ imprisonment with hard labour
and lashes, and at the discretion of the Court before whom he shall be convicted for
every offence thereafter.
17. The Government shall make arrangements as it may deem desirable, so that
each labour district in a proclaimed goldfield shall use and issue a pass distinctive in
colour from those of the other labour districts, and metal badges with initial letters
of each district, in order to facilitate the detection of vagrants or natives moving in
any labour district without a pass and badge for that district.
Employers with more than twenty native labourers are obliged to keep a register
according to schedule form F, at the end of each month fill in and return to Mining
Commissioner or pass officer of district, with all details of natives engaged and dis-
charged that month.
27. Government shall appoint such officers in each district as may from time to
time be found necessary for the due and proper administration of these regulations,
and shall further appoint special labour inspectors for each labour district with pow-
er to summarily arrest all natives contravening these regulations. The duties of such
special labour inspectors shall inter alia be
(a) to make regular and frequent inspections of registers of native labour kept by
employers, to inspect all natives employed, to ensure that their badges are worn and
in order, and, if need be, compare any or all such natives with the district pass filed
by the employer (Industrial Commission of Inquiry, 1897: 577–8).202
The category of the ‘native’, and the rules set out to regulate his whereabouts
and civil rights, were not only used for economic purposes. It served the
imperial objective to appropriate, settle and civilize the territories of
202 Extracts from the Pass Law No. 31, 1896 concerning the administration of ‘natives’
(The Mining Industry. Evidence and Report of the Industrial Commission of Inquiry. Com-
piled and published by the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, Johannesburg, 1897).
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Southern Africa.203 Accordingly, the labour scheme was not only developed
to provide manual labour. It served to appropriate and civilize the country by
white settlers. In this sense, the idea of the ‘native’ also provides a founda-
tional condition for the establishment of the first two power stations in
Johannesburg, which were owned by a German bank and a British gold min-
ing house. German imperial policy in Southern Africa primarily pursued
economic and industrial rather than political colonization. A quote from
Walther Rathenau provides the key to this sense of entitlement: ‘If the nigger
possessed the characteristics of the European, we would have no right to col-
onize his country’ (Rathenau, Reflexionen 1908 [2008]: 163, my trans-
lation).204 Rathenau’s quote indicates that the idea of a subordinate race pro-
vided imperial Europe with a simple justification to take away the land and
rights to self-government of the local populations. The idea legitimized the
subjugation of people, which was required to dispossess and relocate them,
and it allowed the Europeans to ignore them in their plans for the industrial
development of Southern African territories – save in their capacity as
labourers.
Who was subsumed under the category of ‘the native’? An article in the
journal Scientific American in 1900 on the ‘The Natives of South Africa’
offers the following description.
The writer has seen the South African native, commonly called Kafir, in all his vary-
ing phases, in his wild state, semi-civilized and wholly so. He has seen the native at
his best and at his worst – untainted by the touch of civilization and soiled by its
proximity. And through it all, the writer has believed, and perhaps always will, that
the Kafir, whether Zulu or Basuto or Becbuana or Swazie or Amatonga or Matabele
or any other tribe, has good in him, just as though his skin were white – and bad
too. Summed up in a few words, the Kafir, in his uncivilized state, is an overgrown
child, with childish foibles and shortcomings. But let him learn the vices of civi-
lization, let him realize the evil there is in him, let him discover that there is a broad
203 For example, mining magnate Lionel Phillips (1855–1936), friend of Cecil Rhodes
and Alfred Beit, stated, ‘It will be long before the natives derive the full benefit of closer
contact with civilisation, because their reasoning powers are limited, and their point of
view entirely different to ours’ (Phillips, 1905: 99).
204 ‘Besässe der Neger die Eigenschaften des Europäers, so hätten wir kein Recht, sein
Land zu kolonisieren’ (Rathenau, Reflexionen 1908 [2008]: 163).
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path leading to destruction – and you will find a fully civilized being, as capable in
certain directions as is the white man (Mels, 1900: 56).
In 1897, the Industrial Commission of Inquiry defined the category of the
native to ‘apply to males of all the native and coloured races of South Africa’
(Industrial Commission of Inquiry, 1897: 576). This category was not just
used in juxtaposition to the ‘white’ population; it also related to a third cat-
egory, that of the ‘coloured person’, which had been defined in the Gold Law
of 1896 to ‘signify every African, Asiatic native, or coloured American per-
son, Coolie or Chinese’ (Industrial Commission of Inquiry, 1897: 599).
These categories, however, in no way reflected the populations in Johannes-
burg, and difficulties emerged in practice.
Then the difficulty arises with the people known as Cape boys and bastards […].
But you have got the question of white people, you have got the mixed breed, and
you have got the pure kaffir. […] As illustrating the difficulty, I will give you a case
which happened to myself. I have a man in my employ and he is very dark, but his
father is an Englishman, who is married to a woman who is descended from a St.
Helena woman and a white man. Out of nine children this man is the dark one; all
the others are white (Mr. F.W. Kock’s Evidence Industrial Commission of Inquiry,
1897: 298–9).
The categories sanctioned the idea of the white settlement of Southern Afri-
can territories: civilization. This entitlement to civilize the ‘native’was shared
by many powerful personalities involved in the business of electrification in
the Transvaal, such as Emil Rathenau, Cecil Rhodes, Alfred Beit and John
Hays Hammond. Cecil Rhodes probably best illustrates the sense of entitle-
ment over ‘natives’ that gave him free reign to develop his plans to develop a
British colonial empire from the Cape to Cairo. The establishment of the
central power station to supply mines of the Consolidated Gold Fields group
in the Transvaal was only the first step in his grand plan. At the time, the
independent Boer Republic in the Transvaal stood in the way of his creating
a South African union under the British flag. As early as 1894, Rhodes had
consulted with George Forbes (consulting engineer to the Niagara Falls power
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project) about the possibility of generating electric power at the Victoria
Falls and transmitting it to the gold mines of the Witwatersrand.205
Walther Rathenau, one of the masterminds behind the first regional
power scheme in Johannesburg, used the expression ‘nigger’ to discuss the
‘native’ question.
The nigger differs mentally from Occidentals through his greatly reduced capacity
for abstraction and concentration. General and ideational concepts are virtually
inconceivable to his thinking, which is not unskilled in manual work; to retain an
interest and thinking all the way through to a final result causes him pains, he
evades it […]. For this reason a well-founded mental development of the nigger will
remain wishful thinking in the foreseeable future (Rathenau, 1908 [2008]: 157; my
translation).206
205 ‘In 1894, before I had completed the first electric works at Niagara, I was asked by
letter from Johannesburg whether it would be possible to transmit power from the Victo-
ria Falls, on the Zambesi to all the gold mines in Rhodesia, varying from 350 to 500 miles
distance. At first I was inclined to throw the letter into the waste-paper basket. No one, up
to that date, had, to my knowledge, seriously considered the financial aspects of so distant
a transmission of electric power. But the letter required an answer; so I sat down to work
out and quote some figures which should show the absurdity of the scheme. I had been
supplied with maps and costs of fuel, etc. and in a short time I found, to my asto-
nishment, that if the facts were as stated, the scheme was financially and electrically a
sound one […]. Upon this I was asked to go to South Africa to negotiate with Mr. Cecil
Rhodes and Dr. Jameson for a concession. They both appreciated the value of the enter-
prise to the country, and prepared a draft of the concession, which was only awaiting the
sanction of the Chartered Company’s Board when the Jameson raid and the Matabele
rising closed negotiations. Here is a case where, if there be really good gold mines, it will
pay handsomely to transmit electric energy a distance of 500 miles, provided the surveys
of the Falls prove as satisfactory as the photographs do, and provided the fever is not an
insurmountable obstacle’ (Forbes, 1898: 27).
206 ‘Der Neger unterscheidet sich geistig vom Okzidentalen durch weit herabgesetzte
Fähigkeit zur Abstraktion und Konzentration. Allgemeine und ideelle Begriffe sind sei-
nem im Handgreiflichen nicht ungewandten Denken nahezu unfassbar; andauerndes, bis
zum Endergebnis nachgehaltenes Interesse und Nachdenken bereiten ihm Schmerzen, er
weicht ihm aus. […] Deshalb wird eine festgegründete geistige Entwicklung des Negers
für absehbare Zeit ein frommer Wunsch bleiben […]‘ (Rathenau, 1908 [2008]: 157).
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Although Walther Rathenau conceded that ‘a certain legal consciousness’
and ‘sense of justice’ formed part of the few abstractions the ‘nigger’ was
capable of,207 he concluded that education would remain of little importance
to African economic development, except for training in manual skills.208
The particular geography of imagination of this influential historical figure
for the histories of electrification in Germany and South Africa is significant:
Walther Rathenau was the son of Emil Rathenau, who had purchased the
Edison Patents for Germany and founded the A.E.G. He was a director of the
A.E.G., he headed its central power station division before Klingenberg took
over in 1899, and he was the director of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft,
which provided finances for the A.E.G. and (with the Deutsche Bank) for the
establishment of A. Goerz GmbH in 1892, which had commissioned Johan-
nesburg’s first power station.
A few examples of the era’s prevalent images of the ‘native’ are worth
quoting to illustrate how this category was presented. The American mining
engineer for the British South Africa Company, John Hays Hammond, one
of Rhodes’ close friends,209 writing on the topic of ‘South Africa and its
Future’, described the populations of South Africa as follows:
South Africa has a heterogeneous population of about five million, of which over six
hundred and fifty thousand are whites, English and Dutch preponderating […]. It is
to the unique colonizing capacity of Great Britain that South Africa owes the impor-
tant position that she to-day holds. Of the native population the bulk belongs to the
Bantu family, which occupies all of Central and South Africa, and forms the great
reservoir from which the manual labor of South Africa is drawn. The members of
this family are generally designated ‘Natives’ or ‘Kafirs’. […] Kafirs are the negroes
of South Africa, though they have characteristic differences from the negroes of the
West Coast of Africa, whence came our American negroes. The Bantu tribes are not
207 ‚Zu den wenigen Abstraktionen, deren der Neger fähig ist, gehört ein gewisses
Rechtsbewusstsein und ein deutlicher Gerechtigkeitssinn […] (Rathenau, 2008: 163).
208 ‚Erziehung wird daher, soweit sie nicht auf Erlernung einzelner Fertigkeiten, Notio-
nen und Handgriffe hinausläuft, sondern ihren idealen Weg als Geisteskultivation ver-
folgt, ein für die afrikanische Wirtschaftsentwicklung wenig bedeutender Faktor bleiben’
(Rathenau, 1908 [2008]: 157).
209 ‘“Rhodes,” said Mr. Hammond, “was by far the greatest man I have ever met. He had
unlimited vision, extraordinary perception, unbounded courage.”‘ (Forbes, 1917: 187).
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aborigines, having come from Northern Africa. It is a remarkably prolific race, the
numbers of which are increasing with great rapidity. Of far less importance numeri-
cally are the Bushmen, the true autochthons, but now the social pariahs of the whole
continent. The interior of South Africa was originally sparsely populated by these
pigmy Bushmen tribes, which have resisted all attempts at civilization, preserving
their nomadic instincts, and still approximating to the lowest known species of
humanity. The Hottentots, another tribe, which had located in South Africa interior
at the advent of the whites, though possessing some resemblance to the Bushmen,
have radical ethnological differences […]. The Hottentots, though evincing more
receptivity, have been but inconsiderably affected by the civilizing influence of their
environment, and may with the Bushmen be set down as unimportant, and indeed
rapidly vanishing, factors in South Africa’s future (Hammond, 1897: 234–5).
Hammond’s views illustrate the classification of the ‘native’ as a source of
labour rather than as citizen.210 In his imaginary geography, the ‘native’ was
viewed as a labourer rather than a citizen, as described in Cecil Rhodes’ sec-
ond reading of the Glen Grey Act in the Cape House on 30 July 1894, speak-
ing on ‘The Native Question’.
What I have found is this, that we must give some gentle stimulus to these people to
make them go on working. There are a large number of young men in these loca-
tions who are like younger sons at home […]. These young natives live in the native
areas and locations with their fathers and mothers, and never do one stroke of work.
But if a labour tax of 10 s were imposed, they would have to work […]. We want to
get hold of these young men and make them go out to work, and the only way to do
this is to compel them to pay a certain labour tax (Rhodes, in Verschoyle, 1900:
381).
The connection between the history of electrification and oppression by the
non-native population is not apparent and cannot be easily traced. The geog-
raphy of imagination of key players in the history of electrification of the
regional system on the Rand nevertheless reveals glimpses of this connection.
210 ‘It cannot be denied that the regime of the white man has greatly ameliorated the
condition of the Kafir, who, before his advent, was the victim of internecine wars, and of
the operation of a despotic form of native government, possible only among barbaric
people. The only alternative supply of labor would be the importation of indentured East
Indians […]’ (Hammond, 1897: 247).
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Despite their selective and non-representative status, these glimpses are
important historical markers. Thomas Edison’s ‘ordinary native’, Walther
Rathenau’s ‘nigger’ and Charles Merz’s ‘White population’ all map this imagi-
nary geography. These categories were employed to assign the subordinate
status to indigenous populations. Hughes’ history of electrification of West-
ern society, despite its focus on three imperial nations at the height of a glob-
al imperial scramble for territory, does not record the presence of such pop-
ulations. The subordinate status and invisibility of these populations are
effectively endorsed by the application of Hughes’ historical model of tech-
nological development.
The technological projects of the RCEW and the GEPC, rather than
expressing a response to local needs for electricity, served to foster the inter-
ests of rival imperial powers and their companies’ offspring in Johannesburg.
The provision of electricity to the city of Johannesburg was an intermittent,
insignificant by-product of this imperial enterprise. The subsequent history
of the electrification of Johannesburg and South Africa bears this imprint. By
1898, the South African Republic (Transvaal) had become the world’s largest
producer of gold, accounting for nearly 28% of output (Tuffnell, 2015: 56).
The first two central power stations were both associated with companies
and business ventures involved in this grand imperial exploration project.
Both the RCEW and the GEPC were private investments. These investors
pursued the long-term economic and political imperial interests of Great
Britain and Germany in the Transvaal. Thus, the power stations represent
two competing imperial nations in Johannesburg during the years leading up
to the second Boer War. Rather than simple investment or project develop-
ment enterprises, their geography of management reflects the intricate
political and economic scramble for territorial supremacy in the age of New
Imperialism. This scramble rested upon a sense of entitlement to operate and
intervene in foreign territories. Company ventures were one of the principal
vehicles that foreign nations used to participate competitively in this
scramble.
The above discussion suggests three common attributes that find their
expression in the recurring themes that have been identified in the history of
electrification in Johannesburg: gold mining, empire, national competition,
companies, concessions and natives. These attributes relate to the European
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‘Zeitgeist’ and describe forces that powered the course of this history: a sense
of entitlement, a sense of appropriation and a sense of intellectual ascendancy.
Hughes in Johannesburg: New Concepts
The cultural forces influencing the systems stemmed from the societies
within which the systems grew. These societies were of various kinds
according to time and place.
Thomas P. Hughes, 1983.
This chapter presents several new concepts to describe the dynamics and
drivers of electrification; the frontineer, the settler company, technological
entitlement, technological scramble, global texploration and texpansion. These
concepts are introduced by way of examples that relate the early history of
electrification in Johannesburg to Hughes’ history of electrification and mod-
el of technological change.
Hughes’ book uses two points of entry to study the history of elec-
trification. On the one hand, he pursues the material expansion of technol-
ogy relating to electric light and central power stations. On the other hand,
he traces ‘the decisions made by inventors, engineers, managers, and finan-
ciers who were system builders’ (Hughes, 1983: x). According to Hughes, the
focus on system builders also supports his decision to undertake a com-
parative study of the interaction between region and technology rather than
between nation and technology. Whereas the material evolution of technol-
ogy may be drawn from historical records and leaves limited scope for his-
torical controversy, the choice of system builders is a problem of method-
ology in need of explicit criteria for selection. Hughes’ system builders are
defined by professional categories, and they include inventors, engineers,
managers and financiers. All of these professions (individually and in any
combination) are capable of presiding over a system-building process.
Hughes’ criteria for the selection of system builders, therefore, pertains to
their professional qualities and distinctions, which, in turn, are defined by
their material utility in assembling the technology of electric power systems.
System building, according to Hughes, involves solving problems of
various kinds at various stages in the history of technology. In Hughes’
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framework, system builders may be discerned retrospectively by way of their
problem-solving capacity. Put differently, a solved technological problem will
lead the researcher to at least one system builder. In this way, Hughes con-
structs his theoretical framework of growth, which is driven by the reverse
salient and critical problems.211 Thus, the historian’s task is to identify the
key problems that were solved in the history of electrification and to trace
the system builders who solved them in their specific cultural setting. Elec-
trification remains equated with the setting up of electric lights and the con-
struction of regional power systems. However, Hughes’ notion of the system
builder also uses undeclared selection criteria. The system builders in
Hughes’ history of electrification are all American, German and British citi-
zens. Hughes deduces a model of technological change from case studies in
these three countries and extrapolates it on a global scale.
System builders achieve system goals by correcting reverse salients. The
system goal is a compelling technological condition that provides guidance
and direction to the expansive aspirations of the system builder.212 Hughes’
system is composed of related components that are connected by a centrally
controlled network. The limits of this control define the limits of the system
(Hughes, 1983: 5). Therefore, a key question concerns how the researcher is
to ascertain these limits. The study of Johannesburg has shown that this ter-
ritory was within the limits of control of the key protagonists in Hughes’
211 ‘Innumerable (probably most) inventions and technological developments result
from efforts to correct reverse salients. Outstanding inventions and developments in elec-
tric lighting and power during the two decades after 1880 were responses to reverse
salients’ (Hughes, 1983: 80).
212 ‘The idea of a reverse salient suggests the need for concentrated action (invention
and development) if expansion is to proceed. A reverse salient appears in an expanding
system when a component of the system does not march along harmoniously with other
components. As the system evolves toward a goal, some components fall behind or out of
line. As a result of the reverse salient, growth of the entire enterprise is hampered, or
thwarted, and thus remedial action is required. The reverse salient usually appears as a
result of accidents and confluences that persons presiding over or managing the system
do not foresee, or, if they do foresee them, are unable to counter expeditiously. […] The
reverse salient will not be seen, however, unless inventors, engineers, and others view the
technology as a goal-seeking system’ (Hughes, 1983: 79–80).
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history, such as Edison, Klingenberg, Rathenau, Mershon and Merz. By
implication, there is no rational basis for placing Johannesburg outside of
Hughes’ system of electrification in Western society; on the contrary, using
Hughes’ own logic, Johannesburg forms part of his network of inter-
connected components. This has far-reaching implications, which can be
illustrated by Hughes’model system builder, Thomas Edison.
Hughes describes Edison as an inventor-entrepreneur, a ‘holistic con-
ceptualizer and determined solver of the problems associated with the
growth of systems’ (Hughes, 1983: 18): ‘Edison focused on one level of the
process of technological change – invention – but in order to relate every-
thing to a single, central vision, he had to reach out beyond his special com-
petence to research, develop, finance, and manage his inventions. Because of
this organizational, system-building drive, he is known as an inventor-entre-
preneur’ (Hughes, 1983: 18). Thus, Hughes regards ‘the history of Edison
systems building’ as ‘a history of ideas and a study of problem solving’: ‘Edi-
son’s concepts grew out of his need to find organizing principles that were
powerful enough to integrate and give purposeful direction to diverse factors
and components. The problems emerged as he strove to fulfill his ultimate
vision’ (Hughes, 1983: 18). Accordingly, Hughes introduces Thomas Edison
as the ‘Hedgehog’213 who presided over the process of technological change
from problem identification to innovation and technology transfer (Hughes,
1983).
As demonstrated in the study of electrification in Johannesburg, from
the very beginning, Edison envisioned a global empire for this technology.
Edison prepared the legal and diplomatic conditions to develop this global
empire in his agreements with Drexel, Morgan & Co., the company that had
also arranged for the financing of his electric light and central power station
projects. Edison operated at a global scale through companies and patent
213 ‘Quoting the Greek poet Archilochus, Isaiah Berlin wrote in The Hedgehog and the
Fox: “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” Hedgehogs,
according to Berlin, are those “who relate everything to a single central vision, one
system less or more coherent or articulate.” Foxes, in contrast, pursue many ends, ends
that are “often unrelated and even contradictory.” Berlin counted Dante, Plato, Lucre-
tius, Pascal, Hegel, Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche, Ibsen, and Proust among the hedgehogs’
(Hughes, 1983: 18).
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rights for far-away regions before his technology had been developed. The
global scope of his project was strategically pursued by skilfully inserting his
idea into the European imperial architecture of the late 19th century, with
Great Britain as the prime imperial and industrial power, and London as its
financial centre. This vision of entitlement to certain global rights, privileges
and profits regarding technology was a key driver for these technological
projects.
The global dimension and the sphere of control of Edison the system
builder challenge Hughes’ notion of system limits. More importantly, how-
ever, they defy the analytical significance of Hughes’ concept of the system
builder. Because the system builder is also the solver of critical problems that
stem from reverse salients, these concepts, too, need to be revisited. This
requires a shift in perspective on the kinds of problems in need of solutions
in the history of electrification. Hughes views the problems that Edison set
out to solve as reverse salients of material technology, motors of techno-
logical growth. The study of Johannesburg suggests that the problem that
Edison set out to solve was how to develop technology that would impart to
him certain global rights, privileges and profits. One of the consequences of
this shift in perspective is that it brings to light a different profile of the per-
former – one that reaches beyond Hughes’ professionalized group of system
builders (inventors, engineers, managers and financiers) – and thus suggests
a change in the unit of analysis for historical research on technological
change.
Key personalities who drove and shaped the history of electrification in
Johannesburg between 1880 and 1930 include Cecil Rhodes, Adolf Goerz,
Alfred Beit, John Hays Hammond, Emil and Walther Rathenau, Georg Klin-
genberg, Charles Merz and Hendrik van der Bijl, among others. What key
characteristics stand out in these men that allowed them to exert such a pow-
erful influence on the development of electricity? All of these men possessed
a frontier mentality, and they all pursued frontier visions. They pushed the
frontiers of gold mining, British and German territorial and economic impe-
rial expansion, sales markets for electrical equipment, global investment
practices, global company and investment law, ‘civilization’, mining technol-
ogy and the associated frontiers of ‘native’ labour exploitation, empire and
monopoly, and of international patent rights and privileges.
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Rather than system builders, these personalities may be characterized as
‘frontineers’, a designation that blends the words ‘frontier’ and ‘engineer’. The
word ‘frontier’ refers to two kinds of territorial limits: the frontier of land
and the frontier of knowledge. The frontier of land designates the territorial
limits of place, whereas the frontier of knowledge refers to the territorial lim-
its of epistemic space. Given its twofold label, the frontineer can be traced
methodologically using Trouillot’s geographies of management and imagi-
nation. Both the frontiers of place and epistemic space hold the promise of
new fields for exploitative activity. The frontiers offer playing fields for
exploration, expansion and settlement, and they potentially increase spheres
of control and influence. The word ‘engineer’ can be used as a noun or a
verb. Hughes uses this category to refer to an occupational activity that was
professionalized in parallel with the history of electrification. He coined the
phrase ‘inventor-engineer’ to illustrate that the qualities required to spur
technological growth go beyond what has come to be associated with the
professional ‘engineer’ to include inventive, managerial and financial capaci-
ties. As a verb, the word is also used more loosely to indicate clever and often
secret measures taken to make something happen, something that is to the
advantage of the actor. This meaning relates to the etymological roots of the
word ‘engineer’, which derives from the Latin word ingenerare, which means
to contrive, devise, or create. The dual aspiration to the most advanced terri-
tories in place and space is fuelled by a sense of entitlement, a sense of
appropriation and a sense of intellectual ascendancy – the foundational dri-
vers of electrification.
Georg Klingenberg was a frontineer: he devised the large electric power
system of Johannesburg. He also used this project as a technological proto-
type, a case study upon which he constructed his theory and wrote his legen-
dary textbook on large electric power stations – defining nothing less than
the frontiers of electrical engineering on the eve of the First World War.
Simultaneously, however, he also extended the frontiers of his company, the
A.E.G., its frontiers of collaboration with the Deutsche Bank and other Ger-
man and Swiss financial institutions, and the frontiers of the German indus-
trial empire in the Transvaal. Another frontineer, Emil Rathenau, purchased
the Edison patent for the electric light not only for Germany but also to
establish an industrial empire across the world, epitomized by his trip to
America to negotiate with the American General Electric Company for the
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frontiers of their respective industrial territories. His son, Walther Rathenau,
accompanied Bernard Dernburg, the German Secretary for Colonial Affairs,
on his travels through Southern Africa and justified German imperialism
with the need to expand the frontiers of civilization. The consulting company
of the British engineer Charles Merz established offices in London to gain
access to the frontiers of electrification in the British Empire.
The concept of the frontineer can be applied inversely as a unit of study
to Hughes’ history of electrification in Chicago, Berlin and London. The
frontineer’s properties are valid for the key protagonists of Hughes’ history –
the ‘system builders’ Thomas Edison, Samuel Insull, Georg Klingenberg,
Oskar von Miller, Charles Merz, Emil Rathenau, George Westinghouse and
Werner von Siemens. However, the properties of the frontineer might also
make some of these men more prominent than others, or might even bring
new actors into focus. In any event, calling these personalities frontineers
rather than system builders not only expands the range of potentially qual-
ifying agents but also accentuates their expansionary aspirations and spheres
of influence beyond the North Atlantic. For example, the overseas activities
and involvements of the Americans Thomas A. Edison and J.P. Morgan, the
Germans Emil Rathenau and Georg Klingenberg, and the Britons George
Forbes and Charles Merz influenced the technological models, companies
and ideas that they applied at home.
The frontineer in the history of electrification blends a sense of entitle-
ment with a sense of appropriation and intellectual ascendancy. These prop-
erties may be captured by the notion of ‘technological entitlement’. This
notion designates a compulsory property of the frontineer and guides his
actions for technological change. It refers to the conviction of having an
intrinsic right to possess, know or do something relating to technology.
Technological entitlement marks out certain privileges of the frontineer of
electric power schemes. The frontineer needs this property to be part of the
process of electrification.
Hughes’model of system growth presupposes consecutive (though over-
lapping) historical phases that start out with invention and development,
and move on to technology transfer, system growth and system stability, or
maturity. These system-building phases do not apply to the case of Johannes-
burg. The early electrification in Johannesburg is better described by the
expression technological scramble. Technological scramble uses the metaphor
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of a ‘scramble for Africa’ to emphasize the fierce and aggressive disposition
of the electrification process outside the territories of the North Atlantic,
which goes beyond mere industrial or economic competition and involves
the contested realm of national powers and their spheres of sovereignty. The
term is more fitting than technological growth, because the word ‘scramble’
designates ‘an eager or uncontrolled and undignified struggle with others to
obtain or achieve something’ (Stevenson, 2010: 1598). The word conjures
images of frantically climbing uphill on one’s hands and knees. The techno-
logical scramble is best introduced together with the concept of the settler
company. The technological scramble is performed by frontineers under the
patronage of settler companies. These companies typically perform two stra-
tegic actions: texploration and texpansion.
Settler companies are controlled by frontineers. Unlike ordinary compa-
nies that function to make, buy or sell goods or to provide services in
exchange for money, the goals of the settler company include the appropria-
tion of certain rights and privileges that typically apply to places outside the
social, political and jurisdictional order of the frontineer’s home country.
Because of its legal liability and obligations to distantly administered direc-
tives, the settler company carries with it a baggage of inherent sovereign
capacities. These are not visible and often not accessible to the inhabitants of
the region in which the settler company conducts its business. The settler
company often deploys these sovereign capacities typically by means of tech-
nological enterprises.
The concept of the settler company is proposed here as a unit for histor-
ical analysis of technology. To examine technology through this lens helps us
to move away from focusing predominantly on a legal and economic con-
ception of companies to shed light on objectives and operations that remain
unseen from such a point of view. For example, out of the many companies
established in the name of Thomas Edison between 1878 and 1883, Hughes’
book mentions those that pertain to his three case studies in Chicago, Berlin
and London. Considered against his notion of technology transfer, the pur-
pose of these companies was to transport and establish Edison’s electric light
and power station technology to other countries. In other words, the busi-
ness of electrification required companies that were able to make, buy or sell
technological goods or to provide technological services that relate to electric
light or central power stations in exchange for money. However, the estab-
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lishment of Edison companies displays significant patterns that are over-
looked in this model of technology transfer. They claimed rights and priv-
ileges to colonial territories as well as contested territories not yet conquered
by colonial powers. These companies imposed legal, political and admin-
istrative orders on these territories that paved the way for settlement by colo-
nial powers.
In Hughes’ image of networks, the pioneering role and power of ‘com-
panies’ is not afforded adequate significance; instead, a company is regarded
as an economic/financial means to spur the distribution of technology. The
variety of companies involved in the electrification of Johannesburg, and
their excessively broad spectrum of fields of competence, areas of jurisdiction
and range of authorities, indicate that the notion of the company has served
as a deceptive, administrative gap filler for a variety of practices and oper-
ations. In the case of Johannesburg, these practices by no means served the
goal of electrification. Rather, electrification served the miscellaneous inter-
ests of these settler companies.
The fields of operations of the settler company are the frontiers of place
and space – the material and epistemic conquest of territories of land and
knowledge. For example, the company A. Goerz and Co. Ltd., which was
financed by the Deutsche Bank, established Johannesburg’s first central pow-
er station in 1897 and pursued the economic and industrial expansion of the
German Empire in Southern Africa, a territory claimed by the imperial pow-
er of Great Britain. The German company A.E.G. assessed the possibility of
harnessing electric power at the Victoria Falls at the beginning of the 20th
century, before having any contract or potential client for electric power. The
project was equally an opportunity for the A.E.G., and its employee Georg
Klingenberg, to push the frontiers of large electric power systems. The British
South Africa Company sought to use the electric power scheme on the Vic-
toria Falls to further its imperial programme to conquer and settle the coun-
try (railways had only just arrived there) and to push the frontiers of the
British Empire. This blending of settler companies’ interests in exploration
and expansion provided the electrification project with unwavering power –
despite the speculative idea behind the project, which left open many techno-
logical questions. After the Victoria Falls electrification project was dropped,
the original project was simply amended to serve a different goal for the set-
tler companies involved – to establish a monopoly for the generation and
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supply of electricity to the gold mines of the Witwatersrand. The VFTPC
challenged national, industrial, corporate, property, political, technical and
legal frontiers. Settler companies involved in the electrification business
selected their projects based on criteria that relate to texpansion and texplo-
ration, activities that both require the sense of technological entitlement of
the frontineer.
Settler companies supply transitory shelter to the frontineer, the short-
lived refuge to devise and direct his projects. Frontineers and settler compa-
nies do not follow system goals, identify reverse salients or solve critical
problems – indeed, they adapt their goals and companies in a way that best
positions them to derive territorial profits. Again, this adaptation is fuelled
by a sense of entitlement, a sense of appropriation and a sense of intellectual
ascendancy – the foundational drivers of electrification.
Exploration designates an expedition, an organized travelling act into
unacquainted regions in order to gain material resources or knowledge. It
includes activities such as sampling, mapping and prospecting, and it typi-
cally happens outside of the home country of the explorers. Texploration sig-
nifies an adaptation of this word, where the ‘T’ for ‘technology’ implies the
impossibility of excluding technology from exploratory activities. A number
of settler companies involved in the history of electrification in Johannesburg
readily illustrate this kind of organized travelling project activity: the Edison
Indian and Colonial Electric Company, Goerz, Siemens and Halske, the
Rand Central Electric Works (RCEW), the General Electric Power Company
(GEPC), the A.E.G., the BSAC, the VFTPC, the Rand Mines Power Supply
Company and Merz & McLellan. The London Exploration Company Ltd.
patently symbolizes this compulsive synergy. Texploration does not displace
the idea of technological growth, but it gives it a direction, purpose and sense
of conquest. However, it invalidates the ideas of the system goal, because it
replaces the image of an ultimate goal that serves to identify and tie together
the system components with a messy picture of a variety of technological
projects of frontineers and settler companies competing for ‘undiscovered’
material and epistemic frontier territory. In addition, it disqualifies the sim-
ple idea of technology transfer as a neutral dissemination of technology
across nations under mutually beneficial financial and material arrange-
ments. The Briton George Forbes, consultant to the Power Scheme of the
Niagara Falls, professionally considered the idea of harnessing the power of
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the Victoria Falls in 1894 at the request of Cecil Rhodes, and he travelled to
Southern Africa for this purpose. This project was tied to Rhodes’ plans to
create a British Empire from the Cape to Cairo, which envisioned conquest
of new territories by texploration through railways, ‘white settlement’, min-
ing activity and electric power.
Texploration is intricately tied to texpansion, which emphasizes the act
of territorial conquest over its prospect or vision. In Hughes’ view, expansion
of electric power systems ‘[…] was not simply an aggressive drive for undif-
ferentiated size; it was a purposeful move to lower the cost of energy’
(Hughes, 1983: 463). This economic argument, however, is not confirmed in
the case of Johannesburg. Siemens and Halske’s construction of the first cen-
tral power station in Johannesburg was not motivated by the wish to lower
the cost of energy. Siemens and Halske acquired a concession to produce and
supply electricity on land in Brakpan to expand their business in Southern
Africa and to gain territorial primacy in a country undergoing fierce imperial
competition. Likewise, the idea to harness electric power from the Victoria
Falls had less to do with the economics of power supply than with the idea of
expanding A.E.G.’s business in Southern Africa and with conquering and set-
tling the new British territory of Rhodesia.
Expansion denotes ‘the act of becoming bigger or of making something
bigger (territorial, economic), the process of increasing in size and filling
more space, the process of making a business, organization, or activity grow
by including more people, moving into new areas, selling more products etc.,
spread, when something increases in size, range, amount’.214 Texpansion
intends to emphasize that the movement of technology across borders right
from the start requires a synergy with expansionary intentions. Again, pro-
jects of texpansion are quickly discernible in the activities of key players in
the history of electrification in Johannesburg; Goerz, Siemens and Halske, A.
E.G., Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Consolidated Gold Fields, BSAC,
VFTPC, and so on. Texpansion also implies the requirement of the settler
company.
214 http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/, accessed 3.2. 2015.
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The framework of frontineers, settler companies, technological entitle-
ment, texploration and texpansion offers an alternative to the cultural forces
that Hughes views as a formative influence in technological change.
The cultural forces influencing the systems stemmed from the societies within which
the systems grew. These societies were of various kinds according to time and place
[…]. The cultural forces varied from society to society but there were also forces
that transcended local or regional characteristics. These were mostly economic in
nature. These economic forces in turn manifested the values that transcended time
and place and pertained to Western society, or at least to the United States, Ger-
many and England. The values were those of a cost-accounting, capitalistic civi-
lization (Hughes, 1983: 462).
Hughes recognizes two sets of forces that influence electric power systems:
the cultural forces of local and regional societies, and the economic forces of
Western society, particularly the United States, Germany and England. What
were the cultural forces that influenced electrification in Johannesburg
between 1880 and 1930? The cultural forces influencing electrification in
Johannesburg did not stem from the society within which the regional sys-
tem grew. Johannesburg was a melting pot of migrants: migrant African
labourers from all over Southern Africa, migrant Britons, migrant Germans,
migrant Americans, migrant Dutch and migrant Boers. There was no single
local society; at best, there was a myriad of local societies. Even then, the
categories by which the composition of such local societies was determined
reflected the views of the selected communities who claimed racial superi-
ority. The gigantic electric power scheme of Johannesburg was built within
just over two decades of the discovery of gold, in a newly explored gold min-
ing region that required the forceful suppression, driving away or resettle-
ment of local, indigenous populations.
Additional forces acknowledged in Hughes’ model ‘transcend’ local,
regional and national cultures and groups. He labels these forces ‘Western
society’, but Hughes does not define this expression. Neither does he relate
this expression to his systems framework or case study methodology. Clearly,
Hughes assigns the United States, Germany and England strong positions in
this category. The only indication that Hughes gives us about his conception
of ‘Western society’ are the industrializing countries and regions that he
mentions as forming the original pool of possible case studies: ‘France, Italy,
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Sweden, the Benelux countries, Russia, Japan, and other industrializing
regions of the world’ (Hughes, 1983: x).
In effect, by applying the expression of ‘Western society’ in this way,
Hughes performs a particular act of writing history that has been described
by various authors. Hughes’ history of electrification in Western society
establishes the myth that electrification began in the North Atlantic and from
there spread to other societies where the technology was adapted into local
and regional social, political and economic formations. The analysis pre-
sented here, however, has shown that this picture is faulty and that visions of
global expansion and empire drove the project of electrification from the
very beginning.
From the outset, Edison conceived his electric light and power station
technology with a view to the global expansion of certain profitable rights
and privileges. Indeed, because Edison cannot personally be credited with
designing all of the parts that eventually came to compose these schemes (as
Hughes also acknowledges), it might have been this strategy, which entailed
establishing settler companies to participate in the technological scramble,
that afforded him success. This technological scramble included international
exhibitions and demonstration plants at sites that showcased the imperial
and industrial power of the North Atlantic for its societies. The grand power
scheme devised by Georg Klingenberg to provide the mostly foreign-owned
gold mines of the Witwatersrand with cheap electric power appeared as one
of two ‘illustrative examples’ in his textbook on large electric power systems.
A gigantic electric power scheme that had been imposed with little resistance
was classified as successful on economic and technical terms; indeed, it was
an instructive model, with no regard to its broader impact on the political,
social, economic and cultural lives of the people living in this region. Such a
judgement was made from within a ‘Western’ frame of reference, with its
attendant measures of attainment and triumph.
Viewed from this global perspective, Hughes’ historical arrows of tech-
nological change – with their home position in the United States and spear-
heads shooting out to ‘Western society’, and from there on to the Rest of the
world – lose their explanatory power for the history of electrification.
Hughes’ systems approach represents a particular view of geography ‘in
which the world has a single center, Europe […] in reference to which all
other regions are to be located; and an understanding of history in which
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there is only one unfolding of time, the history of the West, in reference to
which all other histories must establish their significance and receive their
meaning’ (Mitchell, 2000:7). This ‘modern’ geography rests upon a particular
order that is centred on Europe and is shaped by ‘historical time, the time of
the West’ (Mitchell, 2000: 7). It ‘presupposes an underlying unity in refer-
ence to which […] variations can be discussed’ (Mitchell, 2000: 24), and
other histories ‘tend to become variations on a master narrative that could be
called “the history of Europe”’ (Chakrabarty, 1992: 1).
Johannesburg is predestined to appear in Hughes’ history of elec-
trification as a variation of the master narrative of his systems model and its
themes. The story of the transfer of Edison’s technology to Berlin and Lon-
don – which overlooks the simultaneous movement of Edison’s and other
technology – casts these specific histories of electrification in Europe as the
primary subject of electrification, ‘the historical residual against which differ-
ence is mapped’ (Chakrabarty, 1992: 2). This kind of historiography con-
tributes to the workings of Europe as ‘a silent referent in historical knowl-
edge’ (Chakrabarty, 1992: 2).
‘Only ‘Europe’, the argument would appear to be, is theoretically (at the level of the
fundamental categories that shape historical thinking) knowable; all other histories
are matters of empirical research that fleshes out a theoretical skeleton which is sub-
stantially ‘Europe’ (Chakrabarty, 1992: 3).
Chakrabarty speaks about a ‘transition narrative’ that ‘situates the modern
individual at the very end of history’ (Chakrabarty, 1992: 10).
This modus operandi is remarkable in two respects. Hughes does not
discuss the implications of his particular choice of case studies for this model
of technological change – three great North Atlantic industrial powers of the
late 19th and early 20th century. On the contrary, he claims that his model
presents themes and subthemes that are valid for other cases as well. How-
ever, the United States, Germany and Great Britain occupied very specific
positions in the family of nations between the years 1880 and 1930. They
were confidently positioned at the frontiers of technological change. This
unreflected specificity silently affords these countries a prime position as
archetypes of technological change. Applying Hughes’ ‘method of growth
analysis’, which includes reverse salients and critical problems, outside of
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these historically specific sites is predestined to generate histories of elec-
trification that become variations and replicas of these archetypes. Thereby,
Hughes quietly places the North Atlantic at the centre stage of history, as an
‘underlying unity’ (Mitchell, 2000: 24) for the master narrative of techno-
logical growth. In this narrative, the North American system builder repre-
sents Chacrabarty’s ‘modern individual at the very end of history’ (Chakra-
barty, 1992: 10).
When this model is applied to the history of electrification in other
places, Hughes notion of ‘Western society’ comes to function as what
Chakrabarty (1992: 2) has termed the silent referent of historical knowledge.
Hughes’ concepts of the reverse salient, the critical problem, the system
builder and technological momentum all contribute to establishing the silent
historical authority of this master narrative of electrification. When these
concepts are employed in other empirical sites, technology comes to be a
North Atlantic universal, always suggesting ‘even if implicitly, a correct state
of affairs—what is good, what is just, what is desirable—not only what is, but
what should be’ (Trouillot, 2002a: 221). In this way, Hughes’ book sets the
terms of the debate on electrification at a global scale and restricts the range
of possible narratives on technological change.
Hughes evocation of the undefined category of the ‘West’ has definite
consequences for writing the history of electrification. These consequences
have to do with the way in which this category is constituted. The ‘West’
acquires definitional meaning in relation to its residual opposite, the ‘non-
West’. This residual opposite is embodied in the utopian image of ‘the sav-
age’. Trouillot describes this pair of utopian terms as the two faces of Janus.
These faces, however, appear in a chronological sequence that ‘reflects a
deeper inequality: The utopian West is first in the construction of this com-
plementarity. It is the first observed face of the figure, the initial projection
against which the savage becomes a reality. The savage makes sense only in
terms of utopia’ (Trouillot, 1991: 30).
Hughes’ history of electrification provides a textbook example of the
silent co-constitution of Western society and ‘the savage’. By applying the
category of Western society, he categorically relegates the ‘Rest’ into the geo-
graphical opposite in place and space, and backwards in historical time. This
silencing or negation of the process of creating ‘Western society’ gives his
historical account definitional power over other historical approaches to
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electrification. Because of this silencing, the category of ‘the native’ appears
disconnected from the components that form part of the system or the net-
work, as well as from its goals, style and classifications. The ‘West’s vision of
order’ requires ‘two complementary spaces, the here and the elsewhere,
which premised one another and were conceived as inseparable’ (Trouillot,
1991: 32). Of particular significance to Hughes’ history is the connection
between the construction of an ‘idealized image of civil society in the West’
and its centre stage in history on the one hand, and a ‘marginal’ African soci-
ety which is ‘measured and found wanting’ on the other hand (Mamdani,
1996, quoted in Randeria, 2002: 291).
The ‘savage’, which is part of the history of electrification in Johannes-
burg as a recurring theme in the form of ‘the native’, does not appear to
relate to electrification, or technology at large, in any common-sense man-
ner. On the contrary, however, these expressions appear to pertain to com-
pletely different worlds of relevance. The ‘native’ has nothing to do with
Hughes’ ingenious system builders of the industrial world, who solve critical
problems that appear as reverse salients in order to achieve system goals – in
and for ‘Western society’. What has ‘the native’ to do with the history of
electrification?
In the history of electrification of Johannesburg, ‘the native’ is a highly
flexible category associated with gold mining, labour, exploration, civil soci-
ety, governance, legislation and technology. This category served to justify
the frontineer’s projects of texploration and texpansion. It provided the nec-
essary reasoning that legitimized the suppression and relocation of indige-
nous people, as required for gold mining, which in turn necessitated elec-
trification. Walter Rathenau, a member of the board of directors of the A.E.
G., explicitly formulated this necessary precondition for the colonization of
the land of the native to legitimize ‘corporate expansion and strategies of
racial control’ (Tuffnell, 2015: 54).
The question that Hughes asked in 1983 with respect to exploring the
history of electrification – ‘how do technological systems evolve?’ – now
needs to be rephrased to: ‘what terms of the debate are put into place by the
notion of technology?’ The key challenge is to recast the terms of the debate
beyond ‘Western society’ and to expand the range of possible histories to dis-
close its ‘hidden faces’ and categories, such as ‘the native’ in Johannesburg.
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The concepts proposed in this chapter are intended to provide a starting
point in the development of a vocabulary that guides the analytical eye to
this hidden face. The frontineer, the settler company, technological entitle-
ment, technological scramble, global texploration and texpansion may seem to
be rather exotic categories when considered against Hughes’ systems frame-
work. However, perhaps they will be able to contribute to a revised history of
the electrification of Berlin, Chicago and London in which new features
come to light that reveal the global scope of the electrification project and
expose the workings of its history of technology as a North Atlantic universal.
3.4 Seamlessness
What lessons may be learned for the field of STS from the study of elec-
trification in Johannesburg? What have the frontineer, the settler company,
technological entitlement, technological scramble, texploration and texpan-
sion to offer the study of technological change more generally? To consider
this question, we need to relate these notions to Hughes’ model of techno-
logical change and its significance in the field of STS. Hughes’ model pro-
poses two units of analysis: the system builder and his settler company.
These two units represent his point of entry for undertaking empirical
research on technological change. Hughes also specifies the sphere of agency
of the system builder and his organizations. He uses the metaphor of the
seamless web of technology and society to designate their field of action. This
metaphor at the same time charts the intellectual contribution of Hughes’
model for the STS community. Hughes proposed the systems approach as a
version of the so-called ‘interactive model’, which intended to overcome the
classic dispute between external and internal approaches. The seamless web
of technology and society provided the necessary terrain for Hughes’ system
builders to freely move across the realms of politics, economics, and society,
since they all formed part of the seamless web.
The frontineer offers an alternative perspective to Hughes’ system
builder for empirically studying technological change. A comparison of
the system builder and the frontineer therefore offers a critical perspective
on Hughes’ seamless web of technology and society. Because the seamless
web links Hughes’ system builder to other approaches in STS, these
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considerations also allow a discussion of the implications of the new con-
cepts for the wider field of STS.
Hughes’ Seamless Web of Technology and Society
Hughes uses the metaphor of the seamless web to specify the systems model
that he introduces in Networks of Power in an article entitled The Seamless
Web: Technology, Science, Etcetera, Etcetera (1986). In this article he also
connects his systems model to the work of fellow scholars and discusses
some of its broader implications for the study of technological change.
Hughes describes his systems approach as a version of the ‘interactive
approach’, which attempts to overcome the division between internalist
(concerned with the content of technology) and externalist perspectives
(concerned with the context of technology).215 In his view, Barry Barnes’
‘interactive hypothesis’ to science should also be applied to technology. This
would replace ‘inside and outside, content and context’ with ‘the interactive’,
which is concerned with interconnection (Hughes, 1986: 285).216 Hughes
215 ‘Within the past decade, as historians of science and technology began increasingly
to seek an explanation for change, they referred more often to the context, especially the
social context, of science and technology. These historians relegated science and tech-
nology to the inside of a context. This brought forth a more complex history that accord-
ed more closely with our sense of messy reality. Rarely, however, did historians precisely
define the categories that they placed in the context, nor did they always explain how the
context and the content were related. They often had to resort to labelling the context as
“social”, or to stringing out a list of analytical categories, including the social, political,
and economic. This, however, merely substituted one set of high-level abstractions for
another and left too much room for misunderstanding the nature of the social, political,
economic, etcetera’ (Hughes, 1986: 282–3).
216 ‘There are problems with the contextual approach espoused by historians of science
and technology, many of whom are reacting against the internalist mode. Flaws in con-
textualism began to appear when historians of technology rejected the notion that science
is the context of technology, or that technology is simply applied science. They proposed
an interactive relationship between technology and science. This, then, raised the question
of whether the relationship between technology and other so-called contextual factors,
such as the political and the social, should be redefined as interactive. The same question
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advises caution with the use of ‘hard, analytical categories – such as technol-
ogy, science, politics, economics and the social […] if their use leads to diffi-
culty in comprehending interconnection’ (Hughes, 1986: 285).
Hughes proposes networks and systems as alternatives to these hard
analytical categories. Systems or networks are inhabited by two sets of inter-
acting entities, which Hughes refers to as ‘heterogeneous professionals –
such as engineers, scientists, and managers – and heterogeneous organ-
izations – such as manufacturing firms, utilities, and banks’ (Hughes, 1986:
281–2). These heterogeneous engineers (or system builders) and organiza-
tions are Hughes’ preferred units of study.
Historians and sociologists who want to organize their research and writing in
accord with an interaction model might, therefore, choose as their subject matter
system builders – such as inventors, engineers, managers and scientists – or the
organizations over which they presided, or of which they were an integral part
(Hughes, 1986: 287).
The advantage of the network and systems perspectives, in Hughes’ view, is
that they ‘eliminate many categories in favour of a “seamless web”’ (Hughes,
1986: 281). The ‘disciplines, persons, and organizations’ that inhabit these
systems or networks ‘take on one another’s functions as if they are part of a
seamless web’ (Hughes, 1986: 281–2). Accordingly, the seamless web is best
grasped by following ‘inventors, engineers, managers, and financiers who
have taken a lead in creating and presiding over technological systems’
(Hughes, 1986: 285). These system builders are ‘no respecters of knowledge
categories or professional boundaries’ (Hughes, 1986: 285). Hughes first
encountered the seamless web in the notebooks of Thomas Edison, who ‘so
thoroughly mixed matters commonly labelled “economic”, “technical” and
“scientific” that his thoughts composed a seamless web’ (Hughes, 1986: 285).
Hughes literally extrapolates this image of Edison’s thoughts into his outside
sphere of action and influence.
was asked about science and its context. A way out of the constraints of contextualism
and into an interactive mode is now posed by the use of the “systems” or “network”
approach’ (Hughes, 1986: 281–2).
208 3. Technological Change and the “Savage Slot”
In other words, Hughes protagonists, the system builders (or heteroge-
neous engineers), inhabit the systems or networks, which in turn form a
seamless web. The metaphor of the seamless web comes to represent the
essence of Hughes’ model. The system builders’ seamless web maps their
movements and spheres of action.
Several system builders who appear in Hughes history of electrification
in Western society also figure prominently in the history of electrification in
Johannesburg. Four of these individuals particularly inspired Hughes’ notion
of the system builder: the American Thomas Alva Edison, the Germans Emil
Rathenau and Georg Klingenberg, and the Briton Charles Merz. All of these
individuals also lastingly influenced the course of electrification in Johannes-
burg. However, this connection is not mentioned in Hughes’ history of elec-
trification in Western society; Johannesburg does not form part of the seam-
less web of technology and society of these system builders. Thus, the
analytical category of the system builder fails to deliberate on the historical
influence of Edison, Rathenau, Klingenberg and Merz on electrification in
Johannesburg, and its implications for their own work and actions. The con-
cepts of the frontineer, the settler company, the technological scramble, tech-
nological entitlement, texploration and texpansion, which developed from
the empirical context of electrification in Johannesburg, offer analytical cate-
gories to reveal this connection. Viewing Hughes’ system builders as fronti-
neers provides an opportunity to reflect upon the performance and limits of
the seamless web metaphor, the core of Hughes’model.
Hughes’ seamless web metaphor has been widely referred to in science
and technology studies literature and beyond. Having the status of a meta-
phor, it has naturally lent itself well to different interpretations. The variety
of different meanings this metaphor has been used to stand for since Hughes’
article is impossible to summarize or categorize. Nevertheless, I submit that
its positive reception and wide use indicates that it has supplied a convenient
label with which to fill a vacuous conceptual slot required for the emerging
field of science and technology studies.
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The Seamless Web Metaphor in STS
The metaphor of the seamless web stands at the beginning of a particular
strand of scholarship that came to be known as the ‘new sociology of tech-
nology’. This new sociology of technology was constituted by three
approaches: ‘the social construction of technology (SCOT), systems (later
known as Large-Scale Technological Systems (LTS)), and actor-network
theory (ANT)’ (Bijker & Pinch, 2012: xiv).217 The seamless web was put for-
ward as one of the common traits of these approaches (Bijker & Pinch, 2012:
xiv). It served as the organizing principle for an edited volume in 1987 that
would come to figure as a founding text for the three directions in the new
sociology of technology: The Social Construction of Technological Systems:
New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (1987), edited by
the three scholars Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes and Trevor Pinch. This
book and their authors’ further work was instrumental in instituting the
social constructivist approach to the study of technological change. The com-
mon denominator of the volume’s articles is Hughes’ notion of the seamless
web:
The second common trait to be found is the shared appreciation for Tom’s “seam-
less web” metaphor. […] all three approaches embraced the methodological princi-
ple of paying attention to how the borders between the social and the technical were
drawn by actors, rather than assuming that these borders are pre-given and static.
This also brings out the common element of a constructivist perspective. (Bijker et
al., 2007: xvii).
The key message of the volume was that ‘technological systems are both
socially constructed and society shaping’ (Bijker et al., 1989: 51). Various
expressions have been introduced to designate this co-construction. Bijker
uses the term ‘sociotechnology’ to designate that technological change is nei-
ther purely social nor purely technical (Bijker, 2010: 67).218 According to
217 Although Bijker and Pinch qualify that ‘[t]hese three approaches did not completely
represent the state of “new” sociology of technology in the mid-1980s’ (Bijker et al.,
2007: xv).
218 ‘The “stuff” of the fluorescent lamp’s invention is economics and politics as much as
electricity and fluorescence. Let us call this “stuff” sociotechnology. The relations that play
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Bruun and Hukkinen, ‘Pinch and Bijker modelled their approach on the
sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). SSK criticized the older institutional
sociology of science – which focused on the social and institutional context
of making science – for not opening the ‘black box’ of science, meaning that
it had failed to make the contents of science an object of study for sociology
(Bruun & Hukkinen, 2003: 100–1).
Bijker, Hughes and Pinch’s 1987 volume was concerned with ‘[…]
searching for a language and for concepts to express their new understanding
of technological change’ (Bijker et al., 1987:13). The authors presented ‘three
different approaches to deal with this seamless web of technology and society’
(Bijker et al., 1987: 10, my italics). Bijker later described three interpretations
of the seamless web of technology and society in subsequent research: first, it
was used ‘[…] as a reminder that non-technical factors are important for
understanding the development of technology’; second, it was used to indi-
cate ‘[…] that it is never clear a priori and independent of context whether
an issue should be treated as technical or social’;219 and third, it was used in
connection with the symmetry principle to replace the allegedly purely social
and the purely technical with ‘sociotechnology’ (Bijker, 2010: 67).
SCOT, ANT and LTS moved on to develop their distinct sets of con-
cepts and models of technological change. Despite the variety in inter-
pretation, the metaphor of the seamless web has offered a common reference
point to develop new concepts for the new sociology of technology. Exam-
ples are John Law’s ‘heterogeneous engineering’, Michel Callon’s ‘actants’ and
Bruno Latour’s nature-culture and human-nonhuman divides. John Law’s
concept of ‘heterogeneous engineering’ exemplifies this emerging conceptual
cohesion when Bijker describes it as having ‘appealed to everyone as captur-
ing aspects of the seamless web and constructivism’ during the preparatory
workshop to the volume (Bijker et al., 2007: xvii). Michel Callon introduces
a role in, for example, the development of the fluorescent lamp are thus neither purely
social nor purely technical—they are sociotechnical’ (Bijker, 2010: 67).
219 ‘The recognition that all kinds of social groups are relevant for the construction of
technology (unit of analysis : artefact) and that the activities of engineers and designers
are best described as heterogeneous system building (unit of analysis : technological
system) supports this second usage of the seamless web metaphor’ (Bijker, 2010: 67).
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the term ‘actants’ as a higher level abstraction to designate the ‘heterogeneous
entities’ that constitute a network (Hughes, 1986: 287). He criticized the cat-
egories or compartments of ‘the elements in a system or network’ and main-
tained that ‘the fabric has no seams’. His concept suggested a higher level
abstraction to address the problem of the hard categories of science, technol-
ogy, economics, and politics, since ‘these elements are permanently interact-
ing, being associated, and being tested by the actors who innovate’ (Hughes,
1986: 287).220 Latour, in turn, has used the seamless web metaphor to desig-
nate the ‘seamlesss fabric’ of the ‘nature-culture’ and human-nonhuman
divides for ANT. He applies the metaphor to present his holistic argument
on how to analyse the ‘modern’world: the modern fabric ‘is no longer seam-
less’ and ‘analytic continuity has become impossible’ (Latour, 1993:7).
The Seamless Web of Technology and Society in Johannesburg
The Edison Incandescent Lamp is unequalled for domestic and general
illumination, and is suitable for all places where a steady, brilliant light,
absolutely safe in its production and use, is required. It is peculiarly
adapted for India and other tropical countries, as it will be unaffected by
Punkahs and wind currents, and emits comparatively little heat. When
once fixed it requires no skilled labour, but can be attended to by an ordi-
nary native or other servant.
Prospectus on the Edison Indian and Colonial Electric Company,
Edison Papers 1882: (D-82–40x); TAEM 63: 32.
Hughes’ notion of the seamless web can be studied by applying the per-
spectives of the system builder and the frontineer to individuals who influ-
enced the course of electrification in Hughes’ case studies on Chicago, Berlin,
and London, and the case study on Johannesburg.
220 Hughes refers to the article by M. Callon, ‘The State and Technical Innovation: A
Case Study of the Electric Vehicle in France’, Research Policy, Vol. 9 (1980), pp. 358–76.
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Thomas Edison
Thomas Edison was Hughes’s favourite example to illustrate the seamless
web (Bijker & Pinch, 2012). Hughes described Edison as ‘moving between
his Menlo Park laboratory and Wall Street to invent technology and raise
capital in a seamless way’ (Bijker & Pinch, 2012: xvii). Hughes’ portrait of
Thomas Edison as system builder accentuates his ability to assume a variety
of roles at the same time, attending to issues of technology, economics,
finance and management in parallel. Edison’s proficiency in connecting dif-
ferent components, such as his ‘technical’ laboratory with the ‘financial’ dis-
trict of New York, aimed to build a system that serves the system goal of
technological growth.
However, if, we look more closely at Edison’s ‘seamless way’ of moving
about to invent technology, ‘Wall Street’ comes to signify more than mere
financial matters. Wall Street was instrumental in shaping the legal and
financial terms and conditions in the United States and the emerging global
political economy of the New Imperialism of the 1880s. Edison did not sim-
ply connect his laboratory or technological business ideas with the Wall
Street firm Drexel, Morgan & Co. to finance his electric light and power sta-
tion project, or to secure his access to the British and continental market of
patent rights. Instead, he sought a point of entry into the global architecture
of the power of the day – admission to default privileges and exploitation of
the British dominions. In other words, Edison exhibited a sense of global
technological entitlement that motivated him to participate in the global
technological scramble that trailed the imperial world order of the day. A
simple geographic map of Edison’s foreign companies charts this global sense
of imperial entitlement to rights and privileges in far-away territories. Edison
might have simply restricted his patents and companies to the United States,
the prospective market of which could reasonably have been expected to
yield large financial profits. Instead, Edison chose Great Britain, the most
powerful Empire of the time, in an effort to ride that country’s wave of
industrial, financial and cultural success to establish his patent empire.
Edison’s movements between his laboratory and Wall Street served this
grand global scheme. Hughes judges this movement as illustrative of the
seamless web of technology and society. Edison’s grand global scheme is
overlooked as a historical force in the ‘interactive mode’ of Hughes’model of
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technological change. It falls through the seamless web. Why? The Edison
Indian and Colonial Electric Company will serve as an example to illustrate
the reasons and to draw conclusions about the assumptions that underlie
Hughes’metaphor of the seamless web.
The Edison Indian and Colonial Electric Company was formed in 1882
‘for the purpose of acquiring and using in the Empire of India, Ceylon, Aus-
tralia and South Africa, the rights and privileges of Mr. Thomas Alva Edison,
relating to the application of Electricity of Magnetism as a lighting, heating
or motive agent’.221 The Company was established as a ‘parent company’ that
would ‘be prepared to undertake the business of a Lighting and Power Com-
pany, by lighting up towns, public buildings, manufactories, barracks, and
residences, and supplying power by means of electricity; and in order to
enlist local capital and influence will grant licences to Corporations and local
Companies to carry on a similar business’.222
It is worth spending a moment to reflect upon the sites that are to be lit
up by this Lighting and Power Company, because they may be assumed to
form part of Edison’s seamless web of technology and society. Whose towns,
public buildings, manufactories, barracks and residences in sites of colonial
rule were to be lit up by Edison’s technology? The reference to ‘the ordinary
native’ in the quote at the beginning of this section indicates that indigenous
inhabitants were not seen to be beneficiaries of the technology. Instead, they
were referred to in a functional role as labourers serving the colonial society:
‘ordinary native’ or ‘servant’, operator of the punkha.223 The seamless web of
technology and society only extended to a particular society, the British colo-
nial society. In such colonial settings, Hughes’ category of local society loses
its meaning.
If we adhere to the systems approach of a seamless web of technology
and society, we are forced to conclude that Edison’s company disregarded the
221 ‘Except the application thereof for the purpose only of locomotion on railway or
tramways or common roads, and except also the right of the Cape Government to use an
installation which has been already sent out to them […]’ Edison Papers, 1882: (D-82–
40x); TAEM 63: 32, pp. 1.
222 Edison Papers, 1882: (D-82–40x); TAEM 63: 32, pp. 2.
223 The word punkha was used in British colonies to name a fan attached to the ceiling
and operated by a servant.
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‘ordinary native or other servant’, as a member of society in the British sov-
ereign territory of British India. The ‘ordinary native or other servant’ is only
referred to in his labour-performing capacity. This is by no means a histor-
ical detail ; it is emblematic of Edison’s vision of the seamless web. The web
only allowed certain peoples to move about in a seamless way. It simulta-
neously banned other peoples’ movements outside of this web. This mecha-
nism relegated people categorized as ‘the ordinary native’ to historical invisi-
bility. Technology was the key to allow this exclusive free movement for
some and to deny it to others. The Edison Incandescent Lamp was designed
to illuminate domestic sites of specific societies, including the ruling British
society in the colonies but excluding local inhabitants. In this way, Edison’s
project contributed to establishing the norms for the ‘society’ for which his
technology would provide solutions to critical problems. Technology does
not only function in harmonious interplay to constitute society; it also
cements a restricted normative image of ‘Western’ society that produces
images of difference, of populations aspiring to move up the ladder of civi-
lization to achieve the status of society.
Edison, the hedgehog, knew one big thing, connected by a seamless web,
but the hedgehog moves within a confined habitat. His short legs do not
allow him to walk beyond the boundaries of his home territory. If he imag-
ines the world beyond this habitat, it is likely to be an extension of the col-
ours and shades of his seamless domestic web. Edison filed patent letters for
his ideas and technologies in far-away territories that he had never visited;
they were fictions of his imagination. Even in legal terms, the contours of
these territories remained vague. Edison’s attorneys in 1889 were unable to
establish whether the ‘South African Republic’ fell within the confines of
their rights and privileges. These territories existed in Edison’s geography of
imagination, they inspired his technological entitlement that induced his
technological scramble to establish and manage his technological rights and
privileges in these territories. The fragile status of territories at the outskirts
of the North Atlantic geography of imagination permitted a more unpro-
blematic and direct application of the geography of management to impose
the seamless web of technology and society. In other words, Edison’s partic-
ular geography of imagination engendered the geography of management
that he invented to expand his imagined seamless web of technology and
society.
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To expand the seamless web, Edison presented his technology at the
nodes of power of a world of empire: Wall Street in New York, the Paris
Electrical Exhibition at the Champs-Élysées in the Palais de l’Industrie, and
the Holborn Viaduct in London. His particular choice of sites to exhibit his
technological prototypes served the texploration and texpansion of the fron-
tineer Edison and his settler companies rather than a straightforward and
neutral notion of ‘technology transfer’.
However, Edison’s technology was not simply inserted cleverly into an
existing imperial world order – the period of New Imperialism had only just
begun. Edison played a part in shaping this period – his patent and company
expansion across the globe contributed to the emerging international patent
and investment law. His imagined seamless web of technology and society
fitted well into the aspirations of these projects.
Emil Rathenau
Hughes presents Emil Rathenau as another system builder in the history of
electrification. Rathenau’s name ‘looms large in the history of the electrical
industry in Germany and also in the establishment of Berlin and its Elek-
tropolis’ (Hughes, 1983: 179). Hughes refers to Rathenau in his capacity as
‘head of Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft, Germany’s largest manufactur-
ing, electrical utility, and banking combination before World War I’ and
notes that ‘he envisaged the entire German economy as functioning like a
single machine’ (Hughes, 1986: 286). In Hughes’ view, ‘Rathenau stood for
the powerful and widely influential interaction of investment capital, indus-
trial enterprise, and highly organized marketing’ (Hughes, 1983: 179).
In Hughes’ narrative, Rathenau is portrayed as presiding over the pro-
cess of transferring Edison’s technology to Berlin and Germany. He fitted the
technology to suit local cultural, political and economic conditions so as to
fabricate a seamless web of technology and German society. For this purpose,
he acquired the Edison patent rights for Germany to establish the Deutsche
Edison-Gesellschaft für Angewandte Elektricität in 1883, and the A.E.G. in
1887. In this portrait, Rathenau’s sphere of operation is Germany. The seam-
less web that he constructs envelops the territory of the German Empire, its
industries, politics and society. According to Hughes, Rathenau travelled to
America in 1903 to ‘[reach] an agreement with General Electric in America
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to divide their world markets’. The result of this agreement was that the ‘A.E.
G. would continue to be preeminent in Europe: [General Electric], in North
America’ (Hughes, 1983: 179).
Viewing Emil Rathenau as a frontineer sheds a different light on Rathe-
nau’s trip to America. From this perspective, Rathenau travelled to America
to represent the interests of the A.E.G., a settler company intent on pushing
its territorial frontiers. These territorial frontiers reached way beyond
‘Europe’ and ‘North America’. Rathenau’s global imperial aspirations are for-
mulated in a letter to Edison (who had written to request that the A.E.G. not
compete in Japan) dated 19 February 1889: ‘You have not taken into consid-
eration the fact that we have during the last year entirely discharged all the
duties toward your rightful successors in Europe […] [A]nd since we have
accomplished this we do not stand any longer, as you describe it, as one of
the Edison companies, confined to a certain territory […]. The market for
our product is the entire world’ (Hausman et al., 2008: 79; my emphasis).
The fact that Hughes only mentions the categories of Europe and North
America in this process of dividing the world market between the A.E.G. and
General Electric betrays his own geography of imagination: his seamless web
only recognizes, and therefore connects, technology and society in the North
Atlantic. In actual fact, Rathenau’s system-building activities reached far
beyond this geographical area.
Emil Rathenau was one of the key initiators of the VFTPC’s grand pow-
er scheme in Johannesburg, the grand power scheme constructed by the A.E.
G. and owned by German banks and the British South Africa Company.
Rathenau served as one of the VFTPC’s two German directors until the First
World War. The great significance of the power scheme on the Rand for the
A.E.G. is evidenced by the fact that Rathenau reported to the German
Emperor in 1906 on the imminent contractual agreement between the A.E.G.
and the British South African Company. He portrayed the the VFTPC con-
tract with the A.E.G. as British acknowledgment of German superiority
(Weinberger, 1971). This portrait testifies to the sense of technological enti-
tlement that fuelled his involvement in the electrification of Johannesburg.
This involvement was not motivated by a system goal or reverse salient; it
represented texploration and texpansion that served the technological scram-
ble of global electrification. Incidentally, the A.E.G.’s business operations in
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Johannesburg brought the settler company substantial profits that buoyed
their finances in the critical years of the first decade of the 20th century.
Georg Klingenberg
Hughes’ model system builder in Germany is Georg Klingenberg, ‘the engi-
neering head of the A.E.G.’s power plant design and construction division, an
engineer of international reputation and author of definitive works on pow-
er-plant design and operation’ (Hughes, 1984: 197). In Hughes’ framework
of system builders, Klingenberg appears as one of the key figures in the his-
tory of electrification in Western society. Hughes notes his acquaintance with
the British system builder Charles Merz and mentions that Klingenberg also
testified to the British Parliament on the eve of the First World War regard-
ing London’s backward state of electrification and the need for large central
power stations (Hughes, 1983: 228).
Klingenberg travelled to Johannesburg in 1906 to conduct negotiations
that would lead to the establishment of the VFTPC and his design of ‘one of
the largest power works in the world’. He later gave evidence before the Pow-
er Companies Commission of the Transvaal Republic in 1909, which had
been convened to look into the need for government regulation in the face of
the VFTPC’s rising monopoly and plans to establish a grand electrification
scheme to supply electricity to the gold mines of the Witwatersrand. Klin-
genberg testified here in his capacity as an internationally renowned engi-
neer, but he was also the head of the A.E.G.’s power plant design and con-
struction division – the company that would receive the contracts for the
construction and equipment of the grand power scheme. Four years later, in
1913, Hughes published a textbook on Large Electric Power Stations: Their
Design and Construction, with Examples from Existing Stations. This book
dedicates more than 100 pages to introducing the model example of the
power system of the VFTPC (the other example is the Märkische Electricity
Works). At this stage, the A.E.G. had not yet managed to realize the idea of a
regional power system for Berlin. In the same year, Klingenberg presented a
paper to the Institution of Electrical Engineers in London on ‘Electricity Sup-
ply in Large Cities’. The paper, which compares the electricity supply in Lon-
don with Chicago and Berlin, is extensively referenced in Hughes’ book.
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To realize this power scheme some 5,500 miles south of Berlin, Klingen-
berg undertook a series of negotiations with various stakeholders, such as the
A.E.G., the British South Africa Company, the Deutsche Bank and other
German and Swiss banks, the gold mining companies of the Rand Mines/
Eckstein Group, the Transvaal government, the municipality of Johannes-
burg and the Coal Owners Association. Assuming that these negotiations
chart Klingenberg’s movements through the seamless web of technology and
society, his path highlights the specific features that led to successfully man-
aging the installation of Johannesburg’s grand power scheme. Although the
particular technology of Klingenberg’s seamless web is widely documented,
we know little about its society. What kind of society is represented by the
institutions that were involved in the negotiations? Whose interests do these
institutions represent?
Most of these institutions (certainly the ones that eventually would
stand to gain from the project) represented foreign financial and imperial
interests. There is no sensible way of claiming that these institutions repre-
sented the interests of any kind of society other than the ones involved in the
imperial scramble for the Transvaal territory. In addition to the British and
German societies, this included the Boer society and the society of North
American expatriates (such as American mining engineers) in Johannesburg,
all belonging to a racial category defined by skin colour. It might be argued
that these institutions only represented particular segments of these societies,
but the point to be made here is that they certainly excluded the majority of
the inhabitants of the Transvaal at the time. The ‘natives’ did not belong to
any kind of society. Therefore, they were considered neither in Klingenberg’s
negotiations nor in the seamless web that he imagined for his grand power
scheme.
However, there was no seamless web of technology and society in
Johannesburg at the time. The population of Johannesburg consisted of
migrant communities from Southern Africa, Europe and other places. Klin-
genberg’s negotiations were not only about the economics and finances of
technology; they were also about constituting a particular kind of society: his
ideal image of the seamless web of technology and society realized in a grand
technological system that served the establishment of white settler society in
Johannesburg. Accordingly, his negotiations concerned issues related to the
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purchase of land, concessions, industrial monopoly, imperial politics and
native labour.
The VFTPC was co-financed by German banks and the British South
Africa Company, a chartered company under the British crown with exten-
sive rights to conquer and exploit territories in Southern Africa. This joining
of forces is not simply symbolic of the mutual constitution of technology and
society; it is emblematic of how the myth of the seamless web was used as a
strategic tool for designing this mutual constitution to further particular
political and economic interests. To constitute the category of society, how-
ever, it was necessary to remove from the web those populations that dis-
turbed the seamless picture and revealed ruptures, ambiguities and incon-
sistencies, such as those embodied in the utopian idea of ‘the native’.
However, even if the connection between technology and the ‘native’
populations is conceptually cast out from the seamless web of technology
and society, it is present in the historical record. In fact, it appears in the
considerations of the system builders. For example, Klingenberg’s account of
the model case of the VFTPC spells out the direct relationship between elec-
trification and labour.224 Klingenberg also comments on the ‘exceedingly
simple’ legal conditions for the property rights and concessions necessary to
attain official permissions for the overhead and underground cables for the
transmission of energy on the Rand. (Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 239). The
legal conditions as they appeared to Klingenberg only appeared as ‘exceed-
ingly simple’, or seamless, because they disregarded the property and land
rights of the majority of the population that inhabited the Transvaal.
The seamless web of Hughes’ system builder Georg Klingenberg appears
to be a strategy for effecting coherence, to institute smooth complementarity
between technology and society. Viewed through the prism of the frontineer
and the settler company, this strategy is inverted to reveal an underlying
assumption of the systems perspective: the seamlessness of technology and
224 ‘At the time of the author’s visit a law had come into force prohibiting the importa-
tion of Chinese labour, and decreeing the gradual substitution of the latter by local
labour; further measures had been proposed for the prevention of double shifts on under-
ground work. The influence which such a radical change in the system of working would
have upon the output and load factor had, therefore, to be considered from the outset’
(Klingenberg, 1916 [1913]: 201).
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society. This notion is intended to capture these systematic erasures in the
dominant historical narrative on electrification that are generated by the
metaphor of the seamless web of technology and society.
Charles Merz
The British consulting engineer Charles Merz also appears in Hughes narra-
tive as ‘a system builder, a Hedgehog like Thomas Edison […]’ (Hughes,
1983: 249), whose entrepreneurial talents ‘ranged from engineering to man-
agement and to politics and finance as well’ (Hughes, 1983: 205). In Hughes’
story, Merz’s system building aspirations were forced to endure a long strug-
gle in London. Hughes describes a series of ignored efforts on the part of
Merz to build a unified electrical system in London.225 Hughes attributes the
failure to realize Merz’s vision to the ‘resistance of proponents of local gov-
ernment and the foes of private ownership’ (Hughes, 1983: 205). In other
words, because of their vested interests and lack of hedgehog perspective, the
established institutions in London stood in the way of Merz’s (rational and
economical) efforts to unify the electric power supply and to realize the
seamless web of technology and society.
In far-away Johannesburg, in contrast, the advice of the British consult-
ing engineer Charles Merz was sought and heard. The Smuts Government of
the newly established Union of South Africa was keen to solicit Merz’s advice
and appointed him to report on national electric power supply in 1919.
Indeed Merz’s recommendations were so well received that they led directly
to the Electricity Act of 1922, which established Escom, the electricity utility
that still occupies a monopoly position in today’s South Africa. The report
submitted to the South African government on behalf of Merz clearly pre-
sents his image of the seamless web of technology and society.
225 According to Hughes, ‘[…] the politicians were not receptive to Merz’s plans’ in
London before World War I (Hughes, 1983:205) and Merz’s proposed Bill to Parliament
to establish a power company to develop a central power scheme in London was rejected
in 1907 (Hughes, 1983:255). Merz’s invited report in 1914 to the London County Council
recommending to establish a company composed by the existing utility companies to
coordinate the London supply situation was not taken further either (Hughes, 1983: 256).
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The importance of developing the supply of electric power in the Union arises from
the need for encouraging its existing manufactures and attracting new and perma-
nent industries as rapidly as possible. This latter has been emphasized by yourself,
and by many important public bodies, who have stated that in no other way can an
adequate white population be obtained. It is therefore a policy which justifies the
expenditure of money in advance of to-day’s actual needs (Merz & McLellan, 1920:
iii ; my emphasis).
In Merz’s vision, the seamless web of electrification technology and society in
the Union of South Africa would serve the settlement of white society in the
‘new country’. Accordingly, his recommendations for electricity supply to the
Union of South Africa were geared to serve the requirements of the white
settler communities. By default, electrification was understood to provide for
the interests of select populations. Other populations did not qualify as soci-
eties; instead, by implication, they were viewed as inferior cultures and there-
fore did not form part of Merz’s vision of a seamless web of technology and
society that would develop the Union of South Africa.
In this example, the vision of the seamless web immediately and power-
fully eradicates histories other than that of the white population from the
stage of the world history of electrification. The new country of the Union of
South Africa only comes into existence with the settlement of ‘white’ society.
In this way, electrification and its technology come to constitute society –
not society as an expression of specific South African political, economic and
cultural features, but as a normative category that quietly installs racial
standards of exclusion. In this manner, the seamless web of technology and
society comes to exclude entire populations, or complex population for-
mations, from historical writing. In 1905, the British Colony of the Transvaal
had a population of some 300,225 ‘European’, 1,030,029 ‘Aboriginal’ and
23,946 ‘Coloured’ people (Native Affairs Commission, 1905: 27 (Annex-
ures)). To erase successfully from ‘society’ and history a population that con-
stituted over three-quarters of the inhabitants has to be considered an extra-
ordinary achievement by any measures. Accordingly, it is a difficult challenge
to reinsert these populations into the dominant historical narrative because
we have to sidestep established analytical and descriptive categories of silent
exclusion while at the same time abiding by the academic standards that are
set in STS.
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Hughes is well aware of Merz’s international influence and refers to him
as an ‘agent of technology transfer on a grand scale’: ‘Charles Merz travelled
throughout the world for Merz & McLellan […]. Merz also observed engi-
neering practices, prepared reports, and organized construction projects in
Australia, Argentina, South Africa, India and in American and British cities
other than Chicago and Newcastle upon Tyne’ (Hughes, 1983: 452–3).
Hughes compliments Merz with this distinction because he ‘[took] with him
the experience he gained in building the NESCO system on the northeast
coast of England and [brought] back state-of-the-art ideas from the rest of
the world’ and because he ‘associated with other leaders in electrical engi-
neering and management, such as Georg Klingenberg of A.E.G.’ (Hughes,
1983: 453). In Hughes’ view, he ‘articulated and disseminated the economic
and technological principles of regional systems’ (Hughes, 1983: 453). He
concludes that ‘no history of technology transfer would be complete without
consideration of consulting engineers like Merz’ (Hughes, 1983: 453).
Merz, in turn, considered the electric power scheme on the Witwa-
tersrand as ‘one of the most important in the world’. Indeed, he referred to
the example of Johannesburg, where ‘many of the largest mines obtain their
power from a central supply rather than put down stations for themselves’,
as illustrative of the ‘proof of the soundness of the policy of concentration’
(Merz & McLellan, 1920: 8). On what basis did Merz pronounce this judge-
ment? By what criteria does Merz appraise the success of the policy of con-
centrating large central power stations in Johannesburg?
Merz judges the case of electrification in Johannesburg in comparison to
London. He contrasts these cases by the order of precedence of electrical leg-
islation and industrial development that differs in ‘older’ and ‘newer’ coun-
tries. In ‘Great Britain and the older countries generally’, where industrial
development preceded electrical legislation, the ‘development of manufactur-
ing’was impeded. In contrast, he considers South Africa to be fortunate to be
able to ‘lay down its power supply system almost at the foundation, instead
of having to superimpose it upon an old-established industrial fabric’ (Merz
& McLellan, 1920: 19). Accordingly, his report recommended that, as a ‘new’
country, South Africa should adopt a policy and establish a system of power
supply ‘before the industrial development of the country has proceeded any
further’. In other words, Merz recognized that electrification had free reign
to compose the seamless web of technology and society in South Africa –
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before institutions had grown to represent the various social groups and their
interests.
From this perspective, Hughes’ verdict on the backwardness of electric
power supply in London at the beginning of the 20th century (which repro-
duces that of Merz, Klingenberg and Insull) appears in a different light.
Hughes identifies ‘vested and historical interests’ as the causes of London’s
backwardness and suggests that they needed to be overcome by the ‘pro-
gressive combination of coordinated forces’. He is persuaded that the reasons
for this backwardness are political, or legislative, and he compares the sit-
uation with Berlin. However, these vested interests (Hughes, 1983: 260)
might also be read as democratic forces of resistance to the system builder’s
projects that tried to impose the seamless web of technology and society
without avail. The many institutions already established to represent both
electrical technology and civil society revolted against the seamless web that
did not fit with the seams already sown together.226
Hughes’ notion of technological progress measures successful elec-
trification in relation to the achievement of the system goal. He regards the
social forces of resistance to technological change in London as an expression
of the local culture in response to the rational proposals of the system
builders, such as Merz. They impeded the building of ‘bridges between the
world of technology and that of politics’, the combining of coherent, co-ordi-
nated forces of technology with ‘finance, industry, and utility’ to create the
system network. In other words, Merz and others did not succeed in their
pursuit of large central power stations because of the seamless web of tech-
nology and society. In Johannesburg, these social forces of resistance and
their institutions did not exist.
226 ‘In Berlin, there were individuals who built bridges between the world of technology
and that of politics. The presence of bankers and industrialists on the advisory board of
BEW was a manifestation of the coherence and co-ordination of finance, industry, and
utility in Berlin. Such a progressive combination of coordinated forces was needed to
overcome vested and historical interests in London, but such a combination did not exist.
Instead, the proponents of local government authority, of municipal socialism, and of pri-
vate enterprise confronted one another in a pluralistic debate that from the point of view
of the forces for technological change produced a stalemate’ (Hughes, 1983: 260).
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Merz’s report on the electrification of South Africa in 1920 is strikingly
illustrative of the system goal of his envisioned large electric power stations –
and his corresponding seamless web of technology and society. In this report,
he refers to the segment of the Southern African population not included in
the ‘white population’ but only in their capacity as ‘valuable supplies of good
native labour’ (Merz & McLellan, 1920: 1).227 However, the ‘white pop-
ulation’ category is neither clear-cut nor defined by any kind of natural cir-
cumstances or colour yardsticks. The co-constitution of electrification and
(white) society served the technological scramble in which Merz’s consulting
company won several large consulting contracts, such as for the construction
of the first central power station after the First World War in Johannesburg,
the Witbank power station.
Hughes refers to Merz as an example to argue for local and regional
differences in technological style. Referring to the overseas experiences of
Merz, Hughes concludes that regional systems were shaped by cultural forces
that ‘stemmed from the societies within which the systems grew’ and that
‘these societies were of various kinds according to time and place […]’
(Hughes, 1983: 462).228 Huges concedes that ‘[t]he cultural forces varied
from society to society but there were also forces that transcended local or
regional characteristics’ (Hughes, 1983: 462). The large electric power
227 Merz and Klingenberg testified not only before the British parliament but also befo-
re the Commission of Inquiry into the Power Companies of South African Union in 1910
which led to the Transvaal Power Act by the Transvaal Colonial Government. Merz and
McLellan’s report begins with the sentences: ‘In the development of every new country
the first necessity is the establishment of means of communication – roads, railways, tele-
graphs. At a later stage, depending upon the labour, raw materials and markets available,
manufactures spring up. In order to develop and flourish, manufactures nowadays need
cheap power’ (Merz & McLellan, 1920: 1). They consider South Africa to possess ‘most of
the requirements needed for the development of manufactures’ and reckon that ‘although
at present its white population is not proportionate to its area and possibilities, it is pro-
bably sufficient for its immediate manufacturing needs if power be more widely used,
while it obtains valuable supplies of good native labour’ (Merz & McLellan, 1920: 1).
228 ‘In the 1904 article and later essays Merz stressed the regional character of tech-
nology. Because of his familiarity with technology throughout the world, he realized that a
universal best way did not exist, instead, a variety of styles prevailed. He believed that
local conditions completely governed power supply within a region’ (Hughes, 1983: 454).
3.4 Seamlessness 225
scheme of Johannesburg, however, did not stem from the societies within
which the system grew. Instead it imposed a seamless web of society and
technology that overlooked the majority of the population in favour of a par-
ticular conception of society. This conception followed racial criteria, such as
skin colour, and therefore only considered a small proportion of the inhab-
itants of Johannesburg.
The seamless web as strategy
One of the common qualities of Hughes’ system builders Edison, Rathenau,
Klingenberg, and Merz is their shared vision of the seamless web of technol-
ogy and society. In Hughes’s study on ‘Western society’, the system builders
of electric light and central power stations move about freely in the seamless
web of technology and society. Here, electrification results from the inter-
actions on this seamless fabric: between local societies, their cultural, political
and economic institutions, and the system builders. Edison, Rathenau, Klin-
genberg, and Merz’s involvement in the history of electrification in Johannes-
burg expands their seamless web beyond the boundaries of Hughes’ ‘Western
society’. Their activities outside of the seamless web in these geographical
regions, however, disclose that Hughes’metaphor of the seamless web carries
a particular imaginary geography. The imaginary geographies of Edison,
Rathenau, Klingenberg, and Merz inform their vision of successful elec-
trification in Johannesburg. This vision prefers large central power stations.
It views society as a normative category that contrasts ‘civilized’ societies with
uncivilized cultures. As a result, electrification in Johannesburg may be seen
as resulting from the extension of the frontiers of the seamless web of tech-
nology and (‘civilized’) society rather than from interaction with local soci-
ety. The seamless web now appears as a metaphor with a specific vision and
underlying assumptions.
The personalities that shaped the course of electrification in Johannes-
burg during the time span that Hughes regards as formative for power sys-
tems imposed this vision. In their enterprises, they were able to depict this
relationship as mutually beneficial and unproblematic. Of particular note is
their audience: they speak to European and North American societies. Other
societies are projected backwards into historical time on the scale of civi-
lization. The seamless web of technology and society does not span this
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historical time; it is designed to serve the frontiers of societies, the model
society: European civilized societies. To impose the seamless web of technol-
ogy and society on other, less civilized societies or cultures becomes a pro-
gramme that does not simply transfer technology.
The seamless web identified by Hughes simply reflects the system build-
ers’ visions. His history maps their quest to institute a smooth path between
technology and society, tailored, so to speak, by the seamless web.
The concept of the system builder assumes the metaphor of the seamless
web. Indeed, one might read Hughes’ theory of technological system growth
as a story of how the seamless web expands. On the surface, this metaphor
serves to chart the great sphere of movement and action of the system
builder, and to soften hard analytical boundaries between technology and
society. Below this surface, however, the metaphor of the seamless web also
serves to naturalize contradictory actions and roles of the system builders,
because it allows them to move about smoothly and to ‘eliminate categories’
(Hughes, 1983: 281). The seamless web provides an acceptable rationale for
their deviation from the public roles, tasks and responsibilities with which
these individuals are typically associated. In other words, the seamless web
dissolves any kinds of questions that relate to paradoxical, unauthorized or
otherwise puzzling conduct or attitudes that might arise from their involve-
ment in ‘physical artefacts, mines, manufacturing firms, utility companies,
academic research and development laboratories, and investment banks’
(Hughes, 1983: 287). The system builder moves about the imaginary seam-
less web of technology and society to effect technological growth and to pur-
sue his imaginary system goals.
Viewed through the lens of the frontineer, however, the system builder
assumes the seamless web as a strategy to justify certain actions and to con-
ceal others. These actions are directed at pushing material and epistemic
frontiers. Once these boundaries are expanded, the frontineer needs to fasten
his new material and epistemic territories to his old assets. In other words,
his core business is to sew seams together, to make things fit and to glue the
new beyond the frontier to the old. Technology becomes the stitching for
these seams. This forceful act is validated by imposing the imaginary
assumption of seamlessness between technology and society. Rather than
dissolving the boundaries between technology and society, the metaphor of
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the seamless web overplays the violent actions that are needed to pursue this
vision.
The ostensibly natural fit of a smooth passage between technology and
society appears to be a strategy for constituting society in a complementary,
harmonizing relationship with technology. The vision of the seamless web
attests to this dual constitution. Hughes envelops the activities of system
builders with a cloth of seamlessness that allows them to rush about unob-
trusively and temporarily to take on roles and carry out activities with which
they are not associated in the public sphere.
The Grand Assumption: Seamlessness
Hughes views the ‘great technological systems, utility networks, trusts, car-
tels, holding companies’ of the 20th century as seamless webs created by sys-
tem builders (Hughes, 1986: 286). System builders may be identified by their
ability to powerfully interconnect the diverse components of technological
systems, such as ‘physical artefacts, mines, manufacturing firms, utility com-
panies, academic research and development laboratories, and investment
banks’ (Hughes, 1986: 287). System builders pursue a system goal. System
components are defined by their participation in the pursuit of this goal:
‘These components make up a system because they fall under a central con-
trol and interact functionally to fulfill a system goal, or to contribute to a
system output’ (Hughes, 1986: 287).
In Hughes history, the ultimate system goal of the system builders in
‘Western society’ was to weave electrification into the seamless web of tech-
nology and society. Technology transfer, the reverse salient, technological
momentum and technological growth provided the necessary steps to reach
the system goals. These and other concepts that Hughes uses to describe
technological change (technological style and culture, system stability and
maturity) configure the seamless web of technology and society for historical
analysis. Based on an examination of Johannesburg, the above analysis has
added new concepts to describe critical properties of the history of elec-
trification that are eclipsed in Hughes’ framework. These concepts challenge
the assumption of a seamless web of technology and society. To capture this
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challenge and to render it effective for further analysis, the notion of ‘Seam-
lessness’ is coined.
The term ‘Seamlessness’ is suggested here as an analytical tool for desig-
nating a set of unstated assumptions that have influenced the course and
development of the field of STS since the mid-1980s. Seamlessness refers to
the metaphor of the seamless web of technology and society as proposed by
Thomas Hughes. This metaphor assumes that science and technology are
surrounded by hard categories such as politics, economics, society and cul-
ture. These categories can be favourably transcended by applying the meta-
phor of the seamless web of technology and society. This elimination of cate-
gories provides a tabula rasa for analysis that naturally encloses all possible
histories. In effect, however, the seamless web implies limited conceptions of
‘technology’ and ‘society’ and also constitutes their opposites.
This erasure of categories leaves behind the idealized historical residue
of ‘the West’, or ‘Europe’, which maintains a unique and universal status.
Technology comes to perform as a North Atlantic universal. Seamlessness
establishes Europe as ‘silent referent in historical knowledge’ and casts a
restricted theoretical condition for knowledge production (Chakrabarty,
1992: 2) in the field of science and technology studies.
Seamlessness can be exposed empirically by employing the units of
study of the frontineer and the settler company. These units displace Hughes’
image of the system or network as the arena for historical action in favour of
a geography of frontiers. These frontiers map material and epistemic terri-
tories that can be studied through Trouillot’s geographies of management
and imagination. Among the projects of the frontineer is the technological
scramble, which is spurred by his sense of technological entitlement. He typi-
cally engages in the activities of texploration and texpansion in the geog-
raphies of place and epistemic place.
The unstated assumptions of the seamless web carry out a strategic
function in STS: rather than simply eliminating categories, they endorse cat-
egories of thinking that presume a seamless unfolding of historical time cen-
tred in Europe, the West. The seamless, harmonious co-constitution of soci-
ety and technology is a means to the end of advocating the West and
naturalizing the contradictory and at times forceful historical actions to pur-
sue technological growth. Seamlessness designates a family of assumptions
that have carved out territorial standards for STS that have persevered to the
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present day. For this reason, these assumptions have restricted the applic-
ability of STS and have posed obstacles to the development of STS.
In the early history of electrification in Johannesburg, society is not an
appropriate category for designating the diversity of populations affected by
technological change. Neither does the category of culture help us to over-
come this problem. No seamless web can be ascertained between technology
and society. Instead, the category ‘electrification’ is escorted by its shadow
category ‘the native’, to designate non-white, residual populations that are
not captured by the word society. The ‘native’, however, remains in the back-
ground and shows no direct connection to electrification. He is defined by
the colonial settler as a ‘labourer’ rather than as a member of civil society.
Thus, he does not form part of the seamless web of technology and society.
The category of ‘the native’ falls through the cracks of the seamless web and
as a consequence vanishes from historical analysis. We lack the necessary
concepts to resituate ‘the native’ in the history of technology.
The ‘native’ defies conceptual connection to the early history of elec-
trification in Johannesburg, although the population groups subsumed under
this category composed three-quarters of the peoples living in the Transvaal
in the early 20th century. The Seamlessness concept is intended to draw
attention to this erasing property of the seamless web of society and technol-
ogy that banishes ‘the native’ from history.
The seamless web of society and technology engenders Trouillot’s ‘Sav-
age Slot’. Trouillot claims that the idea of the ‘West’ ‘structures a set of rela-
tions that necessitate both utopia and the savage’ (Trouillot, 1991: 24). He
views the ‘West’ as a utopian, universalistic project that is inconceivable
without its complementary ‘other’. In this projection, ‘the savage becomes a
reality’, but ‘the savage makes sense only in terms of utopia’ (Trouillot, 1991:
30). Seamlessness labels the utopia of the seamless web: an ideal condition of
a smooth, orderly alliance of technology and society. This project is incon-
ceivable without its complementary ‘other’. The native cannot form part of
the seamless web because he is needed as its residual category. The native’s
function is to constitute the utopian society aspired to by the metaphor.
The literal meaning of the word seamless does not simply denote having
no seams. It also designates an active property of moving from one thing to
another easily and without any interruptions or problems, with no awkward
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transitions, interruptions, or indications of disparity;229 or changing or con-
tinuing very smoothly and without stopping;230 happening without any sud-
den changes, interruption, or difficulty;231 without a break; smoothly.232 In
addition, it indicates a condition of perfection, having no flaws or errors.233
The orderliness aspired to by the dictionary definitions of seamless
relates directly to the categorical omission of ‘the native’ as an inhabitant of
the seamless web. Trouillot’s Savage Slot describes the mechanism underlying
this relationship:234 the savage, or ‘the native’, is a prerequisite for the abso-
lute order and utopia that lies beneath the idea of ‘the West’ and its imagi-
nary geography of civilization.235 Importantly, ‘the West’s vision of order
implied from its inception two complementary spaces, the here and the else-
where, which premised one another and were conceived as inseparable’
(Trouillot, 1991: 32). The first regional power scheme of Johannesburg
installed technology to constitute (white) society – and its opposite, or per-
manent aspirant, ‘the native’.
Hughes’metaphor of the seamless web has been used in other strands of
STS to erase various kinds of categories, but the ideal condition envisioned in
the original metaphor has been retained as a silent but powerful assumption.
Hughes’ concepts for describing technological change do not simply con-
229 Merriam Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seamless.
230 Macmillan, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/seamless.
231 Cambridge, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/de/worterbuch/englisch/seamless.
232 Collins, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/seamless.
233 Merriam Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seamless.
234 ‘In the context of Europe, the works that set up these slots were part of an emerging
debate that tied order to the quest for universal truths, a quest that gave savagery and
utopia their relevance. Looming above the issue of the ideal state of affairs, and tying it to
that of the state of nature, was the issue of order as both a goal and a means, and of its
relation with reason and justice’ (Trouillot, 1991: 31).
235 ‘Colonization became a mission, and the savage became absence and negation. The
symbolic process through which the West created itself thus involved the universal legiti-
macy of power – and order became, in that process, the answer to the question of legiti-
macy. To put it otherwise, the West is inconceivable without a metanarrative, for since
their common emergence in the sixteenth century, both the modern state and coloniza-
tion posed – and continue to pose – the West the issue of the philosophical base of order’
(Trouillot, 1991: 32).
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figure the seamless web of technology and society for historical analysis; they
also configure the Savage Slot that accommodates categories such as ‘the
native’. When Hughes’ theory (and other theories relating to the seamless
web of technology and society) is applied in empirical analyses, it continues
to erase ‘the native’ by relegating him to the Savage Slot. In this way, he is
kept offstage and does not qualify as a relevant unit of analysis for the study
of electrification in STS. Seamlessness designates the assumptions of the
metaphor of the seamless web of technology and society that effect this his-
torical erasure.
Implications of Seamlessness for STS
After all, these facts were always part of the available record. That they
were rarely accorded the significance they deserve suggests the existence
and deployment of mechanisms of silence that make them appear less rel-
evant than they are, even when they are known.
Trouillot, 2003: 34–5.
The discussion has shown that the terms used to frame Hughes’ story of elec-
trification in Western society are problematical. They engender a dominant
narrative on technology that ‘[silences] the past on a world scale’ by system-
atically establishing the seamless web of technology and society as an ideal
condition to be aspired to. The assumptions underlying the metaphor of the
seamless web of technology and society come to function as strategic tools to
constitute society as a normative category by producing difference and con-
trast to ‘other’ populations.
Hughes’ framework for studying electrification ignores the historical
connections of key protagonists – Edison, Klingenberg, Rathenau and
Merz – to the history of electrification outside of ‘Western society’. This era-
sure establishes ‘the continuous centrality of the Atlantic as the revolving
door of major global flows’ (Trouillot, 2003: 29). In this way. electrification,
as a particular manifestation of the North Atlantic universal ‘technology’,
contributes to the transition narrative of world history (Chakrabarty, 2008
[2000]). The transition narrative puts into operation universal claims on the
historical origins and expansion of technology from North America and
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Europe to the rest of the globe. The postcolonial perspective unmasks these
universal claims ‘as convenient fictions of the North Atlantic’ (Trouillot,
2002b: 839). The seamless web of technology and society, too, qualifies as a
convenient fiction of the North Atlantic. Seamlessness gives a name to the
assumptions that sustain this fiction.
Hughes’ model of technological change and his metaphor of the seam-
less web of technology and society play an important part in the intellectual
history of the field of STS. He contributed new categories to describe the
changing ways of thinking about technological change in the mid-1980s.
Subsequent work in the tradition of SCOT, LTS and ANT adopted elements
of his theory of technological change, including the idea of the seamless web
of technology and society, and his work continues to be referenced by the
STS community to this day. The original object of the metaphor – a means
to dissolve the boundaries of conventional categories such as ‘politics, tech-
nology, science, economics, society’ – has been put into operation in these
empirical traditions to erase categories of all kinds. In this vein, Bruno
Latour, for example, has employed the seamless web metaphor to illustrate
the erasure of distinctions between nature and culture, and between humans
and nonhumans (Latour, 1993).
The application of the metaphor of the seamless web in the field of STS
has not been investigated in closer detail. Its general operation as dissolver of
boundaries between categories as hallmark of the social constructivist
approach to technology in the scholarly traditions such as SCOT, LTS and
ANT more broadly, however, has been subjected to critique since the early
1990s. For example, Sandra Harding has criticized ANT’s erasure of catego-
ries as dismissing such basic social factors as race, class, and gender. She
maintains that, by ignoring these categories, ANT is incapable of challenging
the power of racism, oligarchy, patriarchy, or eurocentrism, respectively.
David Bloor (1999) and Sal Restivo (2010) have objected on similar
grounds, noting that ANT’s vocabulary and analytical tools cannot challenge
power structures, they can only describe them. Langdon Winner (1993), too,
has pointed to some of the methodological problems of the social
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constructivist approach to technology236 and has lamented that ‘the conven-
tional distinction between technology and society has finally broken down
altogether’ (Winner, 1993: 366) for some of the proponents of this tradition.
In particular, he refers to the work of Michel Callon and Bruno Latour,
whose actor network theory presents a ‘modern world […] composed of
actor networks’ that wipe out boundaries between human and nonhuman
actors. He raises important questions regarding their ‘methodological
premise’ that treats ‘living persons and nonliving technological entities’
equally (Winner, 1993: 366).
Who says what are relevant social groups and social interests? What about groups
that have no voice but that, nevertheless, will be affected by the results of techno-
logical change? What of groups that have been suppressed or deliberately excluded?
How does one account for potentially important choices that never surface as mat-
ters for debate and choice? (Winner, 1993: 369).
Winner points out the problems of elitism and exclusion associated with this
‘mode of inquiry’, which displays a ‘lack of and, indeed, apparent disdain for
anything resembling an evaluative stance or any particular moral or political
principles that might help people judge the possibilities that technologies
present’ (Winner, 1993:371). Finally, he criticizes the descriptive ‘agnostic’
position that social constructivists of technology choose ‘as regards the ulti-
mate good or ill attached to particular technical accomplishments’ (Winner,
1993: 372).
There is also no desire to weigh arguments about right and wrong involved in
particular social choices in energy, transportation, weaponry, manufacturing,
236 Winner specifies this group of scholars: ‘Among the names of those involved in this
project are a number of Europeans and Americans: H. M. Collins, Trevor Pinch, Wiebe
Bijker, Donald MacKenzie, Steven Woolgar, Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, Thomas Hug-
hes, and John Law. These and other scholars of similar persuasion are now very active
doing research, publishing articles, and building academic programs. They are also openly
proselytizing and even self-consciously imperial in their hopes for establishing this
approach. It is clear they would like to establish social constructivism as the dominant
research strategy and intellectual agenda within science and technology studies for many
years to come’ (Winner, 1993: 364).
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agriculture, computing, and the like. Even less is there any effort to evaluate patterns
of life in technological societies taken as a whole. All the emphasis is focused upon
specific cases and how they illuminate a standard, often repeated hypothesis, name-
ly, that technologies are socially constructed (Winner, 1993: 373).
Michael Hard (1993), too, criticizes Pinch and Bijkers’ approach as lacking a
discussion of power, stratification, and hierarchy (Hard, 1993: 414).
By presenting a view of technology in terms of functionally arranged sociotechnical
systems, we will support those who benefit from harmony and cooperation and dis-
courage those who might benefit from conflict and opposition. We might be able to
reveal both unexpected and unwanted aspects of a technology, but we will remain
unable to suggest an alternative vision (Hard, 1993: 413).
Many of the problems that Winner, Hard, Harding, Bloor and Restivo iden-
tified in the social construction of technology traditions of STS – mecha-
nisms of inclusion and exclusion, its implicit evaluative stance, its untenable
claim of political neutrality, and its impeding of alternative visions – concern
assumptions underlying the seamless web metaphor. In a broad sense, their
analyses may be considered as criticisms of the performance of the seamless
web in STS’s studies of technology subsequent to Hughes’ Networks of Power.
Seamlessness provides a conceptual tool to subsume and give new focused
momentum to this critique.
Why is it necessary to rephrase critique raised by established STS schol-
ars almost thirty years ago? The reason is that the problems they sought to
address persist to this day and have far-reaching consequences on the intel-
lectual advancement of the field of STS. Their arguments have not lost validi-
ty and continue to be applicable to contemporary studies of technology in
the tradition of SCOT, LTS and ANT. The critical reviews of Winner, Hard,
Harding, Bloor and Restivo, and others, have not prevented the problem
from perpetuating in the field of STS. On the contrary, Hughes’ book
remains a compulsory point of reference for the study of electrification and
large technological systems. The term Seamlessness, therefore, is submitted
as an attempt to change the terms of the debate so as to specify and draw
renewed attention to this predicament.
The implications of Seamlessness for STS, however, reach beyond
Hughes’ book and the study of the history of technology. Hughes’ study of
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electrification is considered one of the founding texts of STS of the mid-
1980s. For this reason, the broader intellectual environment of the time has
to be taken into account when inquiring into the implications of Seamless-
ness for STS. Why did Hughes propose the metaphor of the seamless web of
technology and society at this point in time? How did the assumptions
underlying his approach to the history of technology relate to the broader
academic debates in STS of the 1980s?
The intellectual roots of Hughes’ notion of the seamless web of technol-
ogy and society can be traced back to the tradition of the Sociology of Scien-
tific Knowledge (SSK) of the 1970s. Hughes, trained as a historian of science,
proposed his new theory of technological change in response to intellectual
debates of the late 1970s and early 1980s on internal versus external histories.
In particular, Hughes proposed a new approach to the history of technology
that claimed to move beyond the constraints presented by the methodo-
logical approaches of internal and external histories. He presented his book
on Electrification in Western Society in this spirit : ‘This book is not simply a
history of the external factors that shape technology, nor is it only a history
of the internal dynamics of technology; it is a history of technology and soci-
ety’ (Hughes, 1983:2).
Hughes’ study of electrification forms part of a set of new empirical
studies that ‘[searched] for a language and for concepts to express their new
understanding of technological change’ (Bijker et al., 1987:13). Importantly,
these studies ‘[borrowed] from the sociologists of knowledge’ and ‘[urged]
historians and sociologists to open the so-called black box in which the
workings of technology are found’ (Bijker et al., 1987:14). In proposing this
link between technology and society, Hughes applied newly emerging
insights from the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) to the historical
study of technology. His theory replicates for technology the argument that
the content of science can be studied in social and cultural terms, an argu-
ment put forward by scholars in the SSK tradition. SSK had been developed
by a group of scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds affiliated to
the University of Edinburgh, who ‘had set out to understand not just the
organization but the content of scientific knowledge in sociological terms’
(Sismondo, 2010: 47). It extended the sociology of knowledge into the arena
of the ‘hard sciences’. This approach came to be referred to as the Strong
Programme in the SSK.
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The Strong Programme’s most prominent formulation was outlined by
David Bloor’s four tenets for the sociology of scientific knowledge in 1973. Its
central tenets were that, ‘in investigating the causes of beliefs, sociologists
should be impartial to the truth or falsity of the beliefs, and that such beliefs
should be explained symmetrically’ (Bloor 1973, in Bijker et al., 1987:18).
The Strong Programme viewed all knowledge claims as socially constructed
and their genesis, acceptance and rejection were to be explained by the social
world rather than the natural world (Bijker et al., 1987:18).
Hughes’ book on electrification in Western society does not explicitly
name the Strong Programme in SSK. But there is general agreement that
Hughes’ approach to the history of technology may be viewed as an applica-
tion of the tenets of the Strong Programme in SSK. The Strong Programme,
and social constructivist research approaches from these years more gen-
erally, were seen as a promising route for the history of science and technol-
ogy during that time. It provided an argument ‘that one can study the con-
cept of science and technology in social and cultural terms’ (Sismondo, 2010:
55). There is also general consent on the importance of the Strong Pro-
gramme in SSK for the early development of the field of STS. These intellec-
tual roots are important for our inquiry into the implications of Seamlessness
for STS more broadly.
To answer the question of the implications of Seamlessness on STS
more generally, we therefore can follow the conceptual connections of
Hughes’ seamless web with the Strong Programme in the SSK of the 1970s
and early 1980s. How do Hughes’ underlying assumptions on technological
change relate to analytical approaches in SSK in general, and in the Strong
Programme in particular?
Hughes’ theory of technological change can be interpreted as an applica-
tion of ideas in the Strong Programme of SSK to the history of technology.
To link the findings of the last chapter to the Strong Programme in SSK we
will apply Trouillot’s postcolonial approach to a book that has been described
as an exercise in the Strong Programme; Stephen Shapin and Simon Schaff-
er’s renowned book Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the
Experimental Life (Shapin & Schaffer, [1985] 2011).
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4. Scientific Heritage as Transition Narrative
4.1 Shapin and Schaffer’s Experimental Life
The book Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental
Life published in 1985 by Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer has been widely
cited in STS circles and beyond,237 and it continues to influence scholarly
debates and approaches in the field. Reflecting back, Shapin and Schaffer
describe the book as ‘an instantiation of a research programme in the sociol-
ogy of scientific knowledge’ (Shapin & Schaffer, 2011: xIi). The authors
were concerned with ‘a very specific passage’ (Shapin & Shaffer, 2011: xxxi)
in the history of early modern science. They used the classic controversy
between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes in seventeenth-century England
to study experimental practice. The book famously begins with the following
paragraph:
The object of this book is experiment. We want to understand the nature and status
of experimental practices and their intellectual products. These are the questions to
which we seek answers: what is an experiment? How is an experiment performed?
What are the means by which experiments can be said to produce matters of facts,
and what is the relationship between experimental facts and explanatory constructs?
How is a successful experiment identified, and how is success distinguished from
experimental failure? Behind this series of particular questions lie more general
ones: Why does one do experiments in order to arrive at scientific truth? Is experi-
ment a privileged means of arriving at consensually agreed knowledge of nature, or
are other means possible? What recommends the experimental way in science over
alternatives to it? (Shapin & Schaffer, [1985] 2011: 15).
237 Martin et al. rank Shapin and Schaffer’s book as the fifth most cited contribution listed
by STS handbook authors and refer to it as ‘core literature’of STS (Martin et al., 2012).
Shapin and Schaffer’s prominent book on the emergence of specific practices
that came to shape early modern science offers excellent foil to probe the
question of the global travel of STS and its Collective Blind Spot. The pre-
vious chapter investigated these travels by examining an influential book in
the intellectual tradition of STS dedicated to the study of technology. This
chapter explores a book published around the same time that shaped the
intellectual tradition of STS concerned with the study of science. It picks up
on the conclusions on technology as a North Atlantic universal, which
demonstrated Michel-Ralph Trouillot’s claim that these words carry a vision
of the world that requires an alterity – a constitutive Otherness. Expanding
on this conclusion, the chapter starts out with the claim that science, in its
guise as North Atlantic universal, also requires an alterity against which its
knowledge claims attain their full meaning. To demonstrate this claim,
Trouillot’s concept of alterity (‘Elsewhere’) is applied to Steven Shapin and
Simon Schaffer’s paradigmatic book.
If the hypothesis is correct, the case study will have to demonstrate that
Shapin and Schaffer’s historical analysis of early modern science requires a
relation to Otherness. An analysis of Trouillot’s geographies of management
and imagination as they relate to this book should reveal the inhabitants of
its Elsewhere, the oppositional referents for casting and legitimizing their
knowledge claims. The chapter will first offer a brief account of Shapin and
Schaffer’s book on Experimental Life. Then, the philosophical programmes of
Hobbes and Boyle are examined through the lens of the geographies of man-
agement and imagination to show that they required a relation to Otherness.
The ‘New World’, ‘savages’ and ‘inferior creatures’ figured as oppositional
referents for casting and legitimizing their knowledge claims. Elsewhere is
shown to reveal a mechanism by which early modern science comes to gain
legitimacy. The key questions and answers of Shapin and Schaffer’s book are
then revisited against this background. This examination shows that Shapin
and Schaffer required the residual category of the ‘ignorant stranger’ as a cru-
cial referent for framing their symmetrical historical approach to experiment.
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An Exercise in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
Shapin and Schaffer’s book deals ‘with the historical circumstances in which
experiment as a systematic means of generating natural knowledge arose, in
which experimental practices became institutionalized, and in which exper-
imentally produced matters of fact were made into the foundations of what
counted as proper scientific knowledge’ (Shapin & Schaffer, [1985] 2011: 3).
The authors proposed a new approach to studying one of the ‘great para-
digms’ of historians of science, who regarded Robert Boyle as ‘a founder of
the experimental world in which scientists now live and operate’ (Shapin &
Schaffer, [1985] 2011: 5).
The study by Shapin and Schaffer departs from the postulate in the his-
tory of science that the historian and the 17th-century experimentalist Ro-
bert Boyle share a culture. Although the authors do not challenge this postu-
late, they do challenge the historical ‘member’s account and its associated
self-evident method’ (Shapin & Schaffer, [1985] 2011: 5) that historians of
science usually produced. Instead, they propose a new approach to studying
experiment, that of ‘playing the stranger’ to ‘the culture of experiment’ (Sha-
pin & Shaffer, [1985] 2011: 6). Their key methodological challenge, there-
fore, is to specify how the historian can ‘play the stranger to experimental
culture, a culture we are said to share with a setting in the past and of which
one of our subjects is said to be the founder?’ (Shapin & Shaffer, [1985]
2011: 6). Despite this shift of focus to ‘culture’, Shapin and Schaffer empha-
size their positioning in history rather than anthropology and present their
book as ‘an exercise in the sociology of scientific knowledge’ (Shapin &
Schaffer, [1985] 2011: 15).
The author’s historical approach to experimental culture is to cast the
‘great paradigm of experimental procedure’ in terms of a controversy within
the social context of 17th-century Restoration England. This controversy
took place between two principal protagonists – Robert Boyle and Thomas
Hobbes – in England in the 1660s and early 1670s (Shapin & Schaffer,
[1985] 2011: 7). Shapin and Schaffer prefer a symmetrical handling of
rejected and accepted knowledge over controversy to rectify what they view
as an asymmetrical, standard historiographical strategy of naming Boyle as
the winner of the Boyle–Hobbes controversy (Shapin & Schaffer, [1985]
2011: 11). For this purpose, Shapin and Schaffer attempt a member’s account
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of Hobbes’s ‘anti experimentalism’ (Shapin & Schaffer, [1985] 2011: 13) and
a stranger’s account of Boyle’s experimental programme. In this way, Shapin
and Schaffer evoke three positions of historical knowing: the historian as a
member of experimental culture, the historian as an artificial (playing, pre-
tending) stranger to experimental culture, and the (non‐) historian as a gen-
uine (ignorant) stranger to experimental culture.
The central argument of the book is that the Hobbes–Boyle con-
troversies show that ‘[…] solutions to the problem of knowledge are embed-
ded within practical solutions to the problem of social order, and that differ-
ent practical solutions to the problem of social order encapsulate contrasting
practical solutions to the problem of knowledge’ (Shapin & Schaffer, [1985]
2011: 15). Shapin and Schaffer conclude that the Restoration polity and
experimental science shared a common form of life and that ‘the practices
involved in the generation and justification of proper knowledge were part of
the settlement and protection of a certain kind of social order’ (Shapin &
Schaffer, [1985] 2011: 342).
The New World, ‘Inferior Creatures’ and ‘Savages’
Shapin and Schaffer conclude that both Hobbes and Boyle’s philosophical
programmes shaped the nature of early modern philosophical life and exper-
imental culture. This chapter claims that their philosophical programmes
required an alterity, a referent outside themselves, a pre- or non-science in
relation to which their programmes attained their full meaning. What alter-
ities do Hobbes and Boyle’s philosophical programmes require? What is the
complementary Elsewhere to the Here of their philosophical programmes
that both premised one another and were conceived as inseparable? What
Others inhabit the Elsewhere in Hobbes and Boyle’s philosophical pro-
grammes?
Trouillot gives a name to the Elsewhere that was required for the emer-
gence of modern Europe. He describes the ‘discovery’ of the New World,
America, as the creation of Europe’s ‘still unpolished alter ego, its elsewhere,
its Other’ (Trouillot, 1991: 23). Indeed, Trouillot considers ‘The Conquest of
America […] as Europe’s model for the constitution of the Other’ (Trouillot,
1991: 23). Stuart Hall (1992) identifies an explicit connection between the
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quest for order in Europe and the construction of a modern identity. Accord-
ing to Hall, this identity was formed not only by ‘the internal processes that
gradually moulded Western European countries into a distinct type of soci-
ety but also through Europe’s sense of difference from other worlds—how it
came to represent itself in relation to these “others”’ (Hall, 1992: 189). Hall’s
approach corresponds to Trouillot’s views on ‘the West’s vision of order’,
which ‘from its inception required two complementary spaces, the here and
the elsewhere, which premised one another and were conceived as insepa-
rable’ (Trouillot, 2002a: 222).
Because Shapin and Schaffer’s book is concerned with the emergence of
early modern science in 17th-century England, Trouillot’s specification of
Elsewhere for early modernity may be transferred to this case: Elsewhere is
the New World, America. Although Shapin and Schaffer do not mention the
New World, or its inhabitants in their book, other researchers have studied
Hobbes and Boyle’s connections with the New World and their images of its
inhabitants. They have shown that Hobbes and Boyle used the expressions
‘savage’ (Moloney, 2011) and ‘inferior creatures’ (Irving, 2008), respectively,
to designate the populations of the New World in their work.
4.2 Hobbes’s and Boyle’s Natural Philosophical
Programmes
Elsewhere in Robert Boyle’s Natural Philosophical Programme
Robert Boyle never travelled to the New World. However, he held influential
positions in various colonial institutions in the New World: the English East
India Company, the Council for Foreign Plantations and the New England
Company (Irving, 2008: 1).238 He also held stocks in the Hudson’s Bay Com-
pany (Irving, 2008: 1). Although he never visited America, Boyle actively
entertained contact with travellers, tradesmen and colonial officers who pro-
vided him with first-hand information about the New World. In the absence
238 Irving writes that ‘Boyle served on the board of the English East India Company and
on the Council for Foreign Plantations, acted as President of the New England Company
and held shares in the Hudson’s Bay Company’ (Irving, 2008: 1).
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of established conventions, codes and practices for validating knowledge in
seventeenth-century England the verification of information from the New
World in 17th-century England was a serious practical problem to natural
philosophers. Boyle solved this problem by establishing a network of infor-
mants, a community of messengers or harbingers, who provided him with
hands-on information about the New World. Irving shows that the ‘gentle-
manly reliability’ of these informants was established by considering these
‘men’s associations with England’s colonies’ (Irving, 2008: 70).239
Shapin and Schaffer show that Boyle’s membership in the Hartlib Circle
and the Royal Society influenced his philosophical programme. Thus, their
analytical focus remains on Boyle’s ‘elaboration and implementation of pro-
cedures and institutions of control’ (Trouillot, 2003: 2) at home. They do not
consider the influence of Boyle’s association with procedures and institutions
of control abroad. However, both the Royal Society and the Hartlib Circle
viewed the New World as a source of useful knowledge for natural philoso-
phers and they established overseas channels of communication accordingly
(Irving, 2008: 69).
Boyle’s primary motivation, however, was not to establish new com-
monwealths in the New World, to derive profit or to gain first-hand knowl-
edge from informants (Irving, 2008). Managing these interests served his pri-
mary goal, the re-creation of ‘The Empire of Man over Inferior Creatures’
(Irving, 2008: 1).240 In his tract, Of the Usefulness of Experimental Natural
Philosophy, Boyle considers travellers to be vital to ‘the natural philosopher’s
epistemic project of creating man’s empire of knowledge’ (Irving, 2008:
14).241 Boyle believed that ‘only experimental philosophy could give him
239 Irving bases this claim on her analysis of the work diaries of Boyle (in which he
reports on interviews with travellers) by focusing on ‘the way he dealt with the epi-
stemological issue of the veracity of information collected on the colonial periphery’
(Irving, 2008: 70).
240 R. Boyle, Some Considerations Touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural
Philosophy, Part II (1671), in M. H. Hunter and E. B. Davis (eds.), The Works of Robert
Boyle, 14 vols. (London: Pickering and Chatto 2000), vol. 6, p. 406 (Irving, 2008).
241 See also Irving, 2008: 69.
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access to the New World’ (Irving, 2008: 74).242 Furthermore, Irving shows
that Boyle considered the recovery of man’s original empire as ‘part of a pro-
gramme for a model life as an experimental philosopher and as a Christian’
(Irving, 2008: 77). His model for the natural philosopher was ‘the Christian
Virtuoso’ (Irving, 2008: 78).243
Because Boyle never travelled to the New World, and because there were
no established procedures to verify knowledge at the time, Boyle’s expression
‘inferior creatures’ must be classified as a figment of his imagination. The
role of ‘inferior creatures’ in his philosophical programme and the space this
expression occupied in his claims for knowledge, however, are not imaginary.
Its assimilation into his body of knowledge is what Pratt referred to as a nor-
malizing discourse that codifies difference by omitting the ‘observing self’ in
its textual production of the Other (Pratt, 1992: 140).
Mapping and relating the geography of management and imagination of
Boyle’s philosophical programme reveals the direct connections and entan-
glement between scientific institutions such as the Hartlib Circle and the
Royal Society, and colonial institutions such as the English East India Com-
pany, the Council for Foreign Plantations and the New England Company.
The specific geography of Boyle’s imagination required finding a slot for the
inhabitants of the New World, inferior creatures, and a model of their abso-
lute opposite, the experimental natural philosopher.
242 ‘In his defence of experimental philosophy, Boyle drew a theological connection
between natural philosophers’ pursuit of man’s original empire over the world, and Eng-
lish trade and colonization, which he argued were the means of fulfilling God’s command
to man to enjoy the fruitfulness of the earth’ (Irving, 2008: 69).
243 ‘The reason why English natural philosophers were so interested in the New World,
and particularly in English colonies, was because they held a theory of empire as man’s
original dominion over nature. It was the emphasis upon restoring man’s original ency-
clopaedic knowledge of the natural world which generated their interest in the New
World, and ultimately in its English colonies’ (Irving, 2008: 3).
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Elsewhere in Thomas Hobbes’s Philosophical Programme
Just like Boyle, Hobbes never visited the New World, and just like Boyle,
Hobbes was directly involved with colonial institutions in the New World.
As secretary to Lord Cavendish, Hobbes was professionally acquainted with
the New World through their ‘joint involvement with the Virginia Company’
(Moloney, 2011: 197).244 The Virginia Company was a joint stock company
whose purpose was to establish colonial settlements in North America. Its
governing activities were carried out ‘according to a series of royal charters’
(Rose, 2001245).
There are few historical records on Hobbes’s involvement in the Vir-
ginia Company. Indeed, Malcolm considers Hobbes to have remained silent
about his own place in the story of the Virginia Company (Malcolm, 1981:
301). At the same time, he believes that Hobbes ‘made far more use of the
New World than was previously recognized’ (Moloney, 2011: 197). Hobbes’s
direct connection with colonial affairs gave him access to ‘detailed reports of
the Amerindians’ (Moloney, 2011: 197). He used the New World as a crucial
referent in his seminal work on political sovereignty, in which he built an
account ‘of the sovereign authority of civilized states that presupposed its
absence among the primitive societies of the New World’ (Moloney, 2011:
199). Moloney describes how Hobbes only saw ‘savage anarchy’ in the New
World and contrasted savage societies of the Americas with European states:
‘Primitive societies were not considered to be political units whose sover-
eignty merited respect. These were instead the outside of the system of
sovereign states; the chaotic and barbaric regions over which civilized states
244 Moloney quotes the work of Aravamudan (2009) and Malcolm (2002) who have
considered Hobbes’s involvement in English colonial America. Hobbes was employed as a
tutor to Lord Cavendish (who was only two years younger than Hobbes) after leaving
Oxford. When Lord Cavendish started a political career at court and in parliament, ‘Hob-
bes’ employment in the Cavendish household gradually changed from that of a tutor to
that of a secretary’. For several years, the ‘most important and time-consuming business
interest of [Hobbes’] pupil-patron’was the Virginia Company’ (Malcolm, 1981: 297).
245 Hobbes too gained membership of the Company, and there are indications that he
was a shareholder in the Somer Islands Company, an ‘independent but largely subsidiary
company responsible for the settlement of the Bermudas’ (Malcolm, 1981: 298).
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competed in the extension of rival imperial jurisdictions’ (Moloney, 2011:
199).
On what basis did Hobbes come to see savage anarchy, chaos and bar-
barism in the New World, even though he never travelled there? Hobbes’s
association with colonial institutions gave him access to current news and
descriptions from travellers, tradesmen and colonial officers. Hobbes there-
fore relied on the same type of information on the New World and its inhab-
itants as Boyle did, which may be studied as a normalizing discourse that
textually produces the Other (Pratt, 1992). Hobbes used the New World as a
crucial referent in his seminal work on political sovereignty. Hobbes made an
analogy between sovereign individuals in a state of nature and sovereign
states in the European family of nations. This analogy necessitated the denial
of statehood to savage societies. Hobbes denied the indigenous societies of
the New World statehood by identifying them as states of nature. He then
conceptualized ‘the sovereign, European state in juxtaposition to a hypo-
thetical state of nature’ (Moloney, 2011: 199). Assigning ‘savage societies’ to
nature meant to classify their social structures and institutions as pre-politi-
cal (Moloney, 2011).
In sum, Hobbes built an account ‘of the sovereign authority of civilized
states that presupposed its absence among the primitive societies of the New
World’ (Moloney, 2011: 199). His analogy between sovereign individuals in
a state of nature and sovereign states in the European family of nations
necessitated the denial of statehood to savage societies (Moloney, 2011: 199).
Assigning ‘savage societies’ to nature meant to classify their social structures
and institutions as pre-political (Moloney, 2011). Moloney points out that
this kind of theoretical mapping fed into ‘the ideologies Europeans used to
rationalize the global order they were bringing into being’ (Moloney, 2011:
190). He writes that ‘Hobbes built a theoretical bridge between the chaos of
the colonial periphery and the order that ought to characterize the internal
structures of, and the external relationships among, European states’ (Molo-
ney, 2011: 190).
By inscribing ‘savages’ as inhabitants of ‘the anarchic periphery’ of the
New World, Hobbes assigned them a backward space in both time (before
sovereign states) and place (outside sovereign states). By theorising ‘savage
anarchy […] as the only alternative to, the very outside of, civilized states’
(Moloney, 2011: 202), Hobbes contributed to the development of those
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binary oppositional concepts that have sustained the idea of a European
modernity. Instead of viewing these binary constructions as agents in devel-
oping modernity as a stage in history, they can be seen as casting modernity
as historiographical frame for staging difference (Mitchell, 2000).
Mapping and relating the geography of management and imagination of
Hobbes’s philosophical programme reveals that Hobbes’s involvement and
connections to colonial institutions in the New World are meaningful for his
philosophical programme. Hobbes’s theory necessitated what Trouillot has
termed ‘the Savage Slot’ (Trouillot, 2003), an Otherness against which core
concepts of his philosophical programme (and their superiority) came to
make sense in 17th-century Restoration England. Hobbes’s ‘savage’ is not just
a figment of the imagination that he projected into the New World that
would correspond more or less to a reality. The use of the ‘savage’ in his
philosophical programme becomes what Homi Bhabha has referred to as a
‘strategy of representing authority’ (Bhabha, 1994). This strategy assigned
backwardness in time and instantiated an order (of sovereign citizenship)
against which variations can be discussed.
4.3 “What is Experiment?”
The above analysis shows that Boyle and Hobbes’s philosophical pro-
grammes necessitated an Elsewhere as referent against which their knowl-
edge claims could attain full meaning and legitimacy. But it is not clear
whether this approach offers new answers to Shapin and Schaffer’s principal
research questions (What is experiment? What were the historical circum-
stances in which modern experimental life became institutionalized?). Sha-
pin and Schaffer do not define experiment. Instead, they describe character-
istics that typify the phenomenon of experimental practice: experiment is a
solution (to the problems of knowledge and social order); experiment is a
cultural practice (brought about through consensus produced by historical
judgement); and experiment is a form of life (shared by the politics and sci-
ence of the Restoration society, which judges what will best establish order).
The following sections will present new insights from this study on Else-
where with respect to these characteristics.
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Experiment as Solution to Knowledge and Order
The analysis has shown that Hobbes and Boyle used the expressions ‘the sav-
age’, ‘wilderness’ and ‘inferior creatures’ to populate Elsewhere in their
respective philosophical programmes. At the most basic level, the analysis
suggests an essential complement to Shapin and Schaffer’s central tenet of
viewing Hobbes and Boyle’s programmes as solutions to the problems of
knowledge and social order. Experimental practice as a solution to the prob-
lems of knowledge and social order is at the same time a solution to the
problems of non-knowledge and social disorderliness. As will be discussed lat-
er, this is not merely another exercise in symmetry.
Experiment as Cultural Practice
Shapin and Schaffer are interested in explaining the beliefs and practices of
experimental culture (Shapin & Schaffer [1985] 2011). Representing the
beliefs and practices of a specific culture sets the boundaries for its cultural
identity. According to Corbey and Leerssen (1991b: vi), ‘the circumscription
of cultural identity proceeds by silhouetting it against a contrastive back-
ground of Otherness’. Van Alphen shows that descriptions of alterity ‘[…]
are never based on a ‘real’ Other, but on a denial of the self, of the observer’s
identity’ (van Alphen, 1991: 3).
Thus, examining experiment as culture and practice means representing
cultural identity, and the portrayal of cultural identity requires a contrastive
background of Otherness that cannot be based upon a ‘real’ Other but must
be based on an imaginary projection that constitutes the self. Hobbes and
Boyle used ‘savages’ and ‘inferior creatures’ as means to formulate ‘[…] an
ideal, desired identity’ (van Alphen, 1991: 3): the civilized (European) state
and the model experimental philosopher. To view experiment as culture,
therefore, not only implies the need to connect what happens inside the
experimental laboratory with social conventions and formative socio-histor-
ical contexts; it also entails a shift towards the geography of imagination that
evokes ‘the twin concepts of alterity and identity’ (Voestermans, 1991: 221).
Why is this difference important? Shapin and Schaffer regard the pro-
cess of social consensus on Boyle and Hobbes’s knowledge claims as the
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driving force in producing historical judgement in favour of experimental
life. This study considers the construction of a modern European identity as
the key to the successful insertion of both Hobbes and Boyle’s programmes
into the specific circumstances of Restoration England. Experimental prac-
tice becomes a device to construct meaning, a site of enunciation to inscribe
difference and sameness.
Experiment as a Form of Life
Shapin and Shaffer depict experiment as a form of life. In their view, the
ability of this form of life to establish social order was judged by the context
of Restoration society. Boyle’s experimental form of life, however, was not
proposed simply as an optional form of life among others but as a model
form of life, the ‘Christian Virtuoso’ (Irving, 2008). Blending the figure of the
experimental philosopher with the Christian composed a model identity that
allowed Boyle to bestow his programme with a sense of social, political, cul-
tural, economic and religious utility.
Furthermore, Boyle’s model form of life was cast against the contrasting
forms of life of ‘inferior creatures’.246 Its aim was to recover ‘man’s knowledge
of the natural world’ to ‘exert dominion over the Creation’ (Irving, 2008: 78).
The order sought by Hobbes and Boyle’s philosophical programmes con-
cerned not only the battles of the English nation outside the confines of the
17th-century laboratory, but also its (Christian) handling of the encounter
with the New World. The idea that ‘Dominion and knowledge […] go hand
in hand’ (Irving, 2008: 78)247 was shared by natural philosophers, especially
the members of the Royal Society, at the time. This blending can be seen as
246 Likewise, Hobbes’s philosophical programme necessitated ‘the savage’ in the wilder-
ness of the New World, as a referent against which to inscribe his concept of political
sovereignty. His model of civilized states both presupposed and required the denial of
statehood to savage societies.
247 ‘In Boyle’s work the idea of man’s empire became a detailed theory in which he
explored the nature of empire as a form of power: its origins, theological legitimacy and
finally its role as a pursuit for the model natural philosopher, the Christian Virtuoso’
(Irving, 2008: 78).
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an ‘attempt to subdue the strangeness of the Other in cognitive terms’
(Corbey & Leerssen, 1991b: viii).
Accordingly, the model experimental life was developed in the context
of the construction of the identity of Western European nations vis-à-vis the
New World – and their struggle for colonial power. Its particular social
imaginary (Appadurai 1999), therefore, formed part of the larger process of
inventing early modern selves of modernity. Randeria has referred to this
identity as the precursor stage of the European Self (‘Vorstufe des euro-
päischen Selbst’) (Randeria, 1999b: 374). To produce the coherence and
sameness of this identity, Boyle and Hobbes’s philosophical programmes
needed to project alterity and tame difference.
One might be tempted to conclude that these new answers to Shapin
and Schaffer’s questions simply require Shapin and Schaffer’s historical
record to be complemented by extending the context of Restoration society
to other geographical regions, such as the New World, or to other cultures,
designated wrongly as ‘savages’ or ‘inferior creatures’. Is this really all that
happens, however, if we acknowledge that modern science requires ‘an alter-
ity, a referent outside itself, a pre- or non-modern’ in relation to which mod-
ern science attains its full meaning? A shift takes place that moves beyond
focusing on linear processes of inclusion or travel to focusing on processes of
co-constitution and entanglement (Randeria, 2002). The replication of these
alterities does not simply happen by overseeing historical realities that have
now been uncovered by a newer generation of scholars, such as Moloney,
Irving, and others. The replication of alterities lies concealed in Shapin and
Schaffer’s particular approach to experiment: by viewing and treating experi-
ment as a cultural heritage of modern science.
Experiment as Heritage
In addition to these explicit characteristics, Shapin and Schaffer’s analytical
approach implies a significant assumption that informs their approach to
experiment: their distinction between member’s and stranger’s accounts
assumes that Boyle’s experimental programme shaped a cultural practice that
has a historical lineage reaching back to its origins in 17th-century England.
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Experimental practice is thus represented as tradition or cultural heritage.248
Shapin and Schaffer re-inscribe the image of early modern experimental
practice as a culture with directional historical footprints that can be
extrapolated and traced through time and across space.249 This image pro-
vides the backdrop to their proposition for a new approach to the question:
‘How can the historian play the stranger to experimental culture, a culture
we are said to share with a setting in the past and of which one of our sub-
jects is said to be the founder?’ (Shapin & Schaffer, [1985] 2011: 6). Shapin
and Schaffer propose the research methodology of ‘playing the stranger’ to
‘the culture of experiment’ (Shapin & Schaffer, [1985] 2011: 6):
We need to play the stranger, not to be the stranger. A genuine stranger is simply
ignorant. We wish to adopt a calculated and an informed suspension of our taken-
for-granted perceptions of experimental practice and its products. By playing the
stranger, we hope to move away from self-evidence. We want to approach “our”
culture of experiment as Alfred Schutz suggests a stranger approaches an alien soci-
ety, […] (Shapin & Schaffer, [1985] 2011: 6).
This methodology presupposes that the philosophical programmes of both
Boyle and Hobbes form part of the cultural heritage of experimental practice
(because each was offered as a solution to the problems of knowledge and
social order) and that these programmes can be studied by applying a
248 ‘Thus, historians start with the assumption that they (and modern scientists) share a
culture with Robert Boyle, and treat their subject accordingly: the historian and the seven-
teenth century experimentalist are both members’ (Shapin & Schaffer [1985] 2011: 5).
249 Shapin and Schaffer position their approach in contrast to the conventional histo-
rian’s approach to experiment. They challenge the historian’s ‘self-evident method’ of con-
structing a member’s account (Shapin & Schaffer, [1985] 2011: 5). ‘We have a dismissal,
the rudiments of a causal explanation of the rejected knowledge (which implicitly acts to
justify the dismissal), and an asymmetrical handling of rejected and accepted knowledge’
(Shapin & Schaffer, [1985] 2011: 11). ‘One reason why historians have not systematically
and searchingly pressed the questions we want to ask about experimental practices is that
they have, to a great extent, been producing accounts coloured by the member’s self-evi-
dent method. In this method the presuppositions of our own culture’s routine practices
are not regarded as problematic and in need of explanation’ (Shapin & Schaffer, [1985]
2011: 5).
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methodology from the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific
Knowledge (Bloor, 1991 [1976]): the principles of symmetry and impartiality.
By treating experiment as a cultural heritage shared by the historian of
science, the 17th-century experimentalist, and Boyle, Shapin and Schaffer
replicate the alterities that constitute modern science. Who is the genuine
stranger in Shapin and Schaffer’s approach to experimental culture? What is
he/she ignorant of? In what sense is he/she not believable?250 What is inher-
ent in his/her views that allows the two STS scholars Shapin and Schaffer to
evaluate and assign to him/her the status of the ignorant?251
Because Shapin and Schaffer do not elaborate further on the genuine,
ignorant stranger, we can only speculate about his/her identity. A few char-
acteristics, however, are evident: the genuine, ignorant stranger designates
the opposite, the negative necessary to frame their approach to experimental
culture. The genuine, ignorant stranger, therefore, is a device to construct
meaning. He/she is not based on any empirical, analytical or theoretical
250 Shapin and Schaffer’s methodology rests upon the assumption that both Hobbes and
Boyle’s philosophical programmes were believable: ‘Given other circumstances bearing
upon that philosophical community, Hobbes’s views might well have found a different
reception. They were not widely credited or believed—but they were believable; they were
not counted to be correct, but there was nothing inherent in them that prevented a diffe-
rent evaluation’ (Shapin & Schaffer, [1985] 2011: 13). This claim is contrasted against the
genuine ignorant stranger, who by implication is not believable and carries something
inherent in him that prevents a different evaluation.
251 ‘As part of the same exercise we shall be adopting something close to a “member’s
account” of Hobbes’s anti-experimentalism. That is to say, we want to put ourselves in a
position where objections to the experimental programme seem plausible, sensible, and
rational. Following Gellner, we shall be offering a “charitable interpretation” of Hobbes’s
point of view. Our purpose is not to take Hobbes’s side, nor even to resuscitate his scienti-
fic reputation (though this, in our opinion, has been seriously undervalued). Our goal is
to break down the aura of self-evidence surrounding the experimental way of producing
knowledge, and “charitable interpretation” of the opposition to experimentalism is a
valuable means of accomplishing this. Of course, our ambition is not to rewrite the clear
judgement of history […]. Yet we want to show that there was nothing self-evident or
inevitable about the series of historical judgements in that context which yielded a natural
philosophical consensus in favour of the experimental programme’ (Shapin & Schaffer,
[1985] 2011: 13).
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studies on the nature of his/her ignorance or lack of credibility. Therefore,
he/she has to be classified as a fiction of Shapin and Schaffer’s imaginary
geography of experimental culture. This ‘complete stranger’ to experimental
culture is the necessary device that allows Shapin and Schaffer to speak about
‘culture’: if he/she did not exist (in their geography of imagination), there
would be no outside of experimental culture, and the very notion of ‘culture’
would lose its meaning.
Shapin and Schaffer apply the principle of symmetry to two types of
knowledge: rejected and accepted. The analytical web of member’s and (por-
trayed) stranger’s accounts, however, eclipses the historical complementarity
of representing knowledge against its opposite, that is, non-knowledge. To
eclipse this dimension is to replicate the alterities that constitute exper-
imental life and thus modern science more generally. This is not just another
level of symmetry: the added value of making visible the alterities of modern
science lies not in the claim for an equal treatment but in the claim for a
need to focus on the ways in which the twin pair of identity and alterity
comes into being, functions, interacts, and changes.
This approach may be viewed as an example of what Dipesh Chakra-
barty has termed the ‘transition narrative’ of historicism (Chakrabarty, 2008
[2000]). It expresses a ‘historical construction of temporality’ in which the
modern is separated from the pre-modern by historical time (Chakrabarty,
1992: 13). It also records the assumed cultural distance between the West
and the non-West. This ‘mode of thinking about history’ assumes that ‘any
object under investigation [retains] a unity of conception throughout its
existence’ (Chakrabarty, 2008 [2000]: xiv). The transition narrative inscribes
a ‘“first in Europe, then elsewhere” structure of global historical time’ (Chak-
rabarty, 2008 [2000]: 7) that situates the modern individual at the very end
of history (Chakrabarty, 2008 [2000]: 10). The mode of writing history as a
transition narrative, in Chakrabarty’s theory, represents a rehearsal of the
split between the modern and the pre- or non-modern: ‘[…] this split is
what is history; writing history is performing this split over and over again’
(Chakrabarty, 1992: 13). Performing this split relegates the colonial subject
to an ‘Imaginary Waiting Room of history’ (Chakrabarty, 2008 [2000]: 8).
The examination of experimental culture as heritage may be viewed as a
rehearsal of Chakrabarty’s transition narrative, which relegates the ignorant
stranger to experimental culture to the Imaginary Waiting Room of history.
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Shapin and Schaffer’s book re-enacts a social imaginary in which exper-
imental practice as culture is cast against an outside referent (Elsewhere). To
view experiment as a cultural heritage means to replicate its constitutive
alterities, to extrapolate and re-project them through time, all the way into
the present – to perform the split of historical writing over and over again.
Just as Randeria posits for modernity (Randeria, 2002), the idea of modern
science travelling to the rest of the world must be replaced by a more messy
and complex picture. This picture might be referred to as entangled exper-
imental culture, or as uneven modern sciences.
The above discussion shows that the analysis of Elsewhere in Hobbes
and Boyle’s philosophical programmes offers new insights into the central
questions of Shapin and Schaffer’s book. STS appears to reproduce the alter-
ities that have constituted modern science by replicating Chakrabarty’s ‘first
in Europe, then Elsewhere’ structure of global historical time (Chakrabarty,
2008 [2000]: 7) and by inscribing this time as a measure of cultural distance.
This performance of Chakrabarty’s historical split within the body of STS
presents an obstacle to the advancement of this field, because it prevents the
genuine, ignorant stranger from STS’s own Elsewhere from entering this field
of knowledge.
Shapin and Schaffer used the classic controversy between Robert Boyle
and Thomas Hobbes in seventeenth-century England to study the broader
questions, ‘What did people actually do when they were making what they
considered to be knowledge? How did they warrant what they produced, and
how did they secure credibility and authority for it?’ (Shapin & Schaffer,
2011: xiviii). The analysis of Elsewhere in the philosophical programmes of
Boyle and Hobbes has confirmed the hypothesis that modern science
requires a referent outside itself, a pre- or non-modern science in relation to
which it attains its full meaning. Shapin and Schaffer’s approach to experi-
ment as culture and practice in Leviathan and the Air-Pump also relies on
the oppositional contrast between member’s and stranger’s accounts. Their
symmetrical account of the Hobbes–Boyle controversy in terms of rejected
and accepted knowledge puts into effect the residual category of the ‘gen-
uine’, ‘ignorant stranger’, the outside to the culture of experiment. The gen-
uine, ignorant stranger represents a rhetorical device for legitimizing their
historical method and serves as a critical referent in relation to which their
historical knowledge claims attain full meaning. He/she is an imaginary
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construct, an inhabitant of Leviathan and the Air-Pump’s Elsewhere. This
appropriation of a heritage of experimental culture (by contrasting it with its
absence, Elsewhere) promulgates the grand narrative of modernity in which
experimental life appears with a European site of origin spreads over time
and place. Shapin and Schaffer’s study thus replicates the alterities that have
constituted modern science.
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5. A Postcolonial Programme in STS
Can general implications be drawn from the postcolonial analysis of the
paradigmatic books by Thomas Hughes, and Steven Shapin and Simon
Schaffer? Both books perform elements of the Strong Programme in the
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK). Networks of Power applies princi-
ples from the Strong Programme to the history of technology, and Leviathan
and the Air Pump has been called one of its most celebrated products (Long-
ino, 2002). For this reason, the four tenets of David Bloor’s version of the
Strong Programme will be used as referents for formulating a Programme in
Science Studies Elsewhere (Bloor, [1976] 1991). This programme employs
Shalini Randeria’s concepts of entangled histories and uneven modernities
(Randeria, 1999a, 1999b) to put into effect and interpret Michel-Rolph
Trouillot’s notion of Elsewhere for the study of modern science and technol-
ogy. To formulate the Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere (SSE), this
chapter first proposes the notion of Science & Technology Studies Else-
where252 and introduces Randeria’s concepts of entangled histories and
uneven modernities.
5.1 Science & Technology Studies Elsewhere
The study of alterity and the Other may be encountered in a variety of schol-
arly and disciplinary approaches. Elsewhere in this book refers specifically to
Trouillot’s study of alterity and the Other. Accordingly, the notion of Science
& Technology Studies Elsewhere does not simply imply STS in far-away
252 For the sake of brevity, the Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere leaves out the
word ‘technology’ as contained in the expression Science & Technology Studies Elsewhere.
Technology is subsumed under the heading of the programme.
places, nor is it merely a call to include peripheral voices to achieve a more
representative cultural composition of STS scholarship. Michel-Rolph
Trouillot’s notion of Elsewhere refers exclusively to the representation of
alterity in the project of modernity and emphasizes imagination and space
(rather than place). In his view, modernity ‘requires an alterity, a referent
outside of itself—a pre- or non-modern in relation to which the modern
takes its full meaning’ (Trouillot, 2002a: 222).
The claim that someone—someone else—is modern is structurally and necessarily a
discourse on the Other, since the intelligibility of that position—what it means to be
modern—requires a relation to Otherness. The modern is that subject which mea-
sures any distance from itself and redeploys it against an unlimited space of imagi-
nation (Trouillot, 2002a: 226).
Science & Technology Studies Elsewhere adopts Trouillot’s premise for mod-
ernity and claims that modern science and technology, too, require an alter-
ity, a referent outside itself in relation to which they take their full meaning.
The phrase casts science and technology as North Atlantic universals which
can be studied through the lenses of the geographies of management and
imagination. The objective of Science & Technology Studies Elsewhere is to
capture and make visible the transition narrative of science and technology.
The transition narrative refers to a ‘historical construction of temporality’ in
which the modern is separated from the pre-modern by historical time
(Chakrabarty, 1992: 13).
The analysis has shown that Trouillot’s notion of Elsewhere can call atten-
tion to characteristics of science and technology that have remained systemati-
cally eclipsed and that it reveals important sites for future STS. This field has
assumed a particular ‘gaze’ on science and technology, rooted in this field’s
North Atlantic socio-political, institutional and epistemic heritage, and its
positioning within the paradigm of modernity. If science and technology
require an alterity, a referent outside itself, and if STS fails to demonstrate that
it has considered this alterity in its study of science and technology, then its
‘gaze’ is likely to have led to a re-inscription of the alterities that have been
constitutive of science and technology. The key, then, is not to seek ways to
return this gaze by pluralizing the set of authors, problems or empirical sites in
the field of STS. It becomes necessary to analyse the Elsewhere, the space ‘of
and for the Other’ that can be, and often is, imaginary (Trouillot, 2002a: 224)
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in science and technology, and in STS. The term Science & Technology Studies
Elsewhere is coined to designate this analytical focus.
5.2 Entangled Histories and Uneven Modernities
The construction of alterity and the staging of differences are matters of cen-
tral concern to the postcolonial conception of modernity. Trouillot’s notion
of Elsewhere belongs to a particular postcolonial conception of modernity,
which essentially differs from the assumptions on modernity that underlie
the works by Bloor, Hughes, Shapin and Schaffer in the 1970s and 1980s. In
the following decade, the idea of modernity and its underlying images of
Western progress and development were increasingly criticized. By the turn
of the century, concepts such as alternative, multiple and plural modern-
ities253 had been proposed to overcome the confines of a singular conception
of modernity. Modernity is a constitutive category of thought in the social
sciences and humanities. It is also a constitutive category of thought in the
field of STS. Therefore, developments in the conception of modernity have a
bearing on the work of STS.
Modernity has become ‘a contested concept with a multiplicity of mean-
ings which vary with actors and contexts’ (Randeria, 2002, 287). Classically,
modernity was portrayed as a result of the economic, socio-political and cul-
tural movements connected to the European Renaissance, the Reformation
and the Scientific Revolution. These European developments were seen as a
blueprint for modernity to be followed by the rest of the (non-modern)
world. Mitchell (2000) describes the modern age as presenting ‘a particular
view of geography, in which the world has a single center, Europe […] in
reference to which all other regions are to be located; and an understanding
of history in which there is only one unfolding of time, the history of the
West, in reference to which all other histories must establish their sig-
nificance and receive their meaning. […] Historical time, the time of the
West, is what gives modern geography its order, an order centered upon
Europe’ (Mitchell, 2000: 7).
253 See Knauft (2002) for an overview of relevant literature on these concepts.
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The concepts of alternative, multiple and plural modernities were pro-
posed to transcend the Eurocentric view of historical modernity. These con-
cepts, in turn, have been criticized by scholars in postcolonial studies, cul-
tural studies and anthropology. According to Conrad and Randeria (2002:
10), alternative or parallel forms of modernity reproduce the boundaries of
the nation-state and Europe. Bhambra writes that ‘simply pluralizing the cul-
tural forms of modernity, or recognizing the histories of others, does nothing
to address the fundamental problems with the conceptualization of moderni-
ty itself’ (Bhambra, 2011: 655). On the contrary, such approaches continue
to re-inscribe the very categories and polarities that they seek to overcome.
Modernity thus continues to provide what has been referred to as a ‘historio-
graphical frame’ (Mitchell, 2000) or ‘grand narrative, within which the origin
and diffusion of modernity within Europe is located’ (Bhambra, 2011: 653).
Randeria criticizes this grand narrative for casting world history in terms of
binary contrasts, which perpetuates the view of ‘European historical experi-
ence […] as both unique and universal’ (Randeria, 2002: 291).
The most recent postcolonial approaches to modernity have been con-
cerned with finding ways to move beyond the conception of modernity as a
stage in history. Rather, modernity is viewed as the ‘staging’ of history
(Mitchell, 2000: 23), a process that ‘involves the staging of differences’
(Mitchell, 2000: 26). Often, this act is referred to as the construction of alter-
ity. The requirement of constructing alterity for the genealogy of modernity
has become the focal point of recent analysis in a variety of academic fields,
such as postcolonial studies, anthropology, cultural studies and subaltern
studies. Important contributions to this debate have been made by (among
others) Edward Said (1977), Stuart Hall (1992, 1997), Homi Bhabha (1994),
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988), Paul Gilroy (1993), Dipesh Chakrabarty
(1992, 2002a, 2002b, 2008 [2000]), Valentin Mudimbe (1988), Mahmood
Mamdani (1996), Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1991, 2002, 2003), Arturo Esco-
bar (1994), Timothy Mitchell (2000) and Shalini Randeria (1999a, 1999b,
2002). These authors have been concerned with how to move beyond a rela-
tivist approach to the foundational binary constructions that have been char-
acteristic of the discourse on modernity, such as modern/traditional, West-
ern/non-Western, centre/periphery, civilized/primitive, or rational/irrational.
Shalini Randeria has proposed two concepts to develop alternative histor-
ical perspectives to the classic conception of modernity: entangled histories and
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uneven modernities (Randeria, 1999). She suggests replacing ‘the idea of a
homogeneous Western modernity travelling, for the most part imperfectly, to
the rest of the world’ with a ‘more messy and complex picture’ (Randeria,
1999a, 1999b). This would address some of the problems that lie concealed in
the binary concepts that have sustained the idea of modernity.
I would suggest replacing a ‘history of absences’ (Mamdani 1996), as in discourse of
modernisation theory, or a history by analogy, as in discourses of alternative mod-
ernities, by a relational perspective [on modernity] which foregrounds processes of
interaction and intermixture in the entangled histories of uneven modernities (Ran-
deria, 1999a: 1999b) (in Conrad & Randeria, 2002: 287).
Randeria’s notion of ‘entangled histories’ makes a case for substituting the
binary categories of modernity with a new analytical framework in which the
units of analysis emphasize the constitutive role of ‘the exchange and flow of
ideas, institutions and practices’ (Conrad & Randeria, 2002: 8). Her second
concept, ‘uneven modernities’ specifies the focus of these new units of analysis.
Rather than identifying historical commonalities in this exchange and inter-
action, the framework aims to reveal ‘demarcations and fractures’ in the tex-
ture and constitution of the modern world (Conrad & Randeria, 2002: 18/9).
In STS, both the singular concept of modernity (e. g. Chambers & Gil-
lespie, 2000; de Laet & Mol, 2000; Campion & Schrum, 2004; Latour, 1993,
2007; Hess, 2001, 2007; Thompson, 2008) and the relativist approach of
multiple, plural or alternative modernities (e. g. Adams, 2002; Redfield, 2002;
Anderson, 2002; Harding, 2008;254 Anderson & Adams, 2008) are prevalent.
For example, in 2008, Anderson and Adams lamented that various attempts
to pluralize the concept of modernity in the 1990s have been ‘largely ignored’
by scholars in science and technology studies (Anderson & Adams, 2008:
183). Along with other STS scholars,255 they view the field of ‘post-colonial
technoscience’ as a promising site for dealing with ‘the post-colonial critique
254 Sandra Harding has recently drawn attention to the ‘under-addressed’ modernity/
tradition binary in Science and Technology Studies (Harding, 2008: 7).
255 Special Issue on Postcolonial Technoscience in Social Studies of Science, Vol. 32,
No. 5/6 (Oct–Dec, 2002), Special Issue on Postcolonial Technoscience in Science as Cul-
ture, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2005.
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that informs the anthropology of modernity’ (Anderson & Adams, 2008:
183). Its objective, in their view, is to follow the movement of science and
technology into new environments (Anderson & Adams, 2008: 183) by pur-
suing ‘multi-sited histories of science’ (Anderson & Adams, 2008: 192).256
This focus on the traffic or travel of knowledge is an example of the
kind of perspective that Mitchell (2000), Randeria (2002), Bhambra (2011)
and others see as a historiographical frame or grand narrative of world his-
tory – a perspective in which the single conceptualization of modernity iron-
ically remains intact. The standard analytical procedure from this per-
spective, according to Randeria, is doomed to compare the Western with
(the deficient) non-Western historical experience (Randeria, 2002).257 Chak-
rabarty refers to the kind of ‘historical construction of temporality’ which
separates the modern from the premodern by historical time (Chakrabarty,
1992: 13) as a mode of writing history as a transition narrative. The tran-
sition narrative inscribes a particular ‘structure of global historical time’ that
situates the modern individual at the very end of history. The mode of writ-
ing history as ‘first in Europe, then elsewhere’ (Chakrabarty, 2008 [2000]:
10), in Chakrabarty’s theory, represents a rehearsal of the split between the
modern and the pre- or non-modern: ‘[…] this split is what is history;
256 ‘We need multi-sited histories of science which study the bounding of sites of know-
ledge production, the creation of value within such boundaries, the relations with other
local social circumstances, and the traffic of objects and careers between these sites, and in
and out of them. Such histories would help us to comprehend situatedness and mobility
of scientists, and to recognize the unstable economy of “scientific” transaction. If we are
especially fortunate, these histories will creatively complicate conventional distinctions
between center and periphery, modern and traditional, dominant and subordinate, civili-
zed and primitive, global and local’ (Anderson & Adams, 2008: 192).
257 ‘The usual mode of engaging in a comparative exercise idealises and abstracts from
Western experience in order to then compare (more often than not negatively) non-
Western trajectories, transformations and institutions of civil society as deficient or diffe-
rent. These narratives, whether Marxist or liberal, view social reality through the lens of
binary oppositions (West/non-West, modern/traditional, societies with history/societies
without history, secular/religious). Non-Western societies, as the very term signifies, are
defined by negation. […] Their historical and contemporary experience is then underst-
ood in such a framework not in terms of what it is but in terms of what it is not’
(Randeria, 2002: 291).
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writing history is performing this split over and over again’ (Chakrabarty,
1992: 13). The transition narrative appeared in the study of Hughes’ theory
of technological change and Shapin and Schaffer’s study of experimental life,
which demonstrated that modern science and technology require an alterity
against which they take their full meaning.
5.3 The Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere
Trouillot’s notion of Elsewhere and Randeria’s concepts of entangled histories
and uneven modernities (Randeria, 1999a: 1999b) can be used to study the
constitutive role of alterities in modern scientific and technological culture.
The notion of Science & Technology Studies Elsewhere is coined to connect
these concepts from postcolonial studies, anthropology and cultural studies
for this purpose. This is not simply an isolated intellectual exercise. On the
contrary, it follows similar attempts to come to terms with the meaning of
recent debates on modernity in other disciplines and fields in the social sci-
ences and humanities, such as Costa (2005) and Boatcă et al. (2010) in soci-
ology, and Trouillot (1991, 2002) and Restrepo and Escobar (2005) in
anthropology.
Hughes’ Networks of Power and Shapin and Schaffer’s Leviathan and the
Air-Pump implement principles of a research programme in the Sociology of
Scientific Knowledge, associated with an Edinburgh school of STS (for exam-
ple, Barnes, 1977; Bloor, [1976] 1991; Barnes and Bloor, 1982). One of the
founding texts of the Strong Programme is David Bloor’s book Knowledge
and Social Imagery (Bloor, [1976] 1991). This book, too, has been influential
in STS; Martin et al. list it as number nine in core STS literature (Martin et
al., 2012). In this book, Bloor formulated four tenets for the Strong Pro-
gramme; causality, impartiality, symmetry and reflexivity. The implications
of the postcolonial examination of Hughes’ and Shapin and Schaffer’s books
for the field of STS can be thought through by clarifying their relation to the
Strong Programme. These consequences are articulated by formulating four
tenets in the Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere in relation to Bloor’s
version of the Strong Programme (Bloor, [1976] 1991).
The Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere casts science and technol-
ogy as North Atlantic universals that can be studied through Trouillot’s
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intertwined lenses of the geography of management and imagination. Else-
where makes visible the entangled processes and practices that inscribe
sameness and difference in modern science and technology. The Programme
intends to draw attention to the default replication of this production of
alterity by STS. It is not proposed as a call to equalize the global political
economy of STS (this important case has long been made, though undoubt-
edly it would need to be restated). The table below presents the four tenets of
the Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere in relation to Bloor’s four tenets
for the Strong Programme in SSK (Table 7).
The first tenet: Shapin and Schaffer’s first tenet for the Strong Pro-
gramme, causality, leads them to inquire into the historical circumstances in
which modern experimental life became institutionalized. Their aim is to
make visible a direct causal connection between Restoration society and the
rules, procedures and conventions that define experimental practice in the
laboratory.
The study of Elsewhere in Hobbes and Boyle’s philosophical programme
shifts the analytical focus away from causal linkages in the study of exper-
imental culture to the entangled processes that produce scientific meaning
and knowledge against a contrastive alterity. The analysis inquired after the
Elsewhere of Boyle and Hobbes’s philosophical programmes, the opposi-
tional referents outside (and within) themselves, the pre- or non-modern
science in relation to which their philosophical programmes attain their full
meaning. The complementary Elsewhere to the Here of their philosophical
programmes was the New World, the necessary alterity for the construction
of the beginnings of a common European self, both of which premised one
another and were conceived as inseparable. ‘Inferior creatures’ and ‘savages’
were the relational Others that inhabited the Elsewhere in their programmes.
Elsewhere can serve as an analytical tool to emphasize the entangled process-
es and practices of othering that have shaped modern science.
The second tenet: Shapin and Schaffer’s approach to studying experi-
ment aims at delivering an impartial account of rejected (Hobbes) and
accepted (Boyle) knowledge. Their distinction between member’s and strang-
er’s accounts allows them to reveal causal links between Hobbes and Boyle’s
respective knowledge claims and historical judgements in seventeenth cen-
tury England. In their historical approach, the imaginary figure of the ‘gen-
uine’, ‘ignorant stranger’ is assigned a permanent place to occupy outside of
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The Strong Programme in the
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
(Bloor 1991 [1976])
The Programme in
Science Studies Elsewhere
(Hofmänner, 2016)
(1)
It would be causal, that is, concerned with the
conditions which bring about belief or states of
knowledge. Naturally, there will be other types
of causes apart from social ones which will
co-operate in bringing about belief.
It would be entangled, that is, concerned with the
constitutive role of Elsewhere in the practices
and processes that shape knowledge claims in
modern science.
(2)
It would be impartial with respect to truth and
falsity, rationality or irrationality, success and
failure. Both sides of these dichotomies will
require explanation.
It would be relational with respect to claims for
chronological primacy and universality in modern
science. The shaping of binary categories of
historical thinking about modern science
(modern/traditional, rational/irrational,
knowledge/non-knowledge, etc.) will require
relational (rather than oppositional) explanation.
(3)
It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation.
The same types of cause would explain, say,
true and false beliefs.
It would be uneven in its style of explanation. Its
units of analysis would foreground demarcations
and fractures in the social imaginary of modernity
to explain, say, true and false beliefs.
(4)
It would be reflexive. In principle, its patterns
of explanation would have to be applicable to
sociology itself. Like the requirement of
symmetry, this is a response to the need to seek
for general explanations.
It would be contestable. In principle, its patterns
of explanation would have to allow critique that
contests knowledge claims on the Here and the
Elsewhere. This is a response to the need to
develop and debate entangled modes of
explanation.
Table 7: The four tenets of the Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere in reference to
Bloor’s four tenets of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
(Hofmänner, 2016).
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experimental culture from the time of its inception in early Europe all the
way through to the present. He/she fills the necessary slot, personifies the
indispensable (historical) absence against which the presence of Shapin and
Schaffer’s knowledge claims can be contrasted and instantiated.
Shapin and Schaffer’s inscription of the oppositional members and
strangers to experimental culture is a rehearsal of Chakrabarty’s ‘transition
narrative’ – an inscription of historical time as a measure of cultural differ-
ence (Chakrabarty, 2008 [2000]). This rehearsal feeds on replicating Else-
where. Shapin and Schaffer’s ‘ignorant stranger’ is assigned to Chakrabarty’s
Imaginary Waiting Room of history (Chakrabarty, 2008 [2000]). He/she is
waiting there for modern science and its experimental culture to travel to
him/her so that he/she can acquire membership in the universal exper-
imental culture. However, he/she can never become a member of this her-
itage because he/she is doomed to represent the contrastive outside against
which the inside identity of experimental culture is constituted. Shapin and
Schaffer’s impartial approach of ‘playing’ the ‘ignorant stranger’may be seen
as a rhetorical device for performing Chakrabarty’s historical split, the histor-
ical construction of a temporal axis that constantly reconstitutes the outside
(Chakrabarty, 2008 [2000]) of modern science.
The Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere claims that the dichoto-
mies of Bloor’s Strong Programme (truth and falsity, rationality or irrationali-
ty, success and failure) form part of a historiography of science and knowl-
edge that depends upon the twin concepts of alterity and identity. The
relational approach to modern science seeks explanations for the processes
and practices that inscribe such opposing categories of historical thinking.
Emphasizing the role of Elsewhere in the making of modern science is an
attempt to work against Chakrabarty’s perpetual historical split by shifting
attention to the relational entanglement of the dichotomies of modernity that
have favoured certain knowledge claims over others.
The third tenet: Shapin and Schaffer apply a symmetrical style of expla-
nation to the knowledge claims of Boyle and Hobbes to deliver an impartial
account of the two sides of the dichotomies truth/falsity, rationality/irration-
ality, success/failure. The analysis of Elsewhere in Boyle and Hobbes’s philo-
sophical programmes has shown that solving the problems of knowledge and
order necessitated a contrastive background of non-knowledge and disorder-
liness (the New World, its ‘inferior creatures’ and ‘savages’) to legitimize
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knowledge claims. But this contrastive background of alterity does not sim-
ply introduce another analytical level in need of symmetrical inspection. A
symmetrical explanation of the constrasting knowledge claims of Hobbes/
Boyle and ‘inferior creatures’/ ‘savages’ is bound to generate a ‘history of
absences’ (Mamdani 1996). Symmetrical postulates on the foundational,
binary oppositions of modernity re-inscribe how difference has been codified
in modern science.
The Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere proposes to replace
Bloor’s symmetrical style of explanation with an uneven style of explanation.
It attempts to shift the focus away from approximating an ideal image of the
symmetrical neutral view from nowhere to deconstruct modern science. It
does not attempt to eliminate skewed power relations of divided or shared
histories. Neither does it simply try to establish historical commonalities
between Boyle and Hobbes’s philosophical programmes, experimental prac-
tice, the Royal Society, travellers, tradesmen and colonial officers to the New
World, the English East India Company, the Christian Virtuoso, ‘savages’,
and ‘inferior creatures’. The uneven style of explanation seeks new units of
analysis that provide transversal accounts of knowledge claims to investigate
the practices and processes that underlie the binary categories of modernity.
Following Randeria (2002), the shift in style of explanation involves a
change of perspective on the status of modern science: instead of represent-
ing a historical-philosophical category of modernity, modern science
becomes an agent in staging the social imaginary of modernity. The Pro-
gramme in Science Studies Elsewhere seeks to reveal the messy demarcations
and fractures in the texture and constitution (Conrad & Randeria, 2002) of
this agency. Studying the unevenness of the foundational categories of mod-
ern science opens the scene for alternative social imaginaries of knowledge.
The fourth tenet: Bloor’s last tenet on reflexivity specifies that Shapin
and Schaffer’s patterns of historical explanation of experimental culture
would have to be applicable to sociology itself. Shapin and Schaffer do not
address this tenet in their study. However, from the point of view of Science
Studies Elsewhere, Bloor’s fourth tenet illustrates the vicious circle of explan-
ation within which STS has been operating. At the outset of this book, calls
were quoted to address STS’s paradoxical condition of representing itself by
means of an intellectual genealogy that remains detached from its ‘broader
historical and socio-political contextuality’ (Elzinga, 1997) while at the same
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time arguing for the co-construction between research and subject for other
knowledge fields (Guggenheim & Nowotny, 2003). Could not a reflexive per-
spective provide a solution to this paradoxical condition? Would not the
application of STS’s standards and explanations to its own programmes and
concepts provide an analytical framework for examining its own co-con-
struction?
A reflexive perspective is bound to reproduce STS’s knowledge claims
on the Here and the Elsewhere. This perspective would have to remain caged
in this field’s foundational assumptions on modernity. New approaches are
necessary to challenge these assumptions. In this examination, Elsewhere
(and its associated analytical lenses of the geographies of management and
imagination) was proposed as an analytical tool for demonstrating an alter-
native way of framing the phenomenon of experimental culture and practice.
The Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere proposes that debates on alter-
native ways of framing science be a constitutive requirement for STS in the
future. Suggesting that the Programme be contestable is to accentuate the
added value of engaging with such alternative ways of mapping the Here and
the Elsewhere of knowledge claims.
Trouillot’s notion of Elsewhere may be used as a conceptual tool to call
attention to characteristics and procedures of science and technology that
have remained systematically eclipsed. Science & Technology Studies Else-
where delineates a terrain for inquiry into knowledge claims that views the
construction of alterity and identity as key strategies of modern science. To
study these strategies, a Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere is proposed
in reference to David Bloor’s Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific
Knowledge, which provided the theoretical backbone to Shapin and Schaf-
fer’s methodological approach to experiment. Where Bloor proposes a causal,
impartial, symmetrical and reflexive Strong Programme, this study proposes
an entangled, relational, uneven and contestable Programme.
The above analysis might be dismissed as providing material that is rele-
vant only to specialist fields like the anthropology of science, cultural studies
of science, or postcolonial technoscience. However, Science & Technology
Studies Elsewhere attempts to move beyond the project outlined by post-
colonial technoscience, the pluralizing rhetoric of which ironically cements
the universal historical narrative of a uniform modernity and its European
heritage. Its primary object is not to analyse modern science through the lens
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of the cultural or historical diversity ascribed to plural or alternative modern-
ities. It does not propose to develop strategies for overcoming or doing away
with Elsewhere as a device for the construction of meaning in scientific prac-
tice. Nor does it challenge its function in the scientific quest for cognitive
hegemony – such approaches would not address the basic problems and
assumptions that underlie the key explanatory categories of modernity
(modern/traditional knowledge, public/private sphere, etc.) (Bhambra,
2011). The challenge is not to recognize the difference of Shapin and Schaff-
er’s genuine, ignorant stranger but to question his unrivalled status and func-
tion as an oppositional referent to sustain the imaginary geographies of iden-
tity and coherence in modern science.
Viewed through Trouillot’s lens on Elsewhere, the field of STS does not
much resemble the heterogeneous, multi-sited, diverse interdisciplinary field
it has been promoted as. Rather it appears as a homogeneous, concerted re-
inscription of the assumptions and binary categories that underlie the grand
narrative of modernity. As in other fields in the social sciences and human-
ities, STS has built its academic identity by casting its object of study in rela-
tion to the concept of modernity, a now contested concept. Its contested sta-
tus requires fresh perspectives that are able to ask new questions. The
Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere posits the need for a cognitive shift
in perspective on modernity as the imaginary frame against which STS has
legitimized its subject. It seeks to move the analytical focus of STS to study-
ing and contesting the strategies that have successfully established claims on
modern science and knowledge.
But why should STS perform this move? On what grounds would it be
sensible to compromise STS’s present course, given its relative success in the
past? Why should a seemingly abstract expression such as Science & Tech-
nology Studies Elsewhere be taken seriously? This chapter argues in favour
of undertaking research on Science & Technology Studies Elsewhere as an
exercise in addressing Elzinga’s ‘paradox’ (1997) and Guggenheim and No-
wotny’s (2003) ‘collective Blind Spot’ of STS, respectively. Anderson’s (2007)
vision of re-charting the map of STS for the twenty-first century cannot
commence as long as STS eclipses its collective Blind Spot.
However, a plain collage of STS’s genealogy against its specific Western
European and North American social, political and cultural context will not
assist in better understanding STS’s specific conditioning nor will it do away
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with the collective Blind Spot. The formative context for STS was given not
only by the sum of the internal social, political and cultural specificities of
North America and Western Europe, but also by the conceptual confines of
the assumptions that underlie the grand narrative of modernity. These
assumptions rely on imaginary geographies that produce a space for the Oth-
er, Elsewhere. The travels of STS to other countries, as envisioned by Ander-
son in the Introduction, appear as a rehearsal of Chakrabarty’s ‘first in
Europe, then elsewhere’ (Chakrabarty, 2008 [2000]: 7) structure of global
historical science. This transition narrative recreates the binary categories of
thinking about the modern world: modern/traditional, public/private and
Western/non-Western. It situates the North American and Western Euro-
pean STS scholar at the very end of history and consigns the (imagined) Rest
to Chakrabarty’s Imaginary Waiting Room of history (Chakrabarty, 2008
[2000]).
Corbey and Leerssen claimed that there are various ways in which Oth-
erness can be portrayed and that the use of cultural alterity ‘[…] does not by
definition imply a denigration of the Other’ (Corbey & Leerssen, 1991b: vii).
Science & Technology Studies Elsewhere provides an analytical terrain for
seeking such alternative ways of casting knowledge claims. Perhaps the Else-
where of modern science is more easily discerned by the inhabitants of the
(at times imaginary) spaces it has produced, such as that of Shapin and
Schaffer’s genuine, ignorant stranger to experimental culture.
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6. The Revolving Door of STS
The Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere was developed with reference
to two specific books that were written in the mid-1980s, and its central
tenets were articulated in relation to a particular intellectual tradition that
shaped STS at the time. It remains to be shown that the Programme’s tenets
are relevant to subsequent STS scholarship. For this purpose, this chapter
consults a third well-known STS book, Bruno Latour’s celebrated treatise We
Have Never Been Modern (1993). This book qualifies as a suitable candidate
because it refers to both Shapin and Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump
and Hughes’ Networks of Power. Latour is viewed by many as having been
‘the dominant influence within the field of STS’ (Martin et al., 2012: 10). His
work, together with that of Michel Callon and John Law, among others, has
contributed to the development of Actor Network Theory (ANT), a strand of
STS that has been extremely successful. When STS travels to global places
outside of the North Atlantic, Latour’s book will most likely be part of its
baggage.
In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour presents his model of moderni-
ty. His point of departure for this project is Shapin and Schaffer’s Leviathan
and the Air-Pump. Latour also refers to Hughes’ study on electrification and
uses the metaphor of the seamless web and the notion of the network. For
this reason, Latour’s book provides an opportunity to trace the findings of
our two paradigmatic STS case studies in subsequent STS scholarship.
The chapter will show that Latour follows in Shapin and Schaffer’s ana-
lytical footsteps in playing the ignorant stranger to modern culture. There-
fore, just as Shapin and Schaffer’s stranger to experimental culture replicated
the alterities of modern science, Latour’s model of modernity evokes an Else-
where, a space for the Other – despite his assertions to the contrary. Fur-
thermore, the discussion will demonstrate that Latour deployed a modified
version of Hughes’ metaphor of the seamless web to erase conceptual
boundaries between nature and culture, and between humans and nonhu-
mans. However, even though he ascribes to the seamless web several orderly
and appeasing properties, his book retains the assumptions that underlie the
original metaphor. In this way, just like Hughes, Latour engenders a Savage
Slot and configures (imaginary) people outside his scope of analysis.
Latour’s example demonstrates that Elsewhere and Seamlessness can be
traced in STS scholarship subsequent to Hughes’, and Shapin and Schaffer’s
books. To consider the implications of their persistence in STS’s body of
knowledge the chapter reflects on their effect on the STS novice who is keen
to become part of the STS community.
6.1 Latour’s Natureculture
Latour’s Elsewhere: Playing the Stranger
Shapin and Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump is the centrepiece of
Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern (1993). Latour builds his argument,
hypotheses, and conclusions upon Shapin and Schaffer’s study and the classic
debate between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes. In his view, Boyle and
Hobbes were ‘arguing over the distribution of scientific and political power’
and in the process invented our modern world (Latour, 1993).258 The mod-
ern world is defined by the modern Constitution (with a capital C). Latour
considers the debate between ‘the natural philosopher’ Robert Boyle and ‘the
political philosopher’ Thomas Hobbes in the middle of the seventeenth cen-
tury as ‘an exemplary situation that arose at the very beginning’ of the draft-
ing of this modern Constitution (Latour, 993: 15). This backdrop sets the
scene for Latour’s key argument: that the modern Constitution has to be
revised.
To solve the modern dilemma that followed from Boyle and Hobbes’s
invention, Latour intends to define a ‘new anthropology’ (Latour, 1993:
17) and a new, ‘complete Constitution’ (Latour, 1993: 29). The new
258 In this world, ‘the representation of things through the intermediary of the laborato-
ry is forever dissociated from the representation of citizens through the intermediary of
the social contract’ (Latour, 1993: 27).
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anthropology can be developed by using the ‘ideal laboratory material’
provided by the ‘disagreements’ between Boyle and Hobbes (Latour, 1993:
17). In turn, the revised Constitution can be accomplished by ‘[generaliz-
ing] the results achieved by Shapin and Schaffer’ (Latour, 1993: 30).
Latour begins his book by citing instances from an imaginary news-
paper, in which he identifies elements of the ‘modern paradox’. The modern
paradox has to do with the division between nature and culture, an arrange-
ment that is subjected to constant efforts to keep these spheres apart and to
tie them together.259 Furthermore, the modern Constitution ‘believes in the
total separation of humans and nonhumans’ but ‘simultaneously cancels out
this separation’. These opposing properties ‘made the moderns invincible’
(Latour, 1993: 28). Latour introduces terms such as ‘purification’ and ‘trans-
lation’, ‘networks’, ‘hybrids’ and ‘quasi-objects’ to capture the dynamics that
lie beyond this artificial division. Finally, based on his discussion of Shapin
and Shaffer’s book, Latour proposes a ‘Parliament of Things’ as a solution to
the division of powers that was imposed by the modern Constitution.
Latour’s expressions have been exceptionally successful in the field of STS
and continue to be widely applied in STS research and teaching.
Shapin and Schaffer’s celebrated conclusion of Leviathan and the Air-
Pump – that ‘solutions to the problem of knowledge are solutions to the
problem of social order’ (Shapin & Schaffer, 2011 [1985]: 332) – provided
Latour with an excellent starting point for devising his model of modernity.
This conclusion had established in the STS community the power of the
259 ‘Here lies the entire modern paradox. If we consider hybrids, we are dealing only
with mixtures of nature and culture; if we consider the work of purification, we confront
a total separation between nature and culture. It is the relation between these two tasks
that I am seeking to understand. While both Boyle and Hobbes are meddling in politics
and religion and technology and morality and science and law, they are also dividing up
the tasks to the extent that the one restricts himself to the science of things and the other
to the politics of men. What is the intimate relation between their two movements? Is
purification necessary to allow for proliferation? Must there be hundreds of hybrids in
order for a simply human politics and simply natural things to exist? Is an absolute
distinction required between the two movements in order for both to remain effective?
How can the power of this arrangement be explained? What, then, is the secret of the
modern world?’ (Latour, 1993: 29).
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symmetry principle of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) for the
historical passage to modernity. From this vantage point, Latour was able to
put forward the assertion that the two equal opponents, Boyle and Hobbes,
invented the first ‘Great Divide’ between things and humans and the second
‘Great Divide’ between moderns and premoderns.260 They also invented the
modern Constitution that separates scientific and political power to repre-
sent things and subjects, respectively (Latour, 1993: 28). Latour sets out to
deconstruct these two Great Divides.
However, Latour’s use of Shapin and Schaffer’s study alone does not suf-
fice to demonstrate that he continues their replication of the alterities of
modern science. After all, Latour criticizes their book at great length. Fur-
thermore, Latour advocates symmetry: symmetry between nature and cul-
ture, symmetry with respect to ‘Westerners’ and ‘Others’, symmetry between
‘Us’ and ‘Them’, symmetry in anthropology ‘at home’ and in ‘the tropics’.
Indeed, Latour sets out to erase precisely these boundaries and tells us that,
in reality, there is no distinction between nature and culture, between Us and
Them, no ‘Westerners’ and ‘Others’, there is no modern or premodern.
Therefore, how is it possible for Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern to
replicate the alterities of modern science that were traced in Shapin and
Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump?
The answer may be found in Latour’s methodology. Latour dismisses the
categories of the moderns and the premoderns and invokes a third position
that allows him to contemplate both of these categories. This view from the
outside corresponds to Shapin and Schaffer’s method of playing the stranger
to modern culture. This approach assumes that ‘playing’ the stranger con-
figures an outside view from nowhere. Yet the actor of Latour’s third position
is, in reality, modern, and not premodern. He or she retains their cultural
heritage with Boyle and Hobbes. Latour’s use of personal pronouns reveals
this predicament.
Latour sometimes speaks about ‘our modern world’ in contrast to the
premodern world of the others. At other times, Latour dissociates his own
260 ‘The internal partition between humans and nonhumans defines a second partition
– an external one this time – through which the moderns have set themselves apart from
the premoderns’ (Latour, 1993: 99).
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person from the moderns. For example, he laments that ‘the price the mod-
erns paid for this freedom […] was that they remained unable to conceptu-
alize themselves in continuity with the premoderns. They had to think of
themselves as absolutely different, they had to invent the Great Divide’
(Latour, 1993: 39). Latour’s position is variable: sometimes he belongs to the
moderns, sometimes he does not; but this position is also selective. On no
occasion does he position himself with the premoderns. He always refers to
‘other nature cultures’ (Latour, 1993: 11) or ‘other culture-natures’ (Latour,
1993: 38) as premoderns and always uses the personal pronoun ‘them’.
Latour concludes that ‘we are no longer entirely modern’ but that ‘we are not
premodern either’ (Latour, 1993: 127).
Nevertheless, Latour’s solution is not to return to the ‘natureculture’
state of the premoderns: ‘we do not wish to become premoderns all over
again’ (Latour, 1993: 140). Latour’s solution to the modern paradox is to
amend the Constitution and to constitute a Parliament of Things. However,
interestingly, this solution does not abandon the modern but rather calls for
a ratification of ‘what we have always done’:
However, we do not have to create this Parliament out of whole cloth, by calling for
yet another revolution. We simply have to ratify what we have always done, pro-
vided that we reconsider our past, provided that we understand retrospectively to
what extent we have never been modern, and provided that we rejoin the two halves
of the symbol broken by Hobbes and Boyle as a sign of recognition. Half of our
politics is constructed in science and technology. The other half of Nature is con-
structed in societies. Let us patch the two back together, and the political task can
begin again (Latour, 1993: 144).
In other words, the new Constitution and the Parliament of Things require
that the model dividing nature from culture, the modern from the pre-
modern, as well as the new entities Latour has placed into these divides, be
retained. The solution is to come to terms with these new concepts, to
change their focus and dynamics. Once again, the question is, who is Latour
speaking about when he uses the personal pronoun ‘we’? Who will ‘ratify
what we have always done’? The following section offers some indications
about these agents.
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In this desire to bring to light, to incorporate into language, to make public, we
continue to identify with the intuition of the Enlightenment. But this intuition has
never had the anthropology it deserved. It has divided up the human and the non-
human and believed that the others, rendered premoderns by contrast, were not
supposed to do the same thing. […] We have been modern. Very well. We can no
longer be modern in the same way. When we amend the Constitution […] (Latour,
1993: 142, my emphasis).
After he has eliminated the categories of the modern and the premodern,
Latour bizarrely returns to retain a worthy kernel of the moderns. He sepa-
rates out a particular element of modern identity, ‘the intuition of the
Enlightenment’, which was in principle correct, but unfortunately was served
by a faulty anthropology. The crucial issue in Latour’s confusing use of ‘us’
and ‘them’ concerns to whom Latour assigns agency for change. Who will
amend the Constitution and constitute the Parliament of Things? Who con-
tinues ‘to identify with the intuition of the Enlightenment’?
Latour assigns agency for change to those who ‘have been modern’.
They are his audience. Latour does not speak to the Others, the ones who
have not inherited the repertoire of Hobbes and Boyle’s legacy, as revealed in
the following quote:
The task of our predecessors was no less daunting when they invented rights to give
to citizens or the integration of workers into the fabric of our societies. […] It is up
to us to change our ways of changing (Latour, 1993: 145).
Latour’s and the readers’ predecessors are Hobbes and Boyle; their prede-
cessors are heirs to the separation of nature and culture. By this very dis-
tinction, Latour’s audiences are successors to the moderns. His third position
retains a common heritage with Hobbes and Boyle. Just like Shapin and
Schaffer, he views the seventeenth-century ideas of Boyle and Hobbes as the
beginnings of the cultural heritage of modern science. He depicts Hobbes
(‘and his disciples’) and Boyle (‘and his successors’) as inventors of the
‘major repertoires’ of words used by the moderns (Latour, 1993: 25). These
repertoires include words such as ‘representation, sovereign, contract, prop-
erty, citizens’ (Hobbes) and ‘experiment, fact, evidence, colleagues’ (Boyle)
(Latour, 1993: 24–5). Moreover, Latour views Boyle and Hobbes as resem-
bling ‘a pair of Founding Fathers’ to the new Constitution (Latour, 1993: 28)
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which ‘invents a separation between the scientific power charged with repre-
senting things and the political power charged with representing subjects’
(Latour, 1993: 29).
Latour’s third position only becomes effective by contrasting his cultural
heritage against others, who do not form part of the cultural heritage of
Hobbes and Boyle. As the study by Shapin and Schaffer has shown, this posi-
tion does not do away with the construction of alterities, on the contrary.
The acting stranger also configures the category of the ‘ignorant stranger’.
The true stranger is ignorant, while the acted stranger is knowledgeable by
virtue of his cultural association with the moderns; he is only ‘playing’ the
stranger.
No matter how elusive Latour’s position appears with regard to the
‘moderns’ and the ‘premoderns’, his analytical stance abides by the cultural
heritage of Boyle and Hobbes. Even if Latour asserts that categories such as
moderns and the nonmoderns, and ‘Westerners’ and ‘Others’ have become
redundant, his own affiliation with the cultural heritage of Hobbes and Boyle
invokes an alterity. Latour’s text advocates a new ‘symmetrical anthropology’
to overcome the opposing categories of ‘Westerners’ and ‘Others’ (Latour,
1993: 104). However, his text in fact re-inscribes these categories, replicating
the alterities that have constituted modern science, despite his verbatim
assurances to the contrary. Latour assumes a symmetrical style of explan-
ation to approximate a neutral analytical position by playing the stranger to
modern culture. This ideal neutral view from nowhere to deconstruct science
re-inscribes the binary categories that it sets out to eliminate.
Furthermore, Latour adheres to the transition narrative that structures
historical time as emanating from Europe. He follows a specific chronology
of events to recount the genesis of the two Great Divides. The moderns were
created by the first, the Internal Great Divide between nature and culture. In
turn, this divide produced the second, the External Great Divide between the
moderns and the premoderns.261 The moderns came first. This chronology is
261 ‘So the Internal Great Divide accounts for the External Great Divide’ (Latour, 1993:
99) and ‘[i]n order to understand the Great Divide between Us and Them, we have to go
back to that other Great Divide between humans and nonhumans that I defined above’
(Latour, 1993: 97).
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faulty; premoderns were not invented after the moderns.262 The two ideas
presupposed each other and therefore were conceived in tandem. Just like
Shapin and Schaffer, Latour overlooks the point that the ‘premodern’was not
a consequence of modernity, but that the construction of alterity was con-
stitutive of the very idea of modernity. His transition narrative has con-
sequences for the travels of STS.
Latour’s Seamlessness: More of the ‘Savage Slot’
In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour also applies concepts that Hughes
had introduced in his systems model of technological change. In particular,
Latour makes extensive use of the metaphor of the seamless web and the
notion of the network. On occasion, Latour’s text refers to Hughes’ work on
electrification but he does not acknowledge any intellectual inheritance from
Hughes. Instead, Latour presents his own version of the seamless web and
the network as components of his own model. Nevertheless, the connection
between his book and Hughes’ concepts is easily verified. Latour uses the
word ‘network’ in conjunction with the metaphor of the seamless web. There
is no dispute about the intellectual origins of this metaphor in STS. Hughes
introduced the seamless web in conjunction with his systems or network
approach. The association between the network and the seamless web estab-
lishes the intellectual lineage between Latour and Hughes. For this reason,
the book provides an excellent example to probe manifestations of Seamless-
ness in STS.
Latour employs the metaphor of the seamless web to characterize ‘the
fabric’ of the moderns (Latour, 1993: 7). The moderns have created the ana-
lytic distinction between nature and culture. Beyond this division, Latour
262 ‘Century after century, colonial empire after colonial empire, the poor premodern
collectives were accused of making a horrible mishmash of things and humans, of objects
and signs, while their accusers finally separated them totally – to remix them at once on a
scale unknown until now […]. As the moderns also extended this Great Divide in time
after extending it in space, they felt themselves absolutely free to give up following the
ridiculous constraints of their past which required them to take into account the delicate
web of relations between things and people’ (Latour, 1993: 39).
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recognizes ‘the seamless fabric’ of what he calls ‘nature-culture’ (Latour,
1993: 7). Analytic continuity, in his view, is only possible when this fabric is
seamless. To return to this ideal state of the seamless fabric of nature-culture,
he proposes writing a new Constitution. He assigns this task to the anthro-
pologists, since they are ‘accustomed […] to dealing calmly and straightfor-
wardly’ with this seamless fabric (Latour, 1993: 7). Unfortunately, however,
the anthropologists are only able to deliver this analytic continuity when they
‘[go] off to the tropics to study others’ abroad and not ‘at home’ (Latour,
1993: 7).263
As noted above, Latour does not declare his intellectual debt to Hughes
but accords the network a different meaning and employs the seamless web
metaphor for a different purpose. Why did Latour choose these notions only
to change their original meaning and purpose in his model? What is their
function in his text? The discussion below will show that Latour used these
notions because they imply Seamlessness.
The metaphor of the seamless web structures Latour’s imaginary geog-
raphy of modernity. He views the modern condition as a configuration of
concepts that has been imposed onto the seamless fabric of nature-culture. In
this model, the seamless fabric of nature-culture is the tabula rasa, the default
condition freed of linguistic concepts. The new Constitution is needed to
navigate this tabula rasa in new ways that transgress the binary categories of
modernity, such as the moderns and premoderns. Latour introduces a num-
ber of new concepts that aim at re-establishing analytic continuity. His
notion of the network provides the topology for this navigation.
If the argument of this study is correct, we need to demonstrate that in
Latour’s book the utopian orderliness implied by the seamless web engenders
the distinction between the Here and the Elsewhere. In other words, we have
to show that Latour’s use of the seamless web and the network engenders
Trouillot’s ‘Savage Slot’ and banishes this category from historical writing.
263 ‘Send her off to study the Arapesh or the Achuar, the Koreans or the Chinese, and
you will get a single narrative that weaves together the way people regard the heavens and
their ancestors, the way they build houses and the way they grow yams or manioc or rice,
the way they construct their government and their cosmology. In works produced by
anthropologists abroad, you will not find a single trait that is not simultaneously real,
social and narrated’ (Latour, 1993: 7).
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Latour’s semantics are notoriously elusive and difficult to pin down. He does
not define the network. He hints at the meaning of this word by using it in
relation to other elements or properties of his model. However, these refer-
ences are also vague, as the examples below illustrate. For instance, Latour
sees the modern world as constituted by networks264 but at the same time
describes these networks as ‘more invisible than spiderwebs’ (Latour,
1993:4). Furthermore, beyond the network, there is nothing.
Between the lines of the network there is, strictly speaking, nothing at all : no train,
no telephone, no intake pipe, no television set. Technological networks, as the name
indicates, are nets thrown over spaces, and they retain only a few scattered elements
of those spaces. They are connected lines, not surfaces. They are by no means com-
prehensive, global or systematic, even though they embrace surfaces without cover-
ing them, and extend a very long way (Latour, 1993: 118).
Nonetheless, networks constitute the most important components of Latour’s
model, since they ‘weave our world’ (Latour, 1993: 8), and are ‘full of Being’
(Latour 1993: 66).265 Networks provide explanations (‘What reason compli-
cates, networks explicate’ (Latour, 1993: 104)), and guide us through the
labyrinths of modernity. Latour conjures Greek mythology to emphasize the
significance of networks.
More supple than the notion of system, more historical than the notion of structure,
more empirical than the notion of complexity, the idea of network is the Ariadne’s
thread of these interwoven stories (Latour, 1993: 3).
For Latour, Ariadne’s thread corresponds to the thread of his networks. This
thread weaves the seamless web. It has the power to confer continuity
between the local and the global, between the human and the nonhuman.
264 ‘Seen as networks, however, the modern world, like revolutions, permits scarcely
anything more than small extensions of practices, slight accelerations in the circulation of
knowledge, a tiny extension of societies, minuscule increases in the number of actors,
small modifications of old beliefs’ (Latour, 1993: 48).
265 ‘Look around you: scientific objects are circulating simultaneously as subjects,
objects and discourse. Networks are full of Being’ (Latour, 1993: 66).
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Yet there is an Ariadne’s thread that would allow us to pass with continuity from the
local to the global, from the human to the nonhuman. It is the thread of networks of
practices and instruments, of documents and translations (Latour, 1993: 121).
Ariadne’s thread also carries symbolic power. Not only does it confer ana-
lytical continuity, it also has the ability to solve problems; it guides the way
out of the labyrinth. With its assistance, Latour proposes his solution to the
question of the ‘universality of science’, one of the central challenges to rela-
tivist analyses of science and technology: How does science reach ‘every-
where’? How does it become universal? (Latour, 1993: 24). Once more,
Latour’s solution is formulated in terms of networks: science reaches every-
where because ‘the network of science is extended and stabilized’ (Latour,
1993: 24).266 Latour also uses the network to frame his argument for the
need for a symmetrical anthropology: ‘comparative anthropology becomes
possible when networks receive ‘a place of their own’ (Latour, 1993:10).
Finally, networks also figure in Latour’s proposal to revise the modern
Constitution.
Networks are ubiquitous in Latour’s book. What purpose do they serve?
How is it possible for Latour to develop a model around a notion so vaguely
defined? Why does he use this term in conjunction with the seamless web?
Latour strategically applies the network in conjunction with the seamless web
to invoke the power of Seamlessness, which results from the elimination of
analytical categories. It has a positive connotation, because it stages the
removal of categories as a progressive intellectual act. Seamlessness projects
clarity and orderliness; it implies the absence of errors and interruptions.
Seamlessness assures continuity in time and space; it insinuates a condition
of perfection. Simultaneously, the seamless web depicts a new kind of fabric,
a conceptual tabula rasa. Conversely, its archetypal fabric configures Latour’s
analytical position outside of the framework of conventional categories.
However, this archetypal state can only be discerned by the observer who has
266 ‘No science can exit from the network of its practice. The weight of air is indeed
always a universal, but a universal in a network. Owing to the extension of this network,
competences and equipment can become sufficiently routine for production of the vacu-
um to become as invisible as the air we breathe; but universal in the old sense? Never.’
(Latour, 1993: 24).
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transgressed the dichotomies of modernity by playing stranger to its cultural
heritage. In other words, Latour uses the metaphor of the seamless web and
the notion of the network as analytical strategy. However, the metaphor of
the utopian seamless web engenders the Savage Slot. In turn, this residual
category re-inscribes the very alterities Latour claims to have erased.
Latour’s strategy has proven to be extraordinarily successful in STS. His
book is widely cited in the STS community and his concepts and model are
employed in empirical research. They have become an integral part of the
intellectual identity of STS. When STS travels outside of the geographical
region of the North Atlantic, these concepts and models form part of the
intellectual baggage.
6.2 The Imaginary Waiting Room of STS
Latour’s book We Have Never Been Modern illustrates that the notions of
Elsewhere and Seamlessness can be traced in subsequent STS scholarship.
They are carried along silently in STS’s body of mainstream literature, con-
cepts, and approaches. Of interest to this study, however, are the implica-
tions of Elsewhere and Seamlessness on the STS novice, who is learning the
trade of STS somewhere outside Europe and North America.
The STS novice reading We Have Never Been Modern outside the North
Atlantic is likely to be confused by Latour’s use of personal pronouns. Which
personal pronouns would this reader identify with? Latour’s book is written
for his community of STS scholars. By the mere act of reading Latour’s book,
the novice will be initiated into the customs and practices of STS. Latour’s
use of personal pronouns makes it clear that his book is addressed to the
heirs of Boyle and Hobbes’s cultural heritage; it is an exercise for them to
play the stranger to the moderns. By implication, to become a member of the
STS community, the novice will first have to appropriate this cultural herit-
age before being able to play the stranger. This silent rite of passage into STS
is an implication of STS’s Collective Blind Spot, which appears more pro-
nounced when STS travels outside the North Atlantic, where Latour’s per-
sonal pronouns are not self-evident.
The silent rite of passage leads the STS novice out of the Imaginary
Waiting Room of history and into the STS community. This is possible
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because the Waiting Room is a conceptual space and not a geographical
place. Its residents are imaginary constructs. The rite of passage into STS is
determined by an intellectual topology and not by geographical regions. In
other words, the residents of the Imaginary Waiting Room of history do not
necessarily represent particular geographical regions, but form part of an
imagined space. Scholars outside this geographical region of the North
Atlantic are able to leave the Imaginary Waiting Room and enter the com-
munity of STS. Indeed, this study started by pointing out that the STS com-
munity outside of Europe and the North Atlantic has been growing. How-
ever, the rite of passage is more difficult to complete outside of the
geographical regions of the North Atlantic, because novices are likely to be
confused by Latour’s use of personal pronouns.
To qualify as a member of the STS community, the novice will need to
adopt the cultural heritage of Hobbes and Boyle. Latour’s book will also teach
the novice how to play the stranger to this culture. The novice will also be
trained to apply the metaphor of the seamless web to instate clarity and
orderliness by eliminating categories. Indeed, Latour’s book reads as a map to
navigate the rite of passage through the revolving door into STS. However,
the STS novice is likely to be unaware that this particular revolving door
leads through the passageway of the North Atlantic (Trouillot, 2003). Here,
at this junction, the transition narrative of world history is conceived that
situates the modern individual at the very end of history (Chakrabarty,
1992). The revolving door stages Europe as the single centre ‘in reference to
which all other regions are to be located; and an understanding of history in
which there is only one unfolding of time, the history of the West, in refer-
ence to which all other histories must establish their significance and receive
their meaning’ (Mitchell, 2000: 7).
After having read the first few pages of We Have Never Been Modern,
the STS novice is likely to wonder which newspaper Latour is quoting from:
is it a French newspaper? What if the newspaper were written somewhere
else, in a different language, for example, in Zulu or Telugu? What problems
would Latour discern in these newspapers? How would they compare with
the problems Latour quotes at the beginning of his book, the problems he
has set out to solve?
These questions may be rephrased by returning to the mental picture at
the beginning of this study. What would Latour see from the ‘Top of Africa’
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skyscraper in Johannesburg, through his scholarly spectacles with lenses fit-
ted for his study of modernity? This study suggests that a blind spot has
settled on Latour’s spectacles. Will he discern a seamless web in the City of
Gold? Will he identify the inheritors of the cultural legacy of Hobbes and
Boyle, heirs to these Founding Fathers? If not, what otherwise?
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7. The March for Science, and STS
7.1 Times of crisis
The March for Science on 22 April 2017 has been portrayed as emblematic
for the contemporary crisis in the relationship between science and society.
Prominent historians of science have adjudicated the event as unprece-
dented. The participating scientists and protestors demonstrated to restore
trust in science and expertise, to defend the freedom of science, and to
demand that scientific facts be distinguished from untruths. Although these
topics fall squarely within the scope of STS, this scholarly community has
not taken a public stand on the event.
Three years down the road, the aspirations of the organizers of the
March for Science in 2017 to activate a longer-lasting movement have not
been fulfilled, if the declining number of participants at the Marches for Sci-
ence in 2018 and 2019 is any measure to go by. The public debate on issues
that drove demonstrators to the streets at the March for Science in 2017,
however, has intensified and is increasingly associated with political develop-
ments in Western Europe and North America. The decline of public trust in
science, scientific authority and expertise are regarded as enabling features of
the rise in conservative populism, white supremacy and attacks on interna-
tional geopolitical institutions and alliances such as the United Nations and
the European Union.
The March for Science has not received attention in STS, but STS schol-
ars have debated the broader issues of the decline of trust in science and the
rise of ‘post-truth’ politics. In 2017, the distinguished STS journal Social
Studies of Science published a series of conversations on these issues. The
conversations were prompted by questions about STS’s own implication in
these issues. STS was essentially ‘blamed for contributing to the decline in
trust, by painting a picture in which all facts become claims and all claims
are seen as merely political’ (Jasanoff & Simmet, 2017: 752). The debate in
STS, accordingly, centred around the question of STS’s own complicity in
disenchanting science and enabling ‘post-truth’ politics.
One of the articles in this conversation refers to the slogans used at the
March for Science in 2017 – ‘science is real’, ‘reality is not up for debate’ – to
take a stand on this question. The authors consider the simple framing of
‘post-truth’ politics to be flawed and favour a more differentiated picture in
which knowledge and norms are co-produced in political contexts. Accord-
ingly, they argue that scientists need to actively engage their scientific views
with competing political positions (Jasanoff & Simmet, 2017: 763).
To say that facts speak for themselves is to live in a ‘post-value’ world that ignores
contention and questioning as the very stuff of a democracy that has always con-
nected public facts with public values. Reality, indeed, should be up for debate, if
that debate is about whose reality counts and by what measures. Avoiding negotia-
tion between facts and values will only result in the blind subjugation of some values
over others, with those whose values are left out rejecting the other side’s ‘truth’ as
merely politics by another name (Jasanoff & Simmet, 2017: 763).
The example shows that the debate in STS on the contemporary decline of
public trust in science and ‘post-truth’ politics pertains directly to the March
for Science. The general terms of the debate, therefore, are of interest to the
questions raised about the March for Science at the beginning of this book:
What was this demonstration about? Why did these scientists take to the
streets rather than use conventional channels of science advocacy? And why
did the event take place in 2017? What lies behind this apparent loss of con-
fidence? Why is scientific knowledge seen to be losing authority?
The recent discussion in Social Studies of Science on STS’s own liability
in the decline of public trust and ‘post-truth’ politics essentially focused on
the symmetry principle and the Strong Programme in SSK. The ‘logic of
symmetry, and the democratizing of science it spawned’ are held responsible
for inviting ‘the scepticism about experts and other elites that now dominates
political debate in the US and elsewhere’ (Collins et al., 2017: 580). Although
symmetry is treated as a contested concept in the debate, in general terms it
is employed as proxy for the co-construction of knowledge and social order
and as marker for the social and political impact on science and expertise.
Bloor’s symmetry principle and the Strong Programme in SSK are attributed
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a central role in the history of STS because they are considered as part of the
revolution that ‘cracked the pure crystal of science’ (Collins et al., 2017: 581):
Before SSK it was always and only scientific work that was needed to make scientific
truth; after SSK what was once seen as the socially sterilised work of experiment and
observation became hard to distinguish from political work. By revealing the con-
tinuities between science and politics, science studies opened up the cognitive ter-
rain to those concerned to enhance the impact of democratic politics on science but,
in so doing, it opened that terrain for all forms of politics, including populism and
that of the radical right wing (Collins et al., 2017: 581).
Some authors affirm STS’s position as agent engaged in the process of co-
construction of science and politics, and indeed consider this form of
engagement a requirement for democratic life (Jasanoff & Simmet, 2017).
Another position is to refute any inherent political motive of STS, and assert
that STS is ‘an academic/scientific discipline aimed at understanding the
nature of knowledge’ rather than a ‘political movement for promoting
democracy’ (Collins et al., 2017: 584). Others ward off difficulties for STS by
referencing semantic inaccuracies in the historical use of the term symmetry
(Lynch, 2017) or insist on the distinction between scientific and non-scien-
tific knowledge for the body of work of STS (Sismondo, 2017: 589). The
problem at hand, however, the decline in trust in science and rise of post-
truth politics, is not debated per se. Instead, STS stops short at discussing its
own role in these trends.
The differing positions in the debate, however, agree on the high stakes
involved and the gravity of the situation. Fuller reminds the STS community
that ‘symmetry [applies] not only to the range of objects studied but also the
range of agents studying them’ (Fuller, 2016), implying that STS’s own
expertise is on trial in the crisis of science and post-truth politics. Collins et
al., too, contend that if ‘STS cannot find a better way to say why science
matters, then STS will be intellectually bankrupt’ (Collins et al., 2017: 584).
To address this predicament of STS, Collins et al., for example, propose that
STS ‘find a way to justify expertise in general and scientific expertise in par-
ticular’ and recommend ‘the Studies of Expertise and Experience (SSE), the
third wave and elective modernism as programmes to address this dilemma
in STS’ (Collins et al., 2017: 584). Sismondo advises to build on the
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achievements of STS and to continue to show how epistemic authority is
established and employed (Sismondo, 2017: 589).
The debate clarifies positions but offers no answers to the questions
raised about the March for Science and to the resolution of STS’s dilemma.
In the halls of academia, STS continues to claim a position of unique and
objective expertise with regard to matters concerning science, technology and
society. At the same time, its own intellectual programme rejects the ideal
dissociation from political influences for other areas of science. The symme-
try principle and the Strong Programme in SSK, which in many ways paved
the way to the establishment of STS as an interdisciplinary academic field in
its own right in the 1980s, now threatens to undermine this field’s very legiti-
macy in the ‘post-truth’ era. Of interest here is the resurgence of the symme-
try principle and the Strong Programme in SSK in connection with the
debate on STS’s intellectual and analytical exclusivity.
The recent debate in STS on questions about the connection between
‘symmetry’ in Science and Technology Studies (STS) and ‘post-truth’ politics
is relevant to the concerns that drove scientists to participate in the March
for Science. The debate links the interpretation of the March for Science to
the symmetry principle in STS and to the Strong Programme in the SSK. In a
sense, the scientists’ slogans may be read as an attempt to refute Bloor’s con-
tentions: they rebut the causal effect of external influences on science; they
reject an impartial perspective on truth and falsity, and on rationality or irra-
tionality; and they defend the need for asymmetrical explanations for true
and false beliefs.
The debate in STS is also relevant to the March for Science when con-
sidering the question of why this academic community did not seize upon
the historical event to offer its expertise. The silence could be explained by
STS’s predicament: on the one hand, the STS scholar may be tempted to side
with the scientists and experts of the March for Science to insist on standards
that separate his or her own scientific work from non-scientific opinions. On
the other hand, the STS researcher is unable to relinquish the symmetry
principle and the Strong Programme in SSK, because they are hallmarks of
STS’s intellectual history and confer academic authority and identity on its
community.
STS’s conversation on the decline of public trust in science and ‘post-
truth’ politics suggests that the terms of this debate remain confined to the
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conceptual boundaries of the Strong Programme in SSK. This book argues
that postcolonial perspectives offer a path out of this stalemate situation and
can shift the terms of the debate on the crisis of science and society beyond
these boundaries. A brief postcolonial perspective on the March for Science
is offered below to showcase this move.
7.2 A postcolonial perspective on the March for Science
Perhaps the most inspiring aspect of the March for Science, and what
may prove to be its most enduring legacy, is its truly global nature. Sci-
ence is not western; it is everywhere and for everyone.
Mark Lynas, The Guardian, 18 April 2017.
The March for Science originated in communications on Reddit, a social
media site self-described as the ‘front page of the internet’, according to its
organizers. The early idea was for scientists to demonstrate in Washington
D.C., the centre of political power in the US. The proposal quickly spread
through social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, prompting
others to organize local marches. An internet website was created to link
local marches within and across countries to mobilize for the event. In this
narrative, the March for Science simply spread randomly and democratically
by way of the internet and quickly achieved global status by virtue of its geo-
graphic distribution in more than five hundred cities.
The postcolonial perspective warrants closer examination of the global
claims in the narrative of the March for Science. It calls for a more detailed
appraisal of the geographical distribution of the Marches for Science, of the
affiliations of their organizers, of the procedures involved in disseminating
the idea, and of the particular images of science that were endorsed by the
event. Even a quick look at these issues is sufficient to demonstrate the value
of the postcolonial perspective.
The geographical distribution of the Marches for Science in over five
hundred cities was highly concentrated in Western Europe and North Amer-
ica (see Figure 1). For example, a total of nineteen marches were organized
in Germany, but only one single march each took place in all of Russia, India
and China. No marches occurred in Northern African countries and the
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Middle East. On the other hand, marches were carried out in Uganda, Niger-
ia and Ghana. How can this skewed distribution be explained? And in what
sense does it support the claim for a global scope of the March for Science?
At first glance, the researcher might be tempted to suggest that the pat-
tern of distribution of the Marches for Science follows the global distribution
of scientific proficiency and expertise more generally. The clustering of
marches in North America and Western Europe, in this view, might be seen
to express a broader global knowledge divide between developed countries
on the one side, and developing and emerging countries on the other side. In
this picture, the global distribution of marches could be explained in the
terms of Bloor’s tenets, which would attribute different beliefs or states of
knowledge to the geographic locations on both sides of this divide. To inves-
tigate the divide, the researcher could study its formative causal conditions
using the same types of cause to explain true and false beliefs, science and
non-science, knowledge and non-knowledge. In the end, an impartial and
symmetrical style of explanation could be given in the different claims for
knowledge on either side of the divide (Bloor, 1991 [1976]).
At second glance, however, the pattern of distribution of the Marches
for Science in 2017 turns out to be more complex, and escapes the explanato-
ry power of Bloor’s tenets. It does not accord with the patterns of global sci-
entific proficiency and expertise of the time. The global political economy of
science in the twenty-first century has undergone profound changes. The sci-
entific stronghold of Western Europe, North America, and Japan of the last
century has given way to an increasingly ‘multi-polar’ constellation in which
emerging and developing economies assume new roles. The archetypal image
of a simple knowledge divide is no longer defensible and the global political
economy of knowledge has become more intricate. As an example, even
though only one March for Science was organized in China in 2017, this
country accounted for almost twenty percent of global research expenditure,
reaching parity with Europe in that year.
Furthermore, the analytical gaze of Bloor’s tenets also would fail to
explain why marches were carried out in certain African countries, such as
Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana, and not in others. How did the organizers of
the Marches in Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana receive notice of the event? Why
did other African countries, such as Egypt, Ethiopia, and Morocco, not par-
ticipate in the March for Science?
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A quick look at the websites on the Marches for Science in Uganda,
Nigeria and Ghana offers indications on the reasons why marches were
organized in these countries. Their websites all link back to a non-profit
institution, the Cornell Alliance for Science, associated to Cornell University,
a North American Ivy League University. An official partner to the March
for Science, the Cornell Alliance for Science reported in 2017 that it had
mobilized its global network to assist in transforming the historical action of
the March for Science into an international affair. Explicit mention is made
of the countries Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, Mexico, Hawaii, the Philip-
pines and Bangladesh. The organization actively mobilized for the March for
Science in African countries, and internationally. Its mission, purpose, activ-
ities and funding sources might shed some light on the motives for taking
this initiative.
The mission of the Cornell Alliance for Science is to build ‘a global net-
work of science allies’ by offering training courses to ‘equip and empower
emerging international leaders who are committed to advocating for science-
based communications and access to scientific innovation in their home
countries’. Although its name implies a broader purpose, the organization
was originally launched in 2014 as an effort to ‘depolarize the charged
debate’ around genetically modified foods (GMOs) (Malcan, 2019). The sus-
tained focus of the alliance on GMOs is evident from in its training courses
which include strategic planning, grassroots organizing and communications
around agricultural biotechnology. The particular focus on Africa transpires
from resources that are offered on its websites which aim to ‘debunk’ the
‘most common myths’ on GMOs, which are attributed to ‘a massive dis-
information campaign’ on agricultural biotechnology. The alliance maintains
close ties to agricultural and chemical industries that advocate access to
genetically engineered crops. The primary source of funding for the Cornell
Alliance for Science stems from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, with
further grants and donations from other institutions and individuals. Inci-
dentally, the author of the lead article on the March for Science in the British
newspaper The Guardian on 17 April 2017, who was quoted at the beginning
of this section and in the first paragraph of this book (‘Scientists to take to
the streets in global march for truth’) has been sponsored as visiting fellow
by the Alliance.
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The purpose of this brief profile is not to call into question the motives
of the Cornell Alliance for Science in advocating for the March for Science.
The example is of interest because the mere existence of the connections
between a non-profit organization associated with a North American uni-
versity, the Marches for Science in Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, Mexico,
Hawaii, the Philippines and Bangladesh, and an article on the ‘Global March
for Truth’ in a widely-read British newspaper, disproves the narrative of ran-
domness that the organizers claim for the spread of the March for Science
across the world. It also raises questions as to the objectives and purposes of
these Marches for Science as proclaimed by their organizers. Instead, the
connections in this example suggest complex layers of purposes and depen-
dences that are eclipsed in the mainstream storyline of the March for
Science.
The example shows that the spread of the idea of the March for Science
was not arbitrary and unplanned and did not simply proliferate across the
globe on the basis of the merit of the idea and its global relevance. The
March for Science did not qualify as a global occasion because its concerns
were inherently global in nature but because those who stood to judge on the
scope of the March considered their concerns and claims to be universal. The
pattern of distribution of Marches by no account stands the test of being
global; by far the greater number of Marches took place in Western Europe
and North America, the location of the renowned institutions of science who
endorsed and issued public statements on the march, the leaders and
employees who gave interviews and wrote opinion pieces, and the media out-
lets that reported on the event. Nevertheless, their endorsement was de-
scribed as a random, undirected, global process that occurred without any
advocacy activities of interest groups.
The process and implicit criteria by which the March for Science was
staged as a global occasion, warrant closer investigation because they offer
indications on the particular image of science that inspired the event. This
image is important because it informs the diagnosis of a crisis between sci-
ence and society as a decline of public trust in science and the rise of ‘post-
truth’ politics. The postcolonial perspective draws attention to new questions
about the March for Science that challenge the alleged arbitrariness of its
global spread and call for a closer look at the storyline. How did the idea of a
March for Science come to be staged as a global concern? What particular
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images of science and knowledge were promoted by the event? To what
extent can the current crisis of science and society, as identified to be one of
declining public trust in science and ‘post-truth’ politics, be considered a
global phenomenon?
With these questions, the postcolonial perspective adds a new inter-
pretive layer to the cause of the demonstrating scientists at the March for
Science. Rather than simply protesting to restore a separation of truth and
power, of scientific expertise and ‘post-truth’ politics, they also took to the
streets to defend a particular image of science, its institutions and procedures
of evaluation, its traditions to determine criteria for expertise and standards.
The postcolonial perspective also sheds new light on the scope of the ‘histor-
ically unprecedented’ political movement of scientists in the March for Sci-
ence. The skewed global participation in the March for Science suggests that
the concerns of the protesting scientists were, in the first place, directed at
audiences in North America and Europe. The alleged global scope of the
event furnished the scientists with a universal cause and professional voca-
tion in local settings. By implication, the crisis in the relationship between
science and society that motivated the March for Science, perceived as a
decline of public trust in science and ‘post-truth’ politics, loses its validity as
a global diagnosis. The postcolonial perspective shifts the terms of the debate
on the crisis between science and society. The terms by which STS has been
debating this crisis may not be suited to the new scope of questions.
7.3 Conclusions
Certainly STS has work to do to explain why the Enlightenment project
has taken a hit in recent years; and like any social science discipline with
a stake in progress, STS should consider how its perspectives can lead us
forward from this moment of anxiety and popular disenchantment, not
least by helping to better diagnose our present predicament.
Jasanoff and Simmet, 2017.
The March for Science, held in over five hundred cities across the world, was
described as a global manifestation of the public decline of trust in science
and the rise of ‘post-truth’ politics. These matters have been debated in STS
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as a crisis in the relationship between science and society. The debates in STS
have focused on this field’s own role in the crisis and have revolved around
the symmetry principle and the Strong Programme in SSK. The stakes are
high and involve nothing less than STS’s own legitimacy as an interdiscipli-
nary academic field of knowledge in its own right. However, the debate about
the implications of its own analytical principles on STS appears to have
reached gridlock. STS’s silence on an unprecedented event in the history of
science, where hundreds of thousands of scientists took to the streets to dem-
onstrate in a March for Science, supports this presumption. This perform-
ance raises serious questions with regard to the conceptual equipment of STS
to read, analyse and interpret the dynamics of the contemporary relationship
between science and society.
The postcolonial perspective on the March for Science has shown that
the terms of the debate in STS on the public decline of trust in science and
‘post-truth’ politics have limited analytical scope to capture some of the key
characteristics of this historically unique event. It dismantles the claim that
the March for Science simply spread across the globe randomly and by virtue
of the universal relevance of its cause. Instead, postcolonial considerations
reveal that active forces were at work to spread the idea of the March for
Science. These forces advocated particular images and standards of science.
In this way, the March for Science stages science as a North Atlantic univer-
sal and enacts the transition narrative by advocating disembodied claims for
knowledge with particular standards and characteristics. The four tenets of
the Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere uncover the entangled, rela-
tional, uneven and contestable disposition of the March of Science.
The postcolonial perspective is not a newcomer to STS but for many
years has formed part of the heterogeneous set of approaches to the study of
science, technology and society that are the hallmark of this interdisciplinary
field. Why, then, not simply undertake a thorough empirical analysis of the
March for Science from a postcolonial perspective to contribute to the debate
in STS? In any case, would not the natural expansion of STS communities to
postcolonial contexts in one way or another eventually lead to pluralized per-
spectives and newly situated knowledge? Why embark on a new Programme
in Science Studies Elsewhere? The record suggests that postcolonial empiri-
cal research has not succeeded in suspending the Collective Blind Spot of
STS, which prevents the debate from moving forward. Mainstream STS has
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warded off the implications of postcolonial thought for its ‘epistemic land-
scape’ (Felt et al., 2017) by replicating the transition narrative of science and
technology through its analytical tools and concepts.
Thomas P. Hughes replicates the transition narrative of technology
when he develops a theory of technological change based on three cities in
‘Western society’, Chicago, Berlin and London. The transition narrative
becomes effective when his historiography weaves a seamless web of technol-
ogy and society that passes through the historical phases of invention and
development, to technology transfer, to system growth and maturity. This
historiography enacts the transition narrative by affording technological pri-
macy to the idea of Western society. To be sure, Hughes’ sequence of events
is easily disproved by the historical record. The idea of regional electric pow-
er systems was not put to test in Berlin and London and transported from
there to the rest of the world. Instead, Johannesburg was used as an exper-
imental foil to test the idea of large electric power systems before the regional
systems of Berlin and London were constructed.
Notably, the circumstances for constructing a regional electric power
system in Johannesburg differed considerably from those in Berlin and Lon-
don. The gigantic power system of Johannesburg was built before the First
World War to provide electric power to the gold mining industry – not to
the young city of Johannesburg. It was financed, built and owned by the
imperial powers of Germany and Great Britain and used as a textbook proto-
type to advocate for large regional electric power systems in European cities.
When Hughes’model of technological change disregards the influence of set-
tings outside of the geographical boundaries of ‘Western society’ for the his-
tory of electrification in Berlin and London, it enacts the transition narrative.
As soon as STS scholars employ Hughes’ framework and concepts to study
technological change, this mechanism sets in and is silently replicated.
The enactment and replication of the transition narrative of science
and technology in STS’s analytical concepts and approaches are not simply a
matter of intellectual concern. Disregard of the prototype role of the large
electric power system in Johannesburg for the historiography of elec-
trification leads to the omission of key historical drivers and agents, and fal-
sifies the role of others. For example, the concept of society in Hughes’
seamless web makes no sense as an analytical category in the context in
which the gigantic power system of the Witwatersrand was built. The
7.3 Conclusions 295
population of Johannesburg had grown in tandem with the mushrooming
gold mining industry. The historical record presents a complex assemblage
of inhabitants who escaped univocal categorization. Various indigenous
peoples from Southern Africa and adjacent colonies (e. g. Portuguese), Asian
migrants, European and American immigrants, Boer and British settlers, and
others, populated Johannesburg. Rather than forming a society in the sense
of Hughes’ concept, these populations were organized into a hierarchical
labour administration that was based on the idea of racial supremacy and
used categories such as ‘kafirs’, ‘natives’, ‘black labourers’, ‘coloured labour-
ers’, or ‘white labourers’. Hughes’ idea of a seamless web of technology and
society simply does not apply to these circumstances. Instead, the transition
narrative of his history of technology settles as a Blind Spot on his theory
and concepts on technological change and is silently replicated in STS.
This book proposes a postcolonial perspective on science and technol-
ogy as a means to deal with the dilemma of STS’s Collective Blind Spot. The
spot has not budged in more than thirty years of empirical postcolonial STS
studies. Empirical postcolonial analysis alone is unlikely to succeed in con-
tributing to the critical questions STS is currently grappling with. Neither is
the Collective Blind Spot likely to simply disappear with an expansion of the
STS community to new geographical sites. The postcolonial analytical
approach is articulated in the Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere to
shift the terms of the debate in which STS currently appears to be trapped.
The epistemic landscape of the latest Handbook of Science and Technol-
ogy Studies (2017) confirms the need for a programmatic approach to escape
the dilemma of the Collective Blind Spot in STS. The Handbook emphasizes
the intellectual commitment of STS to the tradition of studying situated
knowledge claims (Haraway, 1988) and the political geography in ‘the mak-
ing of knowledge’ (Felt et al., 2017: 13, 14). But it does not translate the
commitment into the epistemic landscape of the Handbook and as a result
only pays lip service to the problem. The Handbook acknowledges in general
terms the influence of locations, experiences and traditions on the valuation
regimes and political economy of STS, and recognizes concomitant obliga-
tions and responsibilities (Felt et al., 2017). But it does not shoulder this
responsibility when it selects topics and authors for the chapters to set stand-
ards and frame problems for the field of STS. The Handbook rejects the
assumption of an ‘uneven distribution of who gets voice’ in the Handbook
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and accentuates the field’s expansion on the international level, to new asso-
ciations in East Asia, Japan, and Latin America or to new locations for STS
conferences in Tokyo (2010) and Buenos Aires (2014) (Felt et al., 2017: 16).
But it substantiates this assumption when the voices and intellectual work of
this international community are not represented in its content, and roughly
90% of chapters are written by authors affiliated with institutions in North
America and Europe.
The Handbook does not translate its reasoning into action. It sidesteps
the consequences of STS’s own intellectual analytical tools on its epistemic
landscape and perpetuates the Collective Blind Spot of STS. This status-quo
demonstrates that STS’s strategy of awaiting a steady accumulation of
diasporic, situated knowledges into the intellectual fabric has not been
successful.
This book proposes the Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere to shift
the terms of the debate in STS. This shift requires attention to be given to the
geographies of management and of imagination that underlie science and
technology as North Atlantic universals. These analytical lenses are easily
looked down upon because they are ambiguous and difficult to grasp – yet
their importance in shaping science and technology is evident. Trouillot’s
notion of Elsewhere reveals mechanisms in the political economy of knowl-
edge and science, but this analysis does not run along the lines of geopolitical
or national boundaries. It follows the contours of the geography of manage-
ment and the geography of imagination. This is a complicating, abstract step
that distinguishes Trouillot’s Elsewhere from other notions of the Other. In
Trouillot’s geographies, geopolitical boundaries play a secondary role. In oth-
er words, his cartography of Elsewhere foreshadows the geopolitical ana-
lytical lens: Had Shapin and Schaffer been Ghanaian and Chinese rather
than American and British STS scholars writing the book at a university in
Buenos Aires, these circumstances would not have changed the book’s repro-
duction of the transition narrative of science. Put differently, the strategies
and mechanisms of replication in STS do not fall under any exclusive propri-
etary rights within the geopolitical boundaries of Euro-America, but abide by
the maps of the geographies of management and imagination (Hofmänner,
2016).
Thomas A. Edison imagined a global empire of rights and privileges for
his electric light and power station project before he developed the technol-
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ogy. He secured these rights and privileges in the form of patents and com-
panies across the globe before the technical and economic feasibility of the
technology had been ascertained. His Edison Indian and Colonial Electric
Company Ltd. formed part of the imperial wrangle over territorial rights and
privileges in colonial settings. Edison’s imaginary geography of far-away
places had a bearing on the design and the success of his electric light and
electric power station technology.
The German engineer Georg Klingenberg imagined a system of large
power stations to provide electricity to the gold mining companies of Johan-
nesburg at the beginning of the twentieth century, barely two decades after
gold had been discovered in the area. This grand system was to be financed
and owned by the imperial powers Germany and Great Britain, who inci-
dentally were also heavily invested in the gold mining business in Johannes-
burg. Once constructed, this prototype informed Klingenberg’s educational
book on ‘Large Electric Power Stations. Their Design and Construction’
(1916) which influenced the imagination of an entire generation of power
station engineers. Thomas Hughes referenced Klingenberg in Networks of
Power as ‘an engineer of international reputation and authority on power
plant design and operation’ (Hughes, 1983: 197). But the seamless web of
technology and society imagined by Hughes prevented him from discerning
the international entanglements of Klingenberg’s activities because his notion
of ‘Western society’was contrasted against its absence, Elsewhere.
The experimental philosophers Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes imag-
ined ‘inferior creatures’ and ‘savages’ respectively, as oppositional referents to
their philosophical programmes. These referents played a role in shaping the
model profile of the experimental natural philosopher and his role in the
beginnings of modern science, an historical episode widely referred to as the
origins of modernity. In this way, the cultural heritage to experimental prac-
tice becomes a standard for science that is contrasted to its absence,
Elsewhere.
As pioneers in the field of STS, the scholars Steven Shapin and Simon
Schaffer imagined ‘the ignorant stranger’ to experimental life as a method for
undertaking a symmetrical study of accepted and rejected knowledge in 17th
century Restoration England. Their study concluded that experimental
practice delivered a solution to the problems of knowledge and social order.
This conclusion has influenced the course of STS and continues to be cited
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frequently by its scholarly community. However, it overlooked that exper-
imental practice as a solution to the problems of knowledge and social order
at the same time created a solution to the problems of non-knowledge and
social disorderliness, Elsewhere.
STS scholars have imagined the field of STS as an increasingly interna-
tional and diverse field of study. Yet, the record shows that the intellectual
landscape and analytical scope of this field continues to be defined by a
handful of countries of the North Atlantic. This contradiction is sustained by
STS’s Collective Blind Spot, and its replication of Elsewhere in the study of
modern science and technology.
The protesters at the March for Science imagined a ‘global’ event,
despite the evident clustering of marches in Western Europe and North
America, and notwithstanding the low uptake of the march outside these
regions. They imagined an international crisis in the relationship between
science and society that is characterized by the decline of public trust in sci-
ence and the rise of ‘post-truth’ politics. The postcolonial perspective on the
March for Science suggests that this characterization may not adequately
capture the range of forces at play in shaping this relationship across the
globe. The postcolonial history of science and technology bears testimony to
the power of imagination in shaping the global political economy of knowl-
edge. The Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere directs STS’s attention to
these forces that transform knowledge, power and truth across the globe.
This book ends by returning to the scenery visible from the viewing
deck on the fiftieth floor of the Carlton Centre in Johannesburg on 22 April
2017. Unlike sightseers in Chicago, Berlin and London, the visitor to the
‘Top of Africa’ skyscraper would not have seen any protesters marching for
science in the streets of the City of Gold because no March for Science took
place in Johannesburg on this day.
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Abbreviations
A.E.G. Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft, Berlin
ANT Actor Network Theory
BSAC British South Africa Company
CSSR Committee on Science and its Social Relations
EASST European Association for the Study of Science and Technology
EASTS East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Jour-
nal
EC European Commission
ECB Electricity Control Board
EPOR Empirical Programme of Relativism
Escom Electricity Supply Commission
GEPC General Electric Power Company Ltd.
ICSU International Council of Scientific Unions
ISCOR South African Iron and Steel Corporation
LTS Large Technological Systems
RCEW Rand Central Electric Works Ltd.
SCOT Social Construction of Technology
STS Science and Technology Studies
VFPC Victoria Falls Power Company
VFTPC Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company
4S Society for Social Studies of Science

Tables
Table 1 Key questions for the empirical study of the North Atlantic universals with the
lenses of the geographies of management and imagination, (based on Trouillot,
1991, 2002).
Table 2 The five phases in the development of electrical power systems in Hughes’
Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930.
Table 3 Specifications on the Rand Central Electric Works Ltd. (RCEW) and the General
Electric Power Company Ltd. (GEPC).
Table 4 Total capacity of power installed and in progress in the four power stations of
Johannesburg in 1913 (Hadley, 1913).
Table 5 Particulars of electricity consumers (mines, industries, municipalities) supplied
by the VFTPC in Johannesburg in 1915 (Price 1915: vi).
Table 6 The total electricity generating capacity in South Africa in 1915 (supplied by the
VFTPC) and in 1930 (supplied by the VFTPC and Escom) (Troost & Norman,
1969).
Table 7 The Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere in reference to the four tenets of
Bloor’s Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.

Figures
Figure 1 Map showing the locations of the March for Science 2017 (https://www.march
forscience.com/ (accessed April 2017))
Figure 2 Abridged illustration of the companies listed by Hughes to describe Edison’s
manufacturing system (Hughes, 1983: 41, abridged)
Figure 3 Map showing the ‘European partition of Africa’ in 1902 (Imperialism in Africa.
http://docplayer.net/47495487-Imperialism-in-africa.html (accessed December
2019))
Figure 4 Map of Cecil Rhodes’ vision of British dominion from the Cape to Cairo (South
African History Online: https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cecil-john-rhodes
(accessed December 2019))
Figure 5 Map of Cecil Rhodes’ plans for a railroad line from the Cape to Cairo (Auckland
Libraries Heritage Collections AWNS-18991110–8–4)
Figure 6 The Victoria Falls at the Zambezi River (© 2011 South Africa. Chic! https://
www.southafricachic.co.uk/luxury-hotel-victoria-falls.html (accessed December
2019))
Figure 7 The Victoria Falls at the Zambezi River compared to Oxford Street and St.
Paul’s Cathedral (Construction of the Victoria Falls Bridge. http://anengineersaspect.
blogspot.com/2014/01/construction-of-victoria-falls-bridge.html (accessed December
2019))
Figure 8 Schedule of Native Wages, Witwatersrand. Agreed to at a combined meeting of
Mining Companies, May 1897 (South African Republic. Industrial Commission of
Inquiry. 1897. The Mining Industry: Evidence and Report of the Industrial Com-
mission of Enquiry. Johannesburg: Transvaal Chamber of Mines)
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